Region
code

PNG

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A Islander in Saidor Gap: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 23, 2017
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
P2-ISM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Lae – Derim
MSN:
227
YOM:
1970
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
While cruising at an altitude of 9,500 feet in adverse weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft struck trees and crashed on the slope of a mountain located in the Saidor Gap, half way from Lae-Nadzab Airport to Derim. Immediately after the crash, the pilot was able to call for help and gave his position. Unfortunately, due to poor weather conditions and the difficulties to reach the crash site, it was not possible for the rescuers to intervene before December 26. Three days after the accident, as the weather conditions improved, the rescuers eventually reached the crash site but it was reported that the pilot died from his injuries.

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2T Islander in Kiunga: 12 killed

Date & Time: Apr 13, 2016 at 1420 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
P2-SBC
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Oksapmin – Kiunga
MSN:
3010
YOM:
1983
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Captain / Total flying hours:
4705
Captain / Total hours on type:
254.00
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft left Oksapmin at 1356LT for a short VFR flight to Kiunga. On final approach, the aircraft pitched up, almost vertically, banked right, stalled and crashed in a wooded area located 1,200 meters short of runway 07 threshold. Two passengers were seriously injured while ten other occupants were killed. Unfortunately, both survivors died from their injuries few hours later. At the time of the loss of control, it is reported that the right propeller was feathered. The below document is a preliminary report from the AIC of PNG.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 In Mount Lawes: 4 killed

Date & Time: Sep 20, 2014 at 0945 LT
Operator:
Registration:
P2-KSF
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Woitape - Port Moresby
MSN:
528
YOM:
1977
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
While approaching Port Moresby Airport, the twin engine aircraft was too low for unknown reason, hit tree tops and crashed inverted in a dense wooded area located near Mount Lawes, some 12 km north of the Port Moresby-Jacksons International Airport. Both pilots (among them an Australian citizen) and a passenger were killed, while all six other occupants were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed. A day later, a second passenger died from his injuries.

Crash of a Pacific Aerospace PAC-750XTOL in Gulgubip

Date & Time: Jul 19, 2014
Registration:
P2-RNB
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kiunga – Gulgubip
MSN:
XL190
YOM:
2013
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2930
Captain / Total hours on type:
1900.00
Aircraft flight hours:
143
Circumstances:
A Pacific Aerospace PAC P-750 XTOL single engine aircraft was chartered to transport store goods and five passengers from Kiunga to Gulgubip. Although Gulgubip is in mountainous terrain and the weather in the area is often poor, the pilot was tasked to fly there without ever having been to Gulgubip before. The terrain to the north north east of Gulgubip rises gradually behind the airstrip. Visual illusions which may affect the pilot’s perception of height and distance can be associated with airstrips situated in terrain of this kind. On arrival at Gulgubip, the pilot orbited and positioned the aircraft for landing. During the final approach he decided to discontinue the approach and go-around. The aircraft impacted terrain approximately 3 km north west of the airstrip and was substantially damaged. The six passengers were unhurt but the pilot sustained serious injuries. The pilot was treated in Gulgubip following the accident, and was airlifted the next day to Tabubil, where he was admitted to hospital.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Kibeni: 3 killed

Date & Time: Nov 25, 2013 at 1330 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
P2-SAH
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Kikori - Gobe
MSN:
208B-1263
YOM:
2007
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
Seven persons escaped with minor scratches when their Cessna Grand Caravan crash-landed on a river in Kibeni in Gulf province. Up to date, rescuers were still looking for three other passengers of the single-engine aircraft operated by Tropicair. The seven survivors, including the pilot, were airlifted to an Oil Search camp at Kopi, in Gulf. Sources told The National that the pilot sent out a distress signal shortly after leaving Kikori for Gobe. They said the cause for the distress signal was not yet known. It is believed the pilot had intended to make an emergency landing on a small airstrip but might have found it too risky as the runway had not been used for some time. The pilot then crash-landed on the river at about 1330LT. Papua New Guinea Accident Investigation Commission’s chief executive, Capt David Inau, said rescuers were at the scene within minutes and confirmed that seven persons on board the plane had been accounted for.

Crash of an ATR42-300F in Madang

Date & Time: Oct 19, 2013 at 0900 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
P2-PXY
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Madang – Tabubil – Kuinga
MSN:
087
YOM:
1988
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7100
Captain / Total hours on type:
3433.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3020
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2420
Circumstances:
Aircraft was performing a flight to Kuinga with an intermediate stop at Tabubil with a cargo consisting of 400 boxes of cigarettes for a total weight of 3,710 kilos. While accelerating on runway 25, just two seconds after Vr, captain decided to abort the takeoff procedure because the aircraft did not lift off. He started an emergency brake procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining runway. It overrun, went through a fence and down an embankment before coming to rest in flames in the Meiro Creek. All three crew escaped themselves and were uninjured, except one slightly. Aircraft was partially destroyed by impact forces and post impact fire.

Crash of a De Havilland Dash-8-100 near Madang: 28 killed

Date & Time: Oct 13, 2011 at 1717 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
P2-MCJ
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Port Moresby - Lae - Madang
MSN:
125
YOM:
1988
Flight number:
CG1600
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
28
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
28
Captain / Total flying hours:
18200
Captain / Total hours on type:
500.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2725
Copilot / Total hours on type:
391
Aircraft flight hours:
38421
Aircraft flight cycles:
48093
Circumstances:
While approaching Madang, aircraft crashed in a jungle 33 km southeast of Airport. SAR arrived on scene few hours later and evacuated four people seriously injured while all 28 other occupants were killed. While descending to Madang, overspeed alarm sounded in the cockpit while both propellers oversped simultaneously and exceeded their maximum RPM limit by about 60%. Crew sent a mayday message and told ATC that both engines stopped. Shortly later, aircraft hit the ground in a relative flat position and was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The four survivors were the captain, the copilot, a stewardess and a passenger.
Probable cause:
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the double propeller overspeed 35 km south south east of Madang on 13 October 2011 involving a Bombardier Inc. DHC-8-103 aircraft, registered P2-MCJ. They should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any organisation or individual.
Contributing safety factors:
 The Pilot-in-Command moved the power levers rearwards below the flight idle gate shortly after the VMO overspeed warning sounded. This means that the release triggers were lifted during the throttle movement.
 The power levers were moved further behind the flight idle gate leading to ground beta operation in flight, loss of propeller speed control, double propeller overspeed, and loss of usable forward thrust, necessitating an off-field landing.
 A significant number of DHC-8-100, -200, and -300 series aircraft worldwide did not have a means of preventing movement of the power levers below the flight idle gate in flight, or a means to prevent such movement resulting in a loss of propeller speed control.
Other safety factors:
 Prior to the VMO overspeed warning, the Pilot-in-Command allowed the rate of descent to increase to 4,200 ft per minute and the airspeed to increase to VMO.
 The beta warning horn malfunctioned and did not sound immediately when one or both of the flight idle gate release triggers were lifted. When the beta warning horn did sound, it did so intermittently and only after the double propeller overspeed had commenced. The sound of the beta warning horn was masked by the noise of the propeller overspeeds.
 There was an uncommanded feathering of the right propeller after the overspeed commenced due to a malfunction within the propeller control beta backup system during the initial stages of the propeller overspeed.
 The right propeller control unit (PCU) fitted to MCJ was last overhauled at an approved overhaul facility which had a quality escape issue involving incorrect application of beta switch reassembly procedures, after a service bulletin modification. The quality escape led to an uncommanded feather incident in an aircraft in the United States due to a beta switch which stuck closed.
 Due to the quality escape, numerous PCU‟s were recalled by the overhaul facility for rectification. The right PCU fitted to MCJ was identified as one of the units that may have been affected by the quality escape and would have been subject to recall had it still been in service.
The FDR data indicated that the right PCU fitted to MCJ had an uncommanded feather, most likely due to a beta switch stuck in the closed position, induced by the propeller overspeed. It was not possible to confirm if the overhaul facility quality escape issue contributed to the beta switch sticking closed, because the PCU was destroyed by the post-impact fire.
 The landing gear and flaps remained retracted during the off-field landing. This led to a higher landing speed than could have been achieved if the gear and flaps had been extended, and increased the impact forces on the airframe and its occupants.
 No DHC-8 emergency procedures or checklists were used by the flight crew after the emergency began.
 The left propeller was not feathered by the flight crew after the engine failed.
 The investigation identified several occurrences where a DHC-8 pilot inadvertently moved one or both power levers behind the flight idle gate in flight, leading to a loss of propeller speed control. Collectively, those events indicated a systemic design issue with the integration of the propeller control system and the aircraft.
Other key findings:
 The flaps and landing gear were available for use after the propeller overspeeds and the engine damage had occurred.
 There was no regulatory requirement to fit the beta lockout system to any DHC-8 aircraft outside the USA at the time of the accident.
 The autopilot could not be used during the accident flight.
 The operator‟s checking and training system did not require the flight crew to have demonstrated the propeller overspeed emergency procedure in the simulator.
 After the accident, the aircraft manufacturer identified a problem in the beta warning horn system that may have led to failures not being identified during regular and periodic tests of the system.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 550 Citation II in Bwagaoia: 4 killed

Date & Time: Aug 31, 2010 at 1615 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
P2-TAA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Port Moresby - Bugoiya
MSN:
550-0145
YOM:
1980
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
14591
Copilot / Total flying hours:
872
Aircraft flight hours:
14268
Circumstances:
Aircraft was conducting a charter flight from Jackson’s International Airport, Port Moresby, National Capital District, Papua New Guinea (PNG), to Bwagaoia Aerodrome, Misima Island, Milne Bay Province, PNG (Misima). There were two pilots and three passengers on board for the flight. The approach and landing was undertaken during a heavy rain storm over Bwagaoia Aerodrome at the time, which resulted in standing water on the runway. This water, combined with the aircraft’s speed caused the aircraft to aquaplane. There was also a tailwind, which contributed the aircraft to landing further along the runway than normal. The pilot in command (PIC) initiated a baulked landing procedure. The aircraft was not able to gain flying speed by the end of the runway and did not climb. The aircraft descended into terrain 100 m beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft impacted terrain at the end of runway 26 at 1615:30 PNG local time and the aircraft was destroyed by a post-impact, fuel-fed fire. The copilot was the only survivor. Other persons who came to assist were unable to rescue the remaining occupants because of fire and explosions in the aircraft. The on-site evidence and reports from the surviving copilot indicated that the aircraft was serviceable and producing significant power at the time of impact. Further investigation found that the same aircraft and PIC were involved in a previous landing overrun at Misima Island in February 2009.
Probable cause:
Contributing safety factors:
• The operator’s processes for determining the aircraft’s required landing distance did not appropriately consider all of the relevant performance factors.
• The operator’s processes for learning and implementing change from the previous runway overrun incident were ineffective.
• The flight crew did not use effective crew resource management techniques to manage the approach and landing.
• The crew landed long on a runway that was too short, affected by a tailwind, had a degraded surface and was water contaminated.
• The crew did not carry out a go-around during the approach when the visibility was less than the minimum requirements for a visual approach.
• The baulked landing that was initiated too late to assure a safe takeoff.
Other safety factors:
• The aircraft aquaplaned during the landing roll, limiting its deceleration.
• The runway surface was described as gravel, but had degraded over time.
• The weather station anemometer was giving an incorrect wind indication.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter in Kokoda: 13 killed

Date & Time: Aug 11, 2009 at 1114 LT
Operator:
Registration:
P2-MCB
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Port Moresby - Kokoda
MSN:
441
YOM:
1975
Flight number:
CG4684
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
13
Captain / Total flying hours:
2270
Captain / Total hours on type:
1970.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2150
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1940
Aircraft flight hours:
46700
Circumstances:
On 11 August 2009, a de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft, registered P2-MCB, with two pilots and 11 passengers, was being operated on a scheduled regular public transport service from Port Moresby to Kokoda Airstrip, Papua New Guinea (PNG). At about 1113, the aircraft impacted terrain on the eastern slope of the Kokoda Gap at about 5,780 ft above mean sea level in heavily-timbered jungle about 11 km south-east of Kokoda Airstrip. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces. There were no survivors. Prior to the accident the crew were manoeuvring the aircraft within the Kokoda Gap, probably in an attempt to maintain visual flight in reported cloudy conditions. The investigation concluded that the accident was probably the result of controlled flight into terrain: that is, an otherwise airworthy aircraft was unintentionally flown into terrain, with little or no awareness by the crew of the impending collision.
Probable cause:
• Visual flight in the Kokoda Gap was made difficult by the extensive cloud coverage in the area.
• The crew attempted to continue the descent visually within the Kokoda Gap despite the weather conditions not being conducive to visual flight.
• It was probable that while manoeuvring at low level near the junction of the Kokoda Gap and Kokoda Valley, the aircraft entered instrument meteorological conditions.
• The aircraft collided with terrain in controlled flight.
Final Report: