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Crash of a Fokker F27 Friendship 200 in Dera Ismail Khan
Date & Time:
Jul 6, 1994 at 1025 LT
Operator:
Registration:
AP-ALN
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Islamabad – Peshawar – Dera Ismail Khan
MSN:
10164
YOM:
1960
Flight number:
PK684
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
38
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On approach to Dera Ismail Khan Airport, the crew encountered technical problems with the left engine. The captain decided to initiate a go-around. Flaps and undercarriage were retracted when the aircraft entered a stall condition, lost height and crashed in an open field. It slid on the ground for about 300 metres before coming to rest against trees. All 42 occupants were evacuated, among them three passengers were injured.
Crash of an Airbus A300B4-203 in Kathmandu: 167 killed
Date & Time:
Sep 28, 1992 at 1430 LT
Operator:
Registration:
AP-BCP
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Karachi - Kathmandu
MSN:
025
YOM:
1976
Flight number:
PK268
Crew on board:
19
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
148
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
167
Captain / Total hours on type:
6260.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1469
Aircraft flight hours:
39045
Aircraft flight cycles:
19172
Circumstances:
The ill-fated aircraft departed Karachi Airport Pakistan, at 0613 hours UTC on 28 September 1992 as Pakistan International Airlines Flight Number PK 268, a non-stop service to Kathmandu, Nepal. The accident occurred at 0845 UTC (1430 hours local time) when the aircraft struck a mountain during an instrument approach to Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan International Airport. The impact site was at an altitude of 7280 feet above sea level (2890 feet above airport level), 9.16 nautical miles from the VOR/DME beacon and directly beneath the instrument approach track from the VOR/DME beacon (9.76 nm from and 2970 ft above the threshold of Runway 02 which is 77 feet below the airport datum). The flight through Pakistani and Indian airspace appears to have proceeded normally. At 0825 hrs UTC (1410 hrs local time) two-way contact between Pakistan 268 and Kathmandu Area Control West was established on VHF radio and the aircraft was procedurally cleared towards Kathmandu in accordance with its flight plan. After obtaining the Kathmandu weather and airfield details, the aircraft was given traffic information and instructed to report overhead the SIM (Simara) non-directional beacon (214°R VOR/39 nm from Kathmandu’s KTM VOR/DME) at or above FL150 (flight level on standard altimeter) as cleared by the Calcutta Area Control Centre. At 08:37 hrs the copilot reported that the aircraft was approaching the SIM beacon at FL 150, whereupon procedural clearance was given to continue to position SIERRA (202°R/10 nm from the KTM beacon) and to descend to 11,500 feet altitude. No approach delay was forecast by the area controller and the co-pilot correctly read back both the clearance and the instruction to report at 25 DME. At 08:40:14 hrs, he reported that the aircraft was approaching 25 DME whereupon the crew were instructed to maintain 11,500 feet and change frequency to Kathmandu Tower. Two-way radio contact with the Tower was established a few seconds later and the crew reported that they were in the process of intercepting the final approach track of 022M (Magnetic) of Radial 202 KTM VOR ) They were instructed to expect a Sierra approach and to report at 16 DME. At 08:42:51 hrs the first officer reported “One six due at eleven thousand five hundred”. The tower controller responded by clearing the aircraft for the Sierra approach and instructing the crew to report at 10 DME. At 08:44:27 the first officer reported 10 DME and three seconds later he was asked, “Report your level”. He replied, “We crossed out of eight thousand five hun,’ two hundred now”. The controller replied with the instruction “Roger clear for final. Report four DME Runway zero two”. The copilot responded to this instruction in a normal, calm and unhurried tone of voice; his reply was the last transmission heard from the aircraft, thirty-two seconds after the copilot reported 10 DME the aircraft crashed into steep, cloud-covered mountainside at 7,280 feet amsl and 9.16 nm on radial 202 of KTM VOR. All 167 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The balance of evidence suggests that the primary cause of the accident was that one or both pilots consistently failed to follow the approach procedure and inadvertently adopted a profile which, at each DME fix, was one altitude step ahead and below the correct procedure. Why and how that happened could not be determined with certainty because there was no record of the crew's conversation on the flight deck. Contributory causal factors were thought to be the inevitable complexity of the approach and the associated approach chart.
The following findings were reported:
- The flight deck crew were properly licensed and medically fit,
- The aircraft had been properly maintained and was fit for the flight and the essential aircraft systems were operating normally during the approach,
- The SIERRA approach to Kathmandu is a demanding approach in any wide-bodied aircraft,
- Unlawful interference and extreme weather were not causal factors,
- The crash site was enveloped in cloud at the time of the accident,
- There was no ATC clearance error,
- The VOR DME beacons used for the approach were operating satisfactorily and there was no evidence of failure or malfunction within the aircraft’s DME equipment,
- The aircraft acquired and maintained the correct final approach track but began descent too early and then continued to descend in accordance with an altitude profile which was consistent with being 'one step ahead' and below the correct profile,
- At 16 DME the co-pilot mis-reported the aircraft’s altitude by 1,000 feet,
- The commander did not adhere to the airline’s recommended technique for the final part of the approach which commenced at 10 DME,
- The 10 DME position report requested by the Tower controller was made at an altitude below the minimum safe altitude for that portion of the approach,
- The altitude profile on the Jeppesen approach chart which should have been used by the pilots was technically correct. However, the profile illustrated could not be flown in the A300 at V app, in common with any other wide-bodied jet of similar size and the minimum altitude at some DME fixes was not directly associated with the fix,
- The aircraft did not have control column mounted chartboards,
- As described in the report, there is scope for improving the SIERRA approach procedure and its associated charts,
- Kathmandu was not a frequent destination for PIA’S A300 crews and neither pilot had operated that within the previous two months,
- PIA’s training of air crews, briefing material and self-briefing facilities for the SIERRA approach to Kathmandu leave room for improvement,
- PIA’s route checking and flight operations inspection procedures were ineffective,
- The accident was inevitable 15 seconds before impact,
- The Tower controller requested an altitude report immediately after the co-pilot reported at 10 DME. His failure to challenge the low altitude reported at 10 DME was a missed opportunity to prevent the accident but, even if he had done so, it is doubtful whether the accident could have been averted,
- Some air controllers at Kathmandu had a low-self-esteem and was reluctant to intervene in piloting matters such as terrain separation,
- The GPWS was probably serviceable but failed to warn the crew of impending flight towards high ground because of the combination of elderly equipment and rugged terrain,
- Advice within the aircraft manufacturer’s operating manuals regarding pilot reaction to a GPWS warning was incomplete,
- The MEL was being breached in that PIA wen not supplying their CAA with the required carry-forward defect summaries for analysis, neither was the CAA requesting them.
The following findings were reported:
- The flight deck crew were properly licensed and medically fit,
- The aircraft had been properly maintained and was fit for the flight and the essential aircraft systems were operating normally during the approach,
- The SIERRA approach to Kathmandu is a demanding approach in any wide-bodied aircraft,
- Unlawful interference and extreme weather were not causal factors,
- The crash site was enveloped in cloud at the time of the accident,
- There was no ATC clearance error,
- The VOR DME beacons used for the approach were operating satisfactorily and there was no evidence of failure or malfunction within the aircraft’s DME equipment,
- The aircraft acquired and maintained the correct final approach track but began descent too early and then continued to descend in accordance with an altitude profile which was consistent with being 'one step ahead' and below the correct profile,
- At 16 DME the co-pilot mis-reported the aircraft’s altitude by 1,000 feet,
- The commander did not adhere to the airline’s recommended technique for the final part of the approach which commenced at 10 DME,
- The 10 DME position report requested by the Tower controller was made at an altitude below the minimum safe altitude for that portion of the approach,
- The altitude profile on the Jeppesen approach chart which should have been used by the pilots was technically correct. However, the profile illustrated could not be flown in the A300 at V app, in common with any other wide-bodied jet of similar size and the minimum altitude at some DME fixes was not directly associated with the fix,
- The aircraft did not have control column mounted chartboards,
- As described in the report, there is scope for improving the SIERRA approach procedure and its associated charts,
- Kathmandu was not a frequent destination for PIA’S A300 crews and neither pilot had operated that within the previous two months,
- PIA’s training of air crews, briefing material and self-briefing facilities for the SIERRA approach to Kathmandu leave room for improvement,
- PIA’s route checking and flight operations inspection procedures were ineffective,
- The accident was inevitable 15 seconds before impact,
- The Tower controller requested an altitude report immediately after the co-pilot reported at 10 DME. His failure to challenge the low altitude reported at 10 DME was a missed opportunity to prevent the accident but, even if he had done so, it is doubtful whether the accident could have been averted,
- Some air controllers at Kathmandu had a low-self-esteem and was reluctant to intervene in piloting matters such as terrain separation,
- The GPWS was probably serviceable but failed to warn the crew of impending flight towards high ground because of the combination of elderly equipment and rugged terrain,
- Advice within the aircraft manufacturer’s operating manuals regarding pilot reaction to a GPWS warning was incomplete,
- The MEL was being breached in that PIA wen not supplying their CAA with the required carry-forward defect summaries for analysis, neither was the CAA requesting them.
Crash of a Boeing 707-351B in Karachi
Date & Time:
Feb 7, 1992
Operator:
Registration:
AP-AZW
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
19636/731
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft suffered a runway excursion after landing at Karachi-Quaid-e-Azam Airport. There were no casualties while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Crash of a Fokker F27 Friendship 200 near Bunji: 54 killed
Date & Time:
Aug 25, 1989 at 0745 LT
Operator:
Registration:
AP-BBF
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Gilgit - Islamabad
MSN:
10207
YOM:
1962
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
49
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
54
Aircraft flight hours:
44524
Aircraft flight cycles:
41685
Circumstances:
Nine minutes after takeoff from Gilgit Airport, while flying in poor weather conditions, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located near Bunji, about 40 km southeast of Gilgit. The wreckage was found in an isolated area few hours later and all 54 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
For unknown reasons, the crew failed to follow the correct route after departure and the aircraft's altitude was insufficient.
Crash of a Fokker F27 Friendship 600 in Peshawar: 13 killed
Date & Time:
Oct 23, 1986 at 2049 LT
Operator:
Registration:
AP-AUX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lahore - Peshawar
MSN:
10335
YOM:
1967
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
49
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
13
Aircraft flight hours:
39732
Aircraft flight cycles:
45472
Circumstances:
The descent to Peshawar Airport was completed in limited visibility caused by night. The copilot was in command when on final approach to runway 35, he descended below the MDA until the aircraft struck a dyke and crashed upside down about 10 km short of runway. 13 occupants were killed and 41 other were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the copilot was under a route check at the time of the accident and failed to initiate a go around procedure as he continued the approach below MDA. On his side, the captain was distracted from monitoring the altitude and failed to correctly supervise the copilot actions.
Crash of a Fokker F27 Friendship 600 in Gilgit
Date & Time:
Jun 5, 1981
Operator:
Registration:
AP-AXF
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Gilgit - Gilgit
MSN:
10354
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
25451
Aircraft flight cycles:
33931
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a local training flight at Gilgit Airport, completing touch-and-goes. After touchdown, at a speed of 90 knots, the pilot-in-command decided to abandon the takeoff procedure for unknown reasons and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the airplane overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The takeoff was aborted at a speed of 90 knots with a V1 speed fixed at 96 knots.
Crash of a Boeing 720-047B in Karachi
Date & Time:
Jan 8, 1981
Operator:
Registration:
AP-AXK
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Karachi - Quetta
MSN:
48590/339
YOM:
1963
Flight number:
PK320
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
72
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On approach to Quetta, the crew was unable to lower the nose gear that remained stuck in its wheel well. The captain initiated a go-around and decided to return to Karachi Intl Airport. Despite several manual attempts to lower the gear, the crew eventually decided to land in a nose gear-up configuration. Upon touchdown, the airplane slid on its nose for few hundred yards before coming to rest. All 79 occupants escaped without injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Failure of the nose gear that remained stuck in its wheel well for unknown reasons.
