Hebrides Islands

The aircraft had been prepared for a Commercial Air Transport flight from Stornoway Airport to Glasgow Airport with 26 passengers and three crew on board; the commander was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the co-pilot was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). At 0825 hrs the aircraft was taxied towards Holding Point A1 for a departure from Runway 18. At 0832 hrs G-LGNL was cleared to enter the runway from Holding Point A1 and take off, and the ATC controller transmitted that the surface wind was from 270° at 27 kt. The commander commented to the co-pilot that the wind was across the runway and that there was no tailwind. As the aircraft taxied onto the runway, the co-pilot applied almost full right aileron input consistent with a cross-wind from the right, and the commander said to the co-pilot “charlie1, one hundred, strong wind from the right”. The commander advanced the power levers, the co-pilot said “autocoarsen high” and the engine torques increased symmetrically. The commander instructed the co-pilot to “set takeoff power” to which the co-pilot replied “apr armed”. Approximately one second after this call, the engine torques began to increase symmetrically, reaching 100% as the aircraft accelerated through 70 kt. During the early stages of the takeoff, left rudder was applied and the aircraft maintained an approximately constant heading. As the aircraft continued accelerating, the rudder was centralised, after which there was a small heading change to the left, then to the right, then a rapid heading change to the left causing the aircraft to deviate to the left of the runway centreline. The pilot applied right rudder but although the aircraft changed heading to the right in response, it did not alter the aircraft’s track significantly and the aircraft skidded to the left, departing the runway surface onto the grass at an IAS of 80 kt. The power levers remained at full power as the aircraft crossed a disused runway and back onto grass. During this period the nose landing gear collapsed before the aircraft came to a halt approximately 38 m left of the edge of the runway and 250 m from where it first left the paved surface. After the aircraft came to a halt, the captain saw that the propellers were still turning and so called into the cabin for the passengers to remain seated. One of the passengers shouted for someone to open the emergency exit but the cabin crew member instructed the passengers not to do so because the propellers were still turning. The co-pilot observed that the right propeller was still turning so operated the engine fire extinguishers to shut down both engines. When the passenger seated in the emergency exit row on the right of the aircraft saw that the right propeller had stopped, he decided to open the exit. He climbed out onto the wing and helped the remaining passengers leave the aircraft through the same exit, instructing them to slide off the rear of the wing onto the ground. The left propeller was still turning at the time the right over-wing exit was opened and the passenger seated in the left-side emergency exit row decided not to open the left exit. The crash alarm was activated by ATC at 0833 hrs. An aircraft accident was declared and the aerodrome emergency plan was put into action. When the Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (RFFS) arrived at the scene, passengers were still exiting the aircraft and the left propeller was still turning. After leaving the aircraft, the cabin crew member confirmed to the RFFS that all passengers had exited the cabin and had been accounted for outside. The passengers were taken to the fire station and then on to the passenger terminal. There were no injuries.

This final sector was flown at FL 50, with the aircraft in IMC conditions. The crew noted no indication of ice at this level and the use of the aircraft de-icing equipment was not required. Prior to their approach to Stornoway, the crew contacted ATC and noted the following information: Runway 36 in use, surface wind 260°/ 08 kt, visibility 15 km in light drizzle, cloud few at 800 feet and broken at 1,400 feet agl, temperature plus 7°C and QNH 1002 mb. The commander then briefed for a NDB/DME approach for Runway 36. With G-BLGB still at FL 50, the crew completed the 'Descent' checks and then, when cleared for the procedure completed the 'Approach' checks 'to the line'. The initial approach was normal and the crew were VMC at a range of approximately 8 nm from the airfield. At this stage the commander was certain of his geographical position and, with the agreement of his first officer, decided to continue visually. Although they were in sight of the surface, there appeared to be some patchy cloud in the direction of the airfield and neither pilot could see the runway. The crew completed the rest of the 'Approach' checks and then did the 'Final' checks down to 'Flaps'; Flap 15 had been selected. By now, the commander was level at his minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 430 feet amsl. Shortly afterwards, the crew acquired visual contact with the runway; the aircraft was to the right of the extended centreline and the crew could see the Precision Approach Path Indicators (PAPI) which were indicating 'four whites'; the commander estimated his range from the runway as one mile. He subsequently recalled that, at the time he considered 'going around' but, considering the length of Stornoway runway, decided to land. The commander called for "Full flap" and for "Props to max", and manoeuvred G-BLGB to the runway extended centreline. His subsequent approach was based on runway perspective with the intention of touching down beside the PAPIs. During this final approach, the first officer was monitoring the airspeed and initially called out "Plus 10"; this signified a speed of 113 kt based on a VAT of 103 kt. Thereafter, he called "Plus 5", "VAT" and then "Minus 5" before calling for "Power" on several occasions just before touchdown. Neither pilot could remember the PAPI lights during this final part of the approach and the commander did not think that he exceeded 1,000 feet per minute rate of descent. He was certain that the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) had not activated during the final approach. The commander remembers pulling back on the control wheel just before touchdown but that this had no effect on the rate of descent; he also advanced the power levers but the aircraft had landed before any increase in power was apparent. Touchdown was 'Firm' and beside the PAPIs. On landing, there was a 'bang' and the left side of the aircraft went down. G-BLGB slewed to the left and the commander used full right rudder and brake in an attempt to counter this movement. The aircraft came to rest at the left edge of the runway. With the aircraft stopped, the first officer shut both engines down and the commander switched off the 'Electrics'. The commander then opened the door to the cabin and, saw that the rear emergency door at the rear right side was open and the evacuation was in progress; the flight crew followed the passengers out of the door. Immediately following the landing, the first officer declared a 'problem' to ATC. The controller had been monitoring the approach and noted the apparent lack of a normal flare; following the call from the crew, he immediately activated the 'Crash Alarm'. Within 30 seconds, the AFS had manned their vehicles and had checked in with the controller; the AFS were cleared direct to the aircraft and arrived there within a minute of the initial call. There was no indication of fire but, with fluid leaking from the right gear, the AFS sprayed the area with foam.

The twin engine aircraft departed Edinburgh at 0832LT on a flight to Stornoway. At 0859LT, the crew was cleared to reach the operational zone and three minutes later, reached the altitude of 3,500 feet under VFR mode. While cruising at the altitude of 200 feet and at a speed of 130 knots, the right engine lost power. The crew cancelled the sortie and decided to divert to Port Ellen Airport. After the right propeller had been feathered, the aircraft lost speed and the crew was unable to maintain a safe altitude so he decided to ditch the aircraft 5 nm east of Colonsay Island. All three occupants took refuge on the left wing but the aircraft sank after few minutes and the wreckage was not recovered. All three occupants were rescued 40 minutes later and suffered hypothermia as the water temperature was 11° C.

On the morning of 30 April 1990, the crew of Shackleton AEW2 WR965 took off from RAF Lossiemouth to participate in a maritime exercise in the Benbecula area to the west of mainland Scotland. The exercise was to be in two parts with a time interval between. To make most economical use of the Shackleton's flying time it was intended to utilise the time interval to undertake some continuation training for which the crew had appropriate authorisation. Although the weather was forecast to be generally clear in the aircraft's operating area there were areas of low cloud and poor visibility over Scottish coastal areas. The first part of the sortie was completed without incident and at 09:45 UTC the crew took the opportunity to participate with a Tornado F3 in mutual training which required the Shackleton's radar to be set to standby/off. After completing this training, the crew commenced their own continuation training which was to include a visual approach to Benbecula airfield. The crew contacted Benbecula Air Traffic Control (ATC) at 10:25 UTC requesting permission for an approach, stating that they were about 20 miles west of the airfield; permission was given and Benbecula ATC passed their actual weather to the crew. Subsequent investigation determined, however, that the aircraft was actually 15 miles north of the position which it had reported at this time. At 10:30 two RAF personnel saw the Shackleton orbiting an island some 12 miles to the north of Benbecula airfield, and at 10:34 the Shackleton crew called Benbecula ATC stating that the weather was not sufficiently good for an approach and that they were turning right and climbing. At around 10:37 it struck the ground about 30 ft below the summit of an 823 ft hill on the Isle of Harris. Reliable evidence indicates that at that time and in that vicinity the cloudbase was 200 ft above mean sea level, with cloud tops at 3000 ft. At impact, the aircraft was in controlled flight with all four engines developing cruise power.
Crew (28th Squadron):
W/Cdr Stephen Roncoroni,
W/Cdr Chas Wrighton,
F/O Colin Burns,
S/L Jerry Lane,
F/Lt Al Campbell,
F/Lt Keith Forbes,
M/O Roger Scutt,
F/Sgt Rick Ricketts,
Sgt Graham Miller,
Cpl Stuart Bolton.

On the day of the accident, the aircraft left Biggin Hill, U.K. on a private flight at 12:51 hrs with full fuel tanks to fly to Paris-Le Bourget, France, carrying a pilot, a pilot's assistant and two passengers. At Le Bourget, two more passengers embarked and the aircraft departed for Liverpool, without refuelling, at approximately 13:55 hrs. It landed at Liverpool at 15:25 hrs, where it was refuelled with 800 litres of turbine fuel, the pilot being seen to mix anti-icing additive to the fuel as it was dispensed. Two more adult passengers and two infants were embarked and the aircraft left Liverpool at 16:32 hrs en route to Stornoway, Outer Hebrides, Scotland. The pilot had submitted an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan to fly from Liverpool to Stornoway at Flight Level (FL) 310 via Dean Cross and Glasgow. At 16:53 hrs, when approximately over Dean Cross, he reported to the Scottish Air Traffic Control Centre (ScATCC) that he was at FL280 climbing to FL310. This radio call was heard by the pilot of another aircraft, registration N40GS. This aircraft was a Citation 11, which had been leased by the operating company of G-UESS and was carrying other members of the same private party to which the passengers in G-UESS belonged. N40GS had taken off from Biggin Hill and was also en-route to Stornoway via Dean Cross at FL350. When just north of Dean Cross, the pilot of N40GS saw G-UESS ahead of him and established radio contact with its pilot on the company discrete radio frequency. From that point on, the two aircraft remained in intermittent radio contact on this frequency. After passing Dean Cross, both aircraft were given clearance by ScATCC to route direct to Stornoway. At 17:00 hrs G-UESS was asked to climb to FL330 to avoid crossing traffic. At 17:18 hrs the pilot of N40GS reported that he still had G-UESS in sight and would be ready to descend in 3 minutes. At this time, his aircraft was slowly overtaking G-UESS. At 17:20 hrs ScATCC directed both aircraft to maintain a radar heading of 330° (M) so as to provide lateral separation during descent, and cleared N40GS to descend. Three minutes later, G-UESS was cleared to descend. During the descent, N40GS was cleared progressively to FL65 and G-UESS to FL85. At 17:29 hrs ScATCC released both aircraft from their radar headings, advising them that there was no other air traffic to affect them. ScATCC also advised N40GS that G-UESS was 5 miles to his right and slightly behind him. The pilot of G-UESS responded to this message by reporting that he had the other aircraft in sight. ScATCC then instructed both aircraft to establish radio contact with Stornoway. At 17:34 hrs Stornoway ATC passed details of the present Stornoway weather to both aircraft and asked them to report at 25 miles range from Stornoway. The weather as reported was fine with a light wind, good visibility and one eighth of low cloud. The pilot of G-UESS acknowledged the weather but did not repeat back the QNH. At this time, G-UESS was 49 miles from Stornoway descending through FL140. At 17:38 hrs N40GS reported at 25 miles range, and immediately afterwards G-UESS reported 30 miles from the airfield. N40GS was then cleared to 2,000 feet on the QNH of 1001. At 17:40 hrs the pilot of G-UESS reported that his range was 25 miles and that he had N40GS in sight. He asked for clearance to continue his descent and was cleared by the Stornoway controller to descend at his discretion with the aircraft ahead in sight. A moment later he was asked to report when he had the airfield in sight for a visual approach to runway 01. He acknowledged this message. No further communication was received from the aircraft and at 17:51 hrs, after failing to re-establish contact, the Stornoway controller reported to ScATCC that he had lost radio contact with G-UESS. The pilot of N40GS, who had meanwhile landed safely, stated afterwards that during the descent from FL350 they had passed through some layered stratus cloud and patches of altocumulus and cumulus cloud. The co-pilot in N40GS described a layer of lower cloud over the sea with tops between 3,000 and 4,000 feet, lying across the path of their descent into Stornoway. The pilot of N40GS was tracking directly to Stornoway airfield during the descent, using Omega/VLF area navigation equipment. At 17:45 hrs he reported to Stornoway ATC that he was just breaking cloud at 1,400 feet but stated later that he had cleared the base of the lowest cloud at between 1,100 and 1,000 feet, close to Stornoway. He also stated that the visibility below cloud was very good, even though the night was dark and he could not see the sea beneath him. N40GS experienced no icing and no significant turbulence during the descent. An intensive search was made for G-UESS that night, and two bodies were recovered one mile north-west of the last observed radar position. During the next 4 days, five more bodies and some small pieces of aircraft wreckage were found near the same position. The bodies of two more passengers were recovered from the sea bed on 28 February and 5 June 1984, and that of the pilot's assistant on 18 July 1984. Attempts to recover the main wreckage were not successful.

Upon landing on the beach at Barra, the twin engine aircraft overturned and came to rest upside down. Both pilots who were engaged in an ambulance flight, were injured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew left Belfast-Aldergrove Airport to perform a meteorological mission over the North Atlantic. While cruising southeast of the Hebrides Islands, the four engine aircraft went out of control and crashed into the sea about 24 km southeast of Barra Head. SAR operations were conducted but eventually suspended few days later as no trace of the aircraft nor the crew was found. On January 16, 1951, the body of the captain and some debris were found by fishermen. It is believed that the loss of control may have been caused by a sudden in flight fire.
Crew (202nd Squadron):
S/L Terence Anthony Cox, pilot,
P/O Donald Nattriss, copilot,
Sgt Edward Arthur Keeble,
Sgt John Frederick Stanley Black,
F/Sgt John Henry Cobbold,
Sgt William Richard Martindale,
Sgt Stuart Gordon Purches,
Sgt Gerald Walklate.

Crashed shortly after takeoff from Barra Airport, Barra Island. The aircraft was written off and all seven occupants were rescued.

The Liberator was one of many aircraft that following the end of the war in Europe was being used to take aircrews back to the United States. The aircraft were typically approaching the end of their useful lives but only had to make it across the Atlantic. The aircraft had taken off from RAF Valley on Anglesey bound for Meeks Field in Keflavik. When the aircraft nearing the southern end of the Isle of Skye, the port outer engine caught fire. It would appear that the fire could not be brought under control, as when the aircraft crossed the coast, the port wing outboard of the number one engine broke away. As the wing fell, it struck the tail section, causing it to separate from the aircraft before the plane dived into a hilltop and exploded. All 14 occupants were killed.
Crew:
1st Lt William H. Bell, pilot,
1st Lt Theodore E. Lundell, copilot,
1st Lt Albert L. Harmonay, navigator,
T/Sgt Svend E. Hansen, flight engineer,
S/Sgt Robert R. Bisbing, radio operator.
Passengers:
F/O Edward Grzesiek,
F/O George W. Baker,
F/O Stephen A. Fenwick,
F/O Marvin Fleak,
2nd Lt Arthur A. Vogel,
F/O Eldon E. Eads,
F/O Edward J. Ruszala,
F/O Wilbur L. Titus,
F/O Newton D. Stanley.
Source:
http://www.peakdistrictaircrashes.co.uk/pages/scotland/scotland41-29369.htm

En route, the engine number two failed while the number three misfired. The captain decided to divert to Stornoway Airport for a safe landing but the crew was unable to lower the gear. The pilot completed a gear up landing and the aircraft skidded for several yards before coming to a halt. While all nine crew members were unhurt, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Crew:
W/O L. Moudry, pilot,
F/Sgt L. Volka copilot,
F/Sgt P. S. Arton, navigator,
F/Sgt A. Kasal, wireless operator and air gunner,
F/Sgt J. Gregor, wireless operator and air gunner,
Sgt J. Matejicek, wireless operator and air gunner,
Sgt R. Soudek wireless operator and air gunner,
W/O Z. Glir, air gunner,
F/Sgt L. Novak, flight enginner.