Lion Air

The aircraft departed runway 25L at Jakarta-Soekarno-Hatta Airport at 0621LT bound for Pangkal Pinang, carrying 181 passengers and 8 crew members. The crew was cleared to climb but apparently encountered technical problems and was unable to reach a higher altitude than 5,375 feet. At this time, the flight shows erratic speed and altitude values. The pilot declared an emergency and elected to return to Jakarta when control was lost while at an altitude of 3,650 feet and at a speed of 345 knots. The airplane entered a dive and crashed 12 minutes after takeoff into the Kerawang Sea, about 63 km northeast from its departure point. The airplane disintegrated on impact and few debris were already recovered but unfortunately no survivors. It has been reported that the aircraft suffered various technical issues during the previous flight on Sunday night but was released for service on Monday morning. Brand new, the airplane was delivered to Lion Air last August 18. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were considered as good. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) was found on 14 January 2019. In the initial stages of the investigation, it was found that there is a potential for repeated automatic nose down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer when the flight control system on a Boeing 737 MAX aircraft receives an erroneously high single AOA sensor input. Such a specific condition could among others potentially result in the stick shaker activating on the affected side and IAS, ALT and/or AOA DISAGREE alerts. The logic behind the automatic nose down trim lies in the aircraft's MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) that was introduced by Boeing on the MAX series aircraft. This feature was added to prevent the aircraft from entering a stall under specific conditions. On November 6, 2018, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) directing operators to existing flight crew procedures to address circumstances where there is erroneous input from an AOA sensor. On November 7, the FAA issued an emergency Airworthiness Directive requiring "revising certificate limitations and operating procedures of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to provide the flight crew with runaway horizontal stabilizer trim procedures to follow under certain conditions.

On 13 April 2013, a Boeing 737-800 aircraft, registered PK-LKS, was being operated by PT. Lion Mentari Airlines (Lion Air) on a scheduled passenger flight as LNI 904. The aircraft departed from Husein Sastranegara International Airport (WICC) Bandung at 0545 UTC to Ngurah Rai International Airport (WADD), Bali, Indonesia. The flight was the last sector of four legs scheduled for the crew on that day which were Palu (WAML) - Balikpapan (WALL) - Banjarmasin (WAOO) - Bandung (WICC) - Bali (WADD). The aircraft flew at FL 390, while the Second in Command (SIC) was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the Pilot in Command (PIC) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). There were 2 pilots, 5 flight attendants and 101 passengers comprising 95 adults, 5 children and 1 infant making a total of 108 persons on board. The flight from the departure until start of the approach into Bali was uneventful. At 0648 UTC, the pilot made first communications with the Bali Approach controller (Bali Director) when the aircraft was located 80 Nm from BLI VOR. The pilot received clearance to proceed direct to the TALOT IFR waypoint and descend to 17,000 feet. At 0652 UTC, the Bali Director issued a further clearance for the pilot direct to KUTA point and descent to 8,000 feet. At 0659 UTC, the aircraft was vectored for a VOR DME approach for runway 09 and descent to 3,000 feet. At 0703 UTC, while the aircraft was over KUTA point, the Bali Director transferred communications with the aircraft to Bali Control Tower (Ngurah Tower). At 0704 UTC, the pilot contacted Ngurah Tower controller and advised that the aircraft was leaving KUTA point. The Ngurah Tower controller instructed the pilot to continue the approach and to reduce the aircraft speed to provide sufficient separation distance with another aircraft. At 0707 UTC, the Ngurah Tower issued take-off clearance for a departing aircraft on runway 09. At 0708 UTC, with LKS at approximately 1,600 feet AGL, the Ngurah Tower controller saw the aircraft on final approach and gave a landing clearance with additional information that the wind was from 120° at 05 knots. At 0708:47 UTC, the aircraft Enhance Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) aural alert called “ONE THOUSAND”, the SIC said one thousand, stabilized, continue, prepare for go-around missed approach three thousand. The FDR showed that the pilot flown using LNAV (Lateral Navigation) and VNAV (Vertical Navigation) during the approach until disengagement of the Auto Pilot. The sequence of events during the final approach is based on the recorded CVR and FDR data, and information from crew interviews as follows: At 0708:56 UTC, while the aircraft altitude was approximately 900 feet AGL, the SIC commented that the runway was not in sight, whereas the PIC commented “OK. Approach light in sight, continue”. At 0709:33 UTC, after the EGPWS aural alert “MINIMUM” sounded at an aircraft altitude of approximately 550 feet AGL, the SIC disengaged the autopilot and the auto-throttle and then continued the approach. At 0709:43 UTC, the EGPWS called “THREE HUNDRED”. At 0709:47 UTC, the CVR recorded a sound similar to rain hitting the windshield. At 0709:49 UTC, the EGPWS called “TWO HUNDRED”. At 0709:53 UTC, while the aircraft altitude was approximately 150 feet AGL, the PIC took over control of the aircraft. The SIC handed control to the PIC and stated that he could not see the runway. At 0710:01 UTC, after the EGPWS called “TWENTY”, the PIC commanded for go-around. At 0710:02 UTC, the aircraft impacted the water, short of the runway. The aircraft stopped facing to the north at about 20 meters from the shore or approximately 300 meters south-west of the beginning of runway 09. Between 0724 UTC to 0745 UTC, three other aircraft took-off and six aircraft landed using runway 09. At 0750 UTC, the airport was closed until 0850 UTC. At 0755 UTC, all occupants were completely evacuated, the injured passengers were taken to the nearest hospitals and uninjured occupants to the airport crisis centre.

On 2 November 2010, a Boeing Company B737-400 aircraft, registered PK-LIQ, was being operated by Lion Mentari Airlines on a passenger schedule flight with flight number JT 712. This flight was the first flight for the crew and was scheduled for departure at 09.30 LT (02.30 UTC). On board the flight was 175 person included 2 pilots and 4 flight attendants and 169 passengers consisted 2 infants and one engineer. The pilots stated that the aircraft had history problem on the difficulty of selection the thrust reversers and automatic of the speed brake deployment. This problem was repetitive since the past three months. The aircraft pushed back at 0950 LT (0250 UTC). During taxi out, the yaw damper light illuminated for two times. The pilot referred to the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) which guided the pilot to turn off the yaw dumper switch then back to turn on. Considered to these problems, the pilot asked the engineer to come to cockpit and asked to witness the problem. The aircraft departed Soekarno Hatta International Airport, Jakarta at 1012 LT (0312 UTC) with destination of Supadio Airport, Pontianak. The Pilot in Command acted as pilot flying (PF) and the Second in Command acted as pilot monitoring (PM). The flight to Pontianak until commenced for descent was uneventful. Prior to descend, the PF performed approach crew briefing with additional briefing included review of the past experiences on the repetitive problems of thrust reversers which sometimes hard to operate and the speed brake failed to auto deploy. Considering these problems, the PF asked to the PM to check and to remind him to the auto deployment of the speed brake after the aircraft touch down. During descend, the pilot was instructed by Pontianak Approach controller to conduct Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach for runway 15 and was informed that the weather was slight rain. On the initial approach, the auto pilot engaged, flaps 5° and aircraft speed 180 knots. After the aircraft captured the localizer at 1300 feet, the PF asked to the PM to select the landing gear down, flaps 15° and the speed decreased to 160 knots. The PF aimed to set the flaps landing configuration when the glide slope captured. When the glide slope captured, the auto pilot did not automatically follow the glide path and the aircraft altitude maintained at 1300 feet, resulted in the aircraft slightly above the normal glide path. The PF realized the condition then disengaged the auto pilot and the auto throttle simultaneously, and fly manually to correct the glide path by pushing the aircraft pitch down. While trying to regain the correct the glide path, the PF commanded for flaps 40° and to complete the landing checklist. The flap lever has been selected to 40°, but the indicator indicated at 30°. Realized to the flaps indication, the PF asked the landing speed for flaps 30° configuration in case the flaps could not move further to 40°. When aircraft altitude was 600 feet and the pilots completing the landing checklist, the PM reselected the flap from 30° to 40° and was successful. The pilots realized that the aircraft touched down was beyond the touchdown zone and during the landing roll the PF tried to select the thrust reverser but the levers were hard to select and followed by the speed brake failed to automatic-deploy. The pilots did not feel the deceleration, and then the PF applied maximum manual braking and selected the speed brake handle manually. Afterward, the thrust reversers successfully operated and a loud sound was heard prior to the aircraft stop. The Supadio tower controller on duty noticed that the aircraft was about to overrun the runway and immediately pressed the crash bell. The aircraft stopped at approximately 70 meters from the runway or 10 meters from the end of stop-way. The PIC then commanded to the flight attendants to evacuate the passengers through the exits. No one injured in this accident.

Lion Mentari Airline (Lion Air) as flight number LNI-793, departed from Sultan Hasanuddin Airport (WAAA), Makassar, Ujung Pandang, Sulawesi at 0636 UTC for Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta. The estimated flight hour from Makassar to Jakarta was 2 hours. The crew consisted of two pilots and four flight attendants. There were 166 adult passengers. The copilot was the pilot flying for the sector, and the pilot in command (PIC) was the support/monitoring pilot. During the approach to runway 25L at Jakarta, the weather at the airport was reported as wind direction 200 degrees, wind speed 20 knots, visibility 1,000 meters, and rain. The PIC reported that he decided to take over control from the copilot. The PIC later reported that he had the runway in sight passing through 1,000 feet on descent, and he disengaged the autopilot at 400 feet. At about 50 feet the aircraft drifted to the right and the PIC initiated corrective action to regain the centreline. The aircraft touched down to the left of the runway 25L centerline and then commenced to drift to the right. The PIC reported that he immediately commenced corrective action by using thrust reverser, but the aircraft increasingly crabbed along the runway with the tail to the right of runway heading. The investigation subsequently found that the right thrust reverser was deployed, but left thrust reverser was not deployed. The aircraft stopped at 0835 on the right side of the runway 25L, 1,095 meters from the departure end of the runway on a heading of 152 degrees; 90 degrees to the runway 25L track. The main landing gear wheels collapsed, and still attached to the aircraft, were on the shoulder of the runway and the nose wheel was on the runway. The passengers and crew disembarked via the front right escape slide and right emergency exit windows. None of the occupants were injured

Following an uneventful flight from Jakarta, the crew started the descent to Makassar (Ujung Pandang) Airport. On approach to runway 31, flaps were selected down from 15° to 30° when the captain observed an asymmetrical condition between both flaps and decided to set back at 15° and to continue the approach in such conditions. The aircraft landed hard to the left of the runway centerline and bounced twice. Out of control, it veered off runway, lost its right main gear and came to rest few dozen metres further. All 164 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair as the left main gear punctured the fuel tank and the fuselage was deformed.

Prior to departure from Bali to Surabaya, the crew was informed that the left engine's thrust reverser system was out of service. Following an uneventful flight, the crew completed a normal approach to runway 10 then landed according to procedures. After touchdown, the crew activated the thrust reverser when the airplane deviated to the right. The crew elected to counteract but the aircraft veered off runway, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a grassy area. All 144 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While descending to Surakarta-Adisumarmo Airport, the crew was informed about stormy conditions at destination with cumulonimbus and heavy rain falls over the airport with a ceiling at 1,500 feet. The approach was continued and after touchdown on runway 26, the crew started the braking procedure and activated the thrust reverser systems. ON a wet runway, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and slid for few dozen metres, collided with equipments of the localizer antenna, a fence and came to rest in a cemetery. Both pilots and 23 passengers were killed while 70 other occupants were injured. 68 occupants escaped unhurt. The aircraft was destroyed.

The flight was a second route of four routes on a first day of two days schedule flight for the crew. All crew have flight schedule on the previous day and returned to Jakarta. The first flight was from Jakarta to Pekanbaru with departure schedule on 08.00 LT (01.00 UTC). All crew did the pre-flight check completely but did not check the audio warning and departed Jakarta on schedule. The flight was normal and landed in Pekanbaru on schedule. There was no problem reported. Transit in Pekanbaru for about 30 minutes and the flight was ready to continue the next flight to Batam. At 10.15 LT (03.05) the boarding process has been completed and all flight documents have ready. First Officer asked for start clearance and received weather information in Syarif Kasim Airport. The weather was fine, wind calm and clear. After start completed, the aircraft taxi to the beginning of runway 18. Flight crews have set the V1, VR, V2 and V2+15 speed bugs according to the load sheet. Take off power decide to use “reduced take off power” with assumed temperature 35o C while the actual temperature was 27° C. flight Attendant have completed the passenger briefing includes rearrange seat for the seats near the “over wing exit windows”. The checklist was done, but flight crews were not sure the indication of flap setting. When ready for take off, flight crew gave a warning to the flight attendants to take their seats. First Officer acted as “Pilot Flying”. PIC opened the power and adjusted to the required take off power setting. The aircraft rolled normal and there was no abnormal indication. PIC called “V1” and “ROTATE” at speed bugs value setting, and the First Officer rotated the control column and set to 150 ANU (Aircraft Nose Up) pitch. The aircraft’s nose was lifted up but the aircraft did not airborne. Flight attendant who was sitting at the rear felt that the nose was higher than normal. Officer also felt stick shaker, warning for approaching stall. First Officer suddenly noticed a warning light illuminated and cross-checked. He found than the warning came from the problem on the air conditioning system. Both pilots also felt pain in the ear. Recognizing this situation, PIC decided to continue the take off and called to the First Officer “disregard”. Realized that the aircraft did not airborne PIC added the power by moving power levers forward. The speed was increasing and passed the speed bug setting for V2+15 ( ± 158 KIAS) but the aircraft did not get airborne. PIC noticed that the runway end getting closer and he thought that the aircraft would not airborne, he decided to abort the take off and called “STOP”. PIC retarded the power levers to idle and set to reverse thrust, extended the speed brake and applied brake. Nose of the aircraft went down hard and made the front left door (L1) opened and 2 trolleys at front galley move forward and blocked the cockpit door. Flight crew turns the aircraft slightly to the right to avoid approach lights ahead. The aircraft moved out or the runway to the right side of the approach lights. After hit some trees the aircraft stopped at ± 275 meters from the end of runway on heading 285°. One passenger had serious injury and the rest had minor injury, all crew were safe and not injured. No one killed in this accident, while the aircraft considered total loss.