Seattle-Boeing Field

While cruising en route in VFR conditions, the aircraft lost power on both engines. The pilot attempted an emergency forced landing at a nearby unpaved State airport, but after encountering a 20 mph tailwind on downwind and a 20 mph headwind on final, the aircraft impacted a tall conifer tree while about one-half mile from the approach end of the runway. The reason for the dual engine power loss was not determined.

The pilot, who had more than 3,340 hours of pilot-in-command time in the make/model of the accident aircraft, and was very familiar with the destination airport and its ILS approach procedure, departed on a cargo flight in the SA227 turboprop aircraft. The aircraft was dispatched with the primary (NAV 1) ILS receiver having been deferred (out of service) due to unreliable performance the evening before the accident, thus leaving the aircraft with the secondary (NAV 2) ILS receiver for ILS use. The pilot arrived in the destination terminal area and was given vectors to intercept the ILS localizer, and radar data showed the aircraft intercepting and tracking the localizer accurately throughout the approach. Mode C altitude readouts showed the aircraft approaching from below the glideslope at the required intercept altitude of 4,100 feet, passing through and above the glideslope and then initiating a relatively constant descent, the angle of which exceeded the glideslope angle of -3.5 degrees. Weather at the destination airport was 400 foot overcast and the decision height for the ILS/DME runway 21R approach was 270 feet. The aircraft passed through the tops of trees in level flight about 530 feet above the airport elevation and slightly under 3 nautical miles from the runway threshold. The pilot was given a low altitude alert by the tower and acknowledged, reporting that he was descending through 2,800 feet, which was confirmed on the mode C radar readout. At that point the aircraft was well below the ILS glideslope and about 13 seconds from impacting the trees. Post crash examination of information captured from the left and right HSI units and an RMI revealed that the NAV 1 receiver was most likely set on the ILS frequency, and the NAV 2 receiver was most likely set on Spokane VORTAC, a terminal navigation facility located very slightly right of the nose of the aircraft and 14 nautical miles southwest of the destination airport.

The Co-Pilot was the flying pilot with the Captain giving directions throughout the approach phase. The Captain stated that he extended the flaps and the landing gear. When the aircraft touched down, the landing gear was not extended. The Co-Pilot reported that she did look down at the landing gear lever and at "three green lights" on the approach. The CVR was read out which indicated that the Co-Pilot directed the Captain to call inbound. The Captain acknowledged this and stated "fifteen flaps." The Co-Pilot then stated "fifteen flaps, before landing." The Captain did not respond to the Co-Pilot but instead made a radio transmission. The Captain shortly thereafter, stated that he was extending the flaps to 25 degrees. The Captain made another radio transmission to the tower when the Co-Pilot stated "final, sync, ignitions." The Captain responded "ignitions on." Full flaps were then extended. The Captain gave the Co-Pilot continued directions while on the approach for heading, speed and altitude. At approximately 300 feet, the Captain stated, "yaw damper's off, air valves are off, ready to land." The Captain reported that it was obvious that touchdown was on the flaps and keel. The Captain stated that he raised the flaps, shutdown the engines, and confirmed that the landing gear handle was down. During the gear swing test the landing gear cycled several times with no difficulties. All red and green lights illuminated at the proper positions. During the test, it was found that the gear not extended horn did not function with the gear retracted, the flaps fully extended and the power levers at idle. Later a bad set of contacts to the relay was found. When the relay was jumped, the horn sounded. Inspection of the damage to the aircraft revealed that the outer rims of both outer tires displayed scrape marks around the circumference of the rim. The outer surface of the gear door fairings were scraped and the flap hinge fairings was ground down.

The crew had originally planned to practice landings at an airport about 20 minutes away, then stop, refuel the airplane, and subsequently return to the original departure airport. Prior to the flight, the crew discussed fuel endurance, which was calculated to be 2 hours based on the captain's knowledge of the airplane's fuel consumption, and the quantity of fuel indicated on the gauges. The fuel tanks were not dipped. The flight was made at 1,500 feet msl. Upon reaching the practice airport, the crew conducted one full stop landing, then taxied back for takeoff. During takeoff, an engine had a momentary overspeed, and the crew decided to return to the original departure airport without refueling. Approaching the original departure airport, the airplane had to delay landing for about 7 minutes for a manual gear extension. Upon completion, it turned back toward the airport, and was about 6 miles from the runway when fuel pressure for one of the engines dropped. The boost pumps were turned on; however, the engine lost power. A low fuel pressure light then illuminated for another engine. The captain called for the flight engineer to switch fuel feed to another tank, but the flight engineer responded, "we're out of fuel." The remaining engines subsequently lost power, and the captain ditched the airplane into a bay. The time from first takeoff until ditching was 1 hour, 19 minutes. The airplane had flown 39 hours since restoration, and exact fuel capacities, fuel flow calculations and unusable fuel amounts had not been established. A dipping chart had been prepared, with one person in the cockpit and one person with a yardstick putting fuel in a main tank in 25-gallon increments. However, the data had not been verified, and dipping was not considered to be part of the pre-flight inspection.

After a 5-hour flight, the Westwind jet began its descent to the airport. Air traffic control instructed the flight crew to cross a VOR at 18,000 feet. The flight crew was then instructed to cross an intersection at 6,000 feet. The flight crew needed to descend the airplane 12,000 feet, in 36 nautical miles, to make the crossing restriction. The flight crew acknowledged the clearance, and no further transmissions were received from the airplane. The airplane struck treetops and impacted the ground in a wooded area. The accident flight was the airplane's first flight after maintenance. Work that was accomplished during the maintenance included disassembly and reassembly of the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator. Examination of the actuator at the accident site revealed that components of the actuator were separated and that they displayed no damage where they would have been attached. Examination of the actuator by the Safety Board revealed that the actuator had not been properly assembled in the airplane. A similar actuator was improperly assembled and installed in a static airplane for a ground test. When the actuator was run, the jackscrews of the actuator were observed backing out of the rod end caps within the first few actuations of the pitch trim toward the nose-down position. As the pitch trim continued to be actuated toward the nose-down position, the jackscrews became disconnected from the rod end caps, and the horizontal stabilizer became disconnected from the actuator. The passenger was Peter Lahaye, founder and owner of the Lahaye Laboratories and the aircraft.

The flight was operating into the Yakima airport at night during the period the airport operates as non-towered. Some witnesses reported the aircraft initially appeared lower than normal and that it descended and impacted the ground at a steep angle, and some witnesses reported an abrupt entry into the descent. The aircraft crashed 2.2 nautical miles east of the runway threshold, slightly right of the localizer course The pilot was 'cleared for approach' by air traffic control (ATC) and he subsequently initiated an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 27. The last radar position showed the aircraft approximately on the localizer, at glide slope intercept altitude, 9 nautical miles east of the airport. Three minutes after the last radar position, the pilot reported to ATC he had broken out and had the airport in sight, and canceled instrument flight rules (IFR). ATC then terminated service and approved a frequency change.. Ceiling was 1,500 feet overcast with 6 miles visibility in mist, with no significant icing forecast. No evidence of mechanical problems was found; however, much of the aircraft was consumed by an intense post-crash fire.

While performing an ILS approach at night and in IMC, the airplane collided with trees in mountainous terrain prior to the IAF. The MDA prior to the IAF is 10,600 feet. The descent altitude at the outer marker is 7,713 feet. The wreckage was located under the localizer path at an elevation of 7,600 feet. Damage to tree tops along the wreckage distribution path indicates that the airplane travelled through the trees on a level plane until contact with the ground approximately 300 feet into the path. Light snow was falling at the time of the accident and visibility was deteriorating due to fog. During the post crash investigation, there was no evidence found to indicate a mechanical failure or malfunction.

While climbing in moderate icing conditions after takeoff, pilot was cleared to 17,000' feet. Radar data showed aircraft climbed at an indicated airspeed (IAS) of 82 to 123 knots. A Beech safety info booklet stated that a minimum airspeed of 140 knots must be maintained in icing conditions. Climbing at reduced airspeed would have increased angle of attack and allowed ice to accumulate under the wings and aft of the de-icing boots. Aircraft climbed to 13,500 feet, descended momentarily to 13,300 feet, then continued climbing as airspeed decreased abruptly. After slowing to 60 knots ias at 13,700 feet, the aircraft entered a steep descending turn and accelerated to high speed (above VNE). An emergency was declared, stating the aircraft 'lost an engine.' Soon thereafter, radar contact was lost and the aircraft crashed. Pieces of empennage surfaces separated in flight and were found at remote location from the main wreckage. Both counterweights separated from the elevators. Post crash tests disclosed no mechanical evidence of engine malfunction. Low ceiling, fog, light rain, snow and icing conditions were reported in area. All six occupants were killed.

Aircraft was performing test flight maneuvers when problems with the modified fuel system occurred. Ice blocking a fuel vent line caused a partial collapse of the main (engine feed) fuel cell which produced an erroneous fuel quantity reading. In addition, the main tank overflow shut off valve was leaking, so tank overflow occurred. The fuel overflow caution light illuminated and auxiliary tank fuel pump feed to main automatically shut down. Due to miscalibration, this system overrode pilot attempts to restart aux fuel pumps. Pilot remained in test area troubleshooting rather than immediate return to base, finally noted main tank gage continuing to read 'full.' En route to Boeing Field, fuel starvation occurred. Pilot opted to attempt forced landing in small athletic field in residential area rather than ditch in puget sound. The aircraft touched down in intended landing area, then bounced across an adjacent street. The arresting action of telephone wires on the vertical fin brought the aircraft to rest in a residential backyard. All three occupants were injured, one seriously.

The aircraft was on a cross country trip. On previous flights over the same route, two refueling stops were made. During this trip, no refueling was accomplished, and while en route, the low fuel warning light came on. The pilot declared an emergency and was vectored and assigned the lowest possible IFR altitude. Shortly thereafter, both engines quit. When he enquired about nearby airports, the pilot was told there were none and advised to find a road or suitable area to land. The pilot overshot a road after feathering both engines and crashed on an embankment. There was no smell of fuel at the scene of the crash. Both props were in the feathered position. The pilot was injured.