Jakarta-Soekarno-Hatta

On 9 January 2021, a Boeing 737-500 aircraft, registration PK-CLC, was being operated by PT. Sriwijaya Air on a scheduled passenger flight from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta to Supadio International Airport (WIOO), Pontianak . The flight number was SJY182. According to the flight plan filed, the fuel endurance was 3 hours 50 minutes. At 0736 UTC (1436 LT) in daylight conditions, Flight SJY182 departed from Runway 25R of Jakarta. There were two pilots, four flight attendants, and 56 passengers onboard the aircraft. At 14:36:46 LT, the SJY182 pilot contacted the Terminal East (TE) controller and was instructed “SJY182 identified on departure, via SID (Standard Instrument Departure) unrestricted climb level 290”. The instruction was read back by the pilot. At 14:36:51 LT, the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data recorded that the Autopilot (AP) system engaged at altitude of 1,980 feet. At 14:38:42 LT, the FDR data recorded that as the aircraft climbed past 8,150 feet, the thrust lever of the left engine started reducing, while the thrust lever position of the right engine remained. The FDR data also recorded the left engine N1 was decreasing whereas the right engine N1 remained. At 14:38:51 LT, the SJY182 pilot requested to the TE controller for a heading change to 075° to avoid weather conditions and the TE controller approved the request. At 14:39:01 LT, the TE controller instructed SJY182 pilot to stop their climb at 11,000 feet to avoid conflict with another aircraft with the same destination that was departing from Runway 25L. The instruction was read back by the SJY182 pilot. At 14:39:47 LT, the FDR data recorded the aircraft’s altitude was about 10,600 feet with a heading of 046° and continuously decreasing (i.e., the aircraft was turning to the left). The thrust lever of the left engine continued decreasing. The thrust lever of the right engine remained. At 14:39:54 LT, the TE controller instructed SJY182 to climb to an altitude of 13,000 feet, and the instruction was read back by an SJY182 pilot at 14:39:59 LT. This was the last known recorded radio transmission by the flight. At 14:40:05 LT, the FDR data recorded the aircraft altitude was about 10,900 feet, which was the highest altitude recorded in the FDR before the aircraft started its descent. The AP system then disengaged at that point with a heading of 016°, the pitch angle was about 4.5° nose up, and the aircraft rolled to the left to more than 45°. The thrust lever position of the left engine continued decreasing while the right engine thrust lever remained. At 14:40:10 LT, the FDR data recorded the autothrottle (A/T) system disengaged and the pitch angle was more than 10° nose down. About 20 seconds later the FDR stopped recording. The last aircraft coordinate recorded was 5°57'56.21" S 106°34'24.86" E. At 14:40:37 LT, the TE controller called SJY182 to request for the aircraft heading but did not receive any response from the pilot. At 14:40:48 LT, the radar target of the aircraft disappeared from the TE controller radar screen. At 14:40:46 LT, the TE controller again called SJY182 but did not receive any response from the pilot. The TE controller then put a measurement vector on the last known position of SJY182 and advised the supervisor of the disappearance of SJY182. The supervisor then reported the occurrence to the operation manager. The TE controller repeatedly called SJY182 several times and also asked other aircraft that flew near the last known location of SJY182 to call the SJY182. The TE controller then activated the emergency frequency of 121.5 MHz and called SJY182 on that frequency. All efforts were unsuccessful to get any responses from the SJY182 pilot. About 1455 LT, the operation manager reported the occurrence to the Indonesian Search and Rescue Agency (Badan Nasional Pencarian dan Pertolongan/BNPP). At 1542 LT, the Air Traffic Services (ATS) provider declared the uncertainty phase (INCERFA) of the SJY182. The distress phase of SJY182 (DETRESFA) was subsequently declared at 1643 LT.

The aircraft departed runway 25L at Jakarta-Soekarno-Hatta Airport at 0621LT bound for Pangkal Pinang, carrying 181 passengers and 8 crew members. The crew was cleared to climb but apparently encountered technical problems and was unable to reach a higher altitude than 5,375 feet. At this time, the flight shows erratic speed and altitude values. The pilot declared an emergency and elected to return to Jakarta when control was lost while at an altitude of 3,650 feet and at a speed of 345 knots. The airplane entered a dive and crashed 12 minutes after takeoff into the Kerawang Sea, about 63 km northeast from its departure point. The airplane disintegrated on impact and few debris were already recovered but unfortunately no survivors. It has been reported that the aircraft suffered various technical issues during the previous flight on Sunday night but was released for service on Monday morning. Brand new, the airplane was delivered to Lion Air last August 18. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were considered as good. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) was found on 14 January 2019. In the initial stages of the investigation, it was found that there is a potential for repeated automatic nose down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer when the flight control system on a Boeing 737 MAX aircraft receives an erroneously high single AOA sensor input. Such a specific condition could among others potentially result in the stick shaker activating on the affected side and IAS, ALT and/or AOA DISAGREE alerts. The logic behind the automatic nose down trim lies in the aircraft's MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) that was introduced by Boeing on the MAX series aircraft. This feature was added to prevent the aircraft from entering a stall under specific conditions. On November 6, 2018, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) directing operators to existing flight crew procedures to address circumstances where there is erroneous input from an AOA sensor. On November 7, the FAA issued an emergency Airworthiness Directive requiring "revising certificate limitations and operating procedures of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to provide the flight crew with runaway horizontal stabilizer trim procedures to follow under certain conditions.

The approach to Pontianak was unstable and really difficult due to turbulence and poor weather conditions (heavy rain falls). The aircraft landed on wet runway 15 and skidded. It eventually veered off runway to the left and went through a muddy field. The nose gear was torn off while both main gears sank, leaving both engines on the ground. While all 163 occupants were evacuated safely, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were as follow: wind from 230 at 22 knots, visibility 600 metres, few clouds at 900 feet, broken at 700 feet, CB's above the terrain and turbulences.

On 20 December 2011, a Boeing 737-300 aircraft, registered PK-CKM, was being operated by PT. Sriwijaya Air on a schedule passenger flight SJ230 from Soekarno Hatta International Airport (WIII) Jakarta to Adisutjipto International Airport (WARJ), Yogyakarta. There were 141 persons on board; two pilots, four cabin crews and 135 passengers consisted124 adult, 7 children and 4 infant. The aircraft departed from Jakarta at 14.00 LT (07.00 UTC), the pilot in command was the pilot flying and the co-pilot was the pilot monitoring. At 08.10 UTC the aircraft made holding at 8 NM from JOG VOR due to bad weather. After the second holding and the weather was deteriorated, the airport authority closed the airport for takeoff and landing. The pilot requested divert to Juanda Airport (WARR), Surabaya and landed at 08.40 UTC. After refuelling and received the information about weather improvement in Yogyakarta then the aircraft departed, at 09.20 UTC, in this sequence of flight the PIC acted as PF, with 137 persons on board consisted of two pilots, four cabin crews and 131 passengers consisted 120 adult, 7 children and 4 infant. The aircraft was on the fifth sequence from seven aircraft approaching Adisucipto airport Yogyakarta. Passing JOG VOR it was seen on radar screen that the aircraft speed was read 203 Kts at 2700 ft. Approach Controller instructed to reduce the speed. At about 1200 ft, the pilot had the runway insight and disengaged the autopilot and auto throttle. The pilot made correction to the approach profile by roll up to 25 degrees and rate of descend up to 2040 ft per minute. The GPWS warning of ‘pull up’ and sink ‘rate were’ activated. Aircraft touched down at speed 156 Kts of 138 Kts target landing speed. During landing roll, the auto-brake and spoiler activated automatically. The thrust reverse were deployed and the N1 were recorded on the FDR increase and decrease to idle before increased to 80% prior to aircraft stop. The PIC noticed that the aircraft would not be able to stop in the runway and decided to turn the aircraft to the left. The aircraft stopped at 75 meter from the end of runway 09 and 54 meter on the left side of the centre line. Most of the passenger evacuated through left and right forward escape slides. All passengers were evacuated safely. The passenger on the stretcher case was evacuated by the airport rescue. 6 passengers reported minor injured while all crew and the remaining passengers were not injured. The aircraft suffered major damage on the right main and nose wheel.

On 2 November 2010, a Boeing Company B737-400 aircraft, registered PK-LIQ, was being operated by Lion Mentari Airlines on a passenger schedule flight with flight number JT 712. This flight was the first flight for the crew and was scheduled for departure at 09.30 LT (02.30 UTC). On board the flight was 175 person included 2 pilots and 4 flight attendants and 169 passengers consisted 2 infants and one engineer. The pilots stated that the aircraft had history problem on the difficulty of selection the thrust reversers and automatic of the speed brake deployment. This problem was repetitive since the past three months. The aircraft pushed back at 0950 LT (0250 UTC). During taxi out, the yaw damper light illuminated for two times. The pilot referred to the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) which guided the pilot to turn off the yaw dumper switch then back to turn on. Considered to these problems, the pilot asked the engineer to come to cockpit and asked to witness the problem. The aircraft departed Soekarno Hatta International Airport, Jakarta at 1012 LT (0312 UTC) with destination of Supadio Airport, Pontianak. The Pilot in Command acted as pilot flying (PF) and the Second in Command acted as pilot monitoring (PM). The flight to Pontianak until commenced for descent was uneventful. Prior to descend, the PF performed approach crew briefing with additional briefing included review of the past experiences on the repetitive problems of thrust reversers which sometimes hard to operate and the speed brake failed to auto deploy. Considering these problems, the PF asked to the PM to check and to remind him to the auto deployment of the speed brake after the aircraft touch down. During descend, the pilot was instructed by Pontianak Approach controller to conduct Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach for runway 15 and was informed that the weather was slight rain. On the initial approach, the auto pilot engaged, flaps 5° and aircraft speed 180 knots. After the aircraft captured the localizer at 1300 feet, the PF asked to the PM to select the landing gear down, flaps 15° and the speed decreased to 160 knots. The PF aimed to set the flaps landing configuration when the glide slope captured. When the glide slope captured, the auto pilot did not automatically follow the glide path and the aircraft altitude maintained at 1300 feet, resulted in the aircraft slightly above the normal glide path. The PF realized the condition then disengaged the auto pilot and the auto throttle simultaneously, and fly manually to correct the glide path by pushing the aircraft pitch down. While trying to regain the correct the glide path, the PF commanded for flaps 40° and to complete the landing checklist. The flap lever has been selected to 40°, but the indicator indicated at 30°. Realized to the flaps indication, the PF asked the landing speed for flaps 30° configuration in case the flaps could not move further to 40°. When aircraft altitude was 600 feet and the pilots completing the landing checklist, the PM reselected the flap from 30° to 40° and was successful. The pilots realized that the aircraft touched down was beyond the touchdown zone and during the landing roll the PF tried to select the thrust reverser but the levers were hard to select and followed by the speed brake failed to automatic-deploy. The pilots did not feel the deceleration, and then the PF applied maximum manual braking and selected the speed brake handle manually. Afterward, the thrust reversers successfully operated and a loud sound was heard prior to the aircraft stop. The Supadio tower controller on duty noticed that the aircraft was about to overrun the runway and immediately pressed the crash bell. The aircraft stopped at approximately 70 meters from the runway or 10 meters from the end of stop-way. The PIC then commanded to the flight attendants to evacuate the passengers through the exits. No one injured in this accident.

Lion Mentari Airline (Lion Air) as flight number LNI-793, departed from Sultan Hasanuddin Airport (WAAA), Makassar, Ujung Pandang, Sulawesi at 0636 UTC for Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta. The estimated flight hour from Makassar to Jakarta was 2 hours. The crew consisted of two pilots and four flight attendants. There were 166 adult passengers. The copilot was the pilot flying for the sector, and the pilot in command (PIC) was the support/monitoring pilot. During the approach to runway 25L at Jakarta, the weather at the airport was reported as wind direction 200 degrees, wind speed 20 knots, visibility 1,000 meters, and rain. The PIC reported that he decided to take over control from the copilot. The PIC later reported that he had the runway in sight passing through 1,000 feet on descent, and he disengaged the autopilot at 400 feet. At about 50 feet the aircraft drifted to the right and the PIC initiated corrective action to regain the centreline. The aircraft touched down to the left of the runway 25L centerline and then commenced to drift to the right. The PIC reported that he immediately commenced corrective action by using thrust reverser, but the aircraft increasingly crabbed along the runway with the tail to the right of runway heading. The investigation subsequently found that the right thrust reverser was deployed, but left thrust reverser was not deployed. The aircraft stopped at 0835 on the right side of the runway 25L, 1,095 meters from the departure end of the runway on a heading of 152 degrees; 90 degrees to the runway 25L track. The main landing gear wheels collapsed, and still attached to the aircraft, were on the shoulder of the runway and the nose wheel was on the runway. The passengers and crew disembarked via the front right escape slide and right emergency exit windows. None of the occupants were injured

On 27 August 2008, a Boeing 737-200 aircraft, registered PK-CJG, was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta to Sultan Thaha Airport, Jambi with flight number SJY062. On board the flight were two pilots, four flight attendants, and 124 passengers. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Flying (PF) while the Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM). The flight time from Jakarta to Jambi was estimated to be about one hour and the aircraft was dispatched with approximately 4 hours of fuel endurance. The number one electrical engine driven generator was unserviceable, as such the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) generator was used during the flight to maintain two generators operation. Prior to descent into Jambi, the PIC conducted the crew briefing and stated a plan for Makinga straight-in approach to runway 31 with flap 40°, reviewed the go-around procedures and stated that Palembang was the alternate airport.There was no abnormality recorded nor reported until the PIC commenced the approach to Jambi. At 09:18 UTC, the SIC contacted Thaha Tower controller and reported that the aircraft was descending and passing FL160 and had been cleared by Palembang Approach control to descend to 12,000 feet. The Thaha Tower controller issued a clearance to descend to 2500 feet and advised that runway 31 was in use. The SIC asked about the weather conditions and was informed that the wind was calm, rain over the field and low cloud on final approach to runway 31. The PIC flew the aircraft direct to intercept the final approach to runway 31. While descending through 2500 feet, and about 8 miles from the VOR, the flap one degree and flap 5° were selected. Subsequently the landing gear was extended and flap 15° was selected. 13 seconds after flap 15 selection, the pilots noticed that the hydraulic system A low pressure warning light illuminated, and also the hydraulic system A quantity indicator showed zero. The PIC commanded the SIC to check the threshold speed for the existing configuration of landing, weight and with flap 15°. The SIC called out that the threshold speed was 134 kts and the PIC decided to continue with the landing. The PIC continued the approach and advised the SIC that he aimed to fly the aircraft slightly below the normal glide path in order to get more distance available for the landing roll. The aircraft touched down at 0930 UTC and during the landing roll, the PIC had difficulty selecting the thrust reversers. The PIC the applied manual braking. During the subsequent interview, the crew reported that initially they felt a deceleration then afterward a gradual loss of deceleration. The PIC reapplied the brakes and exclaimed to the SIC about the braking condition, then the SIC also applied the brakes to maximum in responding to the situation. The aircraft drifted to the right of the runway centre line about 200 meters prior to departing off the end of the runway, and stopped about 120 meters from the end of the runway 31 in a field about 6 meters below the runway level. Three farmers who were working in that area were hit by the aircraft. One was fatally injured and the other two were seriously injured. The pilots reported that, after the aircraft came to a stop, they executed the Emergency on Ground Procedure. The PIC could not put both start levers to the cut-off position, and also could not pull the engines and APU fire warning levers. The PIC also noticed that the speed brake lever did not extend. The radio communications and the interphone were also not working. The flight attendants noticed a significant impact before the aircraft stopped. They waited for any emergency command from the PIC before ordering the evacuation. However, the passengers started to evacuate the aircraft through the right over-wing exit window before commanded by the flight attendants. The flight attendants subsequently executed the evacuation procedure without command from the PIC. The left aft cabin door was blocked by the left main landing gear that had detached from the aircraft and the flight attendants were unable to open the door. The right main landing gear and both engines were also detached from the aircraft. The Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) come to the crash site and activated the extinguishing agent while the passengers were evacuating the aircraft. The PIC, SIC and FA1 were the last persons to evacuate the aircraft. The APU was still running after all passengers and crew evacuation completed, afterward one company engineer went to the cockpit and switched off the APU. All crew and passengers safely evacuated the aircraft. No significant property damage was reported.

On 10 March 2008, a Boeing Company 737-400 aircraft, registered PK-KKT, was being operated by Adam SkyConnection Airlines (Adam Air) as scheduled passenger flight with flight number DHI292. The flight departed Soekarno – Hatta Airport, Jakarta at 01:30 UTC with destination Hang Nadim Airport, Batam and the estimated time of arrival was 03:05 UTC. On board in this flight were 177 people consisted of two pilots, four flight attendants, and 171 passengers. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as pilot flying (PF) and the Second in Command (SIC) acted as pilot monitoring (PM). The flight until commencing descend was uneventful. Prior to descend, the flight crew received weather information indicating that the weather was fine. At 0302 UTC the flight crew contacted Hang Nadim tower controller and informed them that the visibility was 1,000 meters and they were sequence number three for landing runway 04. The flight crew of the aircraft on sequence number two informed to Hang Nadim tower controller that the runway was insight at an altitude of about 500 feet. The Hang Nadim tower controller forwarded the information to the flight crew of DHI 292, and followed this by issuing landing clearance, and additional information that the wind velocity was 360 degrees at 8 knots and heavy rain. The DHI 292 flight crew acknowledged the information. The landing configuration used flaps 40 degrees with landing speed of 136 knots. The flight crew were able to see the runway prior to the Decision Altitude (DA), however the PIC was convinced that continuing the approach to landing was unsafe and elected to go around. The Hang Nadim tower controller instructed the flight crew to climb to 3000 feet, maintain runway heading, and contact Singapore Approach. At 0319 UTC, DHI 292 was established on the localizer runway 04, and the Hang Nadim tower controller informed them that the visibility improved to 2,000 meters. While on final approach, the flight crew DHI 292 reported that the runway was in sight and the Hang Nadim tower controller issued a landing clearance. On touchdown, the crew felt that the main wheels barely touch the runway first. During the landing roll, as the ground speed decreased below 30 knots, the aircraft yawed to the right. The flight crew attempted to steer the aircraft back to centerline by applying full left rudder. The aircraft continued yaw to the right and came to stop on the runway shoulder at approximately 40 meters from the right side of the runway edge, and 2,760 meters from the runway 04 threshold. No one was injured in this accident. The aircraft was seriously damaged with the right main landing gear assembly detached and collapsing backward and damaging the right wing and flaps. The right engine was displaced from its attachment point.

On 1 November 2007, a Boeing Company B737-200 aircraft, registered PK-RIL, operated by PT. Mandala Airlines as flight number MDL 260, was on a scheduled passenger flight from Jakarta Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta, to Abdurrachman Saleh Airport, Malang, East Java. The pilot in command (PIC) was the handling pilot, and the copilot was the support/monitoring pilot. There were 94 persons on board the aircraft, consisting of two pilots, three cabin crew, and 89 passengers. The aircraft landed at Malang at 1324 Western Indonesian Standard Time (06:24 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). It was reported to have been raining heavily when the aircraft landed on runway 35 at Malang. The aircraft bounced twice after the initial severe hard landing, and the lower drag strut of the nose landing gear fractured, resulting in the rearwards collapse of the nose landing gear and separation of the lower nose landing gear shock strut and wheel assembly. The aircraft’s nose then contacted the runway, and the aircraft came to rest 290 metres before the departure end of runway 17. The crew subsequently reported that during the visual segment of the landing approach, they realized that the aircraft was too high with reference to the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) for runway 35. The PIC increased the aircraft’s rate of descent (ROD) to capture the PAPI. The high ROD was not arrested, and as a consequence, the severe hard landing occurred which substantially damaged the aircraft. No one of the passengers or crew was injured.

On 7 March 2007, a Boeing Company 737-497 aircraft, registered PK-GZC, was being operated by Garuda Indonesia on an instrument flight rules (IFR), scheduled passenger service, as flight number GA200 from Soekarno-Hatta Airport, Jakarta to Adisutjipto Airport, Yogyakarta. There were two pilots, five flight attendants, and 133 passengers on board. The pilot in command (PIC) and copilot commenced duty in Jakarta at about 21:30 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), or 04:30 local time, for the flight to Yogyakarta. Prior to departing Jakarta, during the push back, the PIC contacted the ground engineers and informed them that the number-1 (left) engine thrust reverser fault light on the cockpit instruments had illuminated. The engineers reset the thrust reverser in the engine accessories unit and the fault light extinguished. The scheduled departure time was 23:00. The aircraft took off from Jakarta at 23:17, and the PIC was the pilot flying for the sector to Yogyakarta. The copilot was the monitoring/support pilot. During the cruise, just before top of descent, the crew was instructed by Jakarta Control to ‘maintain level 270 and contact Yogya Approach 123.4’. The copilot acknowledged; ‘contact Yogya 123.4, Indonesia 200’. The PIC started to give a crew briefing at 23:43 stating: ‘in case of holding, heading of 096’. The briefing was interrupted by a radio transmission from Yogya Approach, giving GA200 a clearance to Yogyakarta via airway W 17 for runway 09, and a requirement to report when leaving flight level 270. When radio communication was completed, the PIC continued with the crew briefing for an ILS approach, stating:
When clear approach ILS runway 09, course 088. (C) Frequency 1091, aerodrome elevation three hundred fifty, (C) leaving two thousand five hundred by 6 point 6 DME ILS, (C) to check four DME one thousand six hundred seventy, (C) crossing two DME one thousand thirty seven. Decision Altitude ILS Cat I, five eight seven, two three seven both set, approach flap forty, auto brake two. Speed one three six, one five one, two twenty. Timing from final approach-fix to VOR 6 DME. (C) With airspeed approximately one four one, two minutes thirty six. (C) In case localizer, MDA seven hundred, localizer, miss approach, at point six. (C) DME ILS India Juliet oscar golf. (C) On landing, to the left standby parking stand. Go-around missed approach climb one thousand five hundred turn left. To holding fix via Yogya VOR, continue climb four thousand feet, to cross Yogya at or above two thousand five hundred DME eight. (C).
Twelve minutes and 17 seconds later, Yogya Approach cleared GA200 ‘for visual approach runway zero nine, proceed to long final, report runway in sight’. The copilot acknowledged the clearance and asked for confirmation that they were cleared to descend to circuit altitude, Yogya Approach replied ‘descend to two thousand five hundred initially’. The crew informed the investigation that they were conducting an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 09, in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). However they did not inform Yogya Approach or Yogyakarta Tower that they were flying the 09 ILS approach. At 23:58:10, the aircraft overran the departure end of runway 09 at Yogyakarta Airport. The PIC reported that as the aircraft was about to leave the runway, he shut down both engines. The aircraft crossed a road, and impacted an embankment before stopping in a rice paddy field 252 meters from the threshold of runway 27 (departure end of runway 09). The aircraft was destroyed by the impact forces and an intense, fuel-fed, post impact fire. There were 119 survivors. One flight attendant and 20 passengers were fatally injured. One flight attendant and 11 passengers were seriously injured.