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Crash of a Swearingen SA226TC Metro II in Montluçon: 4 killed

Date & Time: Nov 18, 1988 at 0631 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
F-GCPG
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Montluçon - Paris
MSN:
TC-334E
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
FU440
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Aircraft flight hours:
10346
Circumstances:
Following a night takeoff at Montluçon-Guéret Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft nosed down and struck the ground 600 meters past the runway end. It slid for few dozen meters, collided with bushes and eventually came to rest, bursting into flames. All four occupants were killed. It appears that the Stall Avoidance System (SAS) had activated, resulting in the stick pusher activation at a critical altitude. The Metro's SAS system, as well as the SAS system on this particular aircraft, had a history of problems. These problems resulted in several NTSB Safety Recommendations (A-84-66, A-88-154). The copilot was at controls at the time of the accident.
Crew:
Gérard Van Der Veecken, pilot,
Christian Rémondon, copilot.
Passengers:
Robert Aupetit,
Patrick Desdoit.
Probable cause:
The accident resulted from a reduction in the attitude of the airplane causing a downward trajectory in the moments that followed the takeoff. It is likely that this decrease in attitude is due to an untimely triggering of the stick pusher. The absence of a recorder and the complete destruction of the SAS (apart from angle of attack vane and its transmitter) did not prove this hypothesis. With or without inadvertent triggering of the stick pusher, the imprecision of the right horizon and the absence of external visual references played an important role in this accident.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-120RT Brasília in Bordeaux: 16 killed

Date & Time: Dec 21, 1987 at 1510 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
F-GEGH
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Brussels - Bordeaux
MSN:
120-033
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
AF1919
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
16
Captain / Total flying hours:
2394
Captain / Total hours on type:
101.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1326
Copilot / Total hours on type:
215
Aircraft flight hours:
2505
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Brussels, the crew contacted Bordeaux Approach at 15:01 and was vectored for an ILS approach to runway 23. Visibility was poor with low clouds at 100 feet and a runway visual range (RVR) of between 650 and 350 metres. Flight 1919 crossed the KERAG beacon, the initial approach fix (IAF) at an altitude of FL144, at 15:04:40. Cloud base was still around 100 feet so the crew requested to enter a holding pattern to the south of the airport. The weather conditions slightly improved during the next few minutes and Bordeaux Approach reported a cloud base at 160 feet. Flight 1919 had not reached the holding pattern yet and the pilot decided to attempt to rejoin the ILS. At 15:06:38 the flight was cleared direct to the BD beacon and to descend down to 2000 feet. At the BD beacon, the flight was cleared for final approach and instructed to contact Bordeaux Tower. The airplane had overshot the centreline and was slightly right on the glidepath. Bordeaux Tower then instructed the flight to report over the Outer Marker, which was acknowledged by the captain. After crossing the Outer Marker, the airplane was still not properly established on the ILS. The airplane descended below the glideslope with the crew hurriedly deploying flaps and landing gear. The captain did not contact Bordeaux Tower as requested. Instead he took over control of the airplane, attempting to continue the approach. Both crew members had very little time to adapt to their new roles as the airplane was descending below the glide slope. The descent continued until the aircraft struck tree tops and crashed in the Eysines forrest, about 5 km short of runway. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 16 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The accident was the direct result of poorly managed aircraft trajectory.
- The lack of vigilance with respect to altitude, by one pilot and then the other, when they were in a pilot-flying situation (PF, according to the Air Littoral Operations Manual) both when the aircraft descended out of the ILS beam through 2000 feet altitude and when it descended below 220 feet, the decision height.
- Inadequate coordination of tasks between the two pilots who formed the flight crew, neither of which had performed important tasks related to this function, such as monitoring and reporting ILS or altitude deviations, while in a nonpilot-flying situation (PNF, according to the same manual).
Final Report: