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Crash of a Boeing 747-209F in Brussels

Date & Time: May 25, 2008 at 1331 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N704CK
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New York – Brussels – Bahrain
MSN:
22299/462
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
CKS207
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
15000
Captain / Total hours on type:
3000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
200
Aircraft flight hours:
108560
Aircraft flight cycles:
20599
Circumstances:
The flight crew arrived at Brussels the day before the accident, with a flight from Bahrain. The crew rested until the Sunday morning. The aircraft arrived at Brussels on Sunday with another crew; the two crews exchanged some information regarding the airplane. There were no mechanical problems reported. Runway 20 was in service for take-offs, while Runway 25L was mostly used for landings. The pilot performed the pre-flight inspection; he found only minor discrepancies (left inner tire check and E&E door latch down). The pre-flight briefing covered the standard departure call-outs, the runway incursion information, a discussion on the Runway 20 length, etc.. The crew also briefed about the engine failure procedures for an engine failure prior to V1, and they also briefed about an abort takeoff after V1 if there was a dangerous situation that would not allow the airplane to fly. After completing the flight documents, the crew requested an early departure, which they received. For the computation of the take-off parameters, the crew used the Kalitta Air On-board Performance System (OPS computer). The crew determined they needed the full length of the runway for take-off. The airplane taxied towards the B1 intersection for the Runway 20. After a few minutes, waiting for another airplane to land on Runway 25, they lined up on Runway 20, making a tight turn, in order to gain a few meters with respect to the usual departure position. The airplane was cleared for take-off at 11:29. The pilot pushed the throttles forward and checked the engines were stable. The Flight Engineers then set the engine power for take-off (setting “normal”, also known as “reduced thrust”). The aircraft started to accelerate. The standard call-out were made when the speed reached the determined value.
- “airspeed”
- 80 knots
- V1
A few seconds after reaching V1, the engine N°3 ingested a bird. Approximately 5 seconds after V1, the engine N°3 stalled and caused a loud “bang”, and a vibration felt in the cockpit. The pilot stated he had the feeling that the aircraft was no longer accelerating, and decided to abort the take-off. Two seconds after having heard the detonation, the thrust levers were brought back to idle, and braking action was initiated. The thrust reversers were not deployed. The FO called the tower, and notified the aircraft was going to the overrun. The pilot turned the aircraft a few degrees to the right, in order to avoid the approach lights at the end of the runway. The aircraft left the runway at a speed of approximately 72 Knots. The aircraft reached a first embankment, dropping from a height of 4 m, and broke in three parts. The aircraft came to a stop just above the top of the railroad embankment. The crew exited the airplane through the service door since the L1 door normally used was blocked due to deformation of the structure.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by the decision to reject the takeoff 12 knots after passing V1 speed. The following factors contributed to the accident:
- Engine Nr 3 experienced a bird strike, causing it to stall. This phenomenon was accompanied by a loud bang, noticed by the crew.
- The aircraft line up at the B1 intersection although the take-off parameters were computed with the full length of the runway.
- The situational awareness of the crew,
- Less than maximum use of deceleration devices.
- Although the RESA conforms to the minimum ICAO requirement, it does not conform to the ICAO recommendation for length.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-61F at Guantánamo Bay NAS

Date & Time: Aug 18, 1993 at 1656 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N814CK
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Norfolk – Guantánamo Bay
MSN:
46127
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
CB808
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
20727
Captain / Total hours on type:
1527.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
15350
Copilot / Total hours on type:
492
Aircraft flight hours:
43947
Aircraft flight cycles:
18829
Circumstances:
Flight 808 took off from Norfolk at 14:13 for a cargo flight to Guantánamo Bay. The flight and arrival into the Guantánamo terminal area was uneventful. At 16:34, while the flight was descending from FL320, radio contact was established with the Guantánamo radar controller. The radar controller instructed flight 808 to maintain VFR 12 miles off the Cuban coast and report at East Point. The runway in use was runway 10. The flight crew then requested a runway 28 approach, but changed this back to a runway 10 approach a couple of minutes later. Clearance was given at 16:46 with wind reported at 200°/7 knots. The runway 10 threshold was located 0,75 mile East of Cuban airspace, designated by a strobe light, mounted on a Marine Corps guard tower, located at the corner of the Cuban border and the shoreline. On the day of the accident, the strobe light was not operational (both controller and flight crew were not aware of this). The aircraft was approached from the south and was making a right turn for runway 10 with an increasing angle of bank in order to align with the runway. At 200-300 feet agl the wings started to rock towards wings level and the nose pitched up. The right wing appeared to stall, the aircraft rolled to 90deg. angle of bank and the nose pitched down. The aircraft then struck level terrain 1400 feet west of the approach end of the runway and 200 feet north of the extended centreline.
Probable cause:
The impaired judgement, decision-making, and flying abilities of the captain and flight crew due to the effects of fatigue; the captain's failure to properly assess the conditions for landing and maintaining vigilant situational awareness of the airplane while manoeuvring onto final approach; his failure to prevent the loss of airspeed and avoid a stall while in the steep bank turn; and his failure to execute immediate action to recover from a stall. Additional factors contributing to the cause were the inadequacy of the flight and duty time regulations applied to 14 CFR, Part 121, Supplemental Air Carrier, international operations, and the circumstances that resulted in the extended flight/duty hours and fatigue of the flight crew members. Also contributing were the inadequate crew resource management training and the inadequate training and guidance by American International Airways, Inc., to the flight crew for operations at special airports such as Guantanamo Bay; and the Navy's failure to provide a system that would assure that local tower controller was aware of the inoperative strobe light so as to provide the flight crew with such information.
Final Report: