British European Airways - BEA

G-ARCO left London-Heathrow Airport at 2145 hours on 11 October 1967, operating British European Airways (BEA) flight BE284 to Athens. It carried 38 passengers and 2 154 kg of freight, including 920 kg for Nicosia. The aircraft arrived at Athens at 0111 hours on 12 October and reached its parking area on the apron at about 0115 hours. Six Athens passengers were disembarked. At Athens the flight became Cyprus Airways flight CY 284 for Nicosia. Four passengers and the captain remained on board the aircraft whilst it was refuelled and serviced for the flight to Nicosia. The Captain and the two First Officers continued with the aircraft but the cabin staff was changed, the new staff being those of Cyprus Airways. Twenty-seven passengers joined the aircraft at Athens for the flight to Nicosia. From the evidence of the BEA and Olympic Airways staff at Athens the aircraft's transit was normal. It was refuelled to .a total of approximately 17 000 kg and only one minor defect, relating to the Captain's beam compass, was recorded in the technical log. This defect was dealt with by the ground crew. The baggage for the passengers joining the aircraft for the flight to Nicosia and the freight was placed in holds 1 and 2; the baggage and freight from London to Nicosia remained in holds 4 and 5. The aircraft taxied out at 0227 hours and was airborne on schedule at 0231 hours; it was cleared by Athens Control to Nicosia on Upper Airway Red 19 to cruise at flight level (FL) 290. After take-off it climbed to 4 000 ft on the 180' radial of Athens VOR and then turned direct to Sounion, which it reported crossing at 0236 hours. At 0246 hours, the aircraft reported that it was crossing R19B at FL 290 and was estimating Rhodes at 0303 hours. At 0258 hours at an estimated position 3fi041'N, 27O13'E, the aircraft passed a westbound BEA Comet which was flying at FL 280. Each aircraft saw the other; the Captain of the westbound aircraft has staked that flight conditions were clear and smooth. G-ARC0 passed Rhodes at 0304 hours and at 0316 hours reported passing R19C at FL 290 and that it estimated passing abeam of Myrtou, Cyprus, at 0340 hours. This message was not received by Athens direct but was relayed by the westbound aircraft. G-ARC0 was then cleared by Athens to change to the Nicosia FIR frequency. The recording of the R/T communications with Nicosia shows that G-ARC0 called them to establish contact; the time of this call was 0318 hours + 9 seconds and it is estimated that the aircraft would then have been at a position 35° 51'N 30°17' E, approximately 15 NM to the east of R19C. Nicosia replied to the aircraft with an instruction to go ahead with its message but no further transmission was heard. Nicosia continued to try to contact the aircraft but without result and overdue action was therefore taken. At 0440 hours R.A.F. Search and Rescue aircraft took off from Akrotiri; at 0625 hours wreckage from G-ARC0 was sighted in the vicinity of R19C, the last reported position. None of the 66 occupants survived the crash.

The aircraft was on a scheduled domestic flight from Turnhouse Airport, Edinburgh to Heathrow Airport, London. The flight departed Edinburgh at 23:17 hours UTC on October 26 for an domestic flight to London. The flight was uneventful until Garston VOR, the holding point. At 00:15 the captain decided to attempt a landing on runway 28R. The co-pilot was probably making the ILS approach, monitored on PAR by the air traffic control officer, while the pilot-in-command would be seeking a visual reference to enable him if possible to take over control and land. RVR on this runway was reported as 350 m (1140 feet). At 00:23 the captain informed ATC that he was overshooting. He then decided to make a second attempt, this time on runway 28L for which the RVR was reported as 500 m (1634 feet). Since the ILS was operating on glide path only and not in azimuth, ATC provided a full taIkdown. At half a mile from touchdown the PAR Controller was not entirely satisfied with the positioning of the aircraft in azimuth and was about to give instructions to overshoot when he observed that the pilot had in fact instituted na overshoot procedure. At 00:35 hours the pilot-in-command reported that they overshot because they did not see anything. He then requested to join one of the stacks and hold for a little while. This request was granted. The pilot-in-command decided to wait for half an hour at the Garston holding point. At 00:46 another Vanguard landed successfully on runway 28R. At 01:11, although there had been no improvement in the weather conditions, the pilot-in-command probably stimulated by the other aircraft's success, asked permission to make another attempt to land on runway 28R. Meanwhile another Vanguard aircraft had overshot on 28R. However, the captain started another monitored ILS final approach on runway 28R at 01:18. At 01:22 the PAR controller passed the information that the aircraft was 3/4 of a mile from touchdown and on the centre line. Twenty-two seconds later the pilot-in-command reported they were overshooting. The copilot rotated the airplane abruptly and the captain raised the flaps. Instead of selecting the flaps to 20 degrees, he selected 5 degrees or fully up. Because the speed was not building up, the copilot relaxed pressure on the elevator. Speed increased to 137 kts and the vertical speed indicator showed a rate of climb of 850 feet/min. The copilot therefore put the aircraft's nose further down. At four seconds before impact the VSI was probably showing a substantial rate of climb and the altimeter a gain in height, although the airplane was in fact losing height. The copilot was misled into continuing his down pressure on the elevator. The vanguard had by then entered a steep dive. The aircraft hit the runway about 2600 feet from the threshold.

The aircraft took off from London Airport (Heathrow) at 1627 hours GMT on a scheduled international freight flight to Milan-Linate Airport, Italy, and the flight proceeded normally as far as the boundary of Milan TMA (Monteceneri NDB). Control of the aircraft was transferred to Milan ACC from Zurich ACC at FL 170, and after the first air- ground communication the aircraft was cleared to Linate Airport via Saronno and Linate NDB at 1844: 30 hours GMT. Before reaching Saronno VOR the pilot asked for and was given permission to make a slight diversion to the south-west in order to avoid a considerable thunderstorm formation which, as forecast, arrived over the area of Milan CTR at 1952 hours. At the pilot's request, the ATC cleared the descent with a clearance limit of 6 000 ft, confirming the previous clearance for descent. The pilot confirmed that he had received the clearance and reported that he was south-west of Saronno on a heading of 1800. At 1855 hours, the pilot reported that he was still maintaining a heading of 180° to avoid the thunderstorm area; the estimate for Linate NDB was however 1904-1905 hours. Following this communication, the control at Milan ACC amended the previous descent clearance, limiting it to FL 130 in order to safeguard other air traffic south of the CTR. At 1903 hours, the pilot unexpectedly reported that he was heading for Voghera VOR, without having been cleared for this by Control. After a few seconds he reported that he was over Voghera VOR at FL 130 and asked far further descent clearance which he was not given, in view of the unexpected and unorthodox position reported. He was asked to maintain FL 130 until he reached Linate NDB. At 1909 hours, the pilot reported that he was close to Linate NDB at FL 130-135 in a severe thunderstorm. After 30 seconds he reported his position over Linate NDB with certainty and was therefore cleared to descend to holding pattern down to 6 000 ft. At 1911 hours, Approach control gave clearance for the descent to be continued down to 2 000 f t, the minimum safe altitude over Linate NDB. At 1917 hours the pilot, speaking in a slightly agitated manner and sometimes with words which were incomprehensible, said repeatedly that he was not in fast certain of his actual position in relation to Linate NDB, that he was aligned with Linate ILS but that ha was not able to establish his exact position in relation to the radio beacon, the Latter being subject to considerable interference from the heavy electrical discharges due to the thunderstorm. The pilot also stated that he could not hear the ILS Outer Marker. At 1919 hours, the pilot confirmed his uncertainty regarding his position and asked to maintain 4 000 ft for another holding pattern; he was again given the QFE and at 1922 hours reported that he had come down to 2 000 ft, that he was inbound and that he would call over the Outer Marker. After he had been given the clearance, there were no further communications and no reply to the repeated calls from Milan Approach Control. It was subsequently found that the aircraft, which was aligned with the ILS localizer, struck the top of a hill at an altitude of 675 m, 35 NM from the threshold of runway 36, between 1923 and 1925 hours. A crew member was injured while the second was killed.

The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from London to Rome, Athens, Istanbul, Ankara, Nicosia and Tel Aviv. From Istanbul the flight was operated by British European Airways on behalf of Cyprus Airways. The operating crew, employed by BEA, consisted of a captain and two first officers. Also aboard were four cabin staff employed by Cyprus Airways and 27 passengers. The trip to Ankara was normal. The time between landing and starting engines at Ankara was 46 minutes during which light snow was falling. (At take-off the aircraft had a light covering of snow on the upper surface of its wings, however, this deposit had no bearing on the accident). The radio-telephony tape recording showed that the aircraft taxied out along the short taxiway, then back-tracked up the runway to its take-off position on runway 21 at the intersection with the longer taxiway. The runway length available from this position was 9,027 feet. Take-off weight was 53 465 kg, i.e. 18 185 kg below maximum permissible weight or 1 085 kg below the regulated take-off weight. The takeoff run as to distance and time was quite normal, as also were rotation and unstick. The first abnormality occurred a second or two after unstick when the aircraft rapidly assumed an excessively steep climbing angle. One witness put the angle achieved as about twice the normal, another as 45° to 50°. There was also evidence from witnesses of a wing drop and of variations in the engine noise during this climb. The aircraft stalled with the left wing down at a height of about 450 ft then sank to the ground in a relatively flat attitude. The accident site was 1 600 m and on a bearing of 214° from Esenboğa Tower. The accident occurred at 2343LT. The aircraft was almost completely destroyed by impact and fire. All 7 crew and 20 passengers were killed. Six passengers were seriously injured.

On final approach to Land's End Airport, the twin engine aircraft was too low and struck the ground short of runway. The left main gear was sheared off and the airplane came to rest with its both left wings partially sheared off. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Upon landing, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane skidded for about 500 yards before coming to rest in flames. All 59 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

The Viscount was taxiing along the runway after landing when a hydraulic system pressure loss occurred. Wheel brakes and nosewheel steering were inoperative and the plane left the runway, rolling down an area of downslope. Because of the hydraulic system pressure loss an attempt by the pilot to raise the gear, failed. The aircraft came to rest against the control tower. Investigation revealed a fractured pipe line and faulty operation of a non-return valve intended to conserve pressure if there were a pressure loss in the main hydraulic system.
Source:
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19600105-0

After touchdown at Land's End Airport (St Just), the twin engine airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and struck a hedge before coming to rest. All six occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The Viscount, en route from London to Naples, flying on Airway Amber 1, reported over Ostia at 23,500 feet at 1144 hours advising that it was continuing to Ponza, estimating arrival over this point at 1157. At 1150 it collided east of Nettuno with an Italian Air Force F-86 Sabre which was taking part in group training of aerobatic maneuvers. The 26 passengers and 5 crew aboard the Viscount were killed in the accident, and the pilot of the F-86 parachuted to safety. Both aircraft were destroyed.

While cruising at an altitude of 7,500 feet on a cargo flight, the crew contacted ATC and obtained the permission to descent to 5,500 feet due to thunderstorm activity. Shortly later, the airplane went out of control, dove into the ground and crashed in a field located in Châtenoy, about 35 km east of Orléans. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and all three crew members were killed.