Country
code

Bagmati

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-8-Q402 Dash-8 in Kathmandu: 51 killed

Date & Time: Mar 12, 2018 at 1419 LT
Operator:
Registration:
S2-AGU
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dhaka - Kathmandu
MSN:
4041
YOM:
2001
Flight number:
BS211
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
67
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
51
Captain / Total flying hours:
5518
Captain / Total hours on type:
2824.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
390
Copilot / Total hours on type:
240
Aircraft flight hours:
21419
Aircraft flight cycles:
28649
Circumstances:
On March 12, 2018, a US Bangla Airlines, Bombardier DHC-8-402, S2-AGU, flight number BS211 departed Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport, Dhaka, Bangladesh at 06:51 UTC on a schedule flight to Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), Kathmandu, Nepal. The aircraft overflew part of Bangladesh and Indian airspace en-route to Nepal. At 0641, Dhaka Ground Control contacted the aircraft requesting for its Bangladesh ADC number which was recently made mandatory a few weeks ago by Bangladesh authority for all international outbound flights. The crew provided the ADC number as 2177 as provided in the Flight Plan. The Ground Controller again asked the crew if they had the ADC for Bangladesh. At 0642, PIC then contacted the Operations to confirm the Bangladesh ADC number. As per the CVR records, changes in the PIC’s vocal pitch and language used indicated that he was agitated and experiencing high levels of stress at the time while communicating with Dhaka Ground Control and airlines operations. The aircraft finally took off at 0651. As the aircraft was in a climb phase, the PIC overheard a communication between Operations and another US Bangla aircraft regarding the fuel onboard but the PIC without verifying whether the message was meant for him or not, engaged in some unnecessary conversation with the Operations staff. The Captain's vocal pitch and language used indicated that he was very much emotionally disturbed and experiencing high level of stress. The aircraft established its first contact with Kathmandu Control at 0752:04. At 0807:49 the First Officer contacted Kathmandu Control and requested for descent. Kathmandu Control gave descend clearance to FL160 with an estimated approach time of 0826 which was acknowledged by the First Officer. At 0810 the flight was handed over to Kathmandu Approach. At 0811, Kathmandu Approach instructed the aircraft to descend to 13,500 ft and hold over GURAS. The crew inserted the HOLD in the Flight Management System. At 0813:41 Kathmandu Approach further instructed the aircraft to reduce its speed and descend to 12500 ft. At 0816 Kathmandu Approach instructed the aircraft to further descend to 11500 ft., and cleared for VOR approach RWY 02 maintaining minimum approach speed. Both the crew forgot to cancel the hold on the FMS as they were engaged in some unnecessary conversation. Upon reaching GURAS, the aircraft turned left to enter the holding pattern over GURAS, it was noticed by PIC and FO and immediately PIC made correction and simultaneously this was alerted to the crew by Approach Control also. Once realizing the aircraft flying pattern and ATC clearance, the PIC immediately selected a heading of 027° which was just 5° of interception angle to intercept the desired radial of 202° inbound to KTM. The spot wind recorded was westerly at 28kt. The aircraft continued approach on heading mode and crossed radial 202° at 7 DME of KTM VOR. The aircraft then continued on the same heading of 027° and deviated to the right of the final approach course. Having deviated to the right of the final approach path, the aircraft reached about 2-3 NM North east of the KTM VOR and continued to fly further northeast. At 0827, Kathmandu Tower (TWR) alerted the crew that the landing clearance was given for RWY 02 but the aircraft was proceeding towards RWY 20. At 0829, Tower Controller asked the crew of their intention to which the PIC replied that they would be landing on RWY 02. The aircraft then made an orbit to the right. The Controller instructed the aircraft to join downwind for RWY 02 and report when sighting another Buddha Air aircraft which was already on final for RWY 02. The aircraft instead of joining downwind leg for RWY 02, continued on the orbit to the right on a westerly heading towards Northwest of RW 20. The controller instructed the aircraft to remain clear of RWY 20 and continue to hold at present position as Buddha air aircraft was landing at RW 02 (from opposite side) at that time. After the landing of Buddha Air aircraft, Tower Controller, at 08:32 UTC gave choice to BS211 to land either at RW 20 or 02 but the aircraft again made an orbit to the right, this time northwest of RWY 20. While continuing with the turn through Southeastern direction, the PIC reported that he had the runway in sight and requested tower for clearance to land. The Tower Controller cleared the aircraft to land but when the aircraft was still turning for the RWY it approached very close to the threshold for RWY 20 on a westerly heading and not aligned with the runway. At 08:33:27 UTC, spotting the aircraft maneuvering at very close proximity of the ground and not aligned with the RWY. Alarmed by the situation, the Tower Controller hurriedly cancelled the landing clearance of the aircraft by saying, "Takeoff clearance cancelled". Within the next 15-20 seconds, the aircraft pulled up in westerly direction and with very high bank angle turned left and flew over the western area of the domestic apron, continued on a southeasterly heading past the ATC Tower and further continued at a very low height, flew over the domestic southern apron area and finally attempted to align with the runway 20 to land. During this process, while the aircraft was turning inwards and momentarily headed towards the control tower, the tower controllers ducked down out of fear that the aircraft might hit the tower building. Missing the control tower, when the aircraft further turned towards the taxi track aiming for the runway through a right reversal turn, the tower controller made a transmission by saying, "BS 211, I say again...". At 08:34 UTC the aircraft touched down 1700 meters down the threshold with a bank angle of about 15 degrees and an angle of about 25 degrees with the runway axis (approximately heading Southeast) and to the left of the center line of runway 20, then veered southeast out of the runway through the inner perimeter fence along the rough down slope and finally stopped about 442 meters southeast from the first touchdown point on the runway. All four crew members (2 cockpit crew and 2 cabin crew) and 45 out of the 67 passengers onboard the aircraft were killed in the accident. Two more passengers succumbed to injury later in hospital during course of treatment. The aircraft caught fire after 6 seconds of touchdown which engulfed major portions of the aircraft.
Probable cause:
The Accident Investigation Commission determines that the probable cause of the accident is due to disorientation and a complete loss of situational awareness in the part of crewmember. Contributing to this the aircraft was offset to the proper approach path that led to maneuvers in a very dangerous and unsafe attitude to align with the runway. Landing was completed in a sheer desperation after sighting the runway, at very close proximity and very low altitude. There was no attempt made to carry out a go around, when a go around seemed possible until the last instant before touchdown on the runway.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- Improper timing of the pre-flight briefing and the commencement of the flight departure in which the operational pre-flight briefing was given in early morning but the flight departure time was around noon and there were four domestic short flights scheduled in between.
- The PIC, who was the pilot flying, seemed to be under stress due to behavior of a particular female colleague in the company and lack of sleep the preceding night.
- A very steep gradient between the crew.
- Flight crew not having practiced visual approach for runway 20 in the simulator.
- A poor CRM between the crew.

An investigation into the captain's behaviour showed that he had history of depression while serving in the Bangladesh Air Force in 1993 and was removed from active duty after evaluation by a psychiatrist. He was re-evaluated by a psychiatrist in January 2002 and was declared to be fit for flying. Examinations in successive annual medical checks were not focused on his previous medical condition of depression, possibly because this was not declared in the self-declaration form for annual medicals. During the flight the captain was irritable, tensed, moody, and aggressive at various times. He was smoking during the flight, contrary to company regulations. He also used foul language and abusive words in conversation with the junior female first officer. He was engaged in unnecessary conversation during the approach, at a time when sterile cockpit rules were in force. The captain seemed very unsecure about his future as he had submitted resignation from this company, though only verbally. He said he did not have any job and did not know what he was going to do for living.
Final Report:

Crash of an Airbus A330-303 in Kathmandu

Date & Time: Mar 4, 2015 at 0744 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-JOC
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Istanbul – Kathmandu
MSN:
1522
YOM:
2014
Flight number:
TK726
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
224
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
14942
Captain / Total hours on type:
1456.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7659
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1269
Aircraft flight hours:
4139
Aircraft flight cycles:
732
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Istanbul at 1818LT on March 3 on a scheduled flight to Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), Kathmandu with 11 crew members and 224 passengers .The aircraft started contacting Kathmandu Control from 00:02 hrs to 00:11hrs while the aircraft was under control of Varanasi and descending to FL 250 but there was no response because Kathmandu Control was not yet in operation. The airport opened at its scheduled time of 00:15hrs. The aircraft established its first contact with Kathmandu Approach at 00:17 hrs and reported holding over Parsa at FL 270. Kathmandu Approach reported visibility 100 meters and airport status as closed. At 00:22 hrs the aircraft requested to proceed to Simara due to moderate turbulence. The Kathmandu Approach instructed the aircraft to descend to FL 210 and proceed to Simara and hold. At 01:05 hrs when Kathmandu Approach provided an updated visibility of 1000 meters and asked the flight crew of their intentions, the flight crew reported ready for RNAV (RNP) APCH for runway 02. The aircraft was given clearance to make an RNP AR APCH. At 01:23 hrs when the aircraft reported Dovan, Kathmandu Approach instructed the flight crew to contact Kathmandu Tower. Kathmandu Tower issued a landing clearance at 01:24 hrs and provided wind information of 100° at 03 knots. At 01:27 hrs the aircraft carried out a missed approach due to lack of visual reference. The aircraft was given clearance to proceed to RATAN hold via MANRI climbing to 10500 feet as per the missed approach procedure. During the missed approach the aircraft was instructed to contact Kathmandu Approach. At 01:43 hrs the aircraft requested the latest visibility to which Kathmandu Approach provided visibility 3000 m and Kathmandu Tower observation of 1000 meters towards the south east and few clouds at 1000 ft, SCT 2000 ft and BKN 10,000 feet. When the flight crew reported their intention to continue approach at 01:44 hrs, Kathmandu Approach cleared the aircraft for RNAV RNP APCH runway 02 and instructed to report RATAN. The aircraft reported crossing 6700 ft at 01:55 hrs to Kathmandu Tower. Kathmandu Tower cleared the aircraft to land and provided wind information of 160° at 04 kts. At 01:57 hrs Kathmandu Tower asked the aircraft if the runway was insight. The aircraft responded that they were not able to see the runway but were continuing the approach. The aircraft was at 880 ft AGL at that time. At 783 ft AGL the aircraft asked Kathmandu Tower if the approach lights were on. Kathmandu Tower informed the aircraft that the approach lights were on at full intensity. The auto-pilots remained coupled to the aircraft until 14 ft AGL, when it was disconnected, a flare was attempted. The maximum vertical acceleration recorded on the flight data recorder was approximately 2.7 G. The aircraft pitch at touchdown was 1.8 degree nose up up which is lower than a normal flare attitude for other landings. From physical evidence recorded on the runway and the GPS latitude and longitude coordinate data the aircraft touched down to the left of the runway centerline with the left hand main gear off the paved runway surface. The aircraft crossed taxiways E and D and came to a stop on the grass area between taxiway D and C with the heading of the aircraft on rest position being 345 degrees (North North West) and the position of the aircraft on rest position was at N 27° 41' 46", E 85° 21'29" At 02:00 hrs Kathmandu Tower asked if the aircraft had landed. The aircraft requested medical and fire assistance reporting its position at the end of the runway. At 02:03 hrs the aircraft requested for bridge and stairs to open the door and vacate passengers instead of evacuation. The fire and rescue team opened the left cabin door and requested the cabin attendant as well as to pilot through Kathmandu Tower to deploy the evacuation slides. At 02:10 hrs evacuation signal was given to disembark the passengers. All passengers were evacuated safely and later, the aircraft was declared as damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of this accident is the decision of the flight crew to continue approach and landing below the minima with inadequate visual reference and not to perform a missed approach in accordance to the published approach procedure. Other contributing factors of the accident are probable fixation of the flight crew to land at Kathmandu, and the deterioration of weather conditions that resulted in fog over the airport reducing the visibility below the required minima. The following findings were reported:
- On March 2, 2015 i.e. two days before the accident, the crews of the flight to Kathmandu reported through RNP AR MONITORING FORM that all the NAV. accuracy and deviation parameter were perfectly correct at MINIMUM but the real aircraft position was high (PAPI 4 whites) and left offset,
- The airlines as well as crews were unaware of the fact that wrong threshold coordinates were uploaded on FMGS NAV data base of the aircraft,
- The flight crew was unable to get ATIS information on the published frequency because ATIS was not operating. ATIS status was also not included in the Daily Facilities Status check list reporting form of TIA Kathmandu,
- Turkish Airlines Safety Department advised to change the scheduled arrival time at Kathmandu Airport,
- It was the first flight of the Captain to Kathmandu airport and third flight but first RNAV (RNP) approach of the Copilot,
- Both approaches were flown with the auto-pilots coupled,
- Crew comments on the CVR during approach could be an indication that they (crews) were tempted to continue to descend below the decision height despite lack of adequate visual reference condition contrary to State published Standard Instrument Arrival and company Standard Operating procedures with the expectation of getting visual contact with the ground,
- The flight crew were not visual with the runway or approach light at MDA,
- The MET Office did not disseminate SPECI representing deterioration in visibility according to Annex 3,
- The Approach Control and the Kathmandu Tower did not update the aircraft with its observation representing a sudden deterioration in visibility condition due to moving fog,
- The Air Traffic Control Officers are not provided with refresher training at regular interval,
- CAAN did not take into account for the AIRAC cycle 04-2015 from 05 Feb 2015 to 04 March 2015 while cancelling AIP supplement,
- The auto-pilots remained coupled to the aircraft until 14ft AGL when it was disconnected and a flare was attempted,
- The crews were not fully following the standard procedure of KTM RNAV (RNP) Approach and company Standard Operating procedures.
Final Report:

Crash of a Dornier DO228-202 in Kathmandu: 19 killed

Date & Time: Sep 28, 2012 at 0618 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9N-AHA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kathmandu - Lukla
MSN:
8123
YOM:
1987
Flight number:
SIT601
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
16
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
19
Captain / Total flying hours:
8308
Captain / Total hours on type:
7112.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
772
Copilot / Total hours on type:
519
Circumstances:
A Dornier 228 aircraft, registration 9N-AHA, was planned to operate a flight from Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), Kathmandu, to Tensing/Hillary Airport, Lukla with 16 passengers and 3 crews. The Commander was the Pilot Flying (PF) which was in accordance with common practice for flight crews operating this route. The 0020Z METAR for TIA reported calm wind, 3,000 m visibility in mist, scattered cloud at 2,000 ft AAL, broken cloud at 10,000 ft AAL, a temperature of 19° C and a QNH of 1017 HPa. ATC broadcast a change in the QNH to 1018 HPa at 0029 hrs. At 0028 hrs (0613 am), the Co-pilot asked ATC for taxi clearance and 9N-AHA taxied towards Intersection 2 for Runway 20. While taxiing towards the runway the flight crew carried out the before takeoff checklist during which the Commander confirmed that Flaps 1 was set and all four booster pumps were ON. There was no emergency brief or discussion about the reference speeds to be used during the takeoff. The flight crew changed frequency and contacted the tower controller who gave them clearance to enter Runway 20 from the intersection and wait for clearance to takeoff. The Commander asked for the line-up checks to be completed during which the Speed Lever was selected to HIGH. After lining up, the Commander said "THERE IS A BIRD" and, three seconds later "I WILL TAKE FLAPS TWO" which was acknowledged by the co-pilot. The aircraft was cleared for departure and began its takeoff run at 0032 hrs. Two seconds after beginning the takeoff roll, the Commander said "WATCH OUT THE BIRD". The Co-pilot called "50 KNOTS " as the aircraft approached 50 kt and the Commander replied "CHECK". Two seconds later, the co-pilot called "BIRD CLEAR SIR" as the aircraft accelerated through 58 kt. Approaching 70 kt, approximately 13 kt below V1 and Vr , the first officer called "VEE ONE ROTATE". The aircraft began to rotate but did not lift off the ground and the nose was briefly lowered again. As the aircraft reached 86 kt, it lifted off the ground and the landing gear was raised immediately. As the aircraft began to climb, it accelerated to 89 kt over approximately 2 seconds. It continued to climb to 100 ft above the runway over the next 11 seconds but, during this time, the speed decreased to 77 kt. The aircraft then flew level for 14 seconds during which time the following occurred: the speed decreased to 69 kt; the air traffic controller asked "ANY TECHNICAL?" to which the pilot replied "[uncertain]….DUE BIRD HIT"; it's heading changed slowly from 200 °M to approximately 173 °M; and the stall warning was triggered for three seconds as the aircraft decelerated through 71 kt. Two seconds after the stall warning ended, it was triggered again for approximately six seconds with the airspeed at 69 kt. The aircraft began a gentle descent at 69 kt with the stall warning sounding and the rate of turn to the left increased rapidly. It departed controlled flight, most probably left wing low, and crashed into a small open area 420 m south-east of the end of Runway 20. A runway inspection found the remains of a bird, identified as a "Black Kite", at a position 408 m from Intersection 2. No bird strike was reported in relation to any other departure.
Probable cause:
Causal Factors:
The investigation identified the following causal factors:
1. During level flight phase of the aircraft, the drag on the aircraft was greater than the power available and the aircraft decelerated. That resulted in excessive drag in such critical phase of ascent lowering the required thrust. The investigation was unable to determine the reason for the reduced thrust.
2. The flight crew did not maintain the airspeed above the stall speed and there was insufficient height available to recover when the aircraft departed controlled flight.
Contributory Factors:
The investigation identified the following contributory factors:
1. The flight crew did not maintain V2 during the climb and so the power required to maintain the level flight was greater than it would otherwise have been.
2. The flight crew did not maintain the runway centreline which removed the option of landing the aircraft on the runway remaining.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900D in Kathmandu: 19 killed

Date & Time: Sep 25, 2011 at 0731 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9N-AEK
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kathmandu - Kathmandu
MSN:
UE-295
YOM:
1997
Flight number:
BHA103
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
16
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
19
Copilot / Total hours on type:
18
Circumstances:
The aircraft was performing a special flight with tourists above the Himalayan mountains and especially a tour of the Everest in the early morning. While returning to Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport, the copilot (PIC) was cleared to descend to 6,000 feet for a landing on runway 02. In marginal weather conditions, he passed below 6,000 feet until the aircraft contacted trees and crashed in hilly and wooded terrain located near the village of Bishanku Narayan, some 6,7 km southeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. A passenger was seriously injured while 18 other occupants were killed. Few hours later, the only survivor died from his injuries. The 16 tourists were respectively 10 Indians, 2 Americans, 1 Japanese and 3 Nepalese.
Probable cause:
The Accident Investigation Commission assigned by Nepal's Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation have submitted their report to the Ministry. The investigators said in a media briefing, that human factors, mainly fatigue by the captain of the flight, led to the crash. The aircraft was flown by the first officer and was on approach to Kathmandu at 5,000 feet MSL instead of 6,000 feet MSL as required, when it entered a cloud. While inside the cloud in low visibility the aircraft descended, hit tree tops and broke up. The captain had flown another aircraft the previous day and had been assigned to the accident flight on short notice in the morning of the accident day, but did not have sufficient rest. The commission analyzed that due to the resulting fatigue the captain assigned pilot flying duties to the first officer although she wasn't yet ready to cope with the task in demanding conditions. The newly assigned first officer had only 18 hours experience on the aircraft type. The mountain view round trip had to turn back about midway due to weather conditions. While on a visual approach to Kathmandu at 5,000 instead of 6,000 feet MSL the aircraft entered a cloud and started to descend until impact with tree tops. The crew did not follow standard operating procedures, that amongst other details required the aircraft to fly at or above 6,000 feet MSL in the accident area, the interaction between the crew members did not follow standard operating procedures, for example the captain distracted the first officer with frequent advice instead of explaining the/adhering to procedures. The commission said as result of the investigation they released a safety recommendation requiring all operators to install Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS) in addition to eight other safety recommendations regarding pilot training, installation of visual aids, safety audit and fleet policies.

Crash of a Dornier DO228-101 near Kathmandu: 14 killed

Date & Time: Aug 24, 2010 at 0725 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9N-AHE
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kathmandu - Lukla
MSN:
7032
YOM:
1985
Flight number:
AG101
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
14
Circumstances:
On approach to Lukla, the crew encountered poor weather conditions. Unable to locate the runway, he decided to divert to Simara Airport. Unfortunately, the visibility at Simara Airport was insufficient and the crew eventually decided to return to Kathmandu. While descending to runway 02, a generator failed. The crew did not declare an emergency, contacted his maintenance base and was unable to switch to the backup generator. Shortly after the crew elected to reset the battery system, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a rice paddy field. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 14 occupants were killed, among them 4 Americans, one British and one Japanese. The wreckage was found about 30 km southeast of Tribhuvan Airport.
Probable cause:
Loss of control on approach following the failure of a generator for undetermined reasons.

Crash of an Avro 748-501-2B in Kathmandu: 15 killed

Date & Time: Sep 5, 1999 at 1030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9N-AEG
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Pokhara - Kathmandu
MSN:
1806
YOM:
1988
Flight number:
3Z104
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
15
Circumstances:
On approach to Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport under VFR mode, the crew encountered limited visibility due to a low cloud layer. On final, at an altitude of about 6,000 feet, the aircraft collided with a radio antenna (100 feet high) located on the top of a hill and owned by the Nepalese National Broadcasting Company. The aircraft went out of control and crashed seven km short of runway 02. All 15 occupants.
Probable cause:
Collision with obstacle on a VFR approach in limited visibility.

Crash of a Boeing 727-243F in Kathmandu: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jul 7, 1999 at 1951 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VT-LCI
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Katmandu – New Delhi – Sharjah
MSN:
22168
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
LCI8533
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Aircraft flight hours:
43000
Aircraft flight cycles:
25000
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport on a cargo flight to Sharjah with an intermediate stop in New Delhi, carrying five crew members and a load of 21 tons of woolen carpets. After takeoff from runway 20, the crew continued to climb but failed to realize his altitude was insufficient. The aircraft struck the slope of Mt Champadevi located 11 km southwest of the airport and disintegrated on impact. All five crew members were killed.
Probable cause:
The accident occurred as the crew after take off did not adhere to the published Standard Instrument Departure (SID) procedure for runway 20 at Kathmandu, Nepal.
The following contributory factors were identified:
- Incomplete departure briefing given by P1 while other cockpit activities were in progress,
- The unexpected airspeed decay to V 2 -3 during initial right climbing turn South of the VOR which occurred while P2 was busy with ATC,
- The improper power and climb profile used by P1 after rolling the aircraft out on a southwest heading following the initial airspeed loss,
- The inadequate intra cockpit crew coordination and communication as the aircraft proceeded to and across the KTM VOR 4 DME arc before recommencing a shallow right turn, and
- The incorrect and slow response to the initial and subsequent GPWS activation prior to the collision with the terrain.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Kathmandu: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 17, 1995 at 1359 LT
Operator:
Registration:
9N-ABI
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kathmandu - Rumjatar
MSN:
392
YOM:
1973
Flight number:
RA133
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
21
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll on runway 20 at Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport, the aircraft failed to get airborne, overran, went through a fence and came to rest in a field. A passenger and a pilot were killed while all other occupants were rescued.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the crew was composed by two captains. For unknown reasons, the pilot-in-command decided to abort the takeoff procedure but the crew failed to coordinate this decision. At the time of the accident, the total weight of the aircraft was 60 kilos above MTOW.

Crash of an Airbus A300B4-203 in Kathmandu: 167 killed

Date & Time: Sep 28, 1992 at 1430 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
AP-BCP
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Karachi - Kathmandu
MSN:
025
YOM:
1976
Flight number:
PK268
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
19
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
148
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
167
Captain / Total flying hours:
13186
Captain / Total hours on type:
6260.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5849
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1469
Aircraft flight hours:
39045
Aircraft flight cycles:
19172
Circumstances:
The ill-fated aircraft departed Karachi Airport Pakistan, at 0613 hours UTC on 28 September 1992 as Pakistan International Airlines Flight Number PK 268, a non-stop service to Kathmandu, Nepal. The accident occurred at 0845 UTC (1430 hours local time) when the aircraft struck a mountain during an instrument approach to Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan International Airport. The impact site was at an altitude of 7280 feet above sea level (2890 feet above airport level), 9.16 nautical miles from the VOR/DME beacon and directly beneath the instrument approach track from the VOR/DME beacon (9.76 nm from and 2970 ft above the threshold of Runway 02 which is 77 feet below the airport datum). The flight through Pakistani and Indian airspace appears to have proceeded normally. At 0825 hrs UTC (1410 hrs local time) two-way contact between Pakistan 268 and Kathmandu Area Control West was established on VHF radio and the aircraft was procedurally cleared towards Kathmandu in accordance with its flight plan. After obtaining the Kathmandu weather and airfield details, the aircraft was given traffic information and instructed to report overhead the SIM (Simara) non-directional beacon (214°R VOR/39 nm from Kathmandu’s KTM VOR/DME) at or above FL150 (flight level on standard altimeter) as cleared by the Calcutta Area Control Centre. At 08:37 hrs the copilot reported that the aircraft was approaching the SIM beacon at FL 150, whereupon procedural clearance was given to continue to position SIERRA (202°R/10 nm from the KTM beacon) and to descend to 11,500 feet altitude. No approach delay was forecast by the area controller and the co-pilot correctly read back both the clearance and the instruction to report at 25 DME. At 08:40:14 hrs, he reported that the aircraft was approaching 25 DME whereupon the crew were instructed to maintain 11,500 feet and change frequency to Kathmandu Tower. Two-way radio contact with the Tower was established a few seconds later and the crew reported that they were in the process of intercepting the final approach track of 022M (Magnetic) of Radial 202 KTM VOR ) They were instructed to expect a Sierra approach and to report at 16 DME. At 08:42:51 hrs the first officer reported “One six due at eleven thousand five hundred”. The tower controller responded by clearing the aircraft for the Sierra approach and instructing the crew to report at 10 DME. At 08:44:27 the first officer reported 10 DME and three seconds later he was asked, “Report your level”. He replied, “We crossed out of eight thousand five hun,’ two hundred now”. The controller replied with the instruction “Roger clear for final. Report four DME Runway zero two”. The copilot responded to this instruction in a normal, calm and unhurried tone of voice; his reply was the last transmission heard from the aircraft, thirty-two seconds after the copilot reported 10 DME the aircraft crashed into steep, cloud-covered mountainside at 7,280 feet amsl and 9.16 nm on radial 202 of KTM VOR. All 167 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The balance of evidence suggests that the primary cause of the accident was that one or both pilots consistently failed to follow the approach procedure and inadvertently adopted a profile which, at each DME fix, was one altitude step ahead and below the correct procedure. Why and how that happened could not be determined with certainty because there was no record of the crew's conversation on the flight deck. Contributory causal factors were thought to be the inevitable complexity of the approach and the associated approach chart.
The following findings were reported:
- The flight deck crew were properly licensed and medically fit,
- The aircraft had been properly maintained and was fit for the flight and the essential aircraft systems were operating normally during the approach,
- The SIERRA approach to Kathmandu is a demanding approach in any wide-bodied aircraft,
- Unlawful interference and extreme weather were not causal factors,
- The crash site was enveloped in cloud at the time of the accident,
- There was no ATC clearance error,
- The VOR DME beacons used for the approach were operating satisfactorily and there was no evidence of failure or malfunction within the aircraft’s DME equipment,
- The aircraft acquired and maintained the correct final approach track but began descent too early and then continued to descend in accordance with an altitude profile which was consistent with being 'one step ahead' and below the correct profile,
- At 16 DME the co-pilot mis-reported the aircraft’s altitude by 1,000 feet,
- The commander did not adhere to the airline’s recommended technique for the final part of the approach which commenced at 10 DME,
- The 10 DME position report requested by the Tower controller was made at an altitude below the minimum safe altitude for that portion of the approach,
- The altitude profile on the Jeppesen approach chart which should have been used by the pilots was technically correct. However, the profile illustrated could not be flown in the A300 at V app, in common with any other wide-bodied jet of similar size and the minimum altitude at some DME fixes was not directly associated with the fix,
- The aircraft did not have control column mounted chartboards,
- As described in the report, there is scope for improving the SIERRA approach procedure and its associated charts,
- Kathmandu was not a frequent destination for PIA’S A300 crews and neither pilot had operated that within the previous two months,
- PIA’s training of air crews, briefing material and self-briefing facilities for the SIERRA approach to Kathmandu leave room for improvement,
- PIA’s route checking and flight operations inspection procedures were ineffective,
- The accident was inevitable 15 seconds before impact,
- The Tower controller requested an altitude report immediately after the co-pilot reported at 10 DME. His failure to challenge the low altitude reported at 10 DME was a missed opportunity to prevent the accident but, even if he had done so, it is doubtful whether the accident could have been averted,
- Some air controllers at Kathmandu had a low-self-esteem and was reluctant to intervene in piloting matters such as terrain separation,
- The GPWS was probably serviceable but failed to warn the crew of impending flight towards high ground because of the combination of elderly equipment and rugged terrain,
- Advice within the aircraft manufacturer’s operating manuals regarding pilot reaction to a GPWS warning was incomplete,
- The MEL was being breached in that PIA wen not supplying their CAA with the required carry-forward defect summaries for analysis, neither was the CAA requesting them.

Crash of an Airbus A310-304 near Kathmandu: 113 killed

Date & Time: Jul 31, 1992 at 1245 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HS-TID
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Bangkok - Kathmandu
MSN:
438
YOM:
1987
Flight number:
TG311
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
99
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
113
Circumstances:
Thai Airways Flight 311 was conducting the Sierra (VOR/DME) approach to runway 02 at Tribhuvan International Airport, in instrument weather conditions. A flap fault occurred while the flight was on the approach; this caused the crew to ask for clearance back to Calcutta, a decision that was in keeping with both Company and performance requirements, which necessitate the use of full flaps for the steep final approach. Shortly (21 seconds) after making this request, at a distance of approximately 12 nm from the Kathmandu VOR, the flap fault was rectified by retracting and then reselecting the flaps. The crew determined that it was not possible to continue the straight-in approach, due to the steep descent angles required and the position of the aircraft. The crew stated to the control tower that they wished to start their approach again and requested a left turn back to the Romeo fix, which is 41 nm south south-west (202 radial) of the Kathmandu VOR. The Controller, in the non-radar environment, responded by clearing the flight to make the Sierra approach, which starts at the 202 radial and 16 nautical miles from the VOR. The crew response to the clearance was to report that, at the moment, they couldn't land and to ask again for left turn back to Romeo to start their approach again. After further dialogue with the controller, which included requests for a left turn, the crew unilaterally initiated a right turn from the aircraft's 025° heading and commenced a climb from an altitude of 10,500 feet to FL180, when the flight was about 7 nm south of the Kathmandu VOR. The crew reported to the tower controller that the flight was climbing and the controller replied by instructing the crew to report at 16 nm for the Sierra approach. During the turn, there was more discussion between the tower controller and the flight, where it was established that the aircraft was to maintain an altitude of FL115 and was to 'proceed to Romeo' and contact the Area Control Center (ACC) controller. The flight, commencing a descent while in the turn, completed a 360° turn, momentarily rolling out on headings of 045° and 340°, and again proceeded toward the north on a heading of 025° magnetic. When the flight was about 5 nm south-west of the Kathmandu VOR, the crew contacted the ACC and stated that the aircraft was 'heading 025' and they wished to proceed to Romeo to start their approach again; adding they had 'technical problems concerned with the flight.' It was again established that the flight was to proceed to Romeo and the crew agreed to 'report over Romeo.' It was determined from the cockpit voice recorder that the crew was in the process of inserting 'Romeo' and other related navigational information in the Flight Management System, but were experiencing difficulties. The flight continued towards the north on a heading of 025° and then, at about 16 nm north, the heading was altered to the left to 005°. Slightly over one minute later, the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) sounded the warning 'terrain, terrain' followed by 'whoop whoop pull-up'; the aural warning continued until impact approximately 16 seconds later. Engine thrust was increasing and 'Level Change' had been announced on the cockpit, just before the impact occurred at the 11,500-foot level of a 16,000-foot peak; the accident site was located on the 015 radial (north-north east) at 23.3 nm from the Kathmandu VOR. The aircraft was destroyed and all 113 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
TG311 flight crew's management of the aircraft flight path wherein the flight proceeded in a northerly direction which was opposite to the cleared point Romeo to the South; ineffective radio communication between the area control centre and the TG311 flight crew which allowed the flight to continue in the wrong direction, in that the TG311 crew never provided the aircraft's VOR radial when stating DME and the controller never solicited this information and thus the aircraft's position was not transmitted at any time; and ineffective cockpit crew coordination by the TG311 crew in conducting flight navigation duties. Contributing factors were: the misleading depiction of Romeo on the operator's approach chart used by the flight crew; a flap fault, although corrected, required that the initial approach be discontinued; and radio communication difficulties between the TG311 crew and the air traffic controllers that stemmed from language difficulties and ineffective discussion of apparent unresolved problems.