Crash of a Boeing 707-3J9C in Fath: 15 killed

Date & Time: Jan 14, 2019 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-CPP
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Bishkek - Payam
MSN:
21128/917
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
15
Circumstances:
The airplane, owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) was completing a cargo flight from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on behalf of Saha Airlines, and was supposed to land at Payam Airport located southwest of Karaj, carrying a load of meat. On approach, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions and the pilot mistakenly landed on runway 31L at Fath Airport instead of runway 30 at Payam Airport which is located 10 km northwest. After touchdown, control was lost and the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 31L is 1,140 meters long), overran and crashed in flames into several houses located past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed by fire as well as few houses. The flight engineer was evacuated while 15 other occupants were killed.

Crash of a Boeing 747-412F in Bishkek: 39 killed

Date & Time: Jan 16, 2017 at 0719 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-MCL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Hong Kong - Bishkek - Istanbul
MSN:
32897/1322
YOM:
2003
Flight number:
TK6491
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
39
Captain / Total flying hours:
10808
Captain / Total hours on type:
820.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5894
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1758
Aircraft flight hours:
46820
Aircraft flight cycles:
8308
Circumstances:
On 16.01.2017, the crew of the Boeing 747-412F TC-MCL aircraft was performing a THY6491 flight from Hong Kong via Bishkek (Manas Airport) to Istanbul (Ataturk Airport) in order to transport the commercial cargo (public consumer goods) of 85 618 kg. The cargo was planned to be offloaded in Istanbul (Ataturk Airport). Manas Airport was planned as a transit airport for crew change and refueling. From 12.01.2017 to 15.01.2017, the crew had a rest period of 69 h in a hotel in Hong Kong. The aircraft takeoff from the Hong Kong Airport was performed at 19:12 on 5.01.2017, with the delay of 2 h 02 min in respect to the planned takeoff time. During the takeoff, the climb and the on-route cruise flight, the aircraft systems operated normally. At 00:41, on 16.01.2017, the aircraft entered the Bishkek ATC Area Control Center over the reference point of KAMUD at flight level of 10 400 m (according to the separation system, established in the People's Republic of China). At 00:51, the crew requested a descent and reached the FL 220 (according to the separation system, established in the Kyrgyz Republic). At 00:59, the crew received the weather information for Manas Airport: "the RVR at the RWY threshold 400 m, the RWY midpoint and RWY end 300 m, the vertical visibility 130 ft". At 01:01, the crew received the specified data: " in the center of the runway RVR three zero zero meters, vertical visibility one five zero feet." At 01:03, the crew requested a descent, the controller cleared for the descent not below FL 180. At 01:05, the crew was handed over to the Approach Control. At 01:06, the crew was cleared for the descent to FL 60, TOKPA 1 ILS approach chart, RWY 26. At 01:10, the controller reported the weather: wind calm, visibility 50 m, RVR 300 m, freezing fog, vertical visibility 160 ft, and requested the crew if they would continue the approach. The crew reported that they would continue the approach. The crew conducted the approach to RWY 26 in accordance with the standard approach chart. At 01:11, the controller informed the crew: "… transition level six zero" and cleared them for the ILS approach to RWY 26. At 01:15, the crew contacted the Tower controller. The Tower controller cleared them for landing on RWY 26 and reported the weather: "…wind calm… RVR in the beginning of the runway four hundred meters, in the middle point three hundred two five meters and at the end of the runway four hundred meters and vertical visibility one six zero... feet". The aircraft approached the RWY 26 threshold at the height significantly higher than the planned height. Continuing to descend, the aircraft flew over the entire length of the RWY and touched the ground at the distance of 900 m away from the farthest end of the runway (in relation to the direction of the approach) (the RWY 08 threshold). After the touchdown and landing roll, the aircraft impacted the concrete aerodrome barrier and the buildings of the suburban settlement and started to disintegrate, the fuel spillage occurred. As a result of the impact with the ground surface and the obstacles, the aircraft was completely disintegrated, a significant part of the aircraft structure was destroyed by the post-crash ground fire. At 01.17 UTC, the Tower controller requested the aircraft position, but the crew did not respond.
Probable cause:
The cause of the Boeing 747-412F TC-MCL aircraft accident was the missing control of the crew over the aircraft position in relation to the glideslope during the automatic approach, conducted at night in the weather conditions, suitable for ICAO CAT II landing, and as a result, the measures to perform a go-around, not taken in due time with the aircraft, having a significant deviation from the established approach chart, which led to the controlled flight impact with terrain (CFIT) at the distance of ≈930 m beyond the end of the active RWY.
The contributing factors were, most probably, the following:
- the insufficient pre-flight briefing of the flight crew members for the flight to Manas aerodrome (Bishkek), regarding the approach charts, as well as the non-optimal decisions taken by the crew when choosing the aircraft descent parameters, which led to the arrival at the established approach chart reference point at a considerably higher flight altitude;
- the lack of the crew's effective measures to decrease the aircraft vertical position and its arrival at the established approach chart reference point while the crew members were aware of the actual aircraft position being higher than required by the established chart;
- the lack of the requirements in the Tower controllers' job instructions to monitor for considerable aircraft position deviations from the established charts while the pertinent technical equipment for such monitoring was available;
- the excessive psycho-emotional stress of the crew members caused by the complicated approach conditions (night time, CAT II landing, long-lasting working hours) and their failure to eliminate the flight altitude deviations during a long time period. Additionally, the stress level could have been increased due to the crew's (especially the PIC's) highly emotional discussion of the ATC controllers' instructions and actions. Moreover, the ATC controllers' instructions and actions were in compliance with the established operational procedures and charts;
- the lack of the crew members' monitoring for crossing the established navigational reference points (the glideslope capture point, the LOM and LIM reporting points);
- the crew's failure to conduct the standard operational procedure which calls for altitude verification at the FAF/FAP, which is stated in the FCOM and the airline's OM. On the other hand, the Jeppesen Route Manual, used by the crew, contains no FAF/FAP in the RWY 26 approach chart;
- the onboard systems' "capture" of the false glideslope beam with the angle of ≈9°;
- the design features of the Boeing 747-400 aircraft type regarding the continuation of the aircraft approach descent in the automatic mode with the constant descent angle of 3° (the inertial path) with the maintained green indication of the armed automatic landing mode (regardless of the actual aircraft position in relation to the RWY) while the aircraft systems detected that the glideslope signal was missing (after the glideslope signal "capture"). With that, the crew received the designed annunciation, including the aural and visual caution alerts;
- the absence of the red warning alert for the flight crew in case of a "false" glideslope capture and the transition to the inertial mode trajectory, which would require immediate control actions from the part of the crew;
- the lack of monitoring from the part of the crew over the aircraft position in regard to the approach chart, including the monitoring by means of the Navigation Display (ND), engaged in the MAP mode;
- the crew's failure to conduct the Airline's Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs), regarding the performance of the go-around procedure in case the "AUTOPILOT" (the AP switching to the inertial mode) and "GLIDESLOPE" (the EGPWS annunciation of the significant glideslope deviation) alerts during the automatic CAT II landing at true heights below 1000 ft (with no visual reference established with either the runway environment or with the lighting system);
- the delayed actions for initiating the go-around procedure with no visual reference established with the runway environment at the decision height (DH). In fact, the actions were initiated at the true height of 58 ft with the established minimum of 99 ft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing KC-135R Stratotanker near Chaldovar: 3 killed

Date & Time: May 3, 2013 at 1448 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
63-8877
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Bishkek - Bishkek
MSN:
18725/708
YOM:
1964
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
On 3 May 2013, at approximately 1448 hours local time (L), a KC-135R, tail number 63-8877, assigned to the 22d Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, 376th Air Expeditionary Wing, Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyz Republic, crashed in the foothills of mountains located 6 miles south of Chaldovar, Kyrgyz Republic. The mishap crew (MC), which consisted of the mishap pilot (MP), mishap co-pilot (MCP), and mishap boom operator (MBO), perished during the accident. The mishap aircraft (MA) exploded inflight, impacted the terrain at three main locations, and burned. The MA was completely destroyed with total loss to government property estimated at $66.3 million. Upon impact, approximately 228 cubic meters of soil were contaminated with jet fuel, and three distinct craters containing a burn pattern were created. The MA’s mission was to refuel coalition aircraft in Afghanistan and then return to the Transit Center at Manas. Immediately after takeoff, the MA experienced an unexpected rapid heading change from the direction of flight known as a crab. During climb, nearly continuous rudder hunting caused the MA’s nose to hunt slowly left and right about one degree in both directions. The MP commented on the lateral control challenges and possible series yaw damper (SYD) malfunction but continued the mission without turning off either the SYD or rudder power. Approximately nine minutes into the flight, the MA began a series of increasing yaw and roll oscillations known as a dutch roll, which was undiagnosed by the MC. The MCP attempted to decrease these oscillations using manual aileron controls, as well as two brief attempts with the autopilot. The manual corrective inputs kept the oscillations from growing. The autopilot use further exacerbated the situation, and the oscillations intensified. After the second autopilot use, the MP assumed control of the MA and used left rudder to start a left turn. A subsequent series of alternating small rudder inputs, caused by the MA’s dutch roll-induced acceleration forces varying the MP’s foot pressure on the rudder pedals, sharply increased the dutch roll oscillations. Within 30 seconds, the MP made a right rudder input to roll out of the turn, exacerbating the dutch roll condition. The cumulative effects of the malfunctioning SYD, coupled with autopilot use and rudder movements during the unrecognized dutch roll, generated dutch roll forces that exceeded the MA’s design structural limits. The tail section failed and separated from the aircraft, causing the MA to pitch down sharply, enter into a high-speed dive, explode inflight and subsequently impact the ground at approximately 1448L.
Crew:
Cpt Victoria Ann Pinckney,
Cpt Mark Tyler Voss,
T/Sgt Herman Mackey III.
Probable cause:
The board president found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was the MA’s tail section separating due to structural overstress as a result of the MC’s failure to turn off either the SYD (Series Yaw Damper) or the rudder power and oscillating dutch roll-induced acceleration forces translating through the MP’s feet as the MP used rudder during the unrecognized dutch roll condition. Additionally, the board president found, by a preponderance of evidence, that the dutch roll was instigated by the MA’s malfunctioning Flight Control Augmentation System that caused directional instability or rudder hunting which substantially contributed to this mishap. Other substantially contributing factors include insufficient organizational training programs, crew composition, and cumbersome procedural guidance.
Final Report:

Crash of a Tupolev TU-134A-3 in Osh

Date & Time: Dec 28, 2011 at 1246 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-020
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bichkek - Osh
MSN:
61042
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
QH003
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
82
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
41313
Aircraft flight cycles:
25326
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Bishkek, the crew started the descent to Osh Airport. The approach was completed in reduced visibility due to foggy conditions. Not properly aligned with runway 12, the aircraft landed hard. It did not bounce but lost its right main gear due to excessive aerodynamic forces (2,5 g). Out of control, the aircraft veered off runway and came to rest upside down, bursting into flames. The aircraft was partially destroyed by fire. All 88 occupants were evacuated, among them 31 were injured, some seriously. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reduced to 300 metres horizontal and 200 metres vertical. RVR for runway 12 was 550 metres.
Probable cause:
On Apr 22nd 2013 a letter of Kyrgyzstan's Transport Prosecutor to Kyrgyzstan's Parliament of April 2012 became known indicating that the airport had been approved to operate in Category I weather minima without being properly equipped and should never have been approved to operate in these conditions, as a result of the investigation the aerodrome has been limited to operate according to visual flight rules only. The aircraft was not properly equipped to conduct the flight lacking a GPWS as well as passenger oxygen, the crew was not qualified to conduct the flight and the oversight by the airline's dispatch and chief pilot was insufficient, the Transport Prosecutor mentioned that the responsibles to oversee flight operation could not answer even the most basic questions. Kyrgyzstan's Civil Aviation Authority failed to oversee the operation of the airline as well. While on approach to Osh the crew was informed about weather conditions permitting an approach, the data transmitted however were incorrect and the actual weather did not even permit an approach. Instead of being established on the approach 10.5km/5.6nm before touchdown the aircraft was established on the extended centerline only about 4.02km/2.17nm before touchdown, however was above the glidepath. A steep dive to reach the runway resulted in a touch down at a high rate of descent and vertical forces beyond the design limit of the aircraft (more than 2.5G), as result of the high impact forces the aircraft did not even bounce but just started to disintegrate, reaching 58 degrees of right roll 270 meters past the runway threshold, between 270 and 550 meters past the threshold the tail fin separated, the aircraft was completely upside down 600 meters past the threshold and came to a stop about 1000 meters past the threshold of the runway. The main door was jammed, the occupants escaped through other doors and the overwing exits. No serious injury occurred, 6 people needed hospital treatment with minor injuries.

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-11F in Shanghai: 3 killed

Date & Time: Nov 28, 2009 at 0814 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
Z-BAV
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Shanghai - Bishkek
MSN:
48408/457
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
SMJ324
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The three engine aircraft departed Shanghai-Pudong Airport on a cargo flight to Bishkek, carrying various goods and seven crew members. During the takeoff roll from runway 35L, the pilot-in-command initiated the rotation but the aircraft did not lift off properly with had a negative vario. It overran the runway and eventually crashed in an open field. Three crew were killed while four others were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed.
Probable cause:
The crew did not properly operate the thrust levers so that the engines did not reach take off thrust. The aircraft had not reached Vr at the end of the runway and could not get airborne. According to the design criteria of the MD11 the crew needs to push at least two thrust levers to beyond 60 degrees, which will trigger autothrust to leave "CLAMP" mode and adjust the thrust to reach the target setting for takeoff, the servo motors would push the thrust levers forward in that case. During the accident departure the pilot in the left seat did not advance the thrust levers to more than 60 degrees, hence the server motors did not work although autothrust was engaged but remained in CLAMP mode and thus did not adjust the thrust to reach takeoff settings. The crew members perceived something was wrong. Audibly the engine sound was weak, visibibly the speed of the aircraft was low, tactically the pressure on the back of the seat was weaker than normal. Somebody within the crew, possibly on the observer seats, suggested the aircraft may be a bit heavy. The T/O THRUST page never appeared (it appears if autothrust is engaged and changes from CLAMP to Thrust Limit setting. Under normal circumstances with autothrust being engaged a click sound will occur as soon as the thrust levers reach the takeoff thrust position. A hand held on the thrust levers will feel the lever moving forward, however, the crew entirely lost situational awareness. None of the anomalies described in this paragraph prompted the crews members' attention. When the aircraft approached the end of the runway several options were available: reject takeoff and close the throttles, continue takeoff and push the throttle to the forward mechanical stop, continue takeoff and immediately rotate. The observer called "rotate", the captain rotated the aircraft. This shows the crew recognized the abnormal situation but did not identify the error (thrust levers not in takeoff position) in a hurry but reacted instinctively only. As the aircraft had not yet reached Vr, the aircraft could not get airborne when rotated. As verified in simulator verification the decision to rotate was the wrong decision. The simulator verification showed, that had the crew pushed the thrust levers into maximum thrust when they recognized the abnormal situation, they would have safely taken the aircraft airborne 670 meters before the end of the runway. The verification also proved, that had the crew rejected takeoff at that point, the aircraft would have stopped before the end of the runway. The crew did not follow standard operating procedures for managing thrust on takeoff. The crew operations manual stipulates that the left seat pilot advances the thrust levers to EPR 1.1 or 70% N1 (depending on engine type), informs the right seat pilot to connect autothrust. The pilot flying subsequently pushes the thrust levers forward and verifies they are moving forward on servos, the pilot monitoring verifies autothrust is working as expected and reaches takeoff thrust settings. In this case the left seat pilot not only did not continue to push the thrust levers forward, but also called out "thrust set" without reason as he did not verify the takeoff thrust setting had been achieved. It is not possible to subdivide the various violations of procedures and regulations. The crew had worked 16 hours during the previous sector. In addition, one crew member needed to travel for 11 hours from Europe to reach the point of departure of the previous sector (Nairobi Kenya), two crew members need to travel for 19 hours from America to the point of departure of the previous sector. These factors caused fatigue to all crew members. The co-pilot was 61 years of age, pathological examination showed he was suffering from hypertension and cardiovascular atherosclerosis. His physical strength and basic health may have affected the tolerance towards fatigue. All crew members underwent changes across multiple time zones in three days. Although being in the period of awakeness in their biological rhythm cycle, the cycle was already in a trough period causing increased fatigue. The captain had flown the Airbus A340 for 300 hours in the last 6 months, which has an entirely different autothrust handling, e.g. the thrust levers do not move with power changes in automatic thrust, which may have caused the captain to ignore the MD-11 thrust levers. The co-pilot in the right hand seat had been MD-11 captain for about 7 years but had not flown the MD-11 for a year. Both were operating their first flight for the occurrence company. The two pilots on the observer seats had both 0 flight hours in the last 6 months. The co-pilot (right hand seat) was pilot flying for the accident sector. The captain thus was responsible for the thrust management and thrust lever movement according to company manual. A surviving observer told the investigation in post accident interviews that the captain was filling out forms and failed to monitor the aircraft and first officer's actions during this critical phase of flight. There are significant design weaknesses in the MD-11 throttle, the self checks for errors as well as degree of automation is not high.
Source: Aviation Herald/Simon Hradecky

Crash of a Boeing 737-219 in Bishkek: 65 killed

Date & Time: Aug 24, 2008 at 2044 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-009
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bichkek - Tehran
MSN:
22088/676
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
IRC6895
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
85
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
65
Captain / Total flying hours:
18250
Captain / Total hours on type:
2337.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4531
Copilot / Total hours on type:
881
Aircraft flight hours:
60014
Aircraft flight cycles:
56196
Circumstances:
On 24 August, 2008 the Boeing 737-200 aircraft registered ЕХ-009 and operated by a crew including a PIC and a Co-pilot of Itek Air was flying a scheduled passenger flight IRC 6895 from Bishkek to Tehran. Also on board there was the cabin crew (3 persons) as well as 85 passengers including two service passengers: a maintenance engineer and a representative of the Iran Aseman Airlines. Flight IRC 6895 was executed in compliance with the leasing agreement No. 023/05 of 15 July, 2005 for the Boeing 737-200 ЕХ-009 between the Kyrgyz airline, Itek Air, and the Iran Aseman Airlines. The crew passed a medical examination in the ground medical office of Manas Airport. The crew did not have any complaints of their health. The crew received a complete preflight briefing. The weather at the departure airport Manas, the destination airport and at alternate aerodromes was favourable for the flight. Total fuel was 12000 kg, the takeoff weight was 48371 kg with the CG at 24,8% MAC, which was within the B737-200 AFM limitations. After the climb to approximately 3000 m the crew informed the ATC about a pressurization system fault and decided to return to the aerodrome of departure. While they were descending for visual approach the aircraft collided with the ground, was damaged on impact and burnt. As a result of the crash and the following ground fire 64 passengers died. The passenger who was transferred on 29 August, 2008 to the burn resuscitation department of the Moscow Sklifasovsky Research Institute died of burn disease complicated by pneumonia on 23 October, 2008, two months after he got burn injuries. Thus, his death is connected with the injuries received due to the accident.
Probable cause:
The cause of the Itek Air B737-200 ЕХ-009 accident during the air-turn back due to the cabin not pressurizing (probably caused by the jamming of the left forward door seal) was that the crew allowed the aircraft to descend at night to a lower than the minimum descent altitude for visual approach which resulted in the crash with damage to the aircraft followed by the fire and fatalities. The combination of the following factors contributed to the accident:
- Deviations from the Boeing 737-200 SOP and PF/PM task sharing principles;
- Non-adherence to visual approach rules, as the crew did not keep visual contact with the runway and/or ground references and did not follow the prescribed procedures after they lost visual contact;
- Loss of altitude control during the missed approach (which was performed because the PIC incorrectly evaluated the aircraft position in comparison with the required descent flight path when he decided to perform visual straight-in approach);
- Non-adherence to the prescribed procedures after the TAWS warning was triggered.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Boeing KC-135R Stratotanker in Bishkek

Date & Time: Sep 26, 2006 at 2010 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
63-8886
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bishkek - Bishkek
MSN:
18734
YOM:
1964
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On Sept. 26, at approximately 8:03 p.m. local time, a KC-135R landed at Manas International Airport following a combat mission over Afghanistan. After landing, the KC-135R was parked at the intersection of the active runway and a taxiway while the crew awaited clarification on instructions from the air traffic control tower. The KC-135R was struck by a host nation TU-154 that was taking off. The TU-154's right wing struck the fairing of the KC-135R's No. 1 engine. The force of the impact nearly severed the No. 1 engine from KC-135R and destroyed a portion of the aircraft's left wing. The TU-154 lost approximately six feet of its right wingtip, but was able to get airborne and return to the airport for an emergency landing with no additional damage to the aircraft. The three aircrew members on board the KC-135R, as well as the nine aircrew members and 52 passengers aboard the TU-154, survived the accident. None of the aircrew or passengers on board the TU-154 sustained any injuries. One KC-135 crew member sustained minor abrasions while evacuating the aircraft.
Probable cause:
The collision between the TU-154 and KC-135R aircraft was clearly an accident and not the result of any intentional conduct. The Accident Investigation Board, convened by AMC, determined that the accident was caused by the Kyrgyzaeronavigation air traffic controller who cleared a civilian airliner for takeoff without verifying that the KC-135R was clear of the runway. In addition to the air traffic controller, the AIB found evidence of several contributing factors involving the KC-135R aircrew, conflicting published airport notices, and a tower liaison employed by the U.S. Government to facilitate communication between the tower and U.S. aircrews. Although the AIB found the air traffic controller primarily at fault, the U.S. KC-135R crew and tower liaison shared responsibility for ensuring the KC-135R cleared the runway to a safe location following landing. The accident might have been avoided had any of them exercised better awareness of their situation.
In conclusion, the AIB determined the principal cause of the mishap was the Kyrgyzaeronavigation controller clearing the TU-154 for takeoff without verifying that KC-135R was clear of the runway, there was evidence the following factors also contributed to the mishap:
- The Kyrgyz air traffic controller's instruction to vacate at taxiway Golf after dark conflicted with a published Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that limited that taxiway's use to daylight hours. The contractor safety liaison (LNO) employed by the U.S. Air Force to facilitate communication between its aircrews and Kyrgyz controllers did not clarify the apparent discrepancy.
- After questioning the Kyrgyz controller's instruction to vacate the runway at taxiway Golf, the LNO instructed the KC-135R crew to hold short of Alpha. The mishap KC-135R crew misperceived the LNO's instructions and responded "holding short of Golf." The LNO failed to catch the read-back error.
- The Kyrgyz controller failed to maintain awareness of the KC-135R's location.
- The LNO failed to maintain situational awareness and intervene when the controller's actions endangered the KC-135R and aircrew.
The KC-135R is assigned to the 92nd Air Refueling Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, Wash. While deployed at Manas AB, the KC-135R and its aircrew were assigned to U.S. Central Command's 376th Air Expeditionary Wing, flying missions supporting coalition aircraft over Afghanistan.
Final Report:

Crash of a Yakovlev Yak-42D near Trabzon: 75 killed

Date & Time: May 26, 2003 at 0445 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-42352
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Bishkek - Trabzon - Zaragoza
MSN:
18 11 395
YOM:
1988
Flight number:
UKM4230
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
13
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
62
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
75
Aircraft flight hours:
18739
Aircraft flight cycles:
9700
Circumstances:
Chartered by the Spanish Government, the aircraft was completing a charter flight from Bishkek to Zaragoza with an intermediate stop in Trabzon, carrying 62 Spanish peacekeepers and 13 crew members. The 62 passengers were respectively 41 members of the Land Forces and 21 members of the Air Force who were returning to Spain following a peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. While descending to Trabzon Airport by night, the crew encountered poor visibility due to foggy conditions. Unable to establish a visual contact with the approach lights and the runway 29, the crew initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, while completing a second approach, the crew failed to realize he was not following the correct pattern for an approach to runway 29 when the aircraft impacted a mountain at an altitude of 4,600 feet. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 75 occupants were killed. The wreckage was found 3,5 km east of the village of Maçka, about 23 km southwest of the airport.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain due to the combination of the following factors:
- Loss of situational awareness on part of the flying crew,
- The crew failed to comply with the Standard Operational Procedures published by the operator,
- The crew failed to follow the published approach charts,
- Implementation of a non-precision approach,
- Incorrect use of the automated flight systems,
- Inadequate training (LOFT),
- The crew descended below the MDA in limited visibility.

Crash of an Ilyushin II-62M in Bishkek

Date & Time: Oct 23, 2002 at 0457 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
RA-86452
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow - Bishkek
MSN:
16 22 2 1 2
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
34662
Aircraft flight cycles:
6060
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Moscow-Domodedovo Airport on a positioning flight Bishkek-Manas Airport where cargo should be loaded. The water ballast tanks were not filled, causing the centre of gravity to be outside the allowed limits. After passing the outer marker on approach to runway 26, a 15-second period of oscillations started with changes in bank angle and heading (between 245° and 255°). The plane passed over the runway threshold at a height of 30 metres and at a speed of 293 km/h. At this point the altitude should have been 15 metres. At a height of 20 metres, at a speed of 297 km/h, the thrust reversers of the n°1 and 4 engines were deployed. This was contrary to regulations, which stipulate that thrust reversers may only be deployed at the leveling-off altitude of 5-8 metres. The nose then rose to a 7° pitch angle. This was caused by the activation of the thrust reversers and the centre of gravity which was too far aft. The pitch-up could not be countered by a 13° nose down elevator application. The plane finally touched down on the maingear wheels 1395 metres down the 4,200 metres long runway. The flight engineer, without telling the pilot in command, shut down the n°2 and 3 engines. With an elevator-down deflection of 10-11° and the stabilizer at -3,3° the crew were still not able to get the nose gear on the ground. After retracting the thrust reversers and with the elevator deflected in a 21° nose-down attitude, the nose pitched down from +7° to -2,5° in 2-3 seconds. The stabilizer was then trimmed from -3,3° to +9° which caused the pitch angle to increase again. The Ilyushin ran off the left side of the runway 3,001 metres past the runway threshold. The plane continued until colliding with a concrete obstruction. The aircraft caught fire and burned out almost completely.
Probable cause:
Wrong approach configuration on part of the flying crew, which caused the airplane to land too far down the runway. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Poor crew coordination,
- The pilot-in-command who was also the General Manager of the company, did not had sufficient training and qualifications to act in such position,
- Poor crew resources management,
- Poor flight and approach planning.

Crash of a Yakovlev Yak-40 in Osh

Date & Time: Oct 21, 2001
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EX-87470
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Osh – Bishkek
MSN:
9441537
YOM:
1974
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
32
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll at Osh Airport, the captain decided to abort for unknown reasons. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft verran and came to rest in a ravine. All 36 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.