Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

FILE NO. 5002-W-1801
5002-W-1802

CONFIDENTIAL

VOLUME NO. 1

VOL. 5002-W-1801 5002-W-1802

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

FROM Sept. 1/71
TO MAY 14/72

IMPORTANT-**NOTIFY RECORDS** WHEN FILE IS PASSED DIRECT TO ANOTHER SECTION

SUBJECT Aircraft
SUB-SUBJECT Accidents - Air Collisons
FILE TITLE CF - HTN Canso & CF - IDS Canso

DORMANT

(1) DATE LEFT RECORDS	(2) PURPOSE FOR WHICH REFERRED (IF PURPOSE FOR WHICH REFERRED CANNOT BE EXPRESSED IN ONE LINE ADD MEMO TO FILE AND ENTER HERE "WITH MEMO")	(3) REFER FILE TO	(4) ENTER DATE TO BRING FORWARD WHEN REQUIRED	(5) USER'S INITIAL TO SHOW ACTION COMPLETED
SEP 8 1971	22477	WCAI		EB.
SEP 20 1971	24223	WCAI		DD
SEP 28 1971	25278	WCAI		DD
NOV 15 1971	31284	WCAI 22/11/71		DD
NOV 19 1971	B.F. 22/11/71 (31284)	WCAI		DD
		WCA		
DEC 10 1971		WCAW		FR
		WCAR		
DEC 13 1971		WCAE		
		WCAT		
DEC 21 1971		DCAM		MSB
DEC 24 1971				
FEB - 9 1972	42481	WCAI		DD
APR 20 1972	02993	WCAI		DD
	Mr [illegible]	CAIO-1 (2)		R
	Mr Richards	CAS (1)		

DORMANT

DORMANT

DORMANT

02-0001

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

CLOSED VOLUME

CANADA

VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM À CONTER DU	TO JUSQU' AU

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE – À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS – NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE – POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. – DOSSIER Nº	VOLUME

CGSB STANDARD FORM 31BP
7540-21-857-8809

000002

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Coroners Inquest CF-HTN-IDS

1. Some witnesses indicate that both aircraft may have banked at the last instant prior to the collision - indicating evasive action. This could have been the actual collision, where because of the wing contact, both aircraft would be deflected into banked attitudes.

2. Page 33
Radio communication & frequencies at or while fighting a fire seems to be a matter of mutual consent among aircraft involved. MOT regulations are mentioned as <u>not being specific</u> in that regard. 122.8 & 122.9 are used by the aircraft and there was even mention of 122.1 being used. Perhaps, specific freq. assignments to individual fires would be advisable?

3. Pete Ferguson. Pages 39-44 - evasive in his testimony - indicates - they always used helicopter "bird dogs" - but that there were periods when a bird dog could be absent Also he went on to say - he didn't mix rotors with fixed wing - & get the impression he was using a helicopter as "fire control" not as "bird dog" for aircraft control

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

4. It was apparent from Terry Carlo testimony, a helicopter, who had been in the area of the crash, had left 45 minutes prior to the crash - for refuelling & perhaps lunch back at base camp.

5. Neither the jurie's verdict ~~or~~ its recommendations were included in this transcript.

6. In summary (A) none of the evidence is in conflicting with our findings ~~not~~ except in minor detail. i.e. - bombing or evasive action noted by some of the witnesses.

(B) The inquest does establish that earlier - both aircraft had been in radio contact. Neither aircraft had Air - ground radio contact capability with fire fighters.

(C) Only loose control was maintained over water bombers - more of an overall fire control "situation by the helicopter "bird dog" rather than actually controlling aircraft. Under normal circumstances, with only 2 bombers working, this could be probably considered adequate control; except in this instance, the crashed helicopter created the diversion & change in bomber traffic pattern that set up the accident.

Perhaps the transcript should go to Ottawa to encourage D.O. to have more interest & input into activities & conduct of aircraft engaged in fire fighting.

000004

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

5002-1801 (WCAI)
5002-1802

Room 929, Federal Building
9820 - 107th Street
Edmonton, Alberta
T5K 1G3

April 24, 1972

Deputy Registrar General
of Vital Statistics
Government of the Northwest Territories
Yellowknife, N.W.T.

Dear Sir:

Would you kindly forward us a copy of the transcript of the inquest proceedings into the deaths of Peter Willms, William Koshylanyk, Peter Kuryluk and Gordon Hales. We are enclosing a cheque in the amount of $2.60 for this report.

Yours very truly,

D. J. Douglas
Regional Superintendent
Accident Investigation
Division

Encl.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PLEASE QUOTE

FILE.....

GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

CANADA

APR 20 72 02993

M.J. Hewitt, Coroner,

Box 538,

Fort Smith,

N.W.T.

14th April, 1972.

Mr. D.J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation,
Department of Transport,
Room 945, Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton, 2, Alberta.

5002_W 1801
1802

Dear Sir,

The enclosed is self-explanatory. Please direct your requests to the registrar general.

Yours faithfully,

M.J. Hewitt

(Michael J.Hewitt,)
Coroner.

MJH/ES.

P.S. Best personal regards

Mike

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PLEASE QUOTE
FILE 85 016 159

GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
CANADA

Yellowknife, N.W.T.
9 March, 1972

Mr. Michael J. Hewitt,
Coroner,
FORT SMITH, N.W.T.

Dear Mr. Hewitt:

Thank you for the documents pertaining to the Inquest into the deaths of Peter Willms, William Koshylanyk, Peter Kuryluk and Gordon Hales.

Copies of the inquest proceedings may be forwarded to interested parties from this office on receipt from them of the required amount which in this case is 15 cents per folio or $2.60 for the entire report.

In order to process this account in this fiscal year we would appreciate having your account as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

June MacKay (Mrs.)

Ruby Wilson (Mrs.)
for Deputy Registrar General
of Vital Statistics for
the Northwest Territories.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

Room 945, Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton 2, Alberta.

14 February 1972.

Mr. Michael J. Hewitt,
Coroner,
Box 538,
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of 7 February 1972 with the attached recommendations of the jury at the February 1st Inquest.

These recommendations obviously made in accordance with the rules of best evidence, i.e., following the testimony of first hand witnesses and the operators involved undoubtedly will be valid. They are enlightening and most useful to us since your inquest was not dependent upon our informal inquiry.

If we can assist you, the bomber and "bird dog" operators, or other government departments in implementation of the recommendations we would be pleased to help in any way possible.

Apparently at some time during the inquest it was indicated that the MOT investigating team was of the opinion that Mackenzie Forest Service did not use "bird dog" aircraft. We should clarify this. Our investigating team was aware that Mackenzie Forest Service used "bird dog" aircraft as they had been doing with a helicopter earlier on the day of the accident but that no "bird dog" aircraft was being used at the time of the collision.

Perhaps we should have a transcript of the proceedings and witness testimony as an appropriate review of our own investigation. Please submit the usual bill for such transcript.

.../2

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Mr. Michael J. Hewitt,
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

5002-W1801
5002-W1802

14 February 1972

Once again thank you and please do contact us if we can be of any help to you.

Yours very truly,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
D. J. DOUGLAS

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

COPIES TO:

CAI, Ottawa
Mr. T. Smith, Wood Buffalo National Park, Ft. Smith
Mr. B. Simpson, Superintendent, Mackenzie Forest Service, Ft. Smith
RCMP, Fort Smith.

DJD/eb

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

MEMORANDUM **NOTE DE SERVICE**

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

FROM / DE: WCAI
EDMONTON

TO / À: CAI
OTTAWA

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ:

OUR FILE — N/RÉFÉRENCE: 5002-W1801 1802

YOUR FILE — VOTRE RÉFÉRENCE:

DATE: February 11, 1972

SUBJECT / SUJET: Accident - Cansos, CF-HTN & CF-IDS
Fort Smith, N.W.T.
1 September, 1971

1. Attached is additional information received from the R.C.M.P. on the subject accident.

D. J. Douglas
Superintendent
Accident Investigation

Attach

/lj

000010

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

"G" DIVISION

YELLOWKNIFE S/DIV.

42614

YOUR NO.
VOTRE N°

OUR NO. 71YK-500-42
NOTRE N°

Yellowknife, N.W.T.
7 February 1972

Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigations,
Air Regulations,
Ministry of Transport,
Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton, Alberta

5032-W-1801
1802

Dear Sir:

Re: Peter WILLMS (B: 3 MAY 43) et al
Accidental Death (Aircraft Accident)
70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. 1 SEP 71

Et al: William KOSHYLANYK (B: 12 MAY 27)
Peter KURYLUK (B: 15 AUG 35)
Gordon Fred HALES (B: 7 AUG 28)

WCAIB

Further to my memorandum dated September 22, 1971, attached is our final report from Fort Smith Detachment dated February 4, 1972 concluding this investigation after the inquest.

Yours truly,

H.A. Feagan, Insp.
Officer Commanding
Yellowknife S/Div.

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

OTHER FILE REFERENCES: REF. AUTRES DOSSIERS:	DIVISION	DATE	RCMP FILE REFERENCES: REF. DOSSIERS GRC:
	"G"	4 FEB 72	
	SUB DIVISION - SOUS DIVISION		
PCR 10 NOV 71	Yellowknife		71G 500-111 71YK 500-42 71-500-31
	DETACHMENT - DÉTACHEMENT		
	Fort Smith		

RE OBJET:

Peter WILLMS (B: 3 MAY 43) et al
Accidental Death (Aircraft Accident)
70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. 1 SEP 71

1 FEB 72

1. After delays due to the Air Traffic Controllers' strike, the inquest commenced at 2.00 p.m.

2. Mr. Raymond SCHMIDT, MacKenzie Forest Service radio operator, and Ernest MELYNOK, MOT aeradio supervisor, were the first witnesses called and both read excerpts from their radio logs pertaining to the crash. I was the third witness and outlined the duties performed by myself and other members of Fort Smith Detachment in investigating the accident and identifying the deceased. Cpl. SOLUK, Yellowknife Identification Section, entered photographs and a plan drawing of the crash scene. Modeste MANDEVILLE, Herbert BEAULIEU, Lawrence CASAWAY, Marcel MORIN, Henry CALUMET, Jackson WHITEKNIFE and Lawrence LADOUCEUR, all fire-fighters and eye-witnesses to the accident, testified as per their original statements and demonstrated the crash with models of Canso aircraft provided by MOT. Mr. Keith HORNSETH of Norcanair testified as to the serviceability of his aircraft (CF-IDS) and hours flying time of their crew. Mr. Terry HAROLD of North West Air Lease testified as to the serviceability of his aircraft (CF-NTN) and provided information on various aspects of water bombing. Both HORNSETH and HAROLD outlined the aircraft controller or "bird dog" system employed in Alberta on water bombing operations. Peter FERGUSON, Eugene EARL and Terrance EARL, all of MacKenzie Forest Service, gave testimony outlining the MacKenzie Forest Service policy of employing a "bird dog" at the fires. In particular, Terrance EARL testified that he had been acting as "bird dog" on the day in question. Just prior to the crash the "bird dog" helicopter had had to return to base for fuel and it was some time while they were absent from the fire area that the two Cansos collided. Earlier in the day he had heard CF-NTN and CF-IDS in communication with each other, which indicated that the radio equipment was in operating order. It should be noted at this time that the information of the "bird dog" operation had not come to light previously, and in fact MOT investigators were of the opinion that MacKenzie Forest Service did not use a "bird dog". This may have been because the "bird dog" was not actually operating at the time of the accident, however EARL's testimony has clarified the situation.

3. The Coroner, Dr. HUNT, read in two reports from MOT (copies attached) and entered photographs taken by them in a mock-up of the crash.

...2

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This [illegible] supplied to you by the R.C.M.P. for the information of [illegible] to be made known to any other agency or person without the [illegible] of the R.C.M.P.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

OBJET

Peter WILLMS et al

4. The jury deliberated for approximately 1 hour; 50 minutes before returning with the unanimous verdict as outlined in the attached copy of the Inquisition.

5. The remaining exhibits on hand are being forwarded to Mr. HORNSEY for disposition as earlier noted.

6. Extra copies attached.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

CONCLUDED HERE

E. J. Blackman, Cst.
E. J. Blackman, 23307,
Fort Smith Detachment.

J. [illegible] Sgt.
Det.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

I N Q U I S I T I O N Coroners Ordinance

CANADA
Northwest Territories

TO WIT:

An Inquisition taken for the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories at Fort Smith in the Northwest Territories on the 3rd day of September, A.D. 1971 and by adjournment on the 1st day of February, A.D. 1972, before Michael Joseph DOWNEY, a coroner for the Northwest Territories, on view of the bodies of Peter WILLMS, William KOMYLAK, Peter KUNYUK and Gordon HALSE then and there lying dead, the undersigned Ernest KEY, Harvey [illegible], Darryl GEARSON, Joseph REID, John BASADAY, Michael FOX being duly sworn and charged to inquire for the Commissioner, when, where, how and by what means the said Peter WILLMS, William KOMYLAK, Peter KUNYUK and Gordon HALSE came to their deaths, do upon their oath say:

We, the jury, find that on 1st September, A.D. 1971 at approximately 14.45 Mountain Standard Time, at approximately 60° 33' N., 113° 01' W. in the Fire Creek, Peter J. WILLMS, William KOMYLAK, Peter KUNYUK and Gordon H. HALSE met their death after a mid-air collision of aircraft CF-DJ and CF-[illegible]. The direct cause of death was the incidence of multiple traumatic injuries.

We, the jury, cannot find evidence of criminal negligence by anyone involved in this accident.

...2

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

000014

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

We make four recommendations:

1. We recommend strongly that a control aircraft, commonly known as a "bird dog" and manned by a pilot and control officer be in the air continuously during all water bombing operations and that the control officer be trained for such operations.

2. We further recommend that the above recommended procedure be implemented before the 1972 forest fire season.

3. We recommend that the entire system of radio communications (air to air, air to ground and ground to ground) now in use by the Manitoba Forest Service be revised and upgraded before the 1972 forest fire season.

4. We recommend that all aircraft operating on fire suppression operations be equipped with anti-collision lighting.

In addition to the above four recommendations, we the Jury, feel that official recognition be given to the five fighters who assisted the helicopter pilot from his crashed aircraft and we recommend that in cutting of these fire fighters' knowledge of first aid procedures.

PROPERTY OF RCMP / This document is supplied to you by the RCMP on the understanding that the information it contains is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

. . . 3

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

In witness whereof, the corporation has hereunto set its seal and the parties have hereto set their hands, this 2nd day of December, A. D. 1972.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PLEASE QUOTE
FILE.....

FEB 972 42481

GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
CANADA

Michael J. Hewitt,
Coroner,
Box 538,
Fort Smith,
N.W.T.

7th February, 1972.

Mr. B. Simpson,
Superintendent,
Mackenzie Forest Service,
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

5002- W1801
W1802

Dear Sir,

RE: MID-AIR COLLISION - CF-IDS; CF-HTN
September 1st, 1971.
Inquest completed February 1st, 1972

Please find enclosed a copy of recommendations made by the jury at the February 1st inquest.

In the light of evidence presented before myself at that inquest I strongly urge your serious consideration of these recommendations. I wish to add one further suggestion:

That enough fire fighters be trained in the basics of first aid to provide a minimal ratio of one first aider per ten men, and that adequate supplies of first aid equipment be supplied, checked and renewed as required, at regular intervals (e.g. one week).

Yours truly,

M. J. Hewitt

(Michael J. Hewitt)
Coroner

c.c. Mr. T. Smith, Wood Buffalo Nat.Parks.
c.c. Mr. D. Douglas, M.O.T.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

I N Q U I S I T I O N Coroners Ordinance

CANADA
Northwest Territories

TO WIT:

An Inquisition taken for the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories at Fort Smith in the Northwest Territories on the 3rd day of September, A.D. 1971 and by adjournment on the 1st day of February, A.D. 1972, before Michael Joseph HEWITT, a coroner for the Northwest Territories, on view of the bodies of Peter WILLMS, William KOSHYLANYK, Peter KURYLUK and Gordon HALES then and there lying dead, the undersigned Ernest KUYT, Barney COOPER, Darryl CLARKSON, Joseph BIRD, John ZASADNY, Michael FOX being duly sworn and charged to inquire for the Commissioner, when, where, how and by what means the said Peter WILLMS, William KOSHYLANYK, Peter KURYLUK and Gordon HALES came to their deaths, do upon their oath say:

We, the jury, find that on 1st September, A.D. 1971 at approximately 14.45 Mountain Standard Time, at approximately 60° 33' N., 113° 04' W. in the Fire 6 area, Peter J. WILLMS, William KOSHYLANYK, Peter KURYLUK and Gordon F. HALES met their death after a mid-air collision of aircraft CF-HTN and CF-IDS. The direct cause of death was the incidence of multiple traumatic injuries.

We, the jury, cannot find evidence of criminal negligence by anyone involved in this accident.

...2

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

We make four recommendations:

1. We recommend strongly that a control aircraft, commonly known as a "bird dog" and manned by a pilot and control officer be in the air continuously during all water bombing operations and that the control officer be trained for such operations.

2. We further recommend that the above recommended procedure be implemented before the 1972 forest fire season.

3. We recommend that the entire system of radio communications (air to air, air to ground and ground to ground) now in use by the MacKenzie Forest Service be reviewed and upgraded before the 1972 forest fire season.

4. We recommend that all aircraft operating on fire suppression operations be equipped with anti-collision lighting.

In addition to the above four recommendations, we the Jury, feel that official recognition be given to the fire fighters who assisted the helicopter pilot from his crashed aircraft and we recognize the importance of these fire fighters' knowledge of first aid procedures.

...3

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

In witness whereof, the coroner has hereunto set his hand and the jurymen have hereunto set their hands, this 2nd day of February, A.D. 1972.

CORONER Michael J. Hamill

FOREMAN R Knight

D Barefoot

Mildred Fox.

A Hanson

F Bell

Darrell F. Clarkson

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

Room 945, Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton 2, Alberta.

17 January 1972.

Northwestern Air Lease Ltd.,
11519 - 134 Street,
Edmonton 41, Alberta.

Attn: Mrs. G. Kuryluk

Dear Madam:

Thank you for your letter of January 11th, 1972 concerning a request for a copy of the report on the Canso collision.

Our investigation of this occurrence has been completed and the information forwarded to our Headquarters in Ottawa as Headquarters have the responsibility of releasing and publishing the final summary accident report.

Since it may be some time before a summary is published and should you require a copy prior to general publication, we advise you to write to the following address:

Chief of Accident Investigation,
Ministry of Transport,
No. 3 Temporary Building,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

K1A ON8.

If this office can be of any further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Yours very truly,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
D. J. DOUGLAS

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

/eb

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

MEMORANDUM **NOTE DE SERVICE**

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

FROM / DE: W.C.A.I.
EDMONTON

TO / À: C.A.I.
OTTAWA

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ:

OUR FILE — N/RÉFÉRENCE: 5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

YOUR FILE — V/RÉFÉRENCE:

DATE: 17 January 1972

SUBJECT / SUJET: Accident - Cansos, CF-HTN & CF-IDS
- Fort Smith, N.W.T.
- 1 September 1971

1. Attached please find a copy of a letter received from Northwestern Air Lease Ltd., Edmonton as well as a copy of our reply to this firm.

2. Please take the necessary action as indicated.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
D. J. DOUGLAS

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

Atts.

/eb

000022

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Northwestern Air LEASE LTD.

(403)
455-1204

JAN 13 72 38865

11519 - 134 Street,
Edmonton 41, Alberta,
January 11, 1972.

5002-W-1801-HTN
1802-105

Mr. D. Douglas,
Accident Investigation Branch,
Department of Transport,
Federal Building,
Edmonton, Alberta.

Dear Sir:

We hereby request that a copy of the Report of the Canso collision of September 1, 1971, involving one of our aircraft, registration CF-HTN, be sent to the following:

Mr. J.D. Hill,
Barrister & Solicitor,
711 Empire Building,
Edmonton, Alberta,

- and -

NORTHWESTERN AIR Lease Ltd.,
11519 - 134 Street,
Edmonton 41, Alberta.

Thank you.

Yours very truly,

NORTHWESTERN AIR Lease Ltd.,

G. Kuryluk (Mrs.).

/g
cc: Mr. J.D. Hill.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
W1802

Room 945, Federal Building
9820 - 107th Street
Edmonton, Alberta
January 6, 1972

Mr. J. Hewitt
Coroner
Box 24
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

Dear Sir:

Please find enclosed additional colored prints of the Canso models as requested in your last letter.

The two models have been packaged and are being shipped today. We would like to have them returned at your convenience.

If there is any further assistance you require please let us know.

Yours truly,

D. J. Douglas
FOR Superintendent
Accident Investigation

Encl.

AJM/lj

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

JAN 4 72 37535

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

Box 24,
FORT SMITH,
Northwest Territories.

30th December, 1971.

Mr. D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation,
Department of Transport,
Room 945, Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
EDMONTON 2, Alberta.

5002 - W1801
W1802

Dear Sir:

Re: Canso Collision
1st September, 1971

Your correspondence of 21st December is acknowledged.

Will you please forward to me at your earliest possible convenience the two scale models of Canso water bombers, photographs of which we have already received. These models will be returned to you upon completion of the inquest if you so desire.

I am also in need of another two sets of the photographs for the inquest, please.

Should I require any further information between now and the inquest I shall advise you.

Yours truly,

M. J. Hewitt,
Coroner

6 JAN 72

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

REG # 18123
DEC 21/71
RGB

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

Room 945, Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton 2, Alberta.

21 December 1971.

Michael J. Hewitt,
Box 538,
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

Dear Sir:

This letter refers to the Canso collision of 1 September 1971 and follows our telephone conversation of 20 December 1971.

With reference to pilot hours for the four pilots involved it would appear that Mr. Hales had in excess of 7900 hours total time; Mr. Kuryluk in excess of 6100 hours total time; Mr. Koshylanyk in excess of 5000 hours total time and Mr. Willms in excess of 1700 hours total time. We obtained a personal pilot log book for Mr. Hales in his personal possessions at Fort Smith and since this log book is in our possession at the time of writing, we enclose it for the purposes of your inquest. No other pilot log books are in our possession but we did have a pilot log book for Mr. Kuryluk for a brief period. This was obtained from Mr. Terry Harrold of Northwestern Air Leasing subsequent to the accident and was returned to him. No log books for the other two pilots were available to us. We examined journey log sheets supplied by each company involved and these were of some assistance in determining pilot flying hours. All of this paper work was returned to Mr. Keith Hornseth of Norcanair and Mr. Terry Harrold of Northwestern Air Leasing respectively. It would certainly be in order for you to subpoena any of these documents which might assist your inquest.

Regarding expert witnesses, none of our investigators have any extensive Canso experience and none of our investigators are experienced bomber pilots. Our investigators do have a background in aviation but at the present time should not be considered as anything other than expert investigators. Undoubtedly there are expert Canso water bomber pilots available both within the companies involved and in outside companies. If such an expert is required I am sure Mr. Barney Cooper, a member of your jury could advise you as to names and qualifications of such persons.

.../2

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Mr. M. J. Hewitt,
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

21 December 1971

We appreciate your co-operative attitude and assure you that we will assist you in any way as far as providing factual information that is within our possession is concerned.

Yours very truly,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
D. J. DOUGLAS

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

Encl.

DJD/eb

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Michael J. Hewitt,

Box 538,

Fort Smith,

N.W.T.

DEC 14 71 35528

10th December, 1971.

Mr. D.J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Aircraft Accident Investigation,
Room 945 Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton 2, Alberta.

5002 - W1801
5002 - W1802

Dear Mr. Douglas,

Re: Mid-Air Collision 1/9/71.

Many thanks for your report of December 6th, and the photographs.

I have discussed with the R.C.M.P. possible dates for an inquest. We have decided that Tuesday, January 18th would give us time to make the necessary arrangements to contact witnesses etc., and those persons travelling to Fort Smith by scheduled aircraft will have no difficulty in reserving seats.

It seems to me that your presence at the inquest is essential, and I would appreciate (by return) confirmation from you that January 18th is suitable. A formal "Summons to Witness" will be served on you in due course.

Yours truly,

M. J. Hewitt

(Michael J. Hewitt)
Coroner

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

5002 - W1801 (WCAI) ~~5802-9565~~
W1802 ~~5802-19101~~

W.C.A.I.
Edmonton

9 December, 1971

C.A.I.
OTTAWA
K1A 0N8

Accident - Cansos CF-MTN & CF-MTS
60 miles northwest Ft. Smith, N.W.T.
1 September, 1971

1. Attached is one copy of the subject accident report.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
D. J. DOUGLAS

D. J. Douglas
Superintendent
Accident Investigation

Attach

/lj

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

Room 945, Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton 2, Alberta.

6 December 1971.

Mr. M. Hewitt,
Coroner,
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

Dear Mr. Hewitt:

The following information pertains to the mid-air collision between two water bomber aircraft, which were engaged fire fighting in the Northwest Territories.

Date of accident was 1 September 1971; Time 14:45 M.S.T.
Location- 60°33'N, 113°04'W (Fire 6 area).
Aircraft involved:

(A) Consolidated Vultee PBY-5A, serial number 48275
Canadian registration CF-HTN
Owned by Field Aviation Ltd., Box 6023, Toronto
Operated by Northwestern Air Lease, 11519 - 134 St., Edmonton.

(B) Consolidated Vultee PBY-5A, serial number 11629
Owned and operated by North Canada Air Ltd., P.O. Box 850, Prince Albert, Saskatchewan.

Crews involved were:

Aircraft (A) CF-HTN

Captain - Gordon F. Hales, age 43, licence number XDA-1070 Captain Hales held a Canadian Airlines Transport Licence with a single and multi-engine land and sea classification. In addition the licence was endorsed for PBY-5A-46 aircraft. There were no restrictions imposed on his licence and his medical profile was 1-1-1-1 and date of last medical was 22 June 1971.

First Officer - Peter Kuryluk, age 35, licence number XDS-797. First Officer, Peter Kuryluk held a Canadian Senior Commercial Pilot's Licence for aircraft classification single and multi-engine land and sea and endorsed for B-25 aircraft type. The date of his last medical was the 12th of July 1971, medical profile was 1-1-1-1 and there were no restrictions imposed on his licence.

000030

.../2

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Mr. M. Hewitt,
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

6 December 1971

Aircraft (B) CF-IDS

Captain - W. Koshylanyk, age 44, licence number WGA-1163. Captain Koshylanyk held a Canadian Airline Transport Licence with aircraft classification single and multi-engine land and sea, type endorsements were Douglas DC-3, Consolidated Vultee PBY-5A and he held a valid Class I instrument rating. His last medical was 1 May 1971, medical profile was 1-1-1-1 and there were no restrictions imposed on his licence.

First Officer - P. J. Willms, age 28. First Officer Willms held a Canadian Commercial Pilot's Licence number WGC 606 with a Class II instructor's rating. His last medical was dated 1 January 1971, medical profile was 1-1-1-1 and there were no restrictions on his licence.

Circumstances:

Aircraft (A) CF-HTN had completed a water drop on a fire at 60°33'N, 113°03'W and after completion of the drop flew to the vicinity of a helicopter which had crashed earlier that day, approximately 1½ miles west of the fire being bombed. Aircraft (A) CF-HTN circled the wreckage to the right and reported the crash on VHF radio to Fort Smith aeradio on a frequency of 122.2. Aircraft (A) CF-HTN continued to circle around the crashed helicopter to the right. The circle was widened to the northwest on the last circuit and the flight path of the aircraft changed for a near direct path over the helicopter from the north when aircraft (A) and aircraft (B) collided.

Aircraft (B) CF-IDS was also engaged in water bombing the same fire location as was aircraft (A) CF-HTN. It approached the fire from a southerly direction and dropped its load of water on the fire. After the drop the aircraft went into a climbing left turn. During this turn, aircraft (A) and aircraft (B) collided.

Physical evidence at the scene showed collision contact to be the left wing of aircraft (A) CF-HTN and the right wing of aircraft (B) CF-IDS.

Collision contact broke off one half of the right wing of aircraft (B) CF-IDS. Loss of this portion of wing caused the aircraft to roll to the right and crash.

Collision contact broke off the outer one-third of the left wing of aircraft (A) CF-HTN. In addition, the float and tip portion of the wing

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Mr. M. Hewitt,
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

6 December 1971

of aircraft (B) CF-IDS struck the left stabilizer and elevator of aircraft (A) CF-HTN breaking these controls off the aircraft. Aircraft (A) CF-HTN rolled to the left and crashed.

There is no evidence of any evasive action nor that either crew saw anything of the other aircraft.

Our office has photographed scale models of the PBY-5A aircraft in order to portray the aerial collision as was indicated by physical evidence at the scene. Copies of these photos are attached. Photos are numbered in sequence and aircraft are identified by their Canadian registration letters.

Yours very truly,

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

Att.

AJF/eb

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS — CREW

CF-HTN

PERSONAL DATA-QUALIFICATIONS

COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER. (2)

CREW MEMBER

- PILOT-IN-COMMAND [X]
- 2ND PILOT [ ]
- 3RD PILOT [ ]
- FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ]
- NAVIGATOR [ ]
- CREWMAN [ ]
- CABIN ATTENDANT [ ]
- FLIGHT OBSERVER [ ]
- OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

STATION OCCUPIED

- NOT KNOWN [ ]
- PILOT SEAT [X]
- SECOND IN COMMAND SEAT [ ]
- FLIGHT ENGINEER SEAT [ ]
- NAVIGATOR SEAT [ ]
- REST POSITION [ ]
- PASSENGER CABIN [ ]
- OTHER [ ]

SPECIFY:

SPECIAL FUNCTION

- NONE [X]
- INSTRUCTOR [ ]
- COMPANY EXAMINER [ ]
- D.O.T. EXAMINER [ ]
- TECHNICIAN [ ]
- STUDENT [ ]
- OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

PERSONAL DATA

AGE	SEX	SURNAME	INITIALS	LICENCE NUMBER
43	Male	Hales	G.F.	XDA 1070

LICENCES AND PERMITS HELD

CANADIAN [X] FOREIGN [ ]

- NONE [ ]
- UNKNOWN [ ]
- AIRLINE TRANSPORT [X]
- SENIOR COMMERCIAL [ ]
- COMMERCIAL [ ]
- PRIVATE [ ]
- STUDENT PERMIT [ ]
- FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ]
- NAVIGATOR [ ]
- GLIDER [ ]
- GYROPLANE [ ]
- BALLOON [ ]
- MAINTENANCE ENGINEER [ ]

AIRCRAFT CLASSIFICATIONS

- HELICOPTER ONLY [ ]
- SINGLE-ENGINE LAND [ ]
- SINGLE-ENGINE SEA [ ]
- S.E. LAND AND SEA [ ]
- S. & MULTI ENGINE LAND [ ]
- S. & MULTI ENGINE SEA [ ]
- S. & M.E. LAND AND SEA [X]

AIRCRAFT TYPE ENDORSEMENTS

HELICOPTER [ ] GYROPLANE [ ]

PBY5A, C-46

RATINGS

- NONE [ ]
- INSTRUCTOR CL 1 [ ]
- INSTRUCTOR CL 2 [ ]
- INSTRUCTOR CL 3 [ ]
- Expired INSTRUMENT 1 [X]
- INSTRUMENT 2 [ ]
- BLOCK AIRSPACE [ ]
- NIGHT [ ]

EXPERIENCE — FLYING TIME (To nearest hour - if unknown complete with X)

	ALL TYPES	THIS TYPE	DUAL ON THIS TYPE	THIS U/C CONFIGURATION	SINGLE ENGINE	MULTI ENGINE	ACTUAL INSTRUMENT	NIGHT	NIGHT X-COUNTRY	ROTOR-CRAFT
TOTAL HOURS	7908	961	2:00	961	2882	5026	290	140	130	Nil
HRS. LAST 90 DAYS	245	245	Nil	245	Nil	245	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil

FATIGUE FACTORS

FLYING TIME	TOTAL LAST 3 DAYS	TOTAL THIS FLIGHT	HOURS AWAKE SINCE LAST REST PERIOD
	Approx. 2 HRS.	Approx. 2 HRS.	Approx. 8 HRS.

PILOT FLIGHT PREPARATION

COMPLETE ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

WEATHER BRIEFING

- NONE [X]
- ACCREDITED BRIEFER [ ]
- COMPANY FACILITY [ ]
- UNKNOWN [ ]
- OTHER PILOT [ ]
- ACCREDITED FORECASTER [ ]
- OTHER OBSERVER [ ]
- SELF BRIEFING [ ]

OTHER BRIEFINGS

- NONE [X]
- UNKNOWN [ ]
- ROUTE [ ]
- DEPARTURE PROCEDURES [ ]
- OPERATION [ ]
- ARRIVAL PROCEDURES [ ]
- NOTAMS [ ]

DOCUMENTS CARRIED

- NONE [ ]
- COCKPIT CHECK LIST [ ]
- FLIGHT OR OPERATING MANUAL [ ]
- ADEQUATE VFR [X]
- INADEQUATE VFR [ ]
- ADEQUATE IFR [ ]
- INADEQUATE IFR [ ]

FLIGHT PLAN FILED

- NONE [ ]
- SVFR [ ]
- IFR [ ]
- CONTROLLED VFR [ ]
- VFR [ ]
- FLIGHT NOTIFICATION [X]

EXECUTION OF FLIGHT TO START OF OCCURRENCE

ADHERENCE TO PLAN

- NO DEVIATION [ ]
- ALTERATION FOR WX [ ]
- ALTERATION FOR TRAFFIC [ ]
- BECAME LOST [ ]
- ALTERATION FOR U/S [ ]
- OTHER [X]

SPECIFY: Deviation for helicopter crash

PHASE OF FLIGHT DURING WHICH FIRST IRREGULARITY OCCURRED

GROUND

- START-UP [ ]
- MOORING [ ]
- STATIONARY [ ]
- DOCKING [ ]
- TAXIING [ ]
- RAMPING (AMPHIBIOUS) [ ]
- AIR-TAXIING [ ]
- SHUT DOWN [ ]
- STEP-TAXIING [ ]
- PARKING [ ]
- BEACHING [ ]

TAKEOFF

- LINE-UP [ ]
- RUN [ ]
- LIFTOFF [ ]
- HOVER [ ]

IN-FLIGHT

- CLIMB [ ]
- DESCENT [ ]
- CRUISE [ ]
- LEVEL TURN [X]
- CLIMBING TURN [ ]
- DESCENDING TURN [ ]
- TRANSLATION [ ]
- HOVER [ ]

LANDING

- INITIAL APPROACH [ ]
- FINAL APPROACH [ ]
- FLARE [ ]
- HOVER [ ]
- TOUCH-DOWN [ ]
- RUN-OUT [ ]
- TURN-OFF [ ]

OTHER

- LOAD-PICKUP [ ]
- LOAD DROP [ ]
- LOAD POSITIONING [ ]

NAVIGATION AND APPROACH AIDS

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT — ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE [ ]

AIDS AVAILABLE	V.H.F. D.F.	DME	VOR	TACAN	ILS	ASR	PAR	ADF	LORAN	L.F. RNG	NONE
IN AIRCRAFT			X					X		X	
ON GROUND											X
IN USE BY A/C AT TIME OF OC.											

000033

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS - CREW

CF-HTN

PERSONAL DATA-QUALIFICATIONS

COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER. (2)

CREW MEMBER

- PILOT-IN-COMMAND [ ]
- 2ND PILOT [X]
- 3RD PILOT [ ]
- FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ]
- NAVIGATOR [ ]
- CREWMAN [ ]
- CABIN ATTENDANT [ ]
- FLIGHT OBSERVER [ ]
- OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

STATION OCCUPIED

- NOT KNOWN [ ]
- PILOT SEAT [ ]
- SECOND IN COMMAND SEAT [X]
- FLIGHT ENGINEER SEAT [ ]
- NAVIGATOR SEAT [ ]
- REST POSITION [ ]
- PASSENGER CABIN [ ]
- OTHER [ ]

SPECIFY:

SPECIAL FUNCTION

- NONE [X]
- INSTRUCTOR [ ]
- COMPANY EXAMINER [ ]
- D.O.T. EXAMINER [ ]
- TECHNICIAN [ ]
- STUDENT [ ]
- OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

PERSONAL DATA

AGE	SEX	SURNAME	INITIALS	LICENCE NUMBER
35	Male	Kuryluk	P.	XDS 797

LICENCES AND PERMITS HELD

- CANADIAN [X] FOREIGN [ ]
- NONE [ ]
- UNKNOWN [ ]
- AIRLINE TRANSPORT [ ]
- SENIOR COMMERCIAL [X]
- COMMERCIAL [ ]
- PRIVATE [ ]
- STUDENT PERMIT [ ]
- FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ]
- NAVIGATOR [ ]
- GLIDER [ ]
- GYROPLANE [ ]
- BALLOON [ ]
- MAINTENANCE ENGINEER [ ]

AIRCRAFT CLASSIFICATIONS

- HELICOPTER ONLY [ ]
- SINGLE-ENGINE LAND [ ]
- SINGLE-ENGINE SEA [ ]
- S.E. LAND AND SEA [ ]
- S. & MULTI ENGINE LAND [ ]
- S. & MULTI ENGINE SEA [ ]
- S. & M.E. LAND AND SEA [X]

AIRCRAFT TYPE ENDORSEMENTS

- HELICOPTER [ ]
- GYROPLANE [ ]

B-25

RATINGS

- NONE [ ]
- INSTRUCTOR CL 1 [ ]
- INSTRUCTOR CL 2 [X]
- INSTRUCTOR CL 3 [ ]
- INSTRUMENT 1 [ ]
- INSTRUMENT 2 [ ]
- BLOCK AIRSPACE [ ]
- NIGHT [X]

EXPERIENCE - FLYING TIME (To nearest hour - if unknown complete with X)

	ALL TYPES	THIS TYPE	DUAL ON THIS TYPE	THIS U/C CONFIGURATION	SINGLE ENGINE	MULTI ENGINE	ACTUAL INSTRUMENT	NIGHT	NIGHT X-COUNTRY	ROTOR-CRAFT
TOTAL HOURS	6100+	59	Nil	59	4938	1162+	10+	118+	115+	Nil
HRS. LAST 90 DAYS	119	59	Nil	59	Nil	119	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil

FATIGUE FACTORS

FLYING TIME	TOTAL LAST 3 DAYS	TOTAL THIS FLIGHT	HOURS AWAKE SINCE LAST REST PERIOD
	Approx. 2 HRS.	Approx. 2 HRS.	Approx. 8 HRS.

PILOT FLIGHT PREPARATION

COMPLETE ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

WEATHER BRIEFING

- ACCREDITED BRIEFER [ ]
- NONE [X]
- COMPANY FACILITY [ ]
- UNKNOWN [ ]
- OTHER PILOT [ ]
- ACCREDITED FORECASTER [ ]
- OTHER OBSERVER [ ]
- SELF BRIEFING [ ]

OTHER BRIEFINGS

- NONE [X]
- UNKNOWN [ ]
- ROUTE [ ]
- DEPARTURE PROCEDURES [ ]
- OPERATION [ ]
- ARRIVAL PROCEDURES [ ]
- NOTAMS [ ]

DOCUMENTS CARRIED

- NONE [ ]
- COCKPIT CHECK LIST [ ]
- FLIGHT OR OPERATING MANUAL [ ]
- ADEQUATE VFR [X]
- INADEQUATE VFR [ ]
- ADEQUATE IFR [ ]
- INADEQUATE IFR [ ]

FLIGHT PLAN FILED

- NONE [ ]
- SVFR [ ]
- IFR [ ]
- CONTROLLED VFR [ ]
- VFR [ ]
- FLIGHT NOTIFICATION [X]

EXECUTION OF FLIGHT TO START OF OCCURRENCE

ADHERENCE TO PLAN

- NO DEVIATION [ ]
- ALTERATION FOR WX [ ]
- ALTERATION FOR TRAFFIC [ ]
- BECAME LOST [ ]
- ALTERATION FOR U/S [ ]
- OTHER [ ]

SPECIFY: Deviation turn due helicopter crash

PHASE OF FLIGHT DURING WHICH FIRST IRREGULARITY OCCURRED

GROUND

- START-UP [ ]
- MOORING [ ]
- STATIONARY [ ]
- DOCKING [ ]
- TAXIING [ ]
- RAMPING (AMPHIBIOUS) [ ]
- AIR-TAXIING [ ]
- SHUT DOWN [ ]
- STEP-TAXIING [ ]
- PARKING [ ]
- BEACHING [ ]

TAKEOFF

- LINE-UP [ ]
- RUN [ ]
- LIFTOFF [ ]
- HOVER [ ]

IN-FLIGHT

- CLIMB [ ]
- DESCENT [ ]
- CRUISE [ ]
- LEVEL TURN [X]
- CLIMBING TURN [ ]
- DESCENDING TURN [ ]
- TRANSLATION [ ]
- HOVER [ ]

LANDING

- INITIAL APPROACH [ ]
- FINAL APPROACH [ ]
- FLARE [ ]
- HOVER [ ]
- TOUCH-DOWN [ ]
- RUN-OUT [ ]
- TURN-OFF [ ]

OTHER

- LOAD-PICKUP [ ]
- LOAD DROP [ ]
- LOAD POSITIONING [ ]

NAVIGATION AND APPROACH AIDS

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT — ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE [ ]

AIDS AVAILABLE	V.H.F. D.F.	DME	VOR	TACAN	ILS	ASR	PAR	ADF	LORAN	L.F. RNG	NONE
IN AIRCRAFT			X					X		X	
ON GROUND											X
IN USE BY A/C AT TIME OF OC.											

000034

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS

MATERIAL (1)

DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM CONDITIONS Condition: A – NOT DETERMINED S – SERVICEABLE; B – NOT INSTALLED U – UNSERVICEABLE					FUNCTION AFFECTED	COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM CAUSING PROBLEM	NATURE OF COMPONENT SUB-SYSTEM FAILURE
A	B	S	U				
		X		CANOPY WINDSCREEN			
		X		DE-ICING-AIRFRAME			
		X		ELECTRICAL SYSTEM - UP TO CONSUMER DEVICE			
		X		EMPENNAGE - FIXED SURFACES			
		X		ENGINES, ANCILLARIES AND CONTROLS			
		X		FLIGHT CONTROLS			
		X		FLAPS-SPOILERS-DIVEBRAKES AND CONTROLS			
		X		FLUIDS AND GASES			
		X		FUEL SYSTEM-UP TO MIXTURE CONTROL DEVICE			
		X		FUSELAGE-STRUCTURE SKIN			
		X		HYDRAULIC SYSTEM & ALL HYDRAULIC DEVICES			
		X		INSTRUMENTS, FLIGHT DATA; DETECTORS, CIRCUITS			
		X		INSTRUMENTS, SYSTEMS DATA; DETECTORS, ETC.			
	X			LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM; OXYGEN-CABIN PRESS			
X				LIGHTING-INTERNAL/EXTERNAL			
		X		PANELS/DOORS/WINDOWS/HATCHES/HOUSINGS			
		X		PROPELLER(S) AND CONTROLS			
		X		RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM			
X				RADIO NAVIGATION SYSTEM-AURAL, VIS, AUTO.			
	X			MAIN ROTOR-BLADES, STRUCTURE, DRIVETRAIN			
	X			TAIL ROTOR-BLADES, STRUCTURE, DRIVETRAIN			
		X		LANDING GEAR, WHEELS, TIRES, BRAKES, STRUC.			
		X		WARNING SYSTEMS-VISUAL, AURAL			
		X		WING-STRUCTURE, SKIN			
	X			AUTO PILOT			

BASIC DATA (2)

PRE-OCCURRENCE	I.A.S. Approx. 85 KTS	FUEL ON BOARD Approx. 300 IMP. GALS.	CALCULATED A.U.W. 22,902 LBS	MIXTURE RICH [X] LEAN [ ] AUTO [ ]	CARB. HEAT POSITION HOT [ ] PARTIAL [ ] COLD [X]
	C OF G POSITION _____ % MAC		OR 244.4 INS	AFT OF DATUM [X]	FORWARD OF DATUM [ ]
	C OF G PERMISSIBLE RANGE _____ % MAC		TO _____ % MAC OR 242.2 INS TO 251.5 INS	AFT OF DATUM [X]	FORWARD OF DATUM [ ]
AT GROUND CONTACT	I.A.S. Approx. 90 KTS	POWER SETTING NONE [ ] PARTIAL [X] ASYMMETRIC [ ] FULL [ ]	LANDING GEAR POS'N UNLOCKED [ ] UP [X] FIXED GEAR [ ] DOWN [ ]		FLAP POSITION NO FLAPS [ ] UP [X] PARTIAL [ ] DOWN [ ]

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS (1)

AT POINT OF FIRST IRREGULARITY OF FLIGHT IF APPLICABLE (2)

AIRCRAFT CONDITIONS
HEIGHT AGL ____ FT
TERRAIN ELEVATION ____ FT. ASL

CLOUD NONE ☐ UNKNOWN ☐

	HT. AGL	HT. ASL	VERTICAL EXTENT	AMOUNT
LOWEST LAYER	FT	FT	FT	/10
SECOND LAYER	FT	FT	FT	/10

VISIBILITY
AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT ____ MILES

RESTRICTING PHENOMENA: NONE ☐ SMOKE ☐ CLOUD ☐ BLOWING DUST ☐ BLOWING SNOW ☐ FOG ☐ HAZE ☐ PRECIPITATION ☐ BLOWING SAND ☐ ICE CRYSTALS ☐

PRECIPITATION
NONE ☐ RAIN ☐ DRIZZLE ☐ SNOW ☐ FREEZING DRIZZLE ☐ HAIL ☐ FREEZING RAIN ☐
LIGHT ☐ MODERATE ☐ HEAVY ☐

TEMPERATURE AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT
°F
°C

WIND UNKNOWN ☐
AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT
DIRECTION °TRUE
SPEED KTS

ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY
NONE ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ STATIC ☐ ST. ELMOS FIRE ☐ VIOLENT DISCHARGE ☐

SPECIAL HAZARDS
NONE ☐ BIRDS ☐ PARACHUTIST ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ AIRFRAME ICING ☐ TURBULENCE ☐ TALL STRUCTURE ☐ WHITE OUT ☐ AIR TRAFFIC ☐ HOAR FROST ☐ GLASSY WATER ☐ OTHER ☐
SPECIFY:

IN AREA WHERE AIRCRAFT CAME TO REST (3)

CLOUD NONE ☒ UNKNOWN ☐ — Middle and high cloud only

	BASE HT.	TOP HT.	AMOUNT
LOWEST BASE	FT AGL	FT AGL	SCATTERED ☐ BROKEN ☐ OVERCAST ☐
SECOND LAYER	FT AGL	FT AGL	SCATTERED ☐ BROKEN ☐ OVERCAST ☐

VISIBILITY
AT SURFACE 15 MILES RVR ____ FT.

RESTRICTING PHENOMENA: NONE ☒ CLOUD ☐ BLOWING DUST ☐ HAZE ☐ PRECIPITATION ☐ BLOWING SAND ☐ FOG ☐ ICE CRYSTALS ☐ BLOWING SNOW ☐ SMOKE ☐

PRECIPITATION
NONE ☒ RAIN ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ FREEZING RAIN ☐ DRIZZLE ☐ SNOW ☐ FREEZING DRIZZLE ☐ HAIL ☐

TEMPERATURE AT GROUND LEVEL
70 °F. UNKNOWN ☐

DEW POINT AT GROUND LEVEL
Approx 52 °F. UNKNOWN ☐ — Some smoke but not restricting

WIND AT GROUND LEVEL UNKNOWN ☐
DIRECTION Northeasterly MAGNETIC
SPEED 10 - 15 M.P.H.
CHARACTERISTICS: STEADY ☒ SWINGING ☐ GUSTY ☐ UPWARD COMPONENT ☐ SUBSIDENCE ☐

SPECIAL HAZARDS
NONE ☒ UNKNOWN ☐ HOAR FROST ☐ BIRDS ☐ TURBULENCE ☐ SUN GLARE ☐
WIND SHEAR ☐ AIRFRAME ICING ☐ AIR TRAFFIC ☐ WHITE OUT ☐ GLASSY WATER ☐ OTHER ☐ DESCRIBE:

WEATHER DATA SOURCE
EYEWITNESS ☒ PILOT ☐ MET. OBSERVATIONS ☒ AFTERCAST ☐

LOCALE DESCRIPTION
GENERAL: MOUNTAINS ☐ HILLS ☐ ROLLING ☐ FLAT ☒
SPECIFIC: AERODROME ☐ CLEARING ☒ URBAN AREA ☐ ROAD ☐ SWAMP/MUSKEG ☐ TIDAL WATER ☐ RIVER ☐ BUSH ☐ LAKE ☐

OBSTRUCTIONS TO APPROACH/DEPARTURE N/A
NONE ☐ TREE(S) ☐ POLELINE ☐ HIGH GROUND ☐ TOWER(S) ☐ BUILDINGS ☐

SURFACE
GENERAL: PAVED ☐ SAND/GRAVEL ☐ SOIL ☒ SNOW ☐ ICE ☐ WATER ☐ ROCK ☐
SPECIFIC: CONCRETE ☐ ASPHALT ☐ COMPACTED ☒ LOOSE ☐ LOW VEGETATION/GRASS ☐ HIGH WAVES ☐ SWELLS ☐
HAZARDS N/A: NONE ☐ WATER FILM ☐ PUDDLES ☐ ICE PATCHES ☐ SLUSH ☐ SOFT ☐ ROUGH ☐ SNOW DRIFTS ☐

OBSTRUCTIONS TO T.O./LDG. RUN N/A
NONE ☐ VEHICLES ☐ DITCHES/HOLES ☐ ANIMALS ☐ ROCKS/DEBRIS ☐ PEDESTRIANS ☐ RIDGES/SANDBARS ☐ SNOW BANK ☐ POSTS/FENCES ☐ OTHER ☐
SPECIFY:

VITAL DATA
USABLE LENGTH FT
USABLE WIDTH FT
ELEVATION FT
BRAKING ACTION NIL ☐ POOR ☐ FAIR ☐ GOOD ☐ N/A

RUNWAY PROFILE / **AVERAGE SLOPE IN DEGREES**
LEVEL ☒
UP ☐
DOWN ☐
UP ☐ DN ☐
UP ☐ DN ☐

LIGHT CONDITIONS
BRIGHT DAY ☒ DARK DAY ☐ BRIGHT NIGHT ☐ DARK NIGHT ☐ TWILIGHT ☐ UNKNOWN ☐

000036

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER

PILOT-IN-COMMAND [X] 2ND PILOT [ ] FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ] CABIN ATTENDANT [ ] OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:
NAVIGATOR [ ] 3RD PILOT [ ] CREWMAN [ ] FLIGHT OBSERVER [ ]

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE [ ]

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED [ ] OBSERVED [ ] NOT INVESTIGATED [ ]

PHYSICAL

NONE [ ] EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION [ ] FATIGUE [ ]
DROWSINESS [ ] MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS [ ] NAUSEA [ ]
FEVERISHNESS/HOT [ ] PAIN [ ] DROWSINESS [ ]
NUMBNESS [ ] DIARRHOEA [ ] OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES [ ] STOMACH CRAMPS [ ]
COLD/ CHILLS [ ] DIZZINESS [ ]

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION [ ] DEPRESSION [ ]
ANGER [ ] ELATION [ ]
IMPATIENCE [ ] LISTLESSNESS [ ]
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/ TENSENESS [ ] PREOCCUPATION [ ]
OTHER:
NONE EXPERIENCED [ ]

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL G. Hales

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
22 June 1971	Edmonton	Brand 4061-124

MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	SPECIFY
1-1-1-1	Nil	YES [ ] NO [ ]	

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY N/A

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

Compound fracture of both ankles, fractured sternum, open fracture of left humerus, fractured middle fossa of base of skull, fractured pelvis and ruptured bladder, tear of left atrium and ventricle of the heart, ruptured liver. The injuries were consistent with his being in the left hand seat but not controlling the aircraft at the moment of the crash. The fractures of pelvis and skull were associated with force applied to the lower spine. Drugs found on him appeared to be tandearil (against arthritic pain), 292 (against pain), amphetamine (probably being used to control appetite for slimming) but there was no evidence that he was incapacitated at the time of the crash.

M Beare

000037

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER									
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐	2ND PILOT ☒	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐	
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐	
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐	
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:	
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐		
COLD/CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐		

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
OTHER:	
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
12 =July, 1971	Edmonton	McAllister 4455-124

MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	SPECIFY
1-1-1-1	Nil	YES ☐ NO ☐	

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

Bilateral open fractured tibia and fibula, right arm amputated near shoulder, deep wound over front of right chest (not penetrating) lacerations of front of left knee and abrasions of right upper thigh and scrotum and lower chest. Open fractures of frontal bones, ruptured left diaphragm with stomach in chest, torn mesenteries, some bowel rupture, small tear in aorta, multiple rib fractures (near site of torn mesentery). The findings are consistent with the pilot being in the right seat when the aeroplane crashed and the control wheel caused the wound of the right chest. The abrasions appeared due to dragging and also the abrasions over the chest were consistent with being caused by the big seat belt of the Canso. There was no evidence of incapacitation of the pilot before the crash.

K S Beare

000038

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

OCCURRENCE DESCRIPTION (1) (R)

FIRST IRREGULARITY OF FLIGHT (2)

NARRATE THE EVENT(S) WHICH FIRST INDICATED THAT THE FLIGHT WAS NOT PROCEEDING AS DESIRED.

After completing a water drop the crew sighted a crashed helicopter.

RESULTANT ACTION(S) • REACTION(S) (3)


NARRATE ALL THE ACTIONS OF THE PILOT; ALL THE REACTIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT TO PILOT DEMANDS; ALL INTERACTIONS OF PILOT, AIRCRAFT, AND ENVIRONMENT.

The Captain advised by radio that he was proceeding to the crashed helicopter and would be circling over it. Since this aircraft was at low level and was turning right it is considered probable that the co-pilot was flying the aircraft while the Captain passed radio messages and identified the crash location, etc.


TERMINAL EVENT (4)

DESCRIBE THE MOVEMENTS OF THE AIRCRAFT FROM THE MOMENT BEYOND WHICH CORRECTIVE ACTION COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO RETRIEVE THE SITUATION, OR FROM TOUCHDOWN PRECEDING A LANDING UNDER EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES.

The aircraft was in collision with another Canso and a large portion of left wing was severed from CF-HTN.



- CIRCLE THE SILHOUETTES WHICH MOST CLOSELY DESCRIBE ANGLE OF GROUND CONTACT
- DRAW A SQUARE AROUND SILHOUETTES TO DESCRIBE ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT AT REST



23-0003
(8-69)

000039

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'informatio*

ELEVATED VIEW OF LOCALE (1)

SKETCH IN SIGNIFICANT RUNWAYS, OBSTRUCTIONS, FLIGHT PATH, ETC.

(R)

SHOW IMPORTANT DISTANCES, DIMENSIONS.

Nothing pertinent in profile.

PLAN VIEW OF LOCALE (2)

SKETCH IN SIGNIFICANT LANDING AREA, OBSTRUCTIONS, AIRCRAFT PATH, ETC.

SHOW IMPORTANT DISTANCES, DIMENSIONS.

N(Mag.)

Please refer to a blown up aerial photograph which contains relevant data and a directional arrow.

W

E

S

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

POST OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS

PERSONNEL

CREW	FATAL	SERIOUS	MINOR	UNINJURED	NOT PERTINENT	DIED AFTER 30 DAYS
PILOT-IN-COMMAND	☒	☐	☐	☐		☐
SECOND PILOT	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
THIRD PILOT	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
FLIGHT ENGINEER	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ALL OTHER CREW – NUMBER						
PASSENGER(S) – NUMBER						
PERSONS OUTSIDE A/C						

INJURY PATTERNS	HEAD	CHEST	LOWER TORSO	SPINE	ARM(S)	HAND(S)	LEG(S)	FOOT FEET	INTERNAL	MASSIVE
CREW/NO. OF PERSONS										2
PASS./NO. OF PERSONS										
PERSONS OUTSIDE										

EVENT CAUSING INJURY — NO. OF PERSONS INVOLVED	CREW	PASSENGERS	PERSONS OUTSIDE A/C
CONTACT WITH PROPELLER/INTAKE/EXHAUST			
FELL FROM AIRCRAFT (OR THROWN)			
STRUCK INTERIOR OF AIRCRAFT AT IMPACT	2		
STRUCK INTERIOR OF AIRCRAFT IN TURBULENCE			
STRUCK BY FLYING OBJECT INSIDE AIRCRAFT			
STRUCK BY AIRCRAFT			
BURNS ONLY			
BURNS FOLLOWING OTHER INJURIES			
CRUSHED IN WRECKAGE			
PULLED UNDERWATER			
CAME IN CONTACT WITH MAIN ROTOR			
CONTACT WITH TAIL ROTOR			
OTHER (SPECIFY)			

AIRCRAFT

DEGREE OF DAMAGE
- NONE ☐
- UNKNOWN ☐
- MINOR ☐
- SUBSTANTIAL ☐
- DESTROYED ☒

DAMAGE PATTERN
- ENGINE ☐
- PROPELLER ☐
- NONE ☐
- AFT FUSELAGE ☐
- COCKPIT ☐
- EMPENNAGE ☐
- NACELLE(S) ☐
- NOSE ☐
- WING(S) ☐
- UNDERCARRIAGE ☐
- MAIN ROTOR ☐
- TAIL ROTOR ☐
- TOTAL ☒

EVENT CAUSING DAMAGE
- AIRBORNE COLLISION ☒
- AIRBORNE COLLISION AND GROUND IMPACT ☐
- COLLISION ON GROUND/WATER ☐
- EXPLOSION ☐
- FIRE ☐
- AERIAL BREAK UP ☐
- SUBMERGENCE ☐
- GROUND/WATER IMPACT ☒
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

OBJECT OF AIR COLLISION
- AIRCRAFT ☒
- BIRD(S) ☐
- BUILDING ☐
- DETACHED PORTION OF AIRCRAFT ☐
- POLE(S)/POST(S) ☐
- TOWER ☐
- TREE(S) ☐
- WIRE(S) ☐
- OTHER AIRBORNE OBJECT ☐
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

OBJECT OF GROUND COLLISION
- AIRCRAFT ☐ BUILDING ☐
- DETACHED PORTION OF A/C ☐ FENCE(S) ☐
- PEDESTRIAN ☐ TREE(S) ☐
- POST/WIRE ☐ VEHICLE ☐
- DITCH ☐ RIDGE ☐
- SNOW BANK ☐ OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

ENVIRONMENT

PROPERTY DAMAGE
- NONE ☒
- MINOR ☐
- EXTENSIVE ☐

PROPERTY DAMAGED
- RESIDENCE ☐
- PUBLIC BUILDING ☐
- PUBLIC UTILITIES INSTALLATION ☐
- VEHICLE ☐
- AIRFIELD FACILITY ☐
- DOMESTIC ANIMAL(S) ☐
- BARN/STORAGE ☐
- FARM CROP ☐
- AIRCRAFT ☐
- FENCE ☐
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

000041

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

LIFE - PROTECTION DATA

(R)

CRASH PROTECTION

DEVICES

		SEAT(S)	SEAT ANCHORS (SETS)	LAP BELT(S)	SHOULDER HARNESS	BAGGAGE RESTRAINTS
CREW	NUMBER INSTALLED	2		2	2	0
	NUMBER USED	2		2	2	0
	NUMBER FAILED IN CRASH	0	0	0	0	0
PASSENGERS	NUMBER INSTALLED	4		4	0	
	NUMBER USED	0		0	0	
	NUMBER FAILED IN CRASH	0	0	0	0	

CRASH EVACUATION

AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

	ESCAPE SLIDE	ESCAPE LADDER/ROPE	DINGHY	NORMAL EXITS	ESCAPE HATCHES	PORTABLE EXTINGUISHER
NUMBER INSTALLED	☐	☐	☐	9	☐	1
NUMBER USED	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0
NUMBER FAILED IMPROPER OPERATION	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0
NUMBER FAILED IN USE	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

PERSONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT

None being used

DEVICES	OXYGEN MASK	CRASH HELMET	LIFE VEST/INDIVIDUAL FLOTATION DEVICE	FILTER MASK	PARACHUTE	IMMERSION SUIT
NUMBER BEING USED			0			
NUMBER FAILED DUE TO IMPROPER USE			0			
NUMBER FAILED IN OPERATION			0			

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

SEARCH AND RESCUE

PERTINENT ☐ NOT PERTINENT ☒

SEARCH SUCCESS

BY

NONE ☐ PROVINCIAL POLICE ☐
SAR ORGANIZATION ☐ MUNICIPAL POLICE ☐
PRIVATE AGENCY ☐ D.O.T. ☐
COMMERCIAL AGENCY ☐ OTHER ☐
R.C.M.P. ☐ SPECIFY:

DURATION

LESS THAN 4 HRS ☐
4 HRS. BUT LESS THAN 12 ☐
12 HRS. BUT LESS THAN 24 ☐
1 DAY BUT LESS THAN 2 ☐
2 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 4 ☐
4 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 7 ☐
7 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 14 ☐
14 DAYS OR MORE ☐

TYPE

GROUND ☐
AIR ☐
BOAT ☐
COMBINED AIR/BOAT ☐
COMBINED GROUND/AIR ☐
ALL ☐

LOCATING METHOD

L/F RADIO ☐ VISUAL-SMOKE/FIRE ☐
SARAH ☐ VISUAL-WRECKAGE ☐
AUTOMATIC CPI ☐ VISUAL PYROTECHNICS ☐
VHF/UHF HOMING ☐ VISUAL OTHER ☐
VISUAL-MIRROR ☐ OTHER ☐
NOT SUCCESSFUL ☐
IF OTHER SPECIFY ▶

SURVIVAL

PERTINENT ☐ NOT PERTINENT ☒

DEVICES

	TENT	SLEEPING BAG	FIRST AID KIT	EMERGENCY RATIONS	WEAPON	FISHING GEAR	FIRE SOURCE	PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
AVAILABLE-NOT USED	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
NOT AVAILABLE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
FAILED-IMPROPER USE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
NOT SATISFACTORY	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ANALYSIS

INVESTIGATOR'S APPRAISAL (1)

INDICATE WHICH ITEMS OF THE RECORDED FACTUAL DATA, IN THE VIEW OF THE INVESTIGATOR, CAUSED THE ACCIDENT.
DESCRIBE IN NARRATIVE HOW THE ITEMS INTERACTED TO CAUSE THE ACCIDENT.

Crew flying hours included in this report were based on information obtained from pilot and aircraft log books, company information, plus 5802 files for each crew member. A pilot log book for Mr. Hales was found by investigators and this log book was complete right up to but not including the accident flight. The pilot log book for Mr. Kuryluk was supplied to investigators at their request by Mr. Terry Harrold, a partner of Mr. Kuryluk. This log book was not current but provided background experience. Company records and the 5802 files were used to supplement his log book. The pilot log books were not available for Mr. Koshylanyk or Mr. Willms. In their case flying hours were based completely on company records, aircraft journey log sheets and 5802 files.

We have concluded in our report that there was no malfunction in either aircraft. This conclusion cannot be proven by physical evidence but is based on a lack of any radio messages indicating any problem, corroborated to the extent possible by evidence of witnesses. None of the witnesses reported anything which would tend to indicate an apparent malfunction prior to the collision. The investigators considered the possibility of malfunction and carried out some technical investigation of each aircraft, It was considered that there was sufficient evidence to exclude malfunction as a likely factor. The technical investigation was not detailed except to determine how the collision occurred.

The weight and balance data included in the report was based on approved weight and balance calculations in the 5008 files for each aircraft. Conclusions as to the amount of fuel on board the aircraft were reached after discussing this point with each operator.

RECOMMENDATIONS (2)

.../11A

(1) If there had been positive control of this bombing operation it is very unlikely that this accident would have occurred. This investigation has indicated that unacceptable risks exist unless control is well coordinated. At the present time the best method of control seems to be to utilize a "bird dog" aircraft as an airborne platform flown by a pilot familiar with bombing and with a bird dog officer on board, able to decide what tasks to give to the bombers.

It is recommended that all officials who might have to hire bombers be advised that unacceptable risks exist unless there is one bird dog aircraft for each group of bombers.

(2) In the Fire 6 area and generally in the Northwest Territories the radio frequency used by the bombers tends to become cluttered with messages related to ground support and other ground tasks. This also reduces flight safety because urgent messages can easily be missed. It is recommended that officials who may have to hire bombers be advised that portable radios should be provided to enable the bird dog officer to communicate with the fire line without utilizing the flight frequency used by the bombers and the bird dog aircraft.

The most appropriate air to air frequency for bombing operations should be decided upon in advance and be made public information.

FOR REGIONAL USE

~~CAUSES~~

CAUSES

~~Concern for an injured helicopter pilot caused one bomber to alter his circuit in the fire area. Subsequently the two bombers were on converging paths. None of the crew members saw the other bomber in sufficient time to take effective evasive action.~~ The collision occurred at a time when all four crew members would be busy.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

INVESTIGATOR'S APPRAISAL (Continued from Page 11)

Each aircraft was within limits although the C of G locations were very close to the forward limits. This is normal without water on board.

The investigating team concluded that weather was not a factor in this collision and this conclusion was based primarily on the observations of the several witnesses in the immediate area. From their observations and the observations of an accident investigator who arrived at the accident scene approximately 2½ hours after the accident, visibility was substantially unrestricted. Smoke was certainly not a problem over this fire. The wind direction and speed included in the report are based on witnesses' observations. The temperature and dewpoint however were determined by interpollation using Fort Smith and Fort Resolution weather sequences.

The pre-occurrence and post occurrence condition for crew has been discussed by the medical investigator. One or two further comments might be added. In the case of Mr. Kuryluk, an MOT accident investigator had spent approximately half the day with Mr. Kuryluk on the day of his death. This investigator met with Mr. Kuryluk at the Edmonton Industrial Airport at approximately 0830 hours M.S.T., on the 1st of September 1971 and visited with him, his wife and small daughter, approximately 6 years old. Then Mr. Kuryluk and the investigator sat together on PWA flight 761 enroute to Fort Smith and parted company at Fort Smith at noon while the investigator went to investigate a propeller fatality and Mr. Kuryluk went to "sort out some crew problems" he was having with his Canso CF-HTN. Mr. Kuryluk appeared to be in good spirits, well rested and this visit would tend to exclude fatigue or incapacitation as factors in the accident. It was, however, apparent that Mr. Kuryluk considered he was having problems with his Captain Hales who had had numerous co-pilots and Mr. Kuryluk indicated that he was going to "sort" the problem out or "fly the aircraft" himself. He indicated that his captain was acting too much the part of the captain and was being difficult on co-pilots and the co-pilots would eventually refuse to fly with him. The co-pilot who came out from Fort Smith on the day of the accident was Mr. Henry Stanford and a statement from Mr. Stanford is attached as an appendix. Mr. Willms who had at one time been a Mennonite minister was the son of a minister and according to Mr. Keith Hornseth was an absolute "totaller" which would tend to exclude incapacitation from alcohol and fatigue caused by parties. Mr. Hales was known to several of the accident investigators in the Western Region. He tended to be a person who would exaggerate his flying experience and in conversation seem to show extreme confidence but whether he was confident or not is not known. He was a person who talked constantly and tended to indicate that he knew almost everything about every type of aircraft, tended toward rapid nervous-like movements, was somewhat of a bore and tended to be an unpleasant person to associate with. However if our investigators considered him unpleasant company they never let it show.

According to Mr. Stanford in conversation on the 23rd of September 1971 Mr. Hales at one time made a comment about MOT accident investigators and indicated that they used to consult him about the characteristics of different aircraft to assist them in their investigations. The investigating team did not have first hand knowledge about Mr. Koshylanyk except through his employer. However

000044

.../11-

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

INVESTIGATOR'S APPRAISAL (Continued from Page 11A)

there is every indication that he was a competent pilot and there is no indication that he would have been fatigued or incapacitated. Conversely Mr. Koshylanyk and Mr. Willms had just come to the Fort Smith area from stand-by duty at Rocky Mountain House and they should have been well rested and quite ready to go on to fire duties. If cumulative fatigue could have had any bearing on this accident it would only be through Mr. Hales. There is some indication that Mr. Hales was on medication, pain killers and reducing pills, (diet pills) and this possibility will be discussed further when the report comes back from IEM.

There is no record (in their 5802 files) of any previous accidents involving any of the pilots. Mr. Keith Hornseth, however, indicated that Mr. Hales had at one time worked for them and had been involved in one or more minor accidents.

The witnesses to the collision all were cooperative and attempted to be as helpful as possible. However, the majority of them were pre-occupied with other duties, mostly related to the previous crash of the helicopter, CF-OKV, and none of them were actually watching the Cansos for any appreciable time. It is considered that this explains some of the inconsistencies in the statements although it is quite normal for different witnesses to see things slightly differently. In the case of Mr. Hofius, the injured helicopter pilot, he was not interviewed in detail in connection with the Canso collision until October due to the fact that he was seriously injured and we wished him to save his strength during the first few weeks after the accident for maximum assistance in the investigation of his own accident. However, he indicated that he remembered the Canso collision very vividly and was very definite in telling the investigators how the collision occurred. The way he described the collision, however, is not consistent with the physical evidence, that is marks and damage to the wings of each aircraft. Therefore some of his evidence must be discounted including his comment about evasive action. It would seem that the only valid points in his statement are that one aircraft was coming toward him and the other aircraft was on a path close to 90 degrees to that of the first aircraft. It is considered possible that the evasive action he mentions could have been merely a turn or on the other hand it seems possible considering that he was in shock after his own accident that he is now remembering things slightly differently to the way he actually saw them. Investigators intend to keep in touch with Mr. Hofius from time to time to see whether his recollection of the collision changes at all. The majority of the witnesses to the collision have HTN turning right and IDS turning left.

Statements from persons who did not witness the accident but who were able to supply useful background information to assist in understanding possible reasons for the collision are also attached. The statement of Mr. Stanford is quite useful. Comments from his statement that are considered valid by the investigating team are: "cutting corners", "my mistakes, I thought upset him more than it would a good pilot", "agitated man", "no real close friends", "Bird dog had trouble keeping track of him", "seemed difficult for him to integrate himself into the pattern with the other three Cansos", "felt compelled to be accepted by or impress the other pilots, "I think there should be some sort of traffic control and thought this on the job", "seeing a crash on the ground

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

INVESTIGATOR'S APPRAISAL (Continued from Page 11B)

would take his last bit of concentration and he would have none left for other things", "friction between Hales and Kuryluk".

When the statements were obtained from Norcanair, it was considered that some of the comments in their statements would contain a degree of bias. This may still be so but it is remarkable reading the statements together how similar they are to that made by Mr. Stanford. Investigators, from their personal knowledge of the operators and persons involved, consider that the majority of the comments in the statements supplied by Norcanair are in fact valid. Mr. S. McKnight of Norcanair stated that he was a firm believer in using a bird dog. This will be discussed further when we discuss reasons for a recommendation included in our report.

The Accident Scene:

As can be seen in the photographs, this accident occurred in a flat, open area and even though the total fire area was large the fire area consisted of small scattered fires only with very little smoke involved. The fire area had remained approximately the same size all summer, did not seem to be spreading, was not burning valuable timber and in the opinion of the investigating team there was no real urgency to this particular bombing operation. The accident scene and the nature of the fire therefore are excluded as accident causal factors. In fact conditions would have been much better than at the majority of forest fires. There is only one exception to this however and possibly this is also due to the fact that it was an easy operation. There was no bird dog aircraft in the area at the time nor any other form of control. If there had been control at the time this collision would most likely not have occurred. This is the basis of our recommendation relating to control.

Linked Events in the Accident:

An ELAN Plot has been prepared and is attached as an appendix. It is believed that this is self-explanatory. The ELAN Plot illustrates the interaction of factors which caused the accident. There are always hazards associated with fire bombing. A helicopter crash created an additional irregularity. The increased hazard caused by this additional irregularity was compounded by the fact that there was no one person directing the bombing operation, e.g., bird dog aircraft carrying a bird dog officer.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

AFFIRMATION OF THE CONTENT OF THIS REPORT

INVESTIGATOR(S) SIGNATURE(S)

REGIONAL SUPERINTENDENT COMMENTS (1)

REGIONAL SUPT. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION — DATE 9 Dec 71

REGIONAL CONTROLLER, CIVIL AVIATION — DATE 9 Dec 71

DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING THE DETAILS OF THIS REPORT AND APPENDED HERETO

POLICE REPORT ☐	MEDICAL REPORT ☐	MATERIAL LABORATORY REPORT ☐	WEATHER INFORMATION ☐
CRIME LABORATORY REPORT ☐	PATHOLOGIST'S REPORT ☒	PILOT'S STATEMENT (S) ☐	ATC TAPE/TRANSCRIPTION ☐
CORONER'S REPORT ☐	CASUALTY LIST ☐	WITNESSES' STATEMENT (S) ☒	TECHNICAL REPORTS ☒
MAPS AND CHARTS ☒	PASSENGER STATEMENTS ☐	OTHER ☐ SPECIFY:	

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL

INVESTIGATION

ELAPSED TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO INVESTIGATOR'S ARRIVAL ON THE SCENE: 2½ HRS.

ELAPSED TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO RECEIPT OF NOTIFICATION BY REGION: ¼ HRS.

EXPENDITURES

CASH: COST OF FARES, CHARTERS, ETC.: $

ALL OTHER CASH EXPENSES: $

TOTAL CASH EXPENDITURES: $

MAN-HOURS: TIME SPENT ON THIS CASE BY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR(S) INCLUDING TIME. HOURS:

H.Q. USE

CAUSE FACTORS ASSIGNED

000047

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS - CREW

CF-IDS

PERSONAL DATA-QUALIFICATIONS

COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER. (2)

CREW MEMBER

PILOT-IN-COMMAND [X] | 2ND PILOT [ ]
3RD PILOT [ ] | FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ]
NAVIGATOR [ ] | CREWMAN [ ]
CABIN ATTENDANT [ ] | FLIGHT OBSERVER [ ]
OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

STATION OCCUPIED

NOT KNOWN [ ] | PILOT SEAT [X]
SECOND IN COMMAND SEAT [ ] | FLIGHT ENGINEER SEAT [ ]
NAVIGATOR SEAT [ ] | REST POSITION [ ]
PASSENGER CABIN [ ] | OTHER [ ]
SPECIFY:

SPECIAL FUNCTION

NONE [X] | INSTRUCTOR [ ]
COMPANY EXAMINER [ ] | D.O.T. EXAMINER [ ]
TECHNICIAN [ ] | STUDENT [ ]
OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

PERSONAL DATA	AGE	SEX	SURNAME	INITIALS	LICENCE NUMBER
	44	Male	Koshylanyk	W.	WGA-1163

LICENCES AND PERMITS HELD

CANADIAN [X] | FOREIGN [ ]
NONE [ ]
UNKNOWN [ ] | AIRLINE TRANSPORT [X]
SENIOR COMMERCIAL [ ] | COMMERCIAL [ ]
PRIVATE [ ] | STUDENT PERMIT [ ]
FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ] | NAVIGATOR [ ]
GLIDER [ ] | GYROPLANE [ ]
BALLOON [ ] | MAINTENANCE ENGINEER [ ]

AIRCRAFT CLASSIFICATIONS

HELICOPTER ONLY [ ]
SINGLE-ENGINE LAND [ ] | SINGLE-ENGINE SEA [ ]
S.E. LAND AND SEA [ ] | S. & MULTI ENGINE LAND [ ]
S. & MULTI ENGINE SEA [ ] | S. & M.E. LAND AND SEA [X]

AIRCRAFT TYPE ENDORSEMENTS

HELICOPTER [ ] | GYROPLANE [ ]
DC3, PBY5A

RATINGS

NONE [ ]
INSTRUCTOR CL 1 [ ]
INSTRUCTOR CL 2 [ ]
INSTRUCTOR CL 3 [ ]
INSTRUMENT 1 [X]
INSTRUMENT 2 [ ]
BLOCK AIRSPACE [ ]
NIGHT [ ]

EXPERIENCE – FLYING TIME (To nearest hour - if unknown complete with X)

	ALL TYPES	THIS TYPE	DUAL ON THIS TYPE	THIS U/C CONFIGURATION	SINGLE ENGINE	MULTI ENGINE	ACTUAL INSTRUMENT	NIGHT	NIGHT X-COUNTRY	ROTOR-CRAFT
TOTAL HOURS	5025+	400+	2+05	400+	2073:30+	2951:30+	56:00+	100:20+	95:00+	Nil
HRS. LAST 90 DAYS	193	193	Nil	193	Nil	193	None	Probably	None	Nil

FATIGUE FACTORS

FLYING TIME	TOTAL LAST 3 DAYS	TOTAL THIS FLIGHT	HOURS AWAKE SINCE LAST REST PERIOD
	Approximately 2 HRS.	Approximately 2 HRS.	Approximately 8 HRS.

PILOT FLIGHT PREPARATION

COMPLETE ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

WEATHER BRIEFING

NONE [X] | ACCREDITED BRIEFER [ ]
UNKNOWN [ ] | COMPANY FACILITY [ ]
ACCREDITED FORECASTER [ ] | OTHER PILOT [ ]
SELF BRIEFING [ ] | OTHER OBSERVER [ ]

OTHER BRIEFINGS

NONE [X]
UNKNOWN [ ] | ROUTE [ ]
DEPARTURE PROCEDURES [ ] | OPERATION [ ]
ARRIVAL PROCEDURES [ ] | NOTAMS [ ]

DOCUMENTS CARRIED

NONE [ ]
COCKPIT CHECK LIST [ ] | FLIGHT OR OPERATING MANUAL [ ]
ADEQUATE VFR [X] | INADEQUATE VFR [ ]
ADEQUATE IFR [ ] | INADEQUATE IFR [ ]

FLIGHT PLAN FILED

NONE [ ] | SVFR [ ]
IFR [ ] | CONTROLLED VFR [ ]
VFR [ ] | FLIGHT NOTIFICATION [X]

EXECUTION OF FLIGHT TO START OF OCCURRENCE

ADHERENCE TO PLAN

NO DEVIATION [X]
ALTERATION FOR WX [ ]
ALTERATION FOR TRAFFIC [ ]
BECAME LOST [ ]
ALTERATION FOR U/S [ ]
OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

PHASE OF FLIGHT DURING WHICH FIRST IRREGULARITY OCCURRED

GROUND
START-UP [ ] | MOORING [ ]
STATIONARY [ ] | DOCKING [ ]
TAXIING [ ] | RAMPING (AMPHIBIOUS) [ ]
AIR-TAXIING [ ] | SHUT DOWN [ ]
STEP-TAXIING [ ] | PARKING [ ]
BEACHING [ ]

TAKEOFF
LINE-UP [ ]
RUN [ ]
LIFTOFF [ ]
HOVER [ ]

IN-FLIGHT
CLIMB [ ]
DESCENT [ ]
CRUISE [ ]
LEVEL TURN [ ]
CLIMBING TURN [X]
DESCENDING TURN [ ]
TRANSLATION [ ]
HOVER [ ]

LANDING
INITIAL APPROACH [ ]
FINAL APPROACH [ ]
FLARE [ ]
HOVER [ ]
TOUCH-DOWN [ ]
RUN-OUT [ ]
TURN-OFF [ ]

OTHER
LOAD-PICKUP [ ]
LOAD DROP [ ]
LOAD POSITIONING [ ]

NAVIGATION AND APPROACH AIDS

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT — ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE [ ]

AIDS AVAILABLE	V.H.F. D.F.	DME	VOR	TACAN	ILS	ASR	PAR	ADF	LORAN	L.F. RNG	NONE
IN AIRCRAFT								X		X	
ON GROUND											
IN USE BY A/C AT TIME OF OC.											X

000048

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS - CREW

CF-IDS

PERSONAL DATA-QUALIFICATIONS

COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER. (2)

CREW MEMBER

PILOT-IN-COMMAND		2ND PILOT	X
3RD PILOT		FLIGHT ENGINEER	
NAVIGATOR		CREWMAN	
CABIN ATTENDANT		FLIGHT OBSERVER	
OTHER		SPECIFY:	

STATION OCCUPIED

NOT KNOWN		PILOT SEAT	
SECOND IN COMMAND SEAT	X	FLIGHT ENGINEER SEAT	
NAVIGATOR SEAT		REST POSITION	
PASSENGER CABIN		OTHER	

SPECIFY:

SPECIAL FUNCTION

NONE	X	INSTRUCTOR	
COMPANY EXAMINER		D.O.T. EXAMINER	
TECHNICIAN		STUDENT	
OTHER		SPECIFY:	

PERSONAL DATA	AGE	SEX	SURNAME	INITIALS	LICENCE NUMBER
	28	Male	Willms	P.T.	WGC-8606

LICENCES AND PERMITS HELD

CANADIAN X FOREIGN

NONE

UNKNOWN		AIRLINE TRANSPORT	
SENIOR COMMERCIAL		COMMERCIAL	X
PRIVATE		STUDENT PERMIT	
FLIGHT ENGINEER		NAVIGATOR	
GLIDER		GYROPLANE	
BALLOON		MAINTENANCE ENGINEER	

AIRCRAFT CLASSIFICATIONS

HELICOPTER ONLY			
SINGLE-ENGINE LAND		SINGLE-ENGINE SEA	
S.E. LAND AND SEA		S. & MULTI ENGINE LAND	
S. & MULTI ENGINE SEA		S. & M.E. LAND AND SEA	

AIRCRAFT TYPE ENDORSEMENTS

HELICOPTER GYROPLANE

RATINGS

NONE			
INSTRUCTOR CL 1			
INSTRUCTOR CL 2	X		
INSTRUCTOR CL 3			
Expired INSTRUMENT 1	X		
INSTRUMENT 2			
BLOCK AIRSPACE			
NIGHT	X		

EXPERIENCE – FLYING TIME (To nearest hour - if unknown complete with X)

	ALL TYPES	THIS TYPE	DUAL ON THIS TYPE	THIS U/C CONFIGURATION	SINGLE ENGINE	MULTI ENGINE	ACTUAL INSTRUMENT	NIGHT	NIGHT X-COUNTRY	ROTOR-CRAFT
TOTAL HOURS	1700+	193	5	193	1520	180+	44	Not known		Nil
HRS. LAST 90 DAYS	153	157	Nil	153	Nil	153	Nil	Probably none		Nil

FATIGUE FACTORS

FLYING TIME	TOTAL LAST 3 DAYS	TOTAL THIS FLIGHT	HOURS AWAKE SINCE LAST REST PERIOD
	Approximately 2 HRS.	Approximately 2 HRS.	Approximately 8 HRS.

PILOT FLIGHT PREPARATION

COMPLETE ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

WEATHER BRIEFING

		ACCREDITED BRIEFER	
NONE	X	COMPANY FACILITY	
UNKNOWN		OTHER PILOT	
ACCREDITED FORECASTER		OTHER OBSERVER	
SELF BRIEFING			

OTHER BRIEFINGS

Probably NONE X

UNKNOWN		ROUTE	
DEPARTURE PROCEDURES		OPERATION	
ARRIVAL PROCEDURES		NOTAMS	

DOCUMENTS CARRIED

NONE			
COCKPIT CHECK LIST		FLIGHT OR OPERATING MANUAL	
ADEQUATE VFR	X	INADEQUATE VFR	
ADEQUATE IFR		INADEQUATE IFR	

FLIGHT PLAN FILED

NONE		SVFR	
IFR		CONTROLLED VFR	
VFR		FLIGHT NOTIFICATION	X

EXECUTION OF FLIGHT TO START OF OCCURRENCE

ADHERENCE TO PLAN

NO DEVIATION	X
ALTERATION FOR WX	
ALTERATION FOR TRAFFIC	
BECAME LOST	
ALTERATION FOR U/S	
OTHER	

SPECIFY:

PHASE OF FLIGHT DURING WHICH FIRST IRREGULARITY OCCURRED

GROUND		TAKEOFF	IN-FLIGHT	LANDING	OTHER
START-UP		LINE-UP	CLIMB	INITIAL APPROACH	LOAD-PICKUP
STATIONARY		RUN	DESCENT	FINAL APPROACH	
TAXIING		LIFTOFF	CRUISE	FLARE	LOAD DROP
AIR-TAXIING		HOVER	LEVEL TURN	HOVER	
STEP-TAXIING			CLIMBING TURN X	TOUCH-DOWN	
BEACHING			DESCENDING TURN	RUN-OUT	LOAD POSITIONING
MOORING			TRANSLATION	TURN-OFF	
DOCKING			HOVER		
RAMPING (AMPHIBIOUS)					
SHUT DOWN					
PARKING					

NAVIGATION AND APPROACH AIDS

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT — ADEQUATE X INADEQUATE

AIDS AVAILABLE	V.H.F. D.F.	DME	VOR	TACAN	ILS	ASR	PAR	ADF	LORAN	L.F. RNG	NONE
IN AIRCRAFT								X		X	
ON GROUND											X
IN USE BY A/C AT TIME OF OC.											

000049

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS

MATERIAL (1)

DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM CONDITIONS Condition: A – NOT DETERMINED S – SERVICEABLE; B – NOT INSTALLED U – UNSERVICEABLE	A	B	S	U	FUNCTION AFFECTED	COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM CAUSING PROBLEM	NATURE OF COMPONENT SUB-SYSTEM FAILURE
CANOPY WINDSCREEN			X				
DE-ICING-AIRFRAME			X				
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM - UP TO CONSUMER DEVICE			X				
EMPENNAGE - FIXED SURFACES			X				
ENGINES, ANCILLARIES AND CONTROLS			X				
FLIGHT CONTROLS			X				
FLAPS-SPOILERS-DIVEBRAKES AND CONTROLS			X				
FLUIDS AND GASES			X				
FUEL SYSTEM-UP TO MIXTURE CONTROL DEVICE			X				
FUSELAGE-STRUCTURE SKIN			X				
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM & ALL HYDRAULIC DEVICES			X				
INSTRUMENTS, FLIGHT DATA; DETECTORS, CIRCUITS			X				
INSTRUMENTS, SYSTEMS DATA; DETECTORS, ETC.			X				
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM; OXYGEN-CABIN PRESS		X					
LIGHTING-INTERNAL/EXTERNAL	X						
PANELS/DOORS/WINDOWS/HATCHES/HOUSINGS			X				
PROPELLER(S) AND CONTROLS			X				
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM			X				
RADIO NAVIGATION SYSTEM-AURAL, VIS, AUTO.	X						
MAIN ROTOR-BLADES, STRUCTURE, DRIVETRAIN		X					
TAIL ROTOR-BLADES, STRUCTURE, DRIVETRAIN		X					
LANDING GEAR, WHEELS, TIRES, BRAKES, STRUC.			X				
WARNING SYSTEMS-VISUAL, AURAL			X				
WING-STRUCTURE, SKIN			X				
AUTO PILOT		X					

BASIC DATA (2)

PRE-OCCURRENCE

I.A.S. Approx. 85 KTS

FUEL ON BOARD Approx. 200 IMP. GALS.

CALCULATED A.U.W. 22,747.6 LBS

MIXTURE: RICH [X] LEAN [ ] AUTO [ ]

CARB. HEAT POSITION: HOT [ ] PARTIAL [ ] COLD [X]

C OF G POSITION _____ % MAC OR 242.4 INS — AFT OF DATUM [X] FORWARD OF DATUM [ ]

C OF G PERMISSIBLE RANGE _____ % MAC TO _____ % MAC OR 242.2 INS TO 251.0 INS — AFT OF DATUM [X] FORWARD OF DATUM [ ]

AT GROUND CONTACT

I.A.S. Approx. 90 KTS

POWER SETTING: NONE [ ] PARTIAL [X] ASYMMETRIC [ ] FULL [ ]

LANDING GEAR POS'N: UNLOCKED [ ] UP [X] FIXED GEAR [ ] DOWN [ ]

FLAP POSITION: NO FLAPS [ ] UP [X] PARTIAL [ ] DOWN [ ]

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS (1)

AT POINT OF FIRST IRREGULARITY OF FLIGHT IF APPLICABLE (2)

AIRCRAFT CONDITIONS
HEIGHT AGL ____ FT
TERRAIN ELEVATION ____ FT. ASL

CLOUD NONE ☐ UNKNOWN ☐

	HT. AGL	HT. ASL	VERTICAL EXTENT	AMOUNT
LOWEST LAYER	FT	FT	FT	/10
SECOND LAYER	FT	FT	FT	/10

VISIBILITY
AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT ____ MILES

RESTRICTING PHENOMENA: NONE ☐ SMOKE ☐ CLOUD ☐ BLOWING DUST ☐ BLOWING SNOW ☐ FOG ☐ HAZE ☐ PRECIPITATION ☐ BLOWING SAND ☐ ICE CRYSTALS ☐

PRECIPITATION
NONE ☐ RAIN ☐ DRIZZLE ☐ SNOW ☐ FREEZING DRIZZLE ☐ HAIL ☐ FREEZING RAIN ☐
LIGHT ☐ MODERATE ☐ HEAVY ☐

TEMPERATURE AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT
°F
°C

WIND UNKNOWN ☐
AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT
DIRECTION °TRUE
SPEED KTS

ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY
NONE ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ STATIC ☐ ST. ELMOS FIRE ☐ VIOLENT DISCHARGE ☐

SPECIAL HAZARDS
NONE ☐ BIRDS ☐ PARACHUTIST ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ AIRFRAME ICING ☐ TURBULENCE ☐ TALL STRUCTURE ☐ WHITE OUT ☐ AIR TRAFFIC ☐ HOAR FROST ☐ GLASSY WATER ☐ OTHER ☐
SPECIFY:

IN AREA WHERE AIRCRAFT CAME TO REST (3)

CLOUD NONE ☒ UNKNOWN ☐ — But middle and high cloud. This was a low level flight.

	BASE HT.	TOP HT.	AMOUNT
LOWEST BASE	FT AGL	FT AGL	SCATTERED ☐ BROKEN ☐ OVERCAST ☐
SECOND LAYER	FT AGL	FT AGL	SCATTERED ☐ BROKEN ☐ OVERCAST ☐

VISIBILITY
AT SURFACE 15 MILES RVR ____ FT.

RESTRICTING PHENOMENA: NONE ☒ CLOUD ☐ BLOWING DUST ☐ HAZE ☐ PRECIPITATION ☐ BLOWING SAND ☐ FOG ☐ ICE CRYSTALS ☐ BLOWING SNOW ☐ SMOKE ☐

PRECIPITATION
NONE ☒ RAIN ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ FREEZING RAIN ☐ DRIZZLE ☐ SNOW ☐ FREEZING DRIZZLE ☐ HAIL ☐

TEMPERATURE AT GROUND LEVEL
70 °F. UNKNOWN ☐

DEW POINT AT GROUND LEVEL
Approx 52 °F. UNKNOWN ☐

WIND AT GROUND LEVEL UNKNOWN ☐
DIRECTION: Northeasterly °MAGNETIC
SPEED: 10-15 M.P.H.
CHARACTERISTICS: STEADY ☒ SWINGING ☐ GUSTY ☐ UPWARD COMPONENT ☐ SUBSIDENCE ☐

SPECIAL HAZARDS
NONE ☒ UNKNOWN ☐ HOAR FROST ☐ BIRDS ☐ TURBULENCE ☐ SUN GLARE ☐
WIND SHEAR ☐ AIRFRAME ICING ☐ AIR TRAFFIC ☐ WHITE OUT ☐ GLASSY WATER ☐ OTHER ☐ DESCRIBE:

WEATHER DATA SOURCE
EYEWITNESS ☒ PILOT ☐ MET. OBSERVATIONS ☒ AFTERCAST ☐

LOCALE DESCRIPTION
GENERAL: MOUNTAINS ☐ HILLS ☐ ROLLING ☐ FLAT ☒
SPECIFIC: AERODROME ☐ CLEARING ☒ URBAN AREA ☐ ROAD ☐ SWAMP/MUSKEG ☐ TIDAL WATER ☐ RIVER ☐ BUSH ☐ LAKE ☐

OBSTRUCTIONS TO APPROACH/DEPARTURE N/A
NONE ☐ TREE(S) ☐ POLELINE ☐ HIGH GROUND ☐ TOWER(S) ☐ BUILDINGS ☐

SURFACE
GENERAL: PAVED ☐ SAND/GRAVEL ☐ SOIL ☒ SNOW ☐ ICE ☐ WATER ☐ ROCK ☐
SPECIFIC: CONCRETE ☐ ASPHALT ☐ COMPACTED ☒ LOOSE ☐ LOW VEGETATION/GRASS ☐ HIGH WAVES ☐ SWELLS ☐
HAZARDS N/A: NONE ☐ WATER FILM ☐ PUDDLES ☐ ICE PATCHES ☐ SLUSH ☐ SOFT ☐ ROUGH ☐ SNOW DRIFTS ☐

OBSTRUCTIONS TO T.O./LDG. RUN N/A
NONE ☐ VEHICLES ☐ DITCHES/HOLES ☐ ANIMALS ☐ ROCKS/DEBRIS ☐ PEDESTRIANS ☐ RIDGES/SANDBARS ☐ SNOW BANK ☐ POSTS/FENCES ☐ OTHER ☐
SPECIFY:

VITAL DATA
USABLE LENGTH ____ FT
USABLE WIDTH ____ FT
ELEVATION ____ FT
BRAKING ACTION: NIL ☐ POOR ☐ FAIR ☐ GOOD ☐
N/A

RUNWAY PROFILE
LEVEL ☒ UP ☐ DOWN ☐ ☐ ☐

AVERAGE SLOPE IN DEGREES
UP ____ DN ____ UP ____ DN ____

LIGHT CONDITIONS
BRIGHT DAY ☒ DARK DAY ☐ BRIGHT NIGHT ☐ DARK NIGHT ☐ TWILIGHT ☐ UNK ☐

000051

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER									
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND [X]	2ND PILOT [ ]	FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ]	CABIN ATTENDANT [ ]	OTHER [ ]	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR [ ]	3RD PILOT [ ]	CREWMAN [ ]	FLIGHT OBSERVER [ ]		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS — NO TESTS DONE [ ]

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3) — ADMITTED [ ] OBSERVED [ ] NOT INVESTIGATED [ ]

PHYSICAL

NONE [ ]	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION [ ]	FATIGUE [ ]
DROWSINESS [ ]	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS [ ]	NAUSEA [ ]
FEVERISHNESS/HOT [ ]	PAIN [ ]	DROWSINESS [ ]
NUMBNESS [ ]	DIARRHOEA [ ]	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES [ ]	STOMACH CRAMPS [ ]	
COLD/ CHILLS [ ]	DIZZINESS [ ]	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION [ ]	DEPRESSION [ ]
ANGER [ ]	ELATION [ ]
IMPATIENCE [ ]	LISTLESSNESS [ ]
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/ TENSENESS [ ]	PREOCCUPATION [ ]
	OTHER:
NONE EXPERIENCED [ ]	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
1 May, 1971	Prince Albert	3-230-382

MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	SPECIFY
1-1-1-1	N.1	YES [ ] NO [ ]	

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

Extremely burned and fragmented body of this pilot is compatible with immediate and prolonged burning of the aircraft after the crash.

000052

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER										
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐	2ND PILOT ☒	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐	
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐	
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐	
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:	
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐		
COLD/ CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐		

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/ TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
OTHER:	
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE		NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
5 Jan. 1971	Regina		Bradley 3062-396
MEDICAL PROFILE	**RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED**	**RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT**	**SPECIFY**
1-1-1-1	Nil	YES ☐ NO ☐	

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

000053

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

OCCURRENCE DESCRIPTION (1)

(R)

FIRST IRREGULARITY OF FLIGHT (2)

NARRATE THE EVENT(S) WHICH FIRST INDICATED THAT THE FLIGHT WAS NOT PROCEEDING AS DESIRED.

There is no evidence that the crew of CF-IDS was aware of any irregularity until the collision with CF-HTN occurred. It is probable that the crew of CF-IDS heard some radio messages from CF-HTN but this cannot be determined.

RESULTANT ACTION(S) • REACTION(S) (3)


NARRATE ALL THE ACTIONS OF THE PILOT; ALL THE REACTIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT TO PILOT DEMANDS; ALL INTERACTIONS OF PILOT, AIRCRAFT, AND ENVIRONMENT.

The majority of the evidence excludes evasive action having been taken prior to the collision. The aircraft would be completely uncontrollable after the collision

TERMINAL EVENT (4)


DESCRIBE THE MOVEMENTS OF THE AIRCRAFT FROM THE MOMENT BEYOND WHICH CORRECTIVE ACTION COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO RETRIEVE THE SITUATION, OR FROM TOUCHDOWN PRECEDING A LANDING UNDER EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES.

The collision with CF-HTN severed a large portion of right wing from CF-IDS.




- CIRCLE THE SILHOUETTES WHICH MOST CLOSELY DESCRIBE ANGLE OF GROUND CONTACT
- DRAW A SQUARE AROUND SILHOUETTES TO DESCRIBE ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT AT REST

FRONT ELEVATION ▶



STARBOARD ELEVATION ▶



23-0003
(8-69)

000054

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ELEVATION VIEW OF LOCALE (1)

(R)

SKETCH IN SIGNIFICANT RUNWAYS, OBSTRUCTIONS, FLIGHT PATH, ETC.

SHOW IMPORTANT DISTANCES, DIMENSIONS.

Nothing pertinent in profile.

PLAN VIEW OF LOCALE (2)

SKETCH IN SIGNIFICANT LANDING AREA, OBSTRUCTIONS, AIRCRAFT PATH, ETC.

SHOW IMPORTANT DISTANCES, DIMENSIONS.

N(Mag.)

Please refer to a blown up aerial photograph which contains relevant data and a directional arrow.

W

E

S

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

POST OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS

PERSONNEL

CREW	FATAL	SERIOUS	MINOR	UNINJURED	NOT PERTINENT	DIED AFTER 30 DAYS
PILOT-IN-COMMAND	1					
SECOND PILOT	1					
THIRD PILOT						
FLIGHT ENGINEER						
ALL OTHER CREW – NUMBER						
PASSENGER(S) – NUMBER						
PERSONS OUTSIDE A/C						

INJURY PATTERNS	HEAD	CHEST	LOWER TORSO	SPINE	ARM(S)	HAND(S)	LEG(S)	FOOT FEET	INTERNAL	MASSIVE
CREW/NO. OF PERSONS										2
PASS./NO. OF PERSONS										
PERSONS OUTSIDE										

EVENT CAUSING INJURY — NO. OF PERSONS INVOLVED	CREW	PASSENGERS	PERSONS OUTSIDE A/C
CONTACT WITH PROPELLER/INTAKE/EXHAUST			
FELL FROM AIRCRAFT (OR THROWN)			
STRUCK INTERIOR OF AIRCRAFT AT IMPACT	2		
STRUCK INTERIOR OF AIRCRAFT IN TURBULENCE			
STRUCK BY FLYING OBJECT INSIDE AIRCRAFT			
STRUCK BY AIRCRAFT			
BURNS ONLY			
BURNS FOLLOWING OTHER INJURIES			
CRUSHED IN WRECKAGE			
PULLED UNDERWATER			
CAME IN CONTACT WITH MAIN ROTOR			
CONTACT WITH TAIL ROTOR			
OTHER (SPECIFY)			

AIRCRAFT

DEGREE OF DAMAGE
- NONE ☐
- UNKNOWN ☐
- MINOR ☐
- SUBSTANTIAL ☐
- DESTROYED ☒

DAMAGE PATTERN
- ENGINE ☐
- PROPELLER ☐
- NONE ☐
- AFT FUSELAGE ☐
- COCKPIT ☐
- EMPENNAGE ☐
- NACELLE(S) ☐
- NOSE ☐
- WING(S) ☐
- UNDERCARRIAGE ☐
- MAIN ROTOR ☐
- TAIL ROTOR ☐
- TOTAL ☒

EVENT CAUSING DAMAGE
- AIRBORNE COLLISION ☒
- AIRBORNE COLLISION AND GROUND IMPACT ☐
- COLLISION ON GROUND/WATER ☐
- EXPLOSION ☐
- FIRE ☐
- AERIAL BREAK UP ☐
- SUBMERGENCE ☐
- GROUND/~~XXXXX~~ IMPACT ☒
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

OBJECT OF AIR COLLISION
- AIRCRAFT ☒
- BIRD(S) ☐
- BUILDING ☐
- DETACHED PORTION OF AIRCRAFT ☐
- POLE(S)/POST(S) ☐
- TOWER ☐
- TREE(S) ☐
- WIRE(S) ☐
- OTHER AIRBORNE OBJECT ☐
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

OBJECT OF GROUND COLLISION
- AIRCRAFT ☐ BUILDING ☐
- DETACHED PORTION OF A/C ☐ FENCE(S) ☐
- PEDESTRIAN ☐ TREE(S) ☐
- POST/WIRE ☐ VEHICLE ☐
- DITCH ☐ RIDGE ☐
- SNOW BANK ☐ OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

ENVIRONMENT

PROPERTY DAMAGE
- NONE ☒
- MINOR ☐
- EXTENSIVE ☐

PROPERTY DAMAGED
- RESIDENCE ☐
- PUBLIC BUILDING ☐
- PUBLIC UTILITIES INSTALLATION ☐
- VEHICLE ☐
- AIRFIELD FACILITY ☐
- DOMESTIC ANIMAL(S) ☐
- BARN/STORAGE ☐
- FARM CROP ☐
- AIRCRAFT ☐
- FENCE ☐
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

000056

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

LIFE - PROTECTION DATA

(R)

CRASH PROTECTION

DEVICES

		SEAT(S)	SEAT ANCHORS (SETS)	LAP BELT(S)	SHOULDER HARNESS	BAGGAGE RESTRAINTS
CREW	NUMBER INSTALLED	2		2	2	0
	NUMBER USED	2		2	2	0
	NUMBER FAILED IN CRASH					
PASSENGERS	NUMBER INSTALLED					
	NUMBER USED					
	NUMBER FAILED IN CRASH					

CRASH EVACUATION

AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

	ESCAPE SLIDE	ESCAPE LADDER/ROPE	DINGHY	NORMAL EXITS	ESCAPE HATCHES	PORTABLE EXTINGUISHER
NUMBER INSTALLED	☐	☐	☐	9	☐	1
NUMBER USED	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0
NUMBER FAILED IMPROPER OPERATION	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0
NUMBER FAILED IN USE	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

PERSONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT

None being used

DEVICES	OXYGEN MASK	CRASH HELMET	LIFE VEST/INDIVIDUAL FLOTATION DEVICE	FILTER MASK	PARACHUTE	IMMERSION SUIT
NUMBER BEING USED			0			
NUMBER FAILED DUE TO IMPROPER USE			0			
NUMBER FAILED IN OPERATION			0			

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

SEARCH AND RESCUE

PERTINENT ☐ NOT PERTINENT ☒

SEARCH SUCCESS

BY

NONE ☐ PROVINCIAL POLICE ☐
SAR ORGANIZATION ☐ MUNICIPAL POLICE ☐
PRIVATE AGENCY ☐ D.O.T. ☐
COMMERCIAL AGENCY ☐ OTHER ☐
R.C.M.P. ☐ SPECIFY:

DURATION

LESS THAN 4 HRS ☐
4 HRS. BUT LESS THAN 12 ☐
12 HRS. BUT LESS THAN 24 ☐
1 DAY BUT LESS THAN 2 ☐
2 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 4 ☐
4 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 7 ☐
7 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 14 ☐
14 DAYS OR MORE ☐

TYPE

GROUND ☐
AIR ☐
BOAT ☐
COMBINED AIR/BOAT ☐
COMBINED GROUND/AIR ☐
ALL ☐

LOCATING METHOD

L/F RADIO ☐ VISUAL-SMOKE/FIRE ☐
SARAH ☐ VISUAL-WRECKAGE ☐
AUTOMATIC CPI ☐ VISUAL PYROTECHNICS ☐
VHF/UHF HOMING ☐ VISUAL OTHER ☐
VISUAL-MIRROR ☐ OTHER ☐
NOT SUCCESSFUL ☐
IF OTHER SPECIFY ▶

SURVIVAL

PERTINENT ☐ NOT PERTINENT ☒

DEVICES

	TENT	SLEEPING BAG	FIRST AID KIT	EMERGENCY RATIONS	WEAPON	FISHING GEAR	FIRE SOURCE	PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
AVAILABLE-NOT USED	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
NOT AVAILABLE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
FAILED-IMPROPER USE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
NOT SATISFACTORY	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

000057

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

INVESTIGATOR'S APPRAISAL (1)

INDICATE WHICH ITEMS OF THE RECORDED FACTUAL DATA, IN THE VIEW OF THE INVESTIGATOR, CAUSED THE ACCIDENT. DESCRIBE IN NARRATIVE HOW THE ITEMS INTERACTED TO CAUSE THE ACCIDENT.

Crew flying hours included in this report were based on information obtained from pilot and aircraft log books, company information, plus 5802 files for each crew member. A pilot log book for Mr. Hales was found by investigators and this log book was complete right up to but not including the accident flight. The pilot log book for Mr. Kuryluk was supplied to investigators at their request by Mr. Terry Harrold, a partner of Mr. Kuryluk. This log book was not current but provided background experience. Company records and the 5802 files were used to supplement his log book. The pilot log books were not available for Mr. Koshylanyk or Mr. Willms. In their case flying hours were based completely on company records, aircraft journey log sheets and 5802 files.

We have concluded in our report that there was no malfunction in either aircraft. This conclusion cannot be proven by physical evidence but is based on a lack of any radio messages indicating any problem, corroborated to the extent possible by evidence of witnesses. None of the witnesses reported anything which would tend to indicate an apparent malfunction prior to the collision. The investigators considered the possibility of malfunction and carried out some technical investigation of each aircraft, It was considered that there was sufficient evidence to exclude malfunction as a likely factor. The technical investigation was not detailed except to determine how the collision occurred.

The weight and balance data included in the report was based on approved weight and balance calculations in the 5008 files for each aircraft. Conclusions as to the amount of fuel on board the aircraft were reached after discussing this point with each operator.

.../11A

RECOMMENDATIONS (2)

(1) If there had been positive control of this bombing operation it is very unlikely that this accident would have occurred. This investigation has indicated that unacceptable risks exist unless control is well coordinated. At the present time the best method of control seems to be to utilize a "bird dog" aircraft as an airborne platform flown by a pilot familiar with bombing and with a bird dog officer on board, able to decide what tasks to give to the bombers.

It is recommended that all officials who might have to hire bombers be advised that unacceptable risks exist unless there is one bird dog aircraft for each group of bombers.

(2) In the Fire 6 area and generally in the Northwest Territories the radio frequency used by the bombers tends to become cluttered with messages related to ground support and other ground tasks. This also reduces flight safety because urgent messages can easily be missed. It is recommended that officials who may have to hire bombers be advised that portable radios should be provided to enable the bird dog officer to communicate with the fire line without utilizing the flight freqmncy used by the bombers and the bird dog aircraft.

The most appropriate air to air frequency for bombing operations should be decided upon in advance and be made public information.

FOR REGIONAL USE

~~CAUSES~~

CAUSES

~~Concern for an injured helicopter pilot caused one bomber to alter his circuit in the~~ fire area. Subsequently the two bombers were on converging paths. None of the ~~crew members saw the other bomber in sufficient time to take effective evasive action.~~ The collision occurred at a time when all four crew members would be busy.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

INVESTIGATOR'S APPRAISAL (Continued from Page 11)

Each aircraft was within limits although the C of G locations were very close to the forward limits. This is normal without water on board.

The investigating team concluded that weather was not a factor in this collision and this conclusion was based primarily on the observations of the several witnesses in the immediate area. From their observations and the observations of an accident investigator who arrived at the accident scene approximately 2½ hours after the accident, visibility was substantially unrestricted. Smoke was certainly not a problem over this fire. The wind direction and speed included in the report are based on witnesses' observations. The temperature and dewpoint however were determined by interpollation using Fort Smith and Fort Resolution weather sequences.

The pre-occurrence and post occurrence condition for crew has been discussed by the medical investigator. One or two further comments might be added. In the case of Mr. Kuryluk, an MOT accident investigator had spent approximately half the day with Mr. Kuryluk on the day of his death. This investigator met with Mr. Kuryluk at the Edmonton Industrial Airport at approximately 0830 hours M.S.T., on the 1st of September 1971 and visited with him, his wife and small daughter, approximately 6 years old. Then Mr. Kuryluk and the investigator sat together on PWA flight 761 enroute to Fort Smith and parted company at Fort Smith at noon while the investigator went to investigate a propeller fatality and Mr. Kuryluk went to "sort out some crew problems" he was having with his Canso CF-HTN. Mr. Kuryluk appeared to be in good spirits, well rested and this visit would tend to exclude fatigue or incapacitation as factors in the accident. It was, however, apparent that Mr. Kuryluk considered he was having problems with his Captain Hales who had had numerous co-pilots and Mr. Kuryluk indicated that he was going to "sort" the problem out or "fly the aircraft" himself. He indicated that his captain was acting too much the part of the captain and was being difficult on co-pilots and the co-pilots would eventually refuse to fly with him. The co-pilot who came out from Fort Smith on the day of the accident was Mr. Henry Stanford and a statement from Mr. Stanford is attached as an appendix. Mr. Willms who had at one time been a Mennonite minister was the son of a minister and according to Mr. Keith Hornseth was an absolute "teetotaller" which would tend to exclude incapacitation from alcohol and fatigue caused by parties. Mr. Hales was known to several of the accident investigators in the Western Region. He tended to be a person who would exaggerate his flying experience and in conversation seem to show extreme confidence but whether he was confident or not is not known. He was a person who talked constantly and tended to indicate that he knew almost everything about every type of aircraft, tended toward rapid nervous-[redacted] movements, was somewhat of a bore and tended to be an unpleasant person to associate with. However if our investigators considered him unpleasant company they never let it show.

According to Mr. Stanford in conversation on the 23rd of September 1971 Mr. Hales at one time made a comment about MOT accident investigators and indicated that they used to consult him about the characteristics of different aircraft to assist them in their investigations. The investigating team did not have first hand knowledge about Mr. Koshylanyk except through his employer. However,

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

INVESTIGATOR'S APPRAISAL (Continued from Page 11A)

there is every indication that he was a competent pilot and there is no indication that he would have been fatigued or incapacitated. Conversely Mr. Koshylanyk and Mr. Willms had just come to the Fort Smith area from stand-by duty at Rocky Mountain House and they should have been well rested and quite ready to go on to fire duties. If cumulative fatigue could have had any bearing on this accident it would only be through Mr. Hales. There is some indication that Mr. Hales was on medication, pain killers and reducing pills, (diet pills) and this possibility will be discussed further when the report comes back from IEM.

There is no record (in their 5802 files) of any previous accidents involving any of the pilots. Mr. Keith Hornseth, however, indicated that Mr. Hales had at one time worked for them and had been involved in one or more minor accidents.

The witnesses to the collision all were cooperative and attempted to be as helpful as possible. However, the majority of them were pre-occupied with other duties, mostly related to the previous crash of the helicopter, CF-OKV, and none of them were actually watching the Cansos for any appreciable time. It is considered that this explains some of the inconsistencies in the statements although it is quite normal for different witnesses to see things slightly differently. In the case of Mr. Hofius, the injured helicopter pilot, he was not interviewed in detail in connection with the Canso collision until October due to the fact that he was seriously injured and we wished him to save his strength during the first few weeks after the accident for maximum assistance in the investigation of his own accident. However, he indicated that he remembered the Canso collision very vividly and was very definite in telling the investigators how the collision occurred. The way he described the collision, however, is not consistent with the physical evidence, that is marks and damage to the wings of each aircraft. Therefore some of his evidence must be discounted including his comment about evasive action. It would seem that the only valid points in his statement are that one aircraft was coming toward him and the other aircraft was on a path close to 90 degrees to that of the first aircraft. It is considered possible that the evasive action he mentions could have been merely a turn or on the other hand it seems possible considering that he was in shock after his own accident that he is now remembering things slightly differently to the way he actually saw them. Investigators intend to keep in touch with Mr. Hofius from time to time to see whether his recollection of the collision changes at all. The majority of the witnesses to the collision have HTN turning right and IDS turning left.

Statements from persons who did not witness the accident but who were able to supply useful background information to assist in understanding possible reasons for the collision are also attached. The statement of Mr. Stanford is quite useful. Comments from his statement that are considered valid by the investigating team are: "cutting corners", "my mistakes, I thought upset him more than it would a good pilot", "agitated man", "no real close friends", "Bird dog had trouble keeping track of him", "seemed difficult for him to integrate himself into the pattern with the other three Cansos", "felt compelled to be accepted by or impress the other pilots, "I think there should be some sort of traffic control and thought this on the job", "seeing a crash on the ground

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

INVESTIGATOR'S APPRAISAL (Continued from Page 11B)

would take his last bit of concentration and he would have none left for other things", "friction between Hales and Kuryluk".

When the statements were obtained from Norcanair, it was considered that some of the comments in their statements would contain a degree of bias. This may still be so but it is remarkable reading the statements together how similar they are to that made by Mr. Stanford. Investigators, from their personal knowledge of the operators and persons involved, consider that the majority of the comments in the statements supplied by Norcanair are in fact valid. Mr. S. McKnight of Norcanair stated that he was a firm believer in using a bird dog. This will be discussed further when we discuss reasons for a recommendation included in our report.

The Accident Scene:

As can be seen in the photographs, this accident occurred in a flat, open area and even though the total fire area was large the fire area consisted of small scattered fires only with very little smoke involved. The fire area had remained approximately the same size all summer, did not seem to be spreading, was not burning valuable timber and in the opinion of the investigating team there was no real urgency to this particular bombing operation. The accident scene and the nature of the fire therefore are excluded as accident causal factors. In fact conditions would have been much better than at the majority of forest fires. There is only one exception to this however and possibly this is also due to the fact that it was an easy operation. There was no bird dog aircraft in the area at the time nor any other form of control. If there had been control at the time this collision would most likely not have occurred. This is the basis of our recommendation relating to control.

Linked Events in the Accident:

An ELAN Plot has been prepared and is attached as an appendix. It is believed that this is self-explanatory. The ELAN Plot illustrates the interaction of factors which caused the accident. There are always hazards associated with fire bombing. A helicopter crash created an additional irregularity. The increased hazard caused by this additional irregularity was compounded by the fact that there was no one person directing the bombing operation, e.g., bird dog aircraft carrying a bird dog officer.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

AFFIRMATION OF THE CONTENT OF THIS REPORT

INVESTIGATOR(S) SIGNATURE(S)

REGIONAL SUPERINTENDENT COMMENTS (1)

REGIONAL SUPT. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION — DATE 9 Dec 71

REGIONAL CONTROLLER, CIVIL AVIATION — DATE 9 Dec 71

DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING THE DETAILS OF THIS REPORT AND APPENDED HERETO

POLICE REPORT ☐	MEDICAL REPORT ☐	MATERIAL LABORATORY REPORT ☐	WEATHER INFORMATION ☐
CRIME LABORATORY REPORT ☐	PATHOLOGIST'S REPORT ☒	PILOT'S STATEMENT (S) ☐	ATC TAPE/ TRANSCRIPTION ☐
CORONER'S REPORT ☐	CASUALTY LIST ☐	WITNESSES' STATEMENT (S) ☒	TECHNICAL REPORTS ☒
MAPS AND CHARTS ☒	PASSENGER STATEMENTS ☐	OTHER ☐ SPECIFY:	

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL

INVESTIGATION

ELAPSED TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO INVESTIGATOR'S ARRIVAL ON THE SCENE: 2½ HRS.

ELAPSED TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO RECEIPT OF NOTIFICATION BY REGION: ¼ HRS.

EXPENDITURES

CASH: COST OF FARES, CHARTERS, ETC.: $

ALL OTHER CASH EXPENSES: $

TOTAL CASH EXPENDITURES: $

MAN-HOURS: TIME SPENT ON THIS CASE BY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR(S) INCLUDING TIME. HOURS:

H.Q. USE

CAUSE FACTORS ASSIGNED

000062

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

MEMORANDUM
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

NOTE DE SERVICE
GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

FROM / DE: W.C.A.I.

OUR FILE – N/RÉFÉRENCE: 5002-W1801 (WCAI) - W1802

YOUR FILE – V/RÉFÉRENCE:

DATE: 28 October 1971

REFER REPLY TO / ENVOYER LA RÉPONSE À:

TEL. NO. / TÉL.:

TO / À: FILE

SUBJECT / SUJET: Accident - CF-HTN & CF-IDS
- 1 September 1971

1. This memorandum contains information obtained in an interview with Mr. C. F. Platt, Fire Control Officer with Alberta Forest Service, Dept. of Lands & Forests (Alberta). The interview took place in Mr. Platt's office at 10625 - 120 Avenue, telephone number 479-5921 between 1330 hours M.S.T., and 1430 hours M.S.T., on 27 October 1971.

2. Mr. Platt stated that in Government Service the natural tendency dictated by economy is to accept the lowest bid from the various bomber operators who submit tenders. This assures the poorest skill and the poorest aircraft in what is already a marginal operation as far as safety is concerned. The decision as to which bid to accept should not be decided on cost unless of course the difference in cost is staggering. The most important factor in ensuring safety is to know the operator involved, his procedures, his aircraft maintenance and his crews. Mr. Platt believed that in a case of Federal National Parks and Forestry in the Northwest Territories they are now moving into a technology of which their people have no real understanding and Mr. Platt made it clear that he was not faulting any individuals involved but from his knowledge none of these officials had been given any training in how to run a bomber operation. In Alberta, definite procedures have been laid down and specific training procedures have also been outlined. A basic point in the Alberta plan is that they do not hire a bomber group unless the bomber group provides a bird dog aircraft. The company that is providing the bombers must provide the bird dog not some other company. This is the ideal and of course in practise occasionally you have to settle for something less than the ideal. The bird dog pilot should be the highest skilled bomber pilot of the group. The lead bomber pilot should be second most skilled bomber pilot of the group. The function of the bird dog aircraft is to provide an airborne platform for two people with different duties. The bird dog pilot is responsible for air safety. He is to examine the target area before the bombers make their runs and assess the target area from an aerial safety point of view. Once the bird dog pilot has decided that the area can be bombed, the bird dog officer who is a forestry official decides what amount of retardant he needs and where. The bird dog pilot goes in and ensures the bombers can do what the forestry officer wishes to do considering such things as snags, updrafts, downdrafts, that the run is not uphill, direction to approach the target, etc. The bird dog officer and the bird dog pilot must agree on strategy v.s. safety before the bombing runs commence. When this agreement has been reached the bird dog aircraft leads the bombers on their runs. This can be done by one of two methods: one method is to peel off over the fire or wiggle the wings, depending on the agreement between the bird dog pilot and the lead bomber pilot. This

CGSB STANDARD FORM 22CP 7540-21-855-4989-xxx-xxxx

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

method is usually used if visibility is not too good and where it is difficult for the bomber to keep the bird dog aircraft in sight from any distance. A better technique which the Alberta Forest Service subscribes to is if visibility is good enough the bird dog aircraft goes into a circuit over the fire and directs the bomber to go into a circuit below and ahead of him. The bomber then does nothing on his own judgement but he will be given directions by the bird dog pilot such as left, right, hold her steady, now (meaning pull the trigger now) etc. In Mr. Platt's opinion this method gives great accuracy as the bird dog pilot is sighting from his aircraft over the bomber to the fire similar to sighting a rifle and it is much more accurate than the bomber pilot sighting on his own.

3. If more than one company of bombers or group of bombers is involved in a fire, the Alberta Forest Service appoints an air attack boss. This air attack boss co-ordinates movements of aircraft on that fire. His main concern is that the right fires are bombed, etc., and he may issue instructions such as group 1 - go to such and such a fire, group 2 - go to this other fire, etc. When there is an air attack boss there will also be one bird dog aircraft for each group of bombers.

4. The Alberta Forest Service provides bird dog aircraft that they utilize with a rotating beacon and a warbler siren. The warbler siren is to warn ground crews to get out of the way.

5. Circuit procedures in the fire area are the responsibility of the bird dog pilot. The forestry officer or bird dog officer in other words has no responsibility in air safety whatsoever and it is made clear to these bird dog officers by Alberta Forest Service that he is not to coerce pilots or even make suggestions related to flight safety.

6. Alberta Forest Service write up their contracts to include a bird dog aircraft for each group of bombers and this bird dog aircraft is to be supplied by the same company providing the bombers.

7. It is very rare that the Alberta Forest Service will send out a bomber to bomb a fire on its own without a bird dog aircraft. They will only consider doing this if they are sure of the experience and ability of the crew but the policy of Alberta Forest Service is very definite that no bombers to function without a bird dog aircraft. Mr. Platt indicated that bombing procedures in British Columbia now almost duplicate the bombing procedures in Alberta. He also indicated that Ontario now seems to be convinced that the system used in Alberta is among the best.

8. Mr. Platt stated that they do not allow their bird dog officer to talk to pilots of other aircraft at all. Their bird dog officer is in contact with the fire line, that is, the fire boss and other ground personnel by small portaphones which are radios on their own frequency. This way they do not interfere with the aircraft which may be on 122.8 or 122.5. He stated that it would be very bad if they were on the same frequency as the bird dog aircraft and the bombers. Mr. Platt believed that communication problems is a real part of the apparent safety problem in fire bombing in the Northwest Territories.

9. Mr. Platt stated that a helicopter could occasionally be used as a bird dog platform but usually it is definitely out as it is too slow. With the method of sighting the bomber that they have found to be the most effective, a helicopter could not follow the bomber to maintain its relative position.

000064

.../3

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

The Alberta Forest Service is almost entirely oriented now to relatively high speed wheel bombers which are capable of handling retardant. In the opinion of Mr. Platt, clear water is relatively useless in fighting fires.

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

DJD/eh

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

MEMORANDUM
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

NOTE DE SERVICE
GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

FROM / DE: W.C.A.I.

OUR FILE – N/RÉFÉRENCE: 5002-W1801(WCAI) - W1802

YOUR FILE – V/RÉFÉRENCE:

DATE: 2 November 1971

REFER REPLY TO / ENVOYER LA RÉPONSE À:

TEL. NO. / TÉL.:

TO / À: FILE

SUBJECT / SUJET: Accident - CF-HTN & CF-IDS
- 1 September 1971

1. Mr. Ian Wright, pilot with Northern Helicopters Ltd., was contacted once again by telephone at 1046 hours M.S.T., on 1 November 1971 to confirm some information related to this collision. Mr. Wright indicated that HTN had a 'bum' radio and that the Canso he was talking to on the day of the accident was therefore IDS, the one that did not have the poor radio. The Canso he was talking to was coming in for a water drop. The crew of IDS asked Mr. Wright if he had a Canso circling overhead and Mr. Wright replied that he did not. Mr. Wright indicated that IDS would know the approximate location of the helicopter accident as he described to him the large prairie that the crash had occurred on and that this was the only large prairie in that general area. Therefore, the crew of IDS would know which prairie he was talking about and by the same token would know which prairie HTN should have been circling over. Mr. Wright stated that the radio in HTN was so poor that they often had difficulty making out what HTN was saying, and often HTN missed radio conversations from other aircraft. Therefore it is possible that HTN might not have heard the conversations between Mr. Wright and the crew of IDS. Nevertheless, the crew of HTN would know that IDS had been following them on previous drops and even if HTN did not hear conversations, should have known that IDS might have been following them on a water drop.

2. Mr. Wright indicated that he first noticed the people standing in the vicinity of the crashed helicopter. It was not the wreckage itself which drew his attention to the helicopter crash.

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

DJD/eb

000066

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

MEMORANDUM
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

NOTE DE SERVICE
GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

FROM / DE: W.C.A.I.

OUR FILE – N/RÉFÉRENCE: 5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

YOUR FILE – V/RÉFÉRENCE:

DATE: 3 December 1971

TO / À: FILE

REFER REPLY TO / ENVOYER LA RÉPONSE À:

TEL. NO. / TÉL.:

SUBJECT / SUJET: Accident - Cansos, CF-HTN & CF-IDS
- 1 September 1971

1. Mr. Gordon Carlson, Forest Management technician with MacKenzie Forest Headquarters and Mr. Gene Earl who is in charge of the Fort Smith forest were interviewed at 1400 hours M.S.T., in Fort Smith on 30 November 1971. The investigator who conducted the interviews wished to talk with Mr. Pete Ferguson who was in charge of the MacKenzie Forest Service but Mr. Ferguson was not available at that time. Mr. Ferguson will be interviewed at a later date. Mr. Earl being in charge of the Fort Smith forest where the collision occurred was the man who had the overall responsibility for Fire 6. Mr. Earl was encouraged by the investigator to talk about Fire 6 and the Canso operation without the investigator posing any specific questions, and the following is a record of the information informally given to the investigator by Mr. Earl:

The first thing Mr. Earl mentioned was bird dog aircraft. He said that there was no bird dog aircraft on duty at the time of the collision. He stated that a helicopter had been trying to provide bird dog service that day but that Hales had given him such a hard time on the radio that the helicopter pilot decided to quit. Ian Wright apparently was the helicopter pilot and Mr. Earl indicated that this information is consistent with Hales' personality. Mr. Earl stated that Hales was an awful man to complain, nothing ever pleased him apparently and his information was that prior to the collision Hales had been making statements on the radio to the helicopter bird dog such as, "Make up your mind where you want the water dropped", etc. Mr. Earl stated that he never knew when water bombers were going to be used on his fire. He said the first indication he would have that water bombers were going to be used was when he would see them overhead. This seemed to be a surprise to Mr. Carlson from the Headquarters office as he had told the investigator previously on the way out to the office that Mr. Earl would be the man hiring the bombers. It now appears that the decision would lie solely with Mr. Ferguson and communications within MacKenzie Forest Service were very limited. Mr. Earl indicated that one of their employees should be on board the bird dog aircraft which they should have even though they didn't on this occasion. He said that their employees badly need some training prior to next season and in his mind a discussion of this

.../2

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

accident amongst their own people in conjunction with Parks, bomber operators, helicopter operators, potential bird dog pilots and the Ministry of Transport investigating team this winter or early spring would be highly desirable, to resolve some of the unsatisfactory situations which they all know do exist.

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

DJD/eb

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

MEMORANDUM NOTE DE SERVICE

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

FROM / DE: W.C.A.I.

OUR FILE – N/RÉFÉRENCE: 5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

YOUR FILE – V/RÉFÉRENCE:

DATE: 2 December 1971

REFER REPLY TO / ENVOYER LA RÉPONSE À:

TEL. NO. / TÉL.:

TO / À: FILE

SUBJECT / SUJET: Accident - Cansos, CF-HTN & CF-IDS
- 1 September 1971

1. Mr. Ken Cooper, Chief Warden of Wood Buffalo Park was interviewed in his office in Fort Smith at 1100 hours M.S.T., on 30 November 1971. The following information was obtained from Mr. Cooper:

Mr. Cooper indicated at the outset that his greatest concern about water bombing operations was the number of hours these fellows are flying. He said that helicopter people especially appear to be trying to make a year's pay in the summer months, and are flying over 12 hours per day for extended periods of time. Mr. Cooper is quite certain that fatigue exists on many occasions to the point where it probably decreases safety. In his opinion pilots on this type of operation, that is, helicopter flying and water bombing should not be permitted to fly more than 8 hours a day. In Mr. Cooper's report to his regional office he is including this as a recommendation and he is also recommending that an hours meter should be part of the helicopter. He said that it is up to them, the contracter, that is in this case Wood Buffalo National Park to limit the hours. The fire boss should be permitted and actually responsible to limit the number of hours crews are permitted to fly and if the aircraft operator is not willing to accept these limits he should not be hired. Mr. Cooper said that even without the exceptional stress of flying, which exists in a forest fire area no man can keep this up day after day, that is, flying 12 hours or more day in and day out with no days off unless weather cancels flying operations. Mr. Cooper said that the helicopters go into the most difficult landing areas imaginable and in the MacKenzie Forest district during the summer of 1971 there were approximately five or six accidents. None fortunately in his mind in the Wood Buffalo Park area. Mr. Cooper did not take any credit for the apparent higher degree of safety in his area than exists in the MacKenzie Forest area however, numerous other persons intimately involved with both operations tend to praise Mr. Cooper's organization and infer quite strongly that it is unfortunate that Forestry is not organized to the same degree.

2. Getting on to water bombers, Mr. Cooper stated that in many cases the bombers are dropping water every three minutes all day long and that

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

in his opinion is work. The average Mr. Cooper indicated would be about 1 drop every five to eight minutes. This must be extremely fatiguing but even so, the operators and crews will not voluntarily shut themselves down because of fatigue because they are naturally very anxious to make money when able as in some years they may sit around for weeks and do nothing at all. Mr. Cooper said that in the future they are going to write into their contracts that if the crews are required to put in more than 8 hours per day, the operator is required to have a double crew. Parks will then release the bomber if the operator does not live up to this standard, and of course if the fire situation decreases in seriousness due to rain, they would naturally permit the release of the second crew even if the bomber was held on stand-by. If the fire is likely to flare up again and become serious the second crew should only be a phone call away, that is available through the operators base be it Edmonton, Prince Albert or whatever. Mr. Cooper indicated that when they are fighting a fire they have a lot of personnel on the ground and they are responsible for their men. Also fire fighting is costing the department a lot of money and since their department is the fire boss, they should have the authority to tell the pilots what they want done. They have no intention of telling the pilots how to fly their aircraft but they must have the ability to direct the operations, through a fire boss and a bird dog aircraft. Mr. Cooper stated that the hours of flying time can be substantiated and to his own satisfaction already has been by reviewing the accounts and according to their accounts the flying times for the crews were averaging out from 10 to 12 to 13 hours a day on a regular basis.

3. The second recommendation that Mr. Cooper indicated he was kind of hot on refers to bird dogging. He said that if there is more than one bomber on the fire it is absolutely necessary to have a bird dog. Even with one machine only, and men working on the ground it is necessary to have a bird dog aircraft directing operations. One of the duties of the bird dog aircraft is to keep these bombers separated and to protect ground crews. The bird dog aircraft must be in contact with the fire boss. This should be accomplished by adequate radio communications. In the case of Wood Buffalo National Park, they supply radios to the bird dog aircraft. The Park supplies single side band VHF and radio to communicate with DOT stations. However, in Mr. Cooper's opinion which the investigating team would concur with, it should be the responsibility of the aircraft operator to supply standard VHF radio, sufficient to communicate air to air between aircraft and between the aircraft and DOT Aeradio Station. It should be the responsibility of the charterer, that is in this case, Wood Buffalo National Park to supply portable radios to the bird dog aircraft which would permit the bird dog pilot to communicate directly with the fire boss on the ground and with fire headquarters as necessary.

4. Mr. Cooper then cited an example of a near miss when they were using two Mitchell aircraft on a fire and there was also a single engine Otter in the same area. The single engine Otter apparently had no radio or at least was not on the correct frequency and one of the Mitchells very nearly collided with this Otter. The Park office had sent the Otter out to fight the fire but didn't realize that he didn't have sufficient radio or at any rate didn't realize he would not be using it. After this near miss the Park officials sent the single engine Otter away from the fire and would not permit him to carry on fighting it. Mr. Gordon Sherman was flying the Mitchell which was involved in the near miss. Investigators had also heard of this near miss previously from Mr. Gordon Sherman durir informal interview in the office of WCAI. Mr. Joe McBryan was bird dogging

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

when this near miss occurred and when Joe spotted this hazard he managed to contact the Otter and ordered him off the fire.

5. The frequencies of the radios supplied by Parks to aircraft are 166.05 megacycles for communication with the fire boss and the single five band is 4270 kilocycles. Mr. Cooper stated that the bird dog aircraft at least must have 166.05 megacycles but it is not necessary for the bombers to have this frequency provided they have the bird dog aircraft which most people at this point now consider to be absolutely essential.

6. Mr. Cooper stated that he was not too well acquainted with the Norcanair crew as they had just come into the Fort Smith area. He had known Hales all summer and as far as he was aware, Hales was probably a pretty fair bomber pilot. Mr. Cooper really had no positive information in this regard but on the other hand he had no negative feedback concerning Hales. Mr. Cooper was not aware of any apparent rivalry between bomber companies in the area. He said that they had sent for Norcanair as they had to have more bombers in the area. Previously they had been working with Northwestern Air Leasing with the B25's earlier and then later the Canso and also with Kenting Cansos. On the day of the accident, that is 1st of September 1971 the bombers were working for MacKenzie Forest Service. The Canso accident apparently happened just within the boundary of Wood Buffalo National Park but this was a fire that was being controlled by MacKenzie Forest Service. Wood Buffalo National Park officials apparently had nothing to do with the crews on the day of the collision.

7. Mr. Cooper is in agreement that a bird dog aircraft is an essential part of any water bombing operation. He would also like to agree that a bird dog officer, that is, an employee of the charterer should be on board the bird dog aircraft. In their case if a Park officer was on board the bird dog aircraft, decisions could be made immediately as to what needed to be done, whether money was being wasted, etc. A bird dog pilot on his own cannot do this in as objective a manner however, if staffing is a problem and they are able to keep the same person as the bird dog pilot at all times it should work satisfactorily as an interim measure. However for this interim measure to work there must be good communications with the fire line, that is, the fire boss. There is always a fire boss on the ground and if the bird dog pilot is in direct communication with the fire boss, decisions can be made relatively quickly.

8. Specific methods of using the bird dog aircraft are still somewhat of a question in Mr. Cooper's mind that is, whether the bird dog aircraft should actually lead bombers over the fire or whether they should direct operations and act more as a traffic officer without actually leading each bomber in on its bombing run. Mr. Cooper indicated that he now considers it essential that bird dog pilots and bird dog officers get instruction. Mr. Cooper is not aware of any problem with bomber crews not listening to and obeying instructions from the bird dog aircraft however, a possible reason that there has been no problem with Parks is that Mr. Cooper specifically designates that Joe McBryan the bird dog pilot is in charge therefore, the bomber crews are to take instructions from Mr. McBryan. Joe McBryan plans to go to a B.C. Forestry course at Nelson, B.C., this winter. Mr. Cooper believes that in some cases it may be necessary for the bird dog aircraft to actually lead the bombers in on the bombing run but this is still a question in his own mind. He believes that if the bird dog aircraft has made a run he will be able to say, "I want you to hit such and such a spot", and give other specific instructions and then if he does not lead them in

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

he would be free to watch other bombers. In his opinion one bird dog aircraft cannot look after more than three bombers.

9. Mr. Cooper was not aware of how these decisions as to which air to air frequency to use was made. He believed it was probably just a casual selection between the pilots. He was in agreement that the method of selection could be improved and when the selection is made he believed it would be a very good idea to have the frequency for the specific fire advertised through DOT Aeradio Stations, Notam, etc. Mr. Cooper believed that helicopters were the worst offenders as far as radio communications were concerned. Getting back to safety Mr. Cooper stressed that fires in their area should be allowed to burn rather than lose lives. One of Mr. Cooper's deputies actually indicated quite strongly that possibly Parks should not be fighting fires at all in a natural park such as this. The purpose of a park such as Wood Buffalo National Park is to preserve nature and as long as things like micro-wave tower sites and settlements are protected, the nature should be preserved including the forest fires. There is no economic value to the timber being burned and within the matter of a few years it is impossible to tell where a fire has been. As a matter of fact this official commented that where the fires had burned the vegetation returns much better than it does in areas where fire access roads and other disturbances have been made while fighting the fire. On old access roads made for fighting fires frost tends to go deeper and deeper and these old roads become nothing but marsh areas in the summer and there is no re-growth as there is in the areas that were allowed to burn. Also it is almost impossible to put many of these fires out and the majority of these muskeg fires burn throughout the winter and straight water as used with a Canso very rarely will put any of these fires out on a permanent basis.

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

/eb

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

STATEMENT OF - Henry Calumet
Fort Resolution


I am a firefighter and I have been on fire 6 most of the summer. I didn't see the helicopter crash but I heard a motor race up. I went to the helicopter crash across the prairie. We pulled the pilot back. He was lying about 4 feet away from the helicopter. He didn't say anything about what had happened.

I saw a bomber circle overhead but I don't know which direction. I wasn't paying much attention. The other one was coming also. The second one dropped water. After dropping water he pulled up. The other was coming toward us. I saw a wing or something fall off. One blew up and hit the ground first. The other one just turned and went down and I heard the crash. We ran to the one that didn't burn. There was no sign of life at it.

Signed "Henry Calumet"

Witnessed by: D. J. Douglas
2 Sept., 1971

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



South

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

STATEMENT OF: Lawrence Casaway
Fort Resolution


I am employed as a firefighter. I have been on this fire about 6 weeks. I heard the helicopter crash yesterday but did not see it. It sounded like the engine went fast. I went over to the helicopter. The pilot sat up once as we ran to him and went back down again. We didn't see him get up anymore. He was lying right against the chopper and it was burning and so was the grass so we moved him. We put out the grass fire. It lit again and then we put it out again.

One bomber was circling overhead and one was coming. The one with the red wing dropped the water and was flying straight. I saw wings fall down, black smoke and the planes fall down. I didn't go to the bombers.

Signed "Lawrence Casaway"

Witnessed by: D. J. Douglas
2 Sept., 1971

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Laurence Casaway

DJD


Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

STATEMENT OF - Marcel Norn
Fort Resolution

Yesterday we were cutting a fire line here and we saw the helicopter pass by. Not very long after we heard a big noise. It was just a bang like something hitting the ground. I didn't know what it was until after we got on the prairie and we saw the helicopter was down. We went to it and the pilot was lying on the ground. We pulled him away and put the fire out. We wait there and finally another helicopter came and we signalled and he landed. He was talking then to somebody on the radio. He took off again and we wait and wait and while we wait two planes came. A big one circled two or three times and the other one was coming and dropped his water and took off and then went down again after he hit the other one. The wings fell down. The one that was circling was coming down looking like he was going to land and was turning left. The bomber that dropped the water came up and then started going back down again wings level and then he hit the other one and they both went down. I heard the aircraft hit but heard no other strange noises.

(Witness unable to read)

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

STATEMENT OF - Herbert Beaulieu
Fort Resolution

I am employed as a firefighter. I have been on fire 6 for about 2 months. I heard the helicopter hit the ground. We ran. It was down. Mike sat up when we were 200 feet away. He fell back down. We moved him. It kept burning because gas was leaking.

After awhile we saw the Canso. One was circling and the other Canso was coming from the Slave River. One was circling. The other one bombed water. He turned to the left. The other one was turning right. I saw them hit each other. As soon as they hit one blew up and the other one didn't.

Signed " Herbert Beaulieu"

Witnessed by: D. J. Douglas
2 Sept., 1971

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Herbert Brunelle

pg

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Henry Pierrot
Fort Resolution

I was working as a firefighter yesterday at Henry's Camp. I heard a helicopter crash at about 2 o'clock but didn't see it. It sounded like an explosion. I ran to the helicopter and it was burning. The pilot was right beside the chopper so we moved him away. The grass was burning. He didn't talk. Two guys I don't know bandaged him.


While I was at the helicopter I saw one bomber circle around to the right. Another one came through and dropped water east of the helicopter. Both bombers disappeared from my sight. I heard a noise at about 3 o'clock and saw both bombers crash to the ground and one burst into flames immediately. I saw the wings come off. I believe when they hit the bomber circling was still banked about 30^{0} to the right and going down but I don't know the height. The bomber that had dropped water I believe was banked to the left about the same angle as the other one and he was pulling up just as they do after dropping the water.

There wasn't much smoke in the area at the time of the accident.

Signed 'Henry Pierrot'

Witnessed by: D. J. Douglas
Sept. 2/71

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*


STATEMENT OF - Modest Mandeville
Fort Resolution

I am a firefighter - camp cook. I have been in this camp since 20 August, 1971. Yesterday I was in camp, then Pierrot came to camp and told me there was a chopper crash. Then I got up and grabbed a towel and some water and ran to the scene which was about ½ mile away. Then I tried to give help. All I saw was this guy's mouth was full of dirt and I cleaned it as much as I could. I could see that he was conscious. While doing this the bomber was flying around. Then I noted a second one coming. I didn't pay too much attention at the time as I was busy with Mike the helicopter pilot. Then looked up and just as I looked up I noticed a plane was sort of banking and that was at the point they crashed. I would say she burst into flames immediately in the air. Then there were others around so me and Henry decided to come over and see if there were any survivors. We knew that it was hopeless to go to where the plane was burning so we started looking for this other one. Found them and they were beyond help. At the time of the crash in the air I could only see one aircraft and it was turning south). I think this was the one that dropped water that burned and also the one I saw at the time of the crash in the air. I saw the wing fall off.

Signed "Modest Mandeville"

Witnessed by: D. J. Douglas
2 Sept., 1971

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Just starting to bank
struck something & then saw wings falling.

witnessed by
[illegible] 2 Sept 71

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

STATEMENT OF - Henry King Stanford
#304, 11025 - 82 Avenue
Edmonton, Alberta

Phone No. 433-7246
Licence No. XDC-8556
Class III Instructor's Rating
Class II Instructor's Rating

I am presently employed at the Edmonton Flying Club as an Instructor. I just started here last Saturday. Prior to that I was employed at the University of Alberta as an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Science. During this past summer I was working on my instructor's rating at Aero Flying Academy with Gordon Rhodes. North Western Air Leasing, Gordon Hales needed a co-pilot and he phoned the club. The club gave him my name and I agreed to go along. I just met Gordon Monday a week before the accident. This took place at Kuryluk's strip at St. Albert. They offered me a week to 10 days of flying and I would get expenses plus $20 a flying hour for the first 50 hours and anything over that $30 an hour. I had never flown a Canso before. We left at around 1300 on that Monday. Hales said the more we got into it the more training I would get. At first all I did was adjust throttles and props and steer in the air. He showed me the pieces of tape on the landing gear behind the cockpit and told me he would like me to go back and check that each time before landing.

When we got to Smith we checked into the hotel and Hales contacted Parks' people. They wanted us to go out that evening.

On fires we would make the pickup, generally the lakes were suitable. My job on pickup was to select probe down in the water and also advance the throttles and Hales would count the seconds, give me the signal to lift probe and when he had 60 K we would take-off. He would signal when ready for power reductions. Then we would turn to the fire and at this point when on the bomb run I would apply about 25" when the green light came on indicating he had released the water. Then we would just return for pickup again. On the drop, airspeed would be about 80 K although I never noticed because I was always watching the green light. Visibility in the aircraft was generally pretty good except in smoke and we weren't in smoke very much. About the only thing I didn't get a chance to do on the Canso was a landing and a drop. When I left I thought I could manoeuver it very well. It was extremely heavy on the controls but then all my time has been on light aircraft previously.

When I got up there I learned North Western Air Leasing was operating quite differently than the other companies that were there. It was obvious that North Western Air Leasing was cutting corners in terms of support, e.g., no engineer. The other companies I believe felt this was a considerable lack. I heard the other engineers say that they had been instructed not to have anything to do with North Western Air Leasing. There was a question about whether North Western Air Leasing was getting the log books signed. Hales said something about it being permitted in emergencies, specifically forest fires.

/2

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Before going to Smith the aircraft had a 100 hours but I don't know what his intentions were for the next 100 hours. There was no 50 hour carried out at all. The aircraft seemed to be in very good condition. There had been less trouble with it I learned than with a lot of other Cansos in that area. We did have one minor mishap - broke a hydraulic line and had to go through the emergency gear lowering procedure. Hale was too big to crawl into the bombay so I had to and learned a lot from that.

My impression of Hales as a pilot was that he was probably average. He was a very hard person to fly with. I was the eighth co-pilot he had. He was pretty hard on me but I learned from him. I would think that a good pilot would be able to fly the aircraft and instruct the co-pilot's mistakes, of which there were many, and still cope with the flying. My impression was that between me and the flying, Gordon Hales was pretty busy. My mistakes I thought upset him more than it would a good pilot. I never really doubted his ability to fly that machine. He hollered at me a lot but at the hotel he would say he was just trying to make me a better pilot. I think he was an agitated man. The only personality trait that sticks in my mind was that he was either extremely superior or the opposite and was trying to cover up - one or the other. He seemed to be well known around Fort Smith but as far as I know he has no real close friends. I heard the bird dog (Joe McBryan) had expressed the opinion that he had trouble keeping track of Hales around a fire - as to where he was, etc. It seemed difficult for Hales to integrate himself into the pattern with the other three Cansos. On many pickups when I would go to widen out for another Canso he would say no, to steep turn it in ahead of the other aircraft. He always turned steeply away from a fire and had said you can't do gentle turns with all these other pilots watching. He also said Parks was paying a lot for the aircraft and we should save time. It seemed to me he felt compelled to be accepted by or to impress the other pilots. He told me once that Moose Murdock had said something to him that he could really fly a Canso and this he took as a real compliment saying Moose was not the type to say that unless he was impressed. He was often critical of the way others flew. He would watch how long they stayed on the water and remark "they're only picking up half a load" or something like that.

I met Kuryluk at the strip at St. Albert and at Smith the day of the accident and drove he and Hales to MacKenzie Forestry and back to the airport. Parks had just laid HTN off and Hales got an assignment from Forestry.

We used bird dogs all the time when I was there except one morning we alone were at the fire for about one hour before Joe came out. Joe was the bird dog all the time. As far as the aircrafts were concerned, the bird dog didn't provide that much - no traffic control - but he did have communications with the fire line and told us where water was wanted. I wouldn't think it would create any hazard if the bird dog wasn't there. I think there is a better way of using the bird dog. I think there should be some sort of traffic control and thought this while on the job.

/3

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

In the fire area we were on 122.8 usually, sometimes 122.9. We never, when I was there, had them both going at the same time.

I didn't know Bill Koshylanyk. I met Peter one day at breakfast that is all.

There was one pilot, who I can't remember, who mentioned to Hale and I that there were a lot of gripes in the industry about the way Kuryluk was operating without proper licencing. Hales replied that in some way the other operators were preventing Kuryluk from getting proper licencing.

When Parks released HTN the day of the accident, Hales said something like "this is another example of inner politicking".

When I was there helicopters created no hazard.

From my knowledge of Hales, I would think seeing a crash on the ground would take his last bit of concentration and he would have none left for other things. Hales had said I hope I don't get a new co-pilot. I hope they send Terry. I believe there was friction between Hales and Kuryluk. At some time Hales had told Kuryluk to forget a captain check as he just couldn't fly the aircraft. Kuryluk had taken the aircraft up once without Hales knowing about it. Terry was in the right seat . Kuryluk landed on the river and almost porpoised it and Terry took it off. Kuryluk tried it again and did the same thing all over again. A radio range operator told me this. Two co-pilots were riding in the back and were frightened so bad that one won't fly in a Canso again. This Hales told me. I think Hales was afraid that if Kuryluk checked out he wouldn't need him anymore.

I am sure that Hales would make it clear to Kuryluk that Hales was captain before even getting in the aircraft. Hales however did want his co-pilot to fly as much as possible. It would be reasonable that Kuryluk might take over as soon as the drop was completed.

I did not know Terry Harrold well.

I quit because it is the only time that I have ever been afraid in an aircraft. I told Hale "I'm not man enough for this job, no excuses, I want out." He said or seemed concerned. He asked if it was anything personal I said "no". I think North Western Air Leasing would take anybody who had a commercial. I know one of their co-pilots didn't even have a twin rating. I was afraid of the low level flying and the steep turns. The turns were in excess of 30° bank. The AIH was calibrated in a way I had never seen before - like a clock all around - so I can't be precise but I would say about 45°. From my point of view it was pretty steep.

I put in 55 hours with Hales total - 52 hours on fires. It also bothered me the number of hours we were flying a day. On Monday I told him I wanted out. He asked me if I would fly Tuesday to let him get a replacement. Generally we flew at least 10 hours a day and it would have been more except for minor malfunctions. Hale had said once that this was good work because

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

you could get 11 - 12,000 in 2 - 3 months and have the rest of the year off. He was getting $50 an hour. But I believe competition with the other Cansos had quite a lot to do with him putting in such long hours.

I had a lot of trouble understanding radio messages in HTN. I could never make out what Joe was saying. Our intercom was pretty bad at times. We had had some complaints about our transmitter and had it worked on. Apparently it improved according to the range operator who said it was then about as clear as he had ever heard.

If Hales switched to 122.2 it would be on the VHF set that was already on.

"Henry K. Stanford"

Witnessed by - D. J. Douglas
23 September, 1971

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Henry King Stanford
#304 11025 82 Ave.
Edmonton, Alberta
Phone 433-7246
Licence # XDC-8556
Class III Instructor's Rating
Class II Instrument Rating

I am presently employed at the Edmonton Flying Club as an Instructor. I just started here last Saturday. Prior to that I was employed at the U. of A. as an assistant Professor in the faculty of science. During this past summer I was working on my instructor's rating at Aero Flying Academy with Gordon Rhodes. North Western Air Leasing, Gordon Hales needed a co-pilot and he phoned the club. The club gave him my name & I agreed to go along. I just met Gordon Monday a week before the accident. This took place at Kunyluk's strip at St. Albert. They offered me a week to 10 days of flying and I would get expenses plus $20 a flying hour for the first 50 hours & anything over that $30 an hour. I had never flown a Canso before. We left at around 1300 on that Monday. Hales said the more we got into it the more training I would get. At first all I did was adjust throttles & props & steer in the air. He showed me the pieces of tape on the landing gear behind the cockpit & told me he would like me to go back & check

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

that each time before landing.

When we got to Smith we checked into the hotel & Hales contacted Parks people. They wanted us to go out that evening.

On fires we would make the pickup, generally the lakes were suitable. My job on pickup was to select probe down in the water & also advance the throttles & Hales would count the seconds, give me the signal to lift probe & when he had 60 K we would take off. He would signal when ready for power reductions.

Then we would turn to the fire and at this point when the bomb rem I would apply about 25° when the green light came on indicating he had released the water. Then we would just return for picky again. On the drop, airspeed would be about 80 K although I never noticed because I was always watching the green light. Visibility in the a/c was generally pretty good except in smoke & we weren't in smoke very much. About the only thing I didn't get a chance to do on the Cessna was a landing & a drop.

When I left I thought I could manoeuvre it very well. It was extremely heavy on the controls but then all my time has been on light a/c previously.

When I got up there I learned NWAL was operating quite differently than the other companies that were there. It was obvious that NWAL was

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

nothing comes in terms of support e.g. no engineer. The other companies I believe felt this was a considerable lack. I heard other engineers say that they had been instructed not to have anything to do with NWAL.
There was a question about whether NWAL was getting the log books signed. Hales said something about it being permitted in emergencies, specifically forest fires. Before going to Smith the a/c had a 100 hr. but I don't know what his intentions were for the next 100 hr. There was no 50 hr. carried out at all. The a/c seemed to be in very good condition. There had been less trouble with it I heard than with a lot of other Cansos in that area. We did have an minor mishap — broke a hydraulic line & had to go through the emergency gear lowering procedure. Hale was too big to crawl into the bombay so I had to & learned a lot from that.

My impression of Hales as a pilot was that he was probably average. He was a very hard person to fly with. I was the 8th copilot he had. He was pretty hard on me but I learned from him. I would think that a good pilot would be able to fly the a/c & instruct the copilot's mistakes, I think they were many, and still cope with the flying. My impression was that between me and the flying, Gordon Hales was pretty busy. My mistakes I thought upset him more than it would a good pilot.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

I never really doubted his ability to fly that machine. He hollered at me a lot but at the total he would say he was just trying to make me a better pilot. I think he was an agitated man. The only personality trait that sticks in my mind was that he was either extremely superior or the opposite and was trying to cover up — one or the other. He seemed to be well known around Fort Smith but as far as I know he had no real close friends.

I heard the bird dog (Joe McBryan) had expressed the opinion that he had trouble keeping track of Hales around a fire — as to where he was, etc. It seemed difficult for Hales to integrate himself into the pattern with the other 3 Cansos. On many pickups when I would go to widen out for another Canso he would say no to stay & turn it in ahead of the other a/c. He always turned steeply away from a fire & had said you can't do gentle turns with all those other pilots watching. He also said Parks was paying a lot for the a/c & we should save time. It seemed to me he felt compelled to be accepted by & to impress the other pilots. He told me once that Moose Murdock had said something to him that he could really fly a Canso & this he took as a real compliment saying Moose was not the type to say that unless he was impressed.

He was often critical of the way others flew. He would watch how long they

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

stayed a the water & remark "They're only picking up ½ a load" or something like that.

I met Kurylek at the strip at St. Albert & at first the day of the accident & drove he & Hales to Mackenzie Forestry & back to the airport. Parks had just laid HTN off & Hales got an assignment from Forestry.

We used bird dogs all the time while I was there except one morning we alone were at the fire for about 1 hr before Joe came out. Joe was the bird dog all the time. as far as the a/c were concerned, the bird dog didn't provide that much — no traffic control — but he did have communications with the fire line & told us when water was wanted. I wouldn't think it would create any hazard if the bird dog wasn't there. I think there is a better way of using the bird dog. I think there should be some sort of traffic control & thought this while on the job.

In the fire area we were on 122.8 usually sometimes 122.9. HTN had 2 VHF sets. Generally we only used one of them usually #1. We never, when I was there, had them both going at the same time.

I didn't know Bill Kostyshyn.

I met Peter one day at breakfast & that is all.

There was one pilot who I can't remember mentioned to Hales & I that there were a lot of gripes in the industry about the way

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Kuryluk was operating without proper licencing. Hales replied that in some way the other operators were preventing Kuryluk from getting proper licencing.

When Parks released HTN the day of the accident Hales said something like "this is another example of inner politicking".

When I was there helicopters created no hazard.

From my knowledge of Hales, I would think seeing a crash on the ground this would take his last bit of concentration & he would have more hope for other things.

Hales had said I hope I don't get a new co-pilot. I hope they send Terry. I believe there was friction between Hales & Kuryluk. At some time Hales had told Kuryluk to forget a captain check as he just couldn't fly the a/c. Kuryluk had taken the a/c up once without Hales knowing about it. Terry was in the right seat. Kuryluk landed on the river & almost porpoised it & Terry took it off. Kuryluk tried it again & did the same thing all over again. A radio range operator told me this. Two co-pilots were riding in the back & were frightened so bad that one won't fly in a Canso again. This Hales told me. I think Hales was afraid that if Kuryluk checked out he wouldn't need him anymore.

I am sure that Hales would make it clear to Kuryluk that Hales was captain before ever getting in the a/c. Hales however did want his copilot to fly as much as possible.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

It would be reasonable that Kurylek might take over as soon as the drug was completed.

I did not know Terry Harrold well.

I quit because it is the only time that I have ever been afraid in an a/c. I told Hale "I'm not man enough for this job, no excuses I want out." He said or seemed concerned. He asked if it was anything personal. I said "no". I think NWAL would take anybody who had a commercial. I know one of their copilots didn't even have a twin rating. I was afraid of the low level flying & the steep turns. The turns were in excess of 30° bank. The AIH was calibrated in a way I had never seen before — like a clock all around — ok I can't be precise but I would say about 45°. From my point of view it was pretty steep.

I put in 55 hours with Hale total — 52 hrs a jies. It also bothered me the # of hours we were flying a day. On Monday I told him I wanted out. He asked me if I would fly Tuesday to let him get a replacement. Generally we flew at least 10 hours a day & it would have been more except for mine malfunctions. Hale had said once that this was good work because you could get 11 - 12,000 in 2-3 months & have the rest of the year off. He was getting $50 an hour. But I believe competition with the other Cessna had quite a lot to do with him putting in such long hours.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

I had a lot of trouble understanding radio messages in HTN. I could never make out what Joe was saying. Clint Iverson was pretty bad at this. We had had some complaints about our transmitter & had it worked on. Apparently it improved according to the range operator who said it was the about as clear as he had ever heard.

If Hale switched to 122.2 it would be on the VHF set that was already on.

Witnessed by
D Langton
23 Sept 1971

Henry K. Stanford

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

STATEMENT OF: Mike Hofius (Pilot)
Northern Helicopters

When I first saw the Cansos they were due north and I saw Pete Kuryluk's aeroplane to the east side, it was straight and level flight losing altitude, starting to make a low approach over my crash. He was still about a mile away at the time of the mid air. The second Canso I can't say for sure where it came from. I believe he was on a water drop from the west side but when I first saw him it was about 8 seconds before the impact with the mid air. They were both at the same altitude. About 5 seconds before the impact, the aircraft on the west side not Peter Kuryluk's aeroplane saw the other aeroplane and tried to pull up. His aeroplane was unable to gain altitude and it just mushed into the aeroplane on the east side and I believe he hit behind the wings on the aeroplane on the east side, Pete Kuryluk's aeroplane. The wings on Kuryluk's aeroplane were not damaged by what I saw after the impact and the aeroplane on the west side continued in his climb and did a complete loop and the last time I saw him he was heading for the trees nose down with his fuselage north. The top of the aeroplane was on a due west heading and so I believe when he crashed if he had pulled out he was heading on a due west heading. Peter Kuryluk's aeroplane did a slow wing over to the left and I believe on the slow wing over, the aeroplane did a slow turn to the north and I believe he crashed on a northeast correction west to east and it was a slow left wing over. At impact there was quite a bit of noise so I believe there was quite a bit of damage in the mid air itself then the plane on the west side his left engine exploded and during this loop I saw quite a bit of smoke coming out of his left engine. That's all I have to say right now.


I recollect seeing the aircraft on the west side and during his loop I did hear one of the engines from which aeroplane I'm not too sure go into a roar like one of the aeroplanes was trying to gain control of it either the aircraft in the loop trying to gain control of the loop and trying to gain power and get control of the plane and get it level again or whether it was the other aeroplane, I can't tell for sure which one of the engines went to full throttle. Prior to the mid air a copter I can't give the call sign, the pilot was Ian Wright landed he was the first aircraft to see my accident. He was unable to put me in his helicopter so he took off to go back and get another helicopter to pick me up. Right after he took off he radioed the Cansos and the way I understand Pete Kuryluk said he would come and circle me in about 5 minutes. After the helicopter took off was the time of the mid air. I did not see a Canso circle over me but I did see Peter Kuryluk start heading for me just a few seconds before the impact and he was straight and level at that time losing altitude and he came straight for me.

STATEMENT TAKEN AT CHARLES CAMSELL HOSPITAL, EDMONTON ROOM 4204
0900 HOURS M.S.T., 20 OCTOBER 1971.

Witnessed By: D. J. Douglas

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PHOTOCOPY OF ROUGH SKETCH DRAWN BY MR. HOFIUS DURING AN INTERVIEW ON 20 OCTOBER 1971. THE NUMBERS WERE PLACED ON THE SKETCH ON 21 OCTOBER 1971 BY AN INVESTIGATOR TO FACILITATE DISCUSSION OF THE SKETCH.



INDEX TO NUMBERS ON AN ATTACHED SHEET.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

INDEX

(1) Mr. Hofius indicated that he saw a Canso in this relative position appearing to him to be flying directly toward him, wings level and descending as if for a low pass over him.

(2) Then he noticed another Canso in this relative position at exactly the same height as the first Canso.

(3) The first Canso continued until it was in approximately this relative position.

(4) The second Canso arrived in this relative position and somewhere near this relative position the number (2) Canso pulled up steeply and appeared to mush close to the stall. There was a loud impact and crumpling sound after which the wings appeared intact to Mr. Hofius.

(5) This engine exploded went on fire and trailed smoke as indicated by (6).

(7) Mr. Hofius drew this while stating that the number (2) aircraft did a complete loop and appeared to go to the ground in a steep nose down attitude.

(8) Pilot stated he was in this position.

Mr. Hofius indicated that he remembered the Canso accident vividly, better than his own accident. He said he was fully conscious at the time of the collision. There was absolutely no doubt in his mind at the time of this interview as to relative path angles and aircraft movements.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Northern Helicopters


When I first saw the Cansos they were due north and I saw Pete Kuryluk's aeroplane ~~crash~~ to the east side, it was straight and level flight losing altitude, starting to make a low approach over my crash. He was still about a mile away at the time of the mid air. The second Canso I can't say for sure where it came from. I believe ~~he~~ he was on a water drop from the west side but when I first saw him it was about 8 secs., before the impact with the mid air. They ~~were~~ were both at the same altitude. About 5 seconds before the impact, the aircraft on the west side not Peter Kuryluk's aeroplane saw the ~~other~~ other aeroplane and tried to pull up, His aeroplane was unable to gain altitude and it just mushed into the aeroplane on the east side and I believe he hit behind the wings on ~~to wings. When~~ the aeroplane on the east side, Peter Kuryluk's aeroplane. The wings on Kuryluk's aeroplane were not damaged by what I saw after the impact and the aeroplane on the ~~west~~ side continued in his climb and did a complete loop and the last time I saw him he was heading for the trees nose down with his fuselage north. The top of the aeroplane was on a due heading west and so I believe when he crashed if he had pulled out he was heading on a due west heading. Peter Kuryluk's aeroplane did a slow wing over to the left and I believe ~~he~~ on the ~~did a~~ slow ~~w~~wing over, the aeroplane did a slow turn to the north and I believe he crashed on a northeast ~~north~~ correction west to east ~~& it was a slow left wing over~~ & it was a slow left wing over, so I believe ~~probably~~ At impact there was quite a bit of noise, there was quite a bit of damage in the mid-air itself then the plane on the west side his left engine exploded & during this loop I saw quite a bit of smoke coming out of his left engine. That's all I have to say right now. I recollect seeing the a/c on the west side and during his loop I ~~could~~ did hear one of the engines from which aeroplane I'm not too sure go into a roar like one of the aeroplanes was trying to gain control of it ~~either the a/c in the~~ loop trying to gain control of the loop & trying to gain power and get it level again or whether it was the other aeroplane, I can't tell for sure which one of the engines went to full ~~throttle~~ throttle, prior to the mid air ~~another~~ a copter I can't give ~~the~~ the call sign, the pilot was Ion Wright ~~landed~~ he was the first aircraft to see my accident. He was unable to put me in his helicopter so he took off to go back and get another helicopter to pick me up. Right after he took off he radioed the Cansos & the way I understand Pete Kuryluk said he would come and circle me me in about 5 mins after the helicopter took off was the time of the mid air. I did not see a Canso ~~circle~~ circle over me but I did see Peter Kuryluk start heading for me just a

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*


few seconds before the impact and he was straight and level at that time losing altitude and he came straight for me.

Statement taken at Charles Camsell Hospital Room 4704, 0900 hours MST. 20 Oct 1971 x.

Document disclosed under
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'acc*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

STATEMENT OF: Ian Charles Wright
Apt. 101
980 Abou Street
Prince George, B.C.

Phone 562-1862

I am employed by Northern Helicopters at Abbotsford. I'm a pilot for Northern Helicopters. The day of the accident I was supplying camps, groceries, supplies and I left base camp about 12:50 I guess and by the time I got out here it was about say 20 after 2 when I found the machine. I had a net load on at the time which I dropped on the prairie and I set down and went over to see Mike and he was pretty badly in shock. I tried to talk to him but he wouldn't talk, I guess he couldn't talk so I just let him know that everything was O.K., and that I was going to go back to base camp and try to get a stretcher or make a stretcher. Prior to that I was talking to one of the Canso pilots and asked him if he could radio Ft. Smith and get a fixed wing out, a stretcher, a doctor to base camp at Fire 6. Then I left here heading back to base camp. I was talking to one of the Cansos again and he wanted to know if I wanted a Beaver or an Otter and I said well anything, 185 or a Beaver, anything that can have the seats taken out that we could get a stretcher in. So he said, "Fine, stand by 1", and then he came back on the radio and he said, "You have a Canso circling over top of you now", so I replied negative but I couldn't see one, I looked around. So he said, "O.K. standby 1", and that's the last I heard of the Canso. It wasn't till I got back to base camp that I found out that the two had collided. When I got back there, there was a Beaver and the other engineer and myself made a stretcher so we could bring Mike back to base camp.

Q. When were you first informed of this accident?

A. Well nobody informed me about it, I happened to stumble across it as I was taking supplies out to a camp. I noticed quite a group of fellows out in the meadow and I didn't see the chopper at the time till I got closer, then I saw that the machine was down, I dropped my net load and just went over to see Mike. At the time I arrived at the accident it was about 20 after 2.

Q. When did you see Mike prior to the accident?

A. I saw Mike leave the base camp, it was about 1 o'clock.

Q. What was Mike's condition, healthwise during the one or two days prior to the accident?

A. He had quite a bad head cold. He was stuffed up. I don't think he was taking anything for it other than maybe aspirins or something like that but he had a hard time talking and hearing.

Q. Had Mike remarked to you any recent functional problems of OKV?

A. No, he hadn't to me. He had talked to the engineer, he said that he had a slight vertical in the machine but other than that, he didn't indicate that he had any problems.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RECORD OF AN INTERVIEW WITH
MR. JOE McBRYAN CONDUCTED
AT CALGARY AT 0845 HRS.
26 NOVEMBER 1971

Q. Now, would you start off Joe by telling us just briefly your aviation experience and your experience as a bird dog pilot.

A. Well, my aviation experience is about 5000 hours in the Northwest Territories right in the vicinity Ft. Smith, it would be about the last 8 years and the last summer I was flying an Aztec bird dog aircraft, total time of about on that particular type of flying about 500 hours.

Q. Who employed you as a bird dog pilot?

A. I was hired by The Wood Buffalo National Park for the duration of the summer from about the 1st of May till end of September as a bird dog mapper and we did a lot of smoke patrols in between the bird dog and operations. Well it was just about, well it was all for Wood Buffalo Park, I was hired by.

Q. Did you have any connection with MacKenzie Forest Service at all?

A. My connection with MacKenzie Forest Service was bird dog Fire 6 early in the year for the B25's and we did a couple smoke patrols for the MacKenzie Forest Service and other than that if the fires were overlapped and like you say the Wood Buffalo fire was going to the MacKenzie area. My dealings with MacKenzie Forest Service but other than that it was mainly concerned with Wood Buffalo Park.

Q. Did you know personally the crews that were involved in the Canso collision on 1 September?

A. Yes, I knew Gordon Hales for a number of years and Peter Kuryluk and the boys on the Norcanair machine I'd only met a couple previous days to the accident.

Q. Is there anything about either of the crews or their inter-relationship with each other that could have had any bearing on the cause of the accident?

A. The only thing that may have had a bearing with these two Cansos that never worked the same fire other than the day of the accident and they may have not been used to each other's techniques or hazards on a fire and so on. These two Cansos to my knowledge had never worked side by side other than the day of September 1st which was the accident.

Q. Were there any procedural problems associated with Fire 6 generally that in your opinion were hazardous?

A. From what I could gather from talking to the pilots that have flown that fire and worked it, a couple of our company pilots had all summer, I don't think there was very much organization or co-ordination on that fire at all but who am I to say, I wasn't there you know.

Q. What is the reason there was no bird dog flying on 1st of September 1971?

A. Well, MacKenzie Forest Service, they were off and on with the bombers, they

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

A. weren't what I think, they really didn't know whether or not they wanted them, they weren't sure of their efficiency, they hadn't used them much before. This is their big year with them and usually they were sent to a fire from what I could gather and the fire boss on the fire when the bombers would arrive would go out with a helicopter and bird dog them with a helicopter and very seldom did I know of them sending out a fixed wing aeroplane to bird dog these aeroplanes at all. They usually just use a helicopter and well the bombing wasn't that much. They didn't until the Pine Point fire and the Hay River fire MacKenzie Forest Service used water bombers very little.

Q. Actually HTN and IDS then at the time of the collision were working for MacKenzie Forestry?

A. Thats right, they were.

Q. If they had been working for Parks, you would have undoubtedly been bird dogging, is that correct?

A. Oh yes, there is no doubt. I'd have left before they left. This has gone on all summer and I always got off and got to the fire before the bombers did and it was every day procedure if they had been with Parks or I know I'd have been there. There would have been no doubt about it.

Q. You know the circumstances of this collision quite well I imagine do you Joe?

A. Yes, I picked it up second hand. I've been inquiring about it and I pretty well know what happened now.

Q. What would have happened differently if there had been a bird dog there?

A. Well, my main job was to keep in line in my mind where the machines were and broadcast it to one of the other machines so they could know where each other were. I mean the job all summer was giving these guys steers away from one another as they crowded up and you just stood back or above and just told one of them where the other guy was and this let them both know where they were or if there was three or four machines and if you seen any helicopters coming into the area you just checked the helicopter come in such and such and such or the floatplane or ground crew moving in or anything that was getting in their way even though you assumed that they seen it you got nothing else to do but just sit there and talk and thats exactly what I did all summer.

Q. Is there any possibility that this collision would have occurred if the bird dog aircraft had been there?

A. Well I think the bird dog aircraft should have been overseeing at all, he should have been overseeing what was going on especially when something like that happens, you can depend you know that people are watching the ground quite a bit and you just take it upon yourself just to let these guys know assuming that they see each other you still just slowly tell them babbling on where you see so and so at such and such a place and these guys all they do is monitor what you are saying and they always know where each other are because you know it gets sometimes those aeroplanes are kind of hard to see.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Q. Would you have permitted the bomber to be circling a crash if you had been there as a bird dog?

A. If I'd been there, he wouldn't have to been circling the crash, I don't imagine I take it he was circling the crash to bird dog/helicopter into the area I don't know if thats why he was there, I'm not quite clear on that, you know but I know Gordon Hales and knowing what he's like, I imagine he would have stayed right there you know till told to move on, either that or he wasn't needed anymore because he was the type of person that was always trying to be overhelpful.

Q. Why was it that Gordon Hales had so many different co-pilots?

A. Well, I take it that Gordon Hales' co-pilots were green from what I could see and I think that its quite a surprise for a guy right out of the Edmonton Flying Club to climb into a Canso and go out to a fire with a man like Gordon Hales who does not, you know when he says something he says it, you know I mean its not a piece of cake, I mean those boys got quite a surprise when they ended up up there you know. I mean thats a pretty big job, they were all in for a surprise.

Q. This leads to another question. What have you got to say about the procedures of the Canso crews, now we'll start off with Hales, specifically what did you observe of Hales, circuit procedure, bombing procedure and apparent competence?

A. Well Gordon Hales flying of the Canso of course you keep in mind that he come up there, I don't think he had that much time on him as a captain on a water bomber. I found him to be cautious as far as water depth, crosswind water length. He recorded he wanted lots of room, lots of depth and he kept to the circuit that he was told to whether it was going to be left right hand sort of you know, the boys made up their mind with the kind of approach they wanted to make to the lake and to the fire and his drops oh, in the first 25 hours probably show that he didn't have much time but after 25 or 30 hours he started along pretty good and I watched him pretty close about the last 60 hours he bombed and I would say that of all the bombers I watched all summer that he was, from not being in the aeroplane but from being behind it and above it and watching it, it was handled with quite a bit of confidence. He wasn't in anybody's way, he wasn't doing overtight turns or he wasn't over cautious, he just seemed to know what he was doing. His radio procedures sometimes were like I used to have to tell him, he always seemed to, you got an impression he was all tensed up because of the way he handled the microphone you know. When he got on the microphone it sounded like something was going wrong but actually what it was - I used to ask the boys and he put the microphone right in his mouth so this is where you got the impression that he was excitable but actually all in all he did I'd say

Q. Was there any indication that he was working too hard and would there be any possibility that fatigue might have been a factor in the accident?

A. I don't think so+ that day if I remember right he was the first one off

.../4

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

A. the fire the night before. He was probably off the fire 3 or 4 in the afternoon. I really can't verify, I can't just remember just what time he called off the fire and then he never left till noon again the next day and he was well rested up. Now whether the fatigue from the previous two weeks had anything to do with it, I don't know but I really don't know if fatigue played a part in it or not, I wouldn't really say.

Q. What do you know of the other crew - the crew of Koshylanyk and Willms?

A. Well I had only met these fellas the previous couple days and only bird dogged them for a couple hours, I really didn't know their procedures at all.

Q. Was there any indication that Hales was a problem in the circuit or was there any indication that he disliked adhering to the normal circuit pattern in the fire area?

A. No, I wouldn't say there was. Gordon Hales, once he was let into the fire and he'd pick his area that he wanted to pick up on the lake according to the wind and depth, I never had any problem with him. He always did what he was asked and there was a lot of times we discussed it you know because he is flying the Canso, he is not to be told by somebody outside the aeroplane how to fly it or what to do with it but we always come to an agreement and somebody listening to us might get the impression that we were arguing but actually I always kept in mind that he wouldn't tell me how to fly and I wouldn't tell him how to fly. We were just agreeing on what lake we were going to use, what direction he was going to make his run and his take-off run, his pick up run, what direction and what area he was going to make his bombing run and Gordon probably more than anybody else would after an hour and a half of lets say a right hand circuit would change his circuit to kill the boredom of it, he would let everybody know, he would always say that he wanted to widen out or come in from the other way or if there was no wind he would like to pick up, well lets say for the sake of arguement he wanted to pick up to the west instead of the east and everybody knew he was never a hazard. I never seen him get in anybody's way because he changed the circuit and also

Q. Did you ever see him cut anyone off in the circuit, cut in front of another aircraft to try and beat him or something like that?

A. Oh no, no Hales was very conscious of/everybody was I mean I could tell that where he wanted to know where the other machines were, he really did, he was quite concerned and he was always the first one to volunteer to hold back or widen out rather than crowd somebody I mean I watched him on well different fires. I remember on fire 47 he'd always call in and because we were working at that time with B25's and the PBY's and he never wanted to get in close to get in anybody's way and he would always volunteer to hold outside the fire line till it was safe for him to come in but I would say that if people monitored our conversation that sometimes they would probably think that we weren't you know that we were probably having a problem but the biggest problem was his receiver. I had to say you know I'd tell him a couple times what I wanted and sometimes he wouldn't quite understand but he always did before, he always flew straight ahead till he got an exact clear picture in his mind what was expected and then he'd go ahead. He wouldn't be flying and trying to take orders at the same time is what I'm trying to say. If he was having troub-

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

A. receiving or if I was having trouble transmitting as you do somedays your radios don't work perfect everyday but he would always get the picture clear if you had to tell him two or three times you know and people might think well you know, why is he saying that so often, is he trying to you know back up on it but what I'm trying to say is that he did everything according to rules I've set on the radio it may not have sounded like it because of the way we spoke you know.

Q. Was there any friction between Hales and Kuryluk?

A. I really wouldn't know, they've never, I know both of them real well and they've never ever volunteered any information to me whether - well the summer went by without them seeing very much of each other I know that. They brought the machine up together in June and flew the crew up there and Peter stayed a few days and left and I don't think they seen each other much until the day of the accident.

Q. Did helicopters in the fire 6 area create any hazard either by being in unknown locations or by not having the proper radio frequencies?

A. Well fire 6 I'm not too familiar with but from flying in the area adjacent fire 6 all summer I, all helicopters I knew were there I monitored them all day long and they all seemed to have good transmitters and receivers. They all seemed to be, I wouldn't say they were a hazard other than sometimes if they wandered into the flight path. A bird dog should have been there to see it or they should have contacted a bird dog before entering a drop zone so to speak.

Q. Do you think water bombing is safe at all without a bird dog or is the risk too great without a bird dog?

A. No, if I was flying one of those water bombers I'd have bird dog because it depends on the fire, the visibility and a lot of things that time of the drop and you are dropping into you know maybe a hazy condition or a bright sun. No, if there's anymore than one machine there should be a bird dog there because I imagine its pretty hard to watch where you're going to drop and watch for a helicopter which are pretty hard to see at the best of times and there's always floatplanes wandering in. You got to spend a certain amount of time looking at the ground because you know ground crews wander in and change, there's wandering in and you've got to have somebody there to say, "O.K., the way is clear, drop", you know.

Q. From your experience as a bird dog pilot, what is the best procedure or the best method to use a bird dog aircraft?

A. Again I depend on the fire, but I like to go into a fire in the sense that I like to be there as a fire starts so I know what is hot and what is ground burn and then you can bring the mud in, put the mud in certain areas, and you can put the water in another area because if you mix them up, they don't work and sometimes you can bomb all day with mud when you should be using water and vice versa and then you take the bombers in and you locate them over the fire, they pick their lakes as they the wind and depth and everything else and then you lead them in and you show them the area you want them to drop, the line

.../6

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

A. you want them to put in there and you work with them until they've pinpointed exactly where to drop you know - tell them left, right and all the rest of it and as soon as everybody knows exactly where to drop then you pull up and become a traffic officer which is just steadily telling them where each other are and keeping informed of the helicopters on the fires and floatplanes that are servicing the fires and your radio contact with the ground crews, the fire boss and the cat boss and everybody's letting you know where they are on the ground and you can see them and you relay this all to the aeroplanes and you just watch and if anybody looks like they're getting close in to another aeroplane or helicopter or ground crew or if they're lining up on a cat, well then you better be telling them about it and actually what you are doing is you are watching these fellas, maybe four or five machines they're doing a circuit if they start to bunch up on one end of it or one guy is going wide and within a half an hour or so they are all bunched up on one end of their circuit. You spread them out or you send two to another lake and get those coming in when the other two are picking up and just keep everybody as far apart as you can and then if everybody is going and nobody is bunching up, you have nothing else to do but sit there and maybe pick two machines and just check them off the fire and off the lake and they don't answer you or nothing and by this way everybody else knows where they are because you're checking them either off the lake or off the fire and everybody knows - the ones you are not checking off know where they are and the ones you are checking off the water know that the other ones are at the other end of the circuit from them.

Q. Whats the minimum radio equipment you would need in a bird dog aircraft?

A. Well, you need minimum that I would use is two VHF's, thats the minimum and I - you should have two, you can get away with one but radios after you know four or five hours out there, they are pretty warm and you know they are squeaking and everything else but I have two and I want two - which was the frequency we use on a fire and I kept one on DOT so that I could keep track of the machines that were leaving Fort Smith coming out to the fire, I could call them then make sure they were going to call me on 122.8 before they entered the area and as soon as I could hear them off Smith and also I could hear over flights and some of those over flights are going by say between Chip and Smith and these guys are going by in smoke and they were coming right by and they are no higher than well sometimes they are less than 1000 feet and you want to know when they go through, the only way you are going to pick these guys up is by hearing them off Smith DOT and as soon as you hear that you get on them and you call them and you tell them before you cross such and such you give me a call on 122.8 and I'll advise you of the traffic here and advise the bombers that you're going by because a lot of the thru traffic is forestry and they are having a quick check on the way through as how things are going. There is forestry personnel on these aeroplanes you know.

Q. How did you communicate with the fire line, that is, the ground fire fighters?

A. Well working what they call a PT300 its an FM/VHF. Its portable and the cat crews had them and the ground crews had them and any aircraft that worked exclusively for Parks just about had one on board.

Q. Do you consider this radio essential?

...)

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

A. I consider it the most efficient piece of equipment on the fire you know. Its very good - you can know well in advance whats going on just by hearing whats being said and the DOT also monitor this frequency and you have coverage at all times you know and they also supplied me with a single side band HF in case I was quite a ways out and signals were poor I could always get on the HF and give them a call, and I was also used for relaying messages on the HF.

Q. This would eliminate a lot of chatter on the air to air frequency 122.8, you have the portaphone.

A. The portaphone took care of all the Park business, 122.8 took care of air to air my ground to ground was fully covered on another frequency. I knew exactly where all the ground crews were at all times and the aeroplanes that would bomb knew on the Parks knew exactly . A lot if you take the latter part of the year when the leaves start to turn you get a yellow patch of leaves and a cat going alongside of it, its pretty hard to pick out a cat in a yellow patch of leaves you know and the ground communication is a big thing. Of all I've seen in the fires the biggest ever seen. The biggest asset they had, the Parks had was communication and I highly recommend that all fires go the same way. Communication plus, that was the answer.

Q. Now, are there any other recommendations you would like to see put into practise to improve fire fighting in the Northwest Territories in coming years?

A. I recommend No. 1 - that communication be upgraded to the standards of what we had this summer all over the north, mainly the Wood Buffalo Park and if they could look into what they use for communication and see if they could, if everybody could do the same, seeing that we had separate frequencies for air to air then a complete separate set for ground to air and ground to ground and everybody knew at all times where everybody was and what everybody was doing and going to do because of communication and secondly, I'd recommend any bomber going out, there's more than one machine going out, they send a bird dog along. Not maybe so much to bird dog them but to keep the traffic separated, keep the traffic separated. Keep the helicopters, I mean even though you are out there water bombing, there's a lot of other things you can see. You can see helicopters and what is to keep those fellas from getting in the way because they fly low and they blend in with the ground and its pretty hard and I recommend that Forestry or Parks or whose ever in charge make sure that any machine they hire is equipped with a VHF and a good one to communicate, if not pull them off the line, put them where there's nobody else or don't put them anywhere at all, unless its emergency or something else.

Certified correct
D Douglas
2 Dec 71

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

DCIEM LABORATORY REPORT

(SPECIMENS RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT)

DCIEM CONTROL NO 71-51 DATE OF REPORT 7 Oct 71

NAME Hales G. DATE OF ACCIDENT 1 Sept 71

UNIT OR AGENCY REQUESTING SERVICE DOT

LOCATION Jack Smith's N.W.T.

PATHOLOGIST Dr. S. Beare ADDRESS Dr Dr. S. Beare Rm 0
750 Federal Building
Edmonton 14 Alta.

DATE SPECIMEN RECEIVED AT DCIEM 9 Sept 71

CARBON MONOXIDES		
TISSUE	TISSUE NO	% SATURATION
LUNG	3850	Nil
BLOOD	3847	0.04
SPLEEN	3846	0.04
URINE		

ETHANOLS		
TISSUE	TISSUE NO	mgms % Ethanol
BRAIN (White)	6688	4.1
(Grey)		4.4
HEART	6691	6.1
LIVER	3848	3.8
KIDNEY (CORT)	3845	5.0
(MED)		
SPLEEN		
MUSCLE	6681	4.8
LUNG		
BLOOD		
URINE		

INSTRUCTION: IN THE EVENT THAT A REPORT CAN NOT BE DESPATCHED WITHIN 10 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT OF SPECIMEN REASON WILL BE STATED BELOW AND IF POSSIBLE A PROBABLE OUTCOME WILL BE STATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CFMO 42-2 PARA 10.

REMARKS: Lactate report to follow.

(CONTINUE ON REVERSE OR SEPARATE SHEET IF REQUIRED)

for W.R. Franks
Colonel (Canadian Forces Air Reserve)
Scientific Adviser in Aviation Medicine
Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

DCIEM LABORATORY REPORT

(SPECIMENS RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT)

DCIEM CONTROL NO 71-54 DATE OF REPORT 7 Oct 71

NAME Williams P. DATE OF ACCIDENT 1 Sept 71

UNIT OR AGENCY REQUESTING SERVICE Fort Smith NWT

LOCATION

PATHOLOGIST Dr S Beare ADDRESS Dr. Dr S. Beare Rm 0
750 Federal Building
Edmonton 14

DATE SPECIMEN RECEIVED AT DCIEM 9 Sept.

CARBON MONOXIDES		
TISSUE	TISSUE NO	% SATURATION
LUNG	105	NIL
BLOOD	104	1.97
SPLEEN	107	NIL
~~URINE~~		

ETHANOLS		
TISSUE	TISSUE NO	mgms % Ethanol
BRAIN (White)	100	2.5
(Grey)		3.9
HEART	103	2.98
LIVER	101	3.2
KIDNEY (CORT)	102	2.8
(MED)		
SPLEEN		
MUSCLE	106	5.20
LUNG		
BLOOD	104	0.18
URINE		

INSTRUCTION: IN THE EVENT THAT A REPORT CAN NOT BE DESPATCHED WITHIN 10 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT OF SPECIMEN REASON WILL BE STATED BELOW AND IF POSSIBLE A PROBABLE OUTCOME WILL BE STATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CFMO 42-2 PARA 10.

REMARKS: Lactate report to follow.

(CONTINUE ON REVERSE OR SEPARATE SHEET IF REQUIRED)

W.R. Franks
Colonel (Canadian Forces Air Reserve)
Scientific Adviser in Aviation Medicine
Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

DCIEM LABORATORY REPORT

(SPECIMENS RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT)

DCIEM CONTROL NO 71-52 DATE OF REPORT 7 Oct 71

NAME KOSHYLANYK B. DATE OF ACCIDENT 1 Sept 71

UNIT OR AGENCY REQUESTING SERVICE DOT

LOCATION Fort Smith NWT

PATHOLOGIST M. S. Beare ADDRESS Dr. Beare RMO
750 Federal Building
Edmonton 14, Alta

DATE SPECIMEN RECEIVED AT DCIEM 9 Sept 71

CARBON MONOXIDES		
TISSUE	TISSUE NO	% SATURATION
LUNG		
BLOOD	6683	5.09
SPLEEN		
URINE		

ETHANOLS		
TISSUE	TISSUE NO	mgms % Ethanol
BRAIN (White)	613	4.04
(Grey)		
HEART	6684	3.13
LIVER	616	8.85
KIDNEY (CORT)	6687	4.02
(MED)		
SPLEEN		
MUSCLE	615	3.87
LUNG		
BLOOD		
URINE		

INSTRUCTION: IN THE EVENT THAT A REPORT CAN NOT BE DESPATCHED WITHIN 10 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT OF SPECIMEN REASON WILL BE STATED BELOW AND IF POSSIBLE A PROBABLE OUTCOME WILL BE STATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CFMO 42-2 PARA 10.

REMARKS: Toxicity report to follow.

(CONTINUE ON REVERSE OR SEPARATE SHEET IF REQUIRED)

W.R. Franks
Colonel (Canadian Forces Air Reserve)
Scientific Adviser in Aviation Medicine
Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

DCIEM LABORATORY REPORT

(SPECIMENS RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT)

DCIEM CONTROL NO 71-53 DATE OF REPORT 7 Oct 71

NAME KURYLUK P DATE OF ACCIDENT 1 Sept 71

UNIT OR AGENCY REQUESTING SERVICE D.O.T.

LOCATION Fort Smith N.W.T.

PATHOLOGIST W. S. Beare ADDRESS Dr. W. S. Beare
750 Federal Building
Edmonton 14, Alta.

DATE SPECIMEN RECEIVED AT DCIEM 9 Sept 71

CARBON MONOXIDES		
TISSUE	TISSUE NO	% SATURATION
LUNG	206	0.05
BLOOD	205	0.03
SPLEEN	208	0.03
~~URINE~~		

ETHANOLS		
TISSUE	TISSUE NO	mgms % Ethanol
BRAIN (White)	201	5.4
(Grey)	"	5.7
KIDNEY	204	6.5
LIVER	202	19.6
KIDNEY (CORT)	203	6.0
(MED)		
SPLEEN		
MUSCLE	207	10.8
LUNG		
BLOOD	205	0.29
URINE		

INSTRUCTION: IN THE EVENT THAT A REPORT CAN NOT BE DESPATCHED WITHIN 10 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT OF SPECIMEN REASON WILL BE STATED BELOW AND IF POSSIBLE A PROBABLE OUTCOME WILL BE STATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CFMO 42-2 PARA 10.

REMARKS: Lactate report to follow

(CONTINUE ON REVERSE OR SEPARATE SHEET IF REQUIRED)

for W.R. Franks
Colonel (Canadian Forces Air Reserve)
Scientific Adviser in Aviation Medicine
Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS
40-0031
(2192-3)

SUPPLEMENTARY LOG SEPT 01 1971

	HTN	MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY THERES BEEN A HELICOPTER CRASH
		CUD U SEND OUT ANOTHER CHOPPER RITE AWAY/R WHAT IS .
		THE LOCATION QQ/ FIRE 6 FIRE 6 / R SB /B 2137Z JV
		TSM ADVZD/ 2137Z JV
HTN		CUD U GIVE US THE CO-ORDINATES QQ/ 11340 11240 GET A
		HOLD OF FORESTRY THEY SHUD KNOW IT AT THE CAMP FIRE 6 /R
FORESTRY		ADVZD RE CHOPPER AND REQ CO ORDINATES OF FIRE 6 AND
		SEND OUT ANOTHER CHOPPER/ THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL FOUR
		CHOPPERS THERE WILL GET ON IT RITE AWAY/R
	HTN(	AM PROCEEDING TO THE CRASH AND I'LL BE CIRCLING AROUND
		HIM/R
	JWW	THERES A BEAVER AND A CESSNA ON THE WAY THERE TO FIRE 6
		MAYBE THEY CAN HELP/R
PZX		HAVE U BEEN MONITORING THE FREQ/R BUT HTN VERY HARD TO
		READ GQZ IS AHEAD OF ME ABOUT 5 MINS/R
FORESTRY		ADVZD RE TWO ACFT ON THE WAY TO FIRE 6 AND ARE AWARE
		OF THE ACCIDENT/R
PZX		YOU GOING TO THIS CAMP QQ/R SO IS CQZ AND HE SHUD BE THERE
		NOW I'M ESTIMATED THE CAMP IN 5 MINS/R
EGA		SUPVR PSE/ R SB
RCMP		ADVZD OF ABV/R WAS JUST TALKING TO ACCIDENT

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS
40-0031
(2192-3)

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA AT TIME OF COLLISION

CF-IDS

	Wt.	Arm	Moment
Aircraft empty	20,167.6	244.4	4,929,187.9
Fuel	1,440.0	266.2	383,328.0
Oil	810.0	205	166,050.0
People	330.0	108	35,640.0
	22,747.6		5,514,205.9

C. OF G. = 242.4"

CF-HTN

	Wt.	Arm	Moment
Aircraft empty	19,507		4,808,461.28
Fuel	2,160	266.2	575,992.00
Oil	810	205.0	166,050.00
People	425	108.0	45,900.00
	22,902		5,596,403.28

C. OF G. = 244.4"

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

"G" DIVISION

YELLOWKNIFE S/DIV.

SEP 27 71 25278

YOUR No.
VOTRE N°

OUR No. 71YK-500-42
NOTRE N°

Yellowknife, N.W.T.
22 September 1971

Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigations,
Air Regulations,
Ministry of Transport,
Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton, Alberta

5002 - W 1801
- W 1802

Dear Sir:

Re: Peter WILLMS (B: 3 MAY 43) et al
Accidental Death (Aircraft Accident)
70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. 1 SEP 71

Et al: William KOSHYLANYK (B: 12 MAY 27)
Peter KURYLUK (B: 15 AUG 35)
Gordon Fred HALES (B: 7 AUG 28)

Attached is a copy of Fort Smith Detachment report dated September 14, 1971.

I understand from perusal of this report that Mr. D.J. DOUGLAS, a member of your Investigation Section, accompanied our members to the scene of this accident and carried out a separate investigation in respect to same.

A further report will be submitted to you upon the conclusion of this investigation by our Fort Smith Detachment.

Yours truly,

H.A. Teagan, Insp.
Officer Commanding
Yellowknife S/Div.

Document disclosed under the Access to Info
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'info

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE - GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CAN

RCMP GRC 6880

REV. 1-4-6

OTHER FILE REFERENCES: REF. AUTRES DOSSIERS:	DIVISION	DATE	RCMP FILE REFERENCES: REF. DOSSIERS GRC:
FIRST REPORT	"G"	14 SEP 71	
	SUB-DIVISION - SOUS-DIVISION: YELLOWKNIFE		
	DETACHMENT - DÉTACHEMENT: FORT SMITH		71-500-31

RE: OBJET:

Peter WILLMS (B: 3 MAY 43) et al
Accidental Death (Aircraft Accident)
70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. 1 SEP 71

et al William KOSHYLANYK (B: 12 MAY 27)
Peter KURYLUK (B: 15 AUG 35)
Gordon Fred HALES (B: 7 AUG 28)

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

1 SEP 71

1. At 3.35 p.m. on the above date a call was received from Mr. E. MELYMOK, Fort Smith Aeradio, Ministry of Transport, who advised that two Canso water bombers, CF-HTN and CF-IDS had been involved in a mid-air collision over Fire 6, approximately 70 miles northwest of Fort Smith. The crash was in the vicinity of the helicopter crash CF-OKV, covered by our file 71-400-11, Michael HOFIUS (B: 13 NOV 47). At 3.45 p.m. Ray SCHMIDT of MacKenzie Forest Service called to advise that the crews of both aircraft were believed to be dead.

2. Cst. J. G. NETSENA and myself accompanied by D.O.T. investigator Mr. D. DOUGLAS, together with Coroner Mr. M. J. HEWITT, departed Fort Smith via chartered aircraft and helicopter, arriving at the scene approximately 5.45 p.m. Co-ordinates have since been established as 113' 8" W, 60' 30" N. Two aircraft wings, one marked CF-HTN and the other CF-IDS were noted in the clearing. About 200 yards to the south of the wing sections the burning hull of an aircraft was noted. The fire had ignited trees in the vicinity and a small scale forest fire was burning around this plane. About 400 yards to the southeast of the wings was the wreckage of another aircraft, which was not burning. We landed near this latter wreckage and proceeded on foot to the scene.

3. The aircraft was found heeled over to its port side with the tail section partially elevated by broken trees and other wreckage. The nose portion had been crushed upwards and back and most of the upper fuselage and cockpit area had been torn and mangled, back to the first main bulkhead. The right wing and other bits of wreckage lay strewn in a path approximately 200 feet long cut through the trees to the west.

4. Cst. NETSENA photographed the scene and then with the assistance of forest fire fighters and other persons, the nose wheel and control bulkhead of the aircraft were moved enough to free the body of the person who would have been in the right seat, later identified as Peter KURYLUK. The body was severely mangled and broken, and the right arm was missing just below the shoulder. Beneath this body, also badly broken and trapped in torn metal and piping was the body of another man, later identified as Gordon Fred HALES, the pilot. An extensive search of the aircraft and area failed to locate KURYLUK's right arm, although

...2

Document disclosed under the Access to
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

a piece of torn flesh approximately 10 to 12" long was found suspended from a jagged piece of what had been a bulkhead by the control column. No other pieces were found. Because of difficulties encountered in removing the bodies, considerable time elapsed and darkness became a factor to contend with. The bodies were transported to the base camp by helicopter.

5. The other wreckage was visited, however the area was extremely hot and burning trees were falling. We were able to approach the aircraft and could see what appeared to be the remains of two persons in the cockpit portion of the aircraft, both already burnt to charred masses. Firefighters were trying to put out the surrounding fires and the bodies but were having limited success with the small back pumps. The firefighters agreed to guard the scene and we returned to Fort Smith with the bodies of HALES and KURYLUK.

6. Upon our return to the Detachment the situation was discussed with the NCO In Charge, Sgt. HICKLING, and it was felt that Cpl. SOLUK, Yellowknife Identification Section, should be asked to assist in taking photographs, drawing a plan and sifting the ashes of CF-IDS as the bodies would no doubt be burned beyond recognition. Arrangements were made for Cpl. SOLUK to travel to Fort Smith on 2 SEP 71 via police aircraft.

2 SEP 71

7. Next of kin of all deceased were notified by 10.35 p.m. this date.

8. Cpl. SOLUK, Cst. NETSENA, Mr. DOUGLAS and his D.O.T. investigators and I returned to the crash scene. The burned bodies had been extinguished however were still warm to the touch. Cpl. SOLUK took photographs of the scene and the remains were removed one at a time and the wreckage searched under and around the bodies. Body #1 was just a charred mass of flesh. Items shown on page 2 of the exhibit report were found underneath and near this body, and it is believed to be that of the pilot, KOSHYLANYK. Body #2 still had approximately 70% of the head portion remaining, and items listed on page 1 of the exhibit report 71/102 are believed to be his property.

9. Following this search accurate measurements of the crash site, compass readings and distance to the aircraft wings were taken. At this point Cst. NETSENA proceeded to take statements from the available witnesses while Cpl. SOLUK and I measured the distance to CF-HTN and took various photographs and measurements of that site. We also again searched the area for KURYLUK's right arm, however, met with negative results. After a brief visit to the helicopter crash site approximately half a mile away, we returned to Fort Smith.

3 SEP 71

10. Mr. Keith HORNSETH and Mr. J. B. LLOYD of Norcanair reported to the office and viewed the bodies of the crew of CF-IDS. Body #2 was

...3

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

tentatively identified as that of WILLMS, however positive identification was impossible due to lack of the nose and vital portions of the left side of the head. The items found near the bodies as shown on exhibit report pages 1 and 2 were shown to these men and it was fairly conclusively established that body #1 was KOSHYLANYK and #2 was WILLMS.

11. Coroner HEWITT opened the inquest and the jurors elected Mr. E.KUYT as foreman. Other members were Barney COOPER, Daryl CLARKSON, Mike Fox, John ZASADNY and Joseph BIRD. The bodies were viewed and the inquest adjourned sine die.

12. Metal containers were received and the bodies forwarded via P.W.A. to Edmonton General Hospital for autopsy by Dr. HANSON, Chief Pathologist for the Ministry of Transport. I am given to understand that M.O.T. has equipment to analyse body cells etc. and should be able to determine the reactions of the men prior to death, as well as a medical identification of KOSHYLANYK and WILLMS.

9 SEP 71

13. A telex was received from Prince Albert Sub/Division requesting that when the effects of KOSHYLANYK and WILLMS have served their purpose they be forwarded to that point for turning over to Norcanair rather than directly to the families.

10 SEP 71

14. I returned to the accident scene and obtained statements from Jackson WHITEKNIFE and Lawrence LADOUCER.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

12 SEP 71

15. M.O.T. inspectors will have an expert evaluation of the crash available in due course, however from statements obtained, and attached hereto as appendices A to G, it would appear that CF-HTN had completed a bombing run in the area and noticed the helicopter CF-OKV as it crashed, or shortly thereafter. The aircraft then began circling over the scene in a clockwise direction. CF-IDS was at this time completing a bombing run to the north of the helicopter. It would seem that the crews of both aircraft were concentrating on the helicopter crash or their bomb runs and did not notice one another until it was too late, when CF-IDS tried to avoid the collision by going into a tight bank. However the right wing of CF-IDS met the left wing of CF-HTN and both wings came off, CF-IDS burst into flames and fell from the sky starboard side down due to loss of lift on that side, and CF-HTN fell port side down also due to loss of lift. This is only a layman's assessment of the situation based on observations of witnesses and M.O.T. investigators will be able to supply a more comprehensive report.

16. Photographs have not been received to date and they, together with Cpl. SOLUK's plan of the scene will be forwarded as soon as they are received.

...4

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

17. Social Insurance cards for KURYLUK and HALES have been forwarded as per instructions contained in Operational Manual PROP. The pass port for HALES is attached for disposition by "G" Division Headquarters. The property of KURYLUK on page 3 of the exhibit report has been forwarded to Edmonton Detachment for turning over to the surviving partner, Mr. HAROLD. HALES's effects have been forwarded to Vancouver Town Station for turning over to his mother. The items shown on page 5 of the exhibit report, the property of Northwestair Lease have also been forwarded to Edmonton Detachment for turning over to Mr. HAROLD. The items shown on pages 1 and 2 are being held pending positive identification of WILLMS and KOSHYLANYK. Forms C-246 are attached.

18. Extra copies are attached.

S.U.I.
D.D. 15 OCT 71

E. J. Blackman, Cst.
E. J. Blackman, 23307,
Fort Smith Detachment.

(JTH) Sgt.
i/c Det.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Modeste Isadore MANDEVILLE (B: 29 MAY 08) Ft. Resolution. taken 2 SEP 71

I was in camp here, Henry PERREAULT came back to camp here and said there was a chopper crash and the man may not live. I grabbed a towel and water and went to the scene of the crash. Upon arriving there I found the man to be conscious. With the help of a fellow worker we bandaged his head as best as we could. While I was still with the injured man I could observe a water bomber flying around, soon there was another one, which I didn't pay too much attention to, because I was attending this injured man. As I was looking towards the airplane that was flying west it sort of banked to the left then I heard a crash, wing falling, towards the ground. Soon as this plane hit the ground it caught on fire. Somebody hollered, "There's two airplanes crashed." There was nothing we could do for the burning plane so we went in search for the other one.

Jackson WHITEKNIFE told me, "There's nothing we can do for the burning plane but see if there's any survivors in the other one." Me and Henry PERREAULT went out to try and locate this other one. We never found it. While we were searching east of this camp a helicopter came and circled southwest of us, from where we were, a couple of times. We proceeded in that direction and found that some other boys had gotten to the airplane crash. After I arrived there, I could see one dead man and felt the head of the other.

Q. About what time did the helicopter crash?
A. Shortly before 2 o'clock.

Q. What time did the airplanes collide?
A. Around 3 o'clock.

Q. Could you see any dead persons at the burnt Canso?
A. No, not that day.

Q. How about today?
A. Yes, I could tell one for sure.

Modeste MANDEVILLE

Wit: Cst. Netsena, 2.30 p.m.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Herbert Ernest BEAULIEU (B: 16 OCT 50), Fort Resolution taken 2 SEP 71

We were working east of camp, cutting line. We heard a chopper crash. Five of us ran back. Lawrence CASAWAY, Henry PERREAULT, Henry KILLIME, Marcel NORN and I were together. So we got on the prairie and saw the chopper smoking. We start running. Me and Henry KILLIME were ahead of those guys. We were about 200 or more feet from the chopper and Mike sat up then fell down. He was about 7 or 8 feet south of the chopper. So we all got there and three of them said they were going to move him because of the fire. I grabbed a shovel and started throwing dirt on the fire. So Henry PERREAULT, Lawrence CASAWAY and another fellow moved Mike. Me and Henry PERREAULT went back to camp to get some water and a towel. I stopped by the bush for some pop for the guys and Henry went straight to the camp. When I got back to the chopper Jackson WHITEKNIFE and one of his boys were looking for a first aid kit. They found one. So, they bandaged up Mike's head. Then there was a Canso circling above us. He circled about two or 3 times. There was another Canso coming from the east. He bombed water back there, then banked left, to the south of us and the other Canso was flying east. They collided in mid-air and one went down in flames. The other one didn't even smoke, it just crashed. We went looking for the Canso that didn't burn. We found it but never saw any dead persons around there. Another helicopter came, the pilot looked at this wreck and said there was a man dead in there.

Herbert BEAULIEU

Wit: Cst. Netsena, 3.00 p.m.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. | This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RE: OBJET.

Peter WILLMS et al

PAGE

APPENDIX C
71-500-31

Statement of Lawrence Henry CASAWAY (B: 1 OCT 48), Fort Resolution
taken 2 SEP 71

Myself, NORN, Herbert BEAULIEU, Henry PERREAULT and Henry KILLAME were going to cut line sout-east of camp. We heard a chopper crash. We went to the prairie where we saw a chopper, there. We started running to it then saw the pilot sit up then went back down again. When we got there the chopper and grass were burning. We moved Mike away from the fire. Henry came back to camp and got Mod with a towel and water. The grass caught fire again so we had to put it out. Two Chip guys were there, one was called Jackson. Mod and Jackson bandaged Mike's head. A Canso circled us. He circled around us again and another Canso water bombed to the north-east of us. It flew south then I saw saw smoke from one Canso. I saw a wing falling to the ground. I stayed beside the chopper and Mike with Jackson. The other guys went to look for the crashed airplanes.

Lawrence CASAWAY

Wit: Cst. Netsena
3.20 p.m.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Marcel Francis NORN (B: 8 MAY 32) Fort Resolution, taken 2 SEP 71

We were working and heard a chopper crash. We went there and saw the grass burning. So the man was moved and the fire was put out. A helicopter landed beside us and took off again. A Canso was circling above then came down lower to about 300 feet. It flew south then banked to the left. Another Canso came from the east, dropped its water, levelled out then started going down. That's when the Canso hit and both went down. One caught fire. I stayed with the helicopter pilot.

Marcel NORN

Wit: Cst, Netsena,
3.25 p.m.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Henry James CALUMET (B: 3 DEC 36), Fort Resolution, taken 2 SEP 71

We were going to cut the line to the other prairie. We saw a chopper water-bombing the fire. We went back the same way to blaze a straight line. We heard the motor of the chopper speed up then stop. We ran to the prairie and saw that the chopper had crashed. We ran to it because we knew there had been someone in it and we wanted to save him. The pilot was lying about 4 feet from the chopper so he was moved. Then we saw an airplane water-bombing the fire. It started to circle above us quite a few times. Then the other airplane was coming from Slave River. This one dumped its water on the fire. It came real low then went up. One flew by us then turned left. The other one was flying from the north. They hit in mid-air. I saw wings falling to the ground, and one plane, the one that burnt, fell first. The other one fell soon after.

So we ran to the airplane that didn't burn. We went around it and saw no-one there, so we went back to the chopper.

A chopper came to pick up the helicopter pilot. We knew that there were no survivors in the Cansos.

Henry CALUMET

Wit: Cst. Netsena,
3.55 p.m.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Jackson WHITEKNIFE (B: 24 AUG 37) Fort Chipewyan, Alberta.
taken 10 SEP 71

About a quarter to two I went back to camp to get some pails for my boys. That's when we heard that chopper, CF-OKU, the motor coughed once and we heard the noise of the crash. We were working with that bomber that didn't burn at the south east of the big prairie. We waited a couple of minutes and didn't hear the motor again so I told one of the boys we should go see, it didn't sound too far, maybe a mile. When we got on the prairie the first thing we seen was the chopper already on the ground, it had crashed. Henry already had his men there and we seen the pilot was alive and we picked up what he had left of his first aid kit and patched him up and I sent one of my boys back to get my first aid kit in camp. After we bandaged him, Modeste sent a couple of his boys to get blankets. I told him we had to keep him warm because he was in shock. It was around 2.30 we flagged down the other chopper. Ian WRIGHT came and he went back to radio for a fixed wing airplane. During this time, the bomber had finished his bombing. He moved over near where he crashed and kept circling. About 3.00 p.m. the other bomber came from the direction of the river and dropped his load and started lifting. The other one made a loop and started comig back towards us under the other one. Just before they collided, the one that just finished dropping his load made a sharp left turn or bank and that's when they collided. As soon as they collided the one that didn't burn just went down on its left side. The other one, the one that was making the turn, disappeared in the spruce and then there was an explosion. The other boys all went over to see if anybody was alive and I stayed there with the chopper pilot with one of Henry's boys.

Jackson WHITEKNIFE

Wit: E. J. Blackman, Cst.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Lawrence LADOUCEUR (B: 20 JUN 34), Swanson's Landing, Alta. taken 10 SEP 71

I was on the prairie with Jackson, I was watching the one that didn't burn, he was circling around. The other one went for water on the river and came back over a smoke out in the prairie and bombed his water. The other one was circling and came down and looked like he was going to land on the prairie, he came straight to us. The one dropped his water and came up and I think he was going to circle but he hit the other plane and pieces fell down, something dropped anyway. After that they just went down both ways. After that the one hit the ground and all I could see was black smoke from there.

X his mark

Wit: E. J. Blackman, Cst.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RCMP 6920
GRC

C-246
REV. 1-4-66

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE - GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA
EXHIBIT REPORT - RAPPORT SUR LES PIÈCES À CONVICTION

RCMP FILE REFERENCES / RÉF. DOSSIER DE LA GRC	DIV.	SUB-DIV.—SOUS-DIV.	DATE
71-500-31	"G"	Yellowknife	4 SEP 71
	DET.—DÉT. Fort Smith	EXHIBIT REPORT NO. / RAPPORT SUR LES PIÈCES Nº 71/102	PAGE One

RE: / OBJET: Peter WILLMS (B: 3 MAY 43) et al - Accidental Death, 70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. - 1 SEP 71.

I / JE Cst. E.J. BLACKMAN CAME INTO POSSESSION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED GOODS ON / SUIS ENTRÉ EN POSSESSION DES OBJETS DÉCRITS CI-APRÈS LE 2 SEP 71 AT / À ... BY / EN recovering same from the wreckage of CF-IDS

EXHIBITS LISTED BELOW ARE TO BE GIVEN ITEM NUMBERS IN CONSECUTIVE ORDER / LES PIÈCES ÉNUMÉRÉES CI-DESSOUS RECEVRONT UN Nº EN ORDRE CONSÉCUTIF

EXHIBIT ITEM NO. — PIÈCE Nº	DESCRIPTION	RECIPIENT SIGNATURE AND DATE — SIGNATURE DU RÉCIPIENDAIRE ET DATE	WITNESS INITIALS — INITIALES DU TÉMOIN
1.	57¢ in cash		
2.	One piece of molten metal with 25¢ imbedded		
3.	1 belt buckle		
4.	1 rivet (believed to be from belt)		
5.	two "bobby" pins		
6.	1 nail (2" in length)		
7.	1 piece molten metal with spring (believed to be piece of cigarette lighter)		
8.	several common staples		
9.	½" curved piece of metal (believed to be part of ring)		
10.	Nail clippers and ring with two "Ford" car keys, two other keys.		

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Certified Correct

E. J. Blackman Cst.
(E.J. BLACKMAN) #23307
Fort Smith Detachment

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RCMP 6920
GRC

C-246
REV. 1-4-66

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE - GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA
EXHIBIT REPORT - RAPPORT SUR LES PIÈCES À CONVICTION

RCMP FILE REFERENCES / RÉF. DOSSIER DE LA GRC	DIV.	SUB-DIV.—SOUS-DIV.	DATE
71-500-31	"G"	Yellowknife	4 SEP 71
	DET.—DÉT. Fort Smith	EXHIBIT REPORT NO. / RAPPORT SUR LES PIÈCES Nº 71/102	PAGE Two

RE: / OBJET: Peter WILLMS (B: 3 MAY 43) et al - Accidental Death, 70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. - 1 SEP 71

I / JE Cst. E.J. BLACKMAN CAME INTO POSSESSION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED GOODS ON / SUIS ENTRÉ EN POSSESSION DES OBJETS DÉCRITS CI-APRÈS LE 2 SEP 71 AT / À BY / EN recovering same from the wreckage of CF-IDS

EXHIBITS LISTED BELOW ARE TO BE GIVEN ITEM NUMBERS IN CONSECUTIVE ORDER / LES PIÈCES ÉNUMÉRÉES CI-DESSOUS RECEVRONT UN Nº EN ORDRE CONSÉCUTIF

EXHIBIT ITEM NO. — PIÈCE Nº	DESCRIPTION	RECIPIENT SIGNATURE AND DATE — SIGNATURE DU RÉCIPIENDAIRE ET DATE	WITNESS INITIALS — INITIALES DU TÉMOIN
1.	15¢ in cash		
2.	Parts of a cigarette lighter		
3.	One wedding band, approx size 9		
4.	One wrist watch c/w broken strap, day-date model, believed to be "Gruen" make		
5.	Three pieces of what appears to be a "Sharpe" headset		

Certified Correct

Cst.
(E.J. BLACKMAN) #23307
Fort Smith Detachment.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RCMP 6920
GRC

C-246
REV. 1-4-66

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE - GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA
EXHIBIT REPORT - RAPPORT SUR LES PIÈCES À CONVICTION

RCMP FILE REFERENCES / RÉF. DOSSIER DE LA GRC	DIV.	SUB-DIV.—SOUS-DIV.	DATE
71-500-31	"G"	Yellowknife	4 SEP 71
	DET.—DÉT. Fort Smith	EXHIBIT REPORT NO. / RAPPORT SUR LES PIÈCES Nº 71/102	PAGE Three

RE: OBJET: Peter WILLNS (B: 3 MAY 43) et al - Accidental Death, 70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. - 1 SEP 71

I JE..... Cst. E.J. Blackman ..... CAME INTO POSSESSION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED GOODS ON / SUIS ENTRÉ EN POSSESSION DES OBJETS DÉCRITS CI-APRÈS LE
1 SEP 71 AT / À Fort Smith, N.W.T. BY / EN taking same from the body of Peter WILLNS and Pinecrest Hotel Room #27

EXHIBITS LISTED BELOW ARE TO BE GIVEN ITEM NUMBERS IN CONSECUTIVE ORDER / LES PIÈCES ÉNUMÉRÉES CI-DESSOUS RECEVRONT UN Nº EN ORDRE CONSÉCUTIF

EXHIBIT ITEM NO. — PIÈCE Nº	DESCRIPTION	RECIPIENT SIGNATURE AND DATE — SIGNATURE DU RÉCIPIENDAIRE ET DATE	WITNESS INITIALS — INITIALES DU TÉMOIN
1	One gold coloured Timex wrist watch		
2	One key case c/w 6 keys		
3	One small combination knife		
4	One brown leather wallet containing: $13.50 cash, Birth Certificate Marriage Certificate Assorted Credit cards and papers		
5	One P.R.C. #D-41969[illegible]		
6	Social Insurance Card # 610-858-[illegible]		
7	One blue overnight bag containing: One brown leather shaving kit Misc. shirts, socks, trousers, underwear Hunting knife c/w case 4 pens 1 box (50 rds) 22 cal ammunition 1 Jeppson Computer survival food		
8	One black wallet containing Senior Commercial Pilot Lic. #KDS-797 plus endorsement certificates and DOT radio operators lic.		
9	One Iver Johnson .22 Cal revolver, Ser. #A-5014 as per PRC #D-41969[illegible]		

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Certified Correct:

(E.J. BLACKMAN) Cst. #23307
Fort Smith Detachment.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RCMP 6920
GRC

C-246
REV. 1-4-66

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE - GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA
EXHIBIT REPORT - RAPPORT SUR LES PIÈCES À CONVICTION

RCMP FILE REFERENCES / RÉF. DOSSIER DE LA GRC	DIV.	SUB-DIV.—SOUS-DIV.	DATE
71-500-31	"G"	Yellowknife	4 SEP 71
	DET.—DÉT. Fort Smith	EXHIBIT REPORT NO. / RAPPORT SUR LES PIÈCES Nº 71/102	PAGE Four

RE: / OBJET: Peter WILLMS (B: 3 MAY 43) et al - Accidental Death, 70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. - 1 SEP 71

I / JE..Cst. E.J. BLACKMAN.. CAME INTO POSSESSION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED GOODS ON / SUIS ENTRÉ EN POSSESSION DES OBJETS DÉCRITS CI-APRÈS LE 1 SEP 71 AT / À Fort Smith, N.W.T. BY / EN taking same from the body of Gordon HALES and Pinecrest Hotel Room #27

EXHIBITS LISTED BELOW ARE TO BE GIVEN ITEM NUMBERS IN CONSECUTIVE ORDER

LES PIÈCES ÉNUMÉRÉES CI-DESSOUS RECEVRONT UN Nº EN ORDRE CONSÉCUTIF

EXHIBIT ITEM NO. — PIÈCE Nº	DESCRIPTION	RECIPIENT SIGNATURE AND DATE — SIGNATURE DU RÉCIPIENDAIRE ET DATE	WITNESS INITIALS — INITIALES DU TÉMOIN
1.	Canadian Passport in favour of Gordon Fred HALES		
2.	Two Social Insurance Cards #437-826-993		
3.	Airline Transport Pilot Licence #XDA-1070 c/w attachments and DOT radio licence		
4.	Birth Certificate for Gordon Frederick HALES		
5.	Birth Certificate for Gordon Laurence HALES		
6.	$228.23 in cash		
7.	one piece of denture approx 2" in length		
8.	One "Yashica A" camera, Ser. # 38104376 c/w brown case and "All mite" flash		
9.	One "opera" 8 transistor radio		
10.	One "Encore" transistor radio		
11.	One gold coloured "Timex" watch c/w strap		
12.	One gold coloured "Benrus" watch c/w strap		
13.	Nail clippers c/w assorted keys on ring		
14.	Blue garmet bag with misc. jackets, trousers, and shirts.		
15.	Brown flight bag containing laundry, 1 pr shoes, assorted books and personal papers.		

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Certified Correct:

E.J. Blackman

(E.J. BLACKMAN) #23307 Cst.
Fort Smith Detachment

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RCMP 6920
GRC

C-246
REV. 1-4-66

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE - GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA
EXHIBIT REPORT - RAPPORT SUR LES PIÈCES À CONVICTION

RCMP FILE REFERENCES / RÉF. DOSSIER DE LA GRC	DIV.	SUB-DIV.—SOUS-DIV.	DATE
71-500-31	"G"	Yellowknife	4 SEP 71
	DET.—DÉT. Fort Smith	EXHIBIT REPORT NO. / RAPPORT SUR LES PIÈCES Nº 71/102	PAGE Five

RE: OBJET: Peter WILLMS BD: 3 MAY 43 "et al" - Accidental Death
70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. - 1 SEP 71

I / JE Cst. E.J. Blackman CAME INTO POSSESSION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED GOODS ON / SUIS ENTRÉ EN POSSESSION DES OBJETS DÉCRITS CI-APRÈS LE 2 SEP 71 AT / À from CF-HTN BY / EN recovering same

EXHIBITS LISTED BELOW ARE TO BE GIVEN ITEM NUMBERS IN CONSECUTIVE ORDER / LES PIÈCES ÉNUMÉRÉES CI-DESSOUS RECEVRONT UN Nº EN ORDRE CONSÉCUTIF

EXHIBIT ITEM NO. — PIÈCE Nº	DESCRIPTION	RECIPIENT SIGNATURE AND DATE — SIGNATURE DU RÉCIPIENDAIRE ET DATE	WITNESS INITIALS — INITIALES DU TÉMOIN
1.	One brown leather brief case containing misc. maps, part copy of "Canada Air Pilot - West", and plastic map scale. Case badly damaged.		
2.	One Craftsman tool box, badly damaged and containing: 5 assorted wrenches 5 3/8 drive sockets 1 3/8 speeder 4 assorted screwdrivers 1 ball pein hammer 1 pair metal shears 2 large files 1 pin punch 1 cold chisel 1 shraeder tire guage c/w hose assorted nuts, bolts, and misc. aircraft parts		

Certified Correct:

E.J. Blackman Cst.
(E.J. BLACKMAN) #23307
Fort Smith Detachment.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

"G" DIVISION

YELLOWKNIFE SUB DIVISION

71-500-31

Fort Smith, N.W.T.
14 SEP 71

OIC I/C VANCOUVER TOWN STATION

Re: Peter WILLMS (B: 3 MAY 43) et al
Accidental Death, (Aircraft Accident)
70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. 1 SEP 71

Forwarded to you via registered mail this date is a parcel containing items 3 to 13 inclusive of page 4 of exhibit report 71/102 for transmittal to the next of kin of Gordon Frederick HALES, Mrs. D. HALES, his mother. Unfortunately the address part of telex VTS 1158/8 which you sent to us was garbled.

2. Also being forwarded by registered mail is a cardboard box containing items 14 and 15 of page 4 of the exhibit report.

3. Form C-246 is enclosed for receipt and return to this office, please.

S.U.I.
D.D. 15 OCT 71

Sgt.
J. T. Hickling, 16952,
i/c Fort Smith Detachment.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

"G" DIVISION

YELLOWKNIFE SUB DIVISION

71-500-31

Fort Smith, N.W.T.
14 SEP 71

OIC I/C EDMONTON DET.

Re: Peter WILMS (B: 3 MAY 43) et al
Accidental Death, (Aircraft Accident)
70 miles N.W. Fort Smith, N.W.T. 1 SEP 71

Forwarded to you by registered mail this date are items 1 to 5 and 7 to 9 inclusive as per exhibit report 71/102. Please have them turned over to Mr. Terry HAROLD, Northwestair Lease, Edmonton (phone 455-1204 or Lamont 895-2595), for transmittal by him to Mrs. KURYLUK. You will note that a firearm is included in the above items and HAROLD should be advised to have Mrs. KURYLUK transfer this firearm.

2. Also being forwarded by registered mail is a cardboard box containing items 1 and 2 noted on page 5 of the exhibit report. These items are also to be turned over to HAROLD.

3. Form C-245 is enclosed for receipt and return, please.

T.U.I.
D.D. 15 OCT 71

Sgt.
J. T. Hickling, 16952,
I/c Fort Smith Detachment.

PROPERTY OF R.C.M.P. / This Police report is supplied to you by the R. C. M. Police for the information of your Department only. It is not to be made known to any other agency or person without the written permission of the R.C.M.P.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

SEP 20 71 24223

NORCANAIR / PRINCE ALBERT, SASKATCHEWAN / PHONE 764-4271 / AREA CODE 306

September 14th, 1971

5002-1801
-1802

Mr. Don Douglas
Superintendent Accident Investigation
Ministry of Transport
Federal Building
9820 - 107th Street
EDMONTON, Alberta

Dear Sir:

I am enclosing the flight crew information with regard to our crew on Canso CF - I D S which was involved in a fatal accident out of Fort Smith N W T.

Captain William Koshylanyk, License # W G A 1163, total flight time 5157.4 as follows: Singles up to and including Otter, Wheels, Skis and Floats, 3648.1 hours light twins Beech 18, Aztec 43.7 hours, DC-3 475.1 hours, Canso PBY 990.5 hours.

Last thirty days 87.4 hours, last ninety days 193.8 hours all on Canso. Flight training as follows approximately 300.0 hours Co-Pilot on DC-3, 356.0 hours Co-Pilot on Canso's the Summer of 1969, as well as periodic Company training in emergency procedures and I F R training the latest being on DC-3 in December 1970 7.0 hours, April 1971 3.0 hours on Canso refresher and proficiency check. Medical Due Date November 11th, 1971, E C G Due Date February 3rd, 1975, M O T Instrument Check Ride Due November 1st, 1971, Company Check Ride due November 1st, 1971.

First Officer Peter Willms License # WGC 8606 - Medical Due Date January 6th, 1972, E C G Due Date January 21st, 1972, Company Check Ride Due November 1st, 1971. Flying time as follows: Last thirty days 75.4 hours, Last ninety days 153.0 hours, total type 192.7 hours. Company training Canso's 5.0 hours, DC-3 11.0 hours. Floats Cessna "206" 3.0 hours.

Our engineering department have sent you under separate cover the technical logs and our copy of the journey logs for Canso CF - I D S, we would appreciate having same returned when you have no further use for them.

As near as we can determine CF - I D S had approximately 200 gallons of fuel and 54 gallons of oil on board at the time of the accident.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

NORCANAIR

Also sending for your information copies of our crew reports, who were flying our other Canso's CF - I Z O and CF - U A W in the area working with CF - H T N. We are also proceeding with obtaining additional statements from persons involved other than our own employees which will be made available to you if you so desire.

If we can be of further help please don't hesitate getting in touch.

Trusting this information is found satisfactory. I remain,

Yours sincerely,

KEITH HORNSETH
Operations Manager

KH/ej
Encl.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

NORCANAIR / PRINCE ALBERT, SASKATCHEWAN / PHONE 764-4271 / AREA CODE 306

September 8th, 1971

[redacted] REPORT on CF - H T N

While in the N W T working out of Fort Smith on Fires 78 and 80 and flying as Co-Pilot in Canso CF - I Z O, we had the occasion to work with and see the operations of Canso CF - H T N and crew. Our Company also had Canso CF - U A W working on these same fires at this time. The first encounter with CF - H T N was on Fire 80 where we were picking up on a small lake approximately five miles West of the fire. On several occasions on our first day of operation on this fire we were cut off by Canso CF - H T N when we were approaching the lake to do our pickup. What I mean by being cut off is each aircraft takes his turn at pickingup water and their turn is governed by doing a reasonably normal circuit and maintaining this pattern as closely as possible for safety reasons and if this pattern is going to be changed it is announced to the other aircraft over the radio his new intentions. He would break this pattern and try beat us back to the lake by doing steep turns and fast pull up after his drop; thus several times we had to reduce power and make wide deviations to await this aircraft. It was quite obvious that he had No Respect for other aircraft and I felt that he resented us coming into this area and working.

On one occasion we had been bombing for about three hours (3 hrs.) and CF - H T N had returned to Fort Smith for fuel. When he returned to do his pickup about one hour (1 hr.) later we were just approaching the lake and about to make our right turn on final. CF - H T N was descending from a higher level than us and we could see that he was trying to cut us off again. In this instance were to close to the lake by the time he was abreast of us and he proceeded directly over us and dida left turn on to the lake. He failed to announce his intentions too over the radio. On the very next circuit he came in behind us on the drop and made a steep right turn after drop and managed again to cut in front of us and beat us back to the lake. It appeared he was racing or resented

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

us being ahead of him on this pickup. We took evasive action by widening our circuit and allowing him to go ahead of us.

While working on Fire 78, we were pickingup on a larger lake and he would not announce his changes in pattern or tell us when he was changing direction of his first turn off the lake. Also he would not announce his intention to change direction of pickup on this lake when his pickup direction changed. He was continually a hazard to us through this lack of respect for other machines working in the area.

He (Hales) was incoherent when on the radio and it was impossible to understand his transmission. He sounded excited and uptight and hollered into his mic. He appeared to me to be on some kind of drug, as his actions on the ground were that of continued excitment. He was fidgety and extremely uptight. Even when he ate his meals he couldn't sit still. Any moves he made were rushed and it appeared he always had something else on his mind other than what he was doing at the time. He acted irrational.

The aircraft CF - H T N did not have an accompanying engineer. From reports from our fellows the aircraft appeared to be poorly maintained as a result of this. On one occasion it went unserviceable due to a hydraulic leak in the forward section of the engine nacelle. He approached our engineering crew --- Mr. Sterling and Mr. Mowery and asked them to repair this. They refused as they did not feel they wanted to be responsible for working on an aircraft of this condition. He got a fellow by the name of Cooper from Buffalo Airways to do the repairs and I am sure that Mr. Cooper is not qualified to work on a Canso nor is he knowledgeable or properly endorsed to do so. None-the-less he repaired this aircraft and he was back flying immediately after the repairs. This aircraft could not have been signed out after this repair nor could the aircraft have been properly inspected, maintained, or signed out on his 7day, 50 hour, or 100 hour inspections as there was no engineer based with it.

For some reason his Co-Pilot quit on about the 28th of August and Mr. Hales approached Keith Mowery, who is on our Maintenance Staff, and offered him $30.00 per hour if he would act as Co-Pilot for him. Keith advised him that he was not a qualified pilot and Mr. Hales said, that that did not matter as long as he could push the throttle to the proper

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

power setting on take-off, he said he would do the rest. Keith refused and told me later that he would not ride in that aircraft or with that man for $300.00 per hour.

I saw him on the morning of the accident and he appeared to be in the same frame of mind previously to going on the fire by Pine Point.

Bill MacNeil

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

NORCANAIR

September 10th, 1971

REPORT CF - H T N

From August 27th to September 1st, 1971, while flying as Captain of Canso CF - U A W on a water bombing operation in Wood Buffalo Park out of Fort Smith, N W T; we were working with Canso CF - I Z O and CF - H T N and later CF - I D S.

During this time Canso CF - H T N made no effort to conform to normal practices employed by several aircraft working from the same pickup area and fire, such as: maintaining proper position in the circuit and all aircraft making the same direction turns at the pickup area and fire, also turns to the right of over 10 - 15° are usually avoided if possible due to the restricted visibility from the Captain's side (if this type of turn is necessary it is fairly common practice to have the Second Officer do the turn). Also if the direction of a pickup or drop run is to be changed, it is common practice for the aircraft changing directions to notify all other aircraft of the intended change on the radio frequency being used.

On numerous occasions CF - H T N forced us either to widen our circuit or go around by cutting in front of us on pickups or by cutting in front of us on a leg to or from the fire area. The shortening of his circuits was accomplished by a violent pull-up over the fire usually accompanied by a very steep right turn and I can only assume by using higher than normal power settings.

The radio transmissions from CF - H T N were practically unintelligible due to what could only be called screaming into the microphone by Hales the Captain.

Although we had what I would call three near misses and numerous inconveniences, the worst one was when a change was made in our pickup area to a different lake. In radio communication CF - I Z O advised they would check the lake for suitability, I advised I had checked the lake already and would be following CF - I Z O on pickup; CF - H T N passed some remark about the unsuitability of the lake which we could not make out, on a long straight in approach CF - I Z O was in sight ahead on his approach and pickup. CF - H T N was above us at our eleven o'clock position going in the opposite direction, short of touch down Aztec M I G, who was in the area above the lake called that CF - H T N was on pickup also, I looked to my left and saw him come down past the

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Port wing and on a closing course to us an angle of about 20°; we were forced to apply power pull-up and do a steep right turn to avoid a definite collision.

During this time CF - H T N went unservicable due to hydraulic problems, our maintenance personnel were approached by Hales to carry out repairs to CF - H T N. This request was refused due to the apparent condition of the aircraft and the fact that there had been no maintenance personnel or engineer with CF - H T N since its arrival at Fort Smith in early June.

There was also a problem with the Second Officer of CF - H T N quitting and our maintenance personnel were approached to act as Co-Pilot by Hales although he was advised they held no pilot license.

All of Hales's actions both in the air and on the ground, I would consider to be erratic and very unpredictable.

Hales was known to me personally before this time through our both being employed by the Saskatchewan Government Airways, his services were at that time considered unsuitable by our Company and he was dismissed.

On the morning of September 1st, 1971, Hales advised me that he had made $13,500 since early in June flying CF - H T N at $50.00 per hour.

In respect to this operation and the eventual accident, I am a firm believer in a bird dog aircraft with a competent pilot and a Forestry Officer from the Agency involved being used on a bombing operation especially if more than one bomber is being used.

S. W. McKNIGHT

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

NORCANAIR

September 10th, 1971

REPORT CF - H T N

I was flying Co-Pilot on Canso CF - U A W on fires #78 and # 80 south of Fort Smith, N W T and noted the flying and some of the behavoir of the crew of Canso CF - H T N which worked on the same fires with us.

My first impression was that CF - H T N was racing the rest of us maybe to impress the local Forestry Officials. His Canso being stripped was a few knots faster but he never tried to fit into the circuit. One time our Canso was lined up on final for a pickup on McNiel Lake when we were passed on the left side by CF - H T N and we immediately initiated an overshoot to the right to regain position in the circuit. Again the next day we (CF - U A W) had to change circuit direction to hit a different fire spot. We told the bird dog aircraft of our intentions before pickup and he acknowledged and in turn informed the rest of the group of our intentions. After the pickup the bird dog pilot radioed again to CF - H T N that we were turning right and we then noticed that CF - H T N was turning inside of our turn. We were about 200 feet higher than CF - H T N but to be sure we added METO power and were prepared to jettison our load for better mobility. It appeared that CF - H T N either had no receiver or just ignored the previous radio transmission.

The pilot of CF - H T N transmitted in a high pitched, rapid, and overly excited manner which led us to believe that he was very nervous.

I have worked on many fires during the last Summer with aircraft and helicopters of different speeds and makes and never had to jockey for position in the bombing circuit, as all of our previous colleagues were equally safety conscious and were a pleasure to work with.

Only one incident on the ground came to my attention that left me in wonderment when our engineer was offered a Co-Pilot position with CF - H T N when the previous Co-Pilot quit. If our engineer had had a private license he was offered $30.00 per hour for the job.

The above statement is made to the best of my memory and I would be available for further questions should the occasion arise.

DON MARTINUSEN
NORCANAIR

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

NORCANAIR

September 10th, 1971


REPORT
CF - H T N

I, Melvin Connor , was Captain on Canso CF - I Z O before and during the time of the accident. We arrived at Fort Smith about a week previous to this and we were working with CF - H T N and our own machine CF - U A W. I did not know the Captain of CF - H T N personally but in my opinion he was a very erratic pilot. The first few days we water bombed with Mr. Hales it was almost a hazard being in the same area with him. He would cut us off at times on our approach for a pickup, sometimes narrowly missing us. It appeared like he was evidently making his turns too steep, diving and pulling up very sharply while he was making his drops. He was very uncourteous and pushy during the water bombing sessions and would not conform to a proper traffic pattern. From the way he flew his machine and the tone of his voice over the radio, I could easily visualize a man sitting in the left seat of that airplane very frantic. I was surprised to note, however, that two days before the fatal accident he was more courteous on the job and was starting to fly a safe traffic pattern and this was the last time I worked with him.

MELVIN CONNOR

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS



See "Index to Maps Available" for sheets published.

The general public may obtain copies of this map from the Map Distribution Office Dept. of Mines and Technical Surveys, Ottawa. at 25 cents per copy.

BEAR CREEK

DISTRICT OF MACKENZIE N.W.T.

85 A/11 EAST HALF

FIRST EDITION
(PRELIMINARY)

Scale 1:50,000

1 0 1 2 3 Miles


1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Metres

1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Yards


MAGNETIC DECLINATION 31°21' EAST
AT CENTRE OF SHEET 1953.
Annual magnetic change 8' westerly.

000146

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PILOT HISTORY

Peter John Willms WGC-8606

1. Medical examination report dated 30 December, 1966, was assessed 1-1-1-1. Mr. Willms held private pilot licence VRP-7348 at that time. His occupation at that time was listed on the medical report form as Mennonite Minister with a total flying time of 80 hours.

2. Flight test for commercial flying licence was passed on November 21, 1968, with a mark of 72 percent.

3. Written examination CP-10 was passed with a mark of 76 percent on the 21st of November, 1968.

4. Commercial pilot licence WGC-8606 was issued dated the 18th of February, 1969, endorsed aeroplane - single engine, land - valid for day flying only.

5. Was awarded a category three instructor's rating on May 22, 1969.

6. Written examinations were passed with the following marks:
   SA1 - 70% - 10 March, 1970
   SA2A - 60% - 10 March, 1970
   IR1A - 82% - 9 March, 1970

7. Commercial pilot licence WGC-8606 was endorsed "Valid for Block Air Space", 23 March, 1970.

8. Was awarded a class two instructor's rating on 25th of May, 1970

9. Was awarded a class one instrument rating on the 23rd of October, 1970.

10. Licence WGC-8606 was endorsed "DC-3 PBY5A and sea" on the 23rd of April, 1971.

11. There is no record of any infractions, incidents or previous accidents.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PILOT HISTORY

William Koshylanyk WGA-1163

1. Student pilot permit WG-4732 was issued dated the 5th of June, 1958.

2. Flight test for private pilot licence was passed on the 8th March, 1958, with a mark of 78.7 percent.

3. Private pilot licence WGP-5024 was issued dated 1st of April, 1958.

4. First attempt at commercial pilot flight test was failed on 15th of January, 1963.

5. Second attempt at commercial pilot flight test was passed on the 12th of February, 1964, with a mark of 72 percent.

6. Commercial pilot licence WGC-7689 was issued dated the 20th February, 1964, endorsed "aeroplanes - single engine, land - valid for day flying only".

7. Was awarded a categorythree instructor's rating on the 19th of April, 1966.

8. Licence WGC-7869 was endorsed "and sea" on the 17th May, 1966.

9. Was awarded a class two instructor's rating on 19th of November, 1968.

10. Licence was endorsed "multi" on May 1st, 1969.

11. Licence WGC-7869 was endorsed "consolidated PBY5A on the 16th of May, 1969.

12. Licence WGC-7869 was endorsed "Douglas DC-3 on the 29th of July, 1969.

13. Was awarded a class one instrument rating on the 28th of January, 1970.

14. Restriction valid for day flying only was removed from the licence on the 28th of January, 1970.

15. Senior Commercial pilot licence WGS-811 was issued dated 11th of May, 1970.

16. Airline transport licence WGA-1163 was issued dated 3rd of December, 1970, endorsed "aeroplanes, single and multi engine, land and sea, Douglas DC-3, consolidated PBY5A.

000150

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

17. There is no record of any infractions, incidents or previous accidents.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PILOT HISTORY

Gordon Frederick Hales XDA-1070

1. Airline transport pilot licence XDA-1070 was issued dated 30 December, 1969, endorsed "aeroplanes - single and multi engine, land and sea, PBY5A, Curtis C-46."

2. Prior to this Mr. Hales had possessed senior commercial pilot licence VRS-640.

3. The Edmonton 5802 for Mr. Hales contains no record of any previous incidents or accidents or infractions.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PILOT HISTORY

Peter Kuryluk XDS-797

1. Flight test for commercial pilot licence was passed on the 5th of October, 1960 with the mark of 77 percent.

2. Commercial pilot licence XDC-7528 was issued dated the 6th of October, 1960, endorsed "aeroplanes - single engine, land" with no special conditions or endorsements.

3. Category three instructor's rating was awarded on the 9th of November, 1960.

4. Licence XDC-7528 was endorsed "and multi" on June 17, 1963.

5. Class two instructor's rating was awarded on the 4th of June, 1963.


6. Licence XDC-7528 was endorsed "and sea, North American B-25" on the 20th of December, 1967.

7. Senior commercial pilot licence XDS-797 was issued dated 12 February, 1970, endorsed "aircraft - single and multi engine, land and sea, North American B-25".

8. There is no record of any infractions, incidents or previous accidents.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

CF-HTN & CF-IDS W1801 W1802



General view of area.

1. Indicates severed wing panels of the two Canso aircraft. The left or northerly speck is the CF-HTN panel.

2. The burned out hulk of CF-IDS which appeared to have gone straight in and burned. The white smoke in the top centre of the picture is the still burning area which was being fire bombed.

3. The wreckage of CF-HTN which did not catch fire.

4. The point of impact of the helicopter CF-OKV which CF-HTN had been circling and toward which they appear to have been moving for a low pass.

5. Fire being bombed.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

CF-HTN & CF-IDS

E·L·A·N PLOT

Helicopter CF-OKV crashed near area where water bombers were working

CF-IDS came in on the established bombing run and dropped water

Two aircraft collided

Collision damage made both aircraft uncontrollable

Both aircraft crashed

File W1069 explains

CF-HTN altered his circuit and circled OKV

Out of concern for injured helicopter pilot

Circling was to the right

First officer probably flying while captain talked on radio reporting accident. (Voice of Captain was identified on 122.2 mcs.)

Was aware of helicopter crash and that HTN was circling in Fire 6 area but Fire 6 included a very large area.

IDS turned left after water drop.

Normal procedure. Also might have decided to look at OKV.

None of crew saw other aircraft or did not see other aircraft in time

Due to positioning difficult to see (turns, etc.)

Crew busy
- with low level flying
- bombing
- selecting next run
- concern for injured helicopter pilot

Was no control (e.g. bird dog aircraft)

Fire was not a disaster type. Had been burning for weeks. Fire was not spreading. Procedures were not strictly established. Sometimes used bird dog sometimes not.

Each aircraft lost a major portion of one wing in the collision.

Damaged beyond control in collision.

HTN & IDS ended up on converging paths

None of crew members saw other aircraft in time to avoid collision

Crew of HTN busy reporting helicopter accident, watching wreckage, deciding what was needed, circling at low level, etc.

Crew of IDS occupied with post drop checks, turning, looking for HTN and possibly OKV, etc.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL
11111 JASPER AVE
DEPARTMENT OF LABORATORY MEDICINE

Name KOSHYLANYK: Mr. Bill Case 71-D.O.A. Age 44 Sex M Necropsy # 71-174

Doctor Willoughby Ward not admitted Pathologist Dr. T.Y. Thay

Date of Admission not admitted Date & Hour of Death Sept. 1/71

Date & Hour of Necropsy Sept. 4/71 Necropsy Hours after Death.

ANATOMICAL DIAGNOSIS

- WATER BOMBER AIRPLANES COLLIDED AT THE SCENE OF HELICOPTER CRASH.

- SEVERE THERMAL BURN AND MULTIPLE TRAUMATIC INJURIES.

- Water bombers colided at the scene of helicopter crash.
- Severe thermal burns of the body , body beyond recognition.
- Multiple traumatic injuries.
- Extensive coagulation necrosis of the viscera (lungs, heart, liver, adrenals, kidneys, spleen & bowel).
- Pulmonary congestion, edema and hemorrhage, bilateral, moderate.
- Blood and fat for ethyl alcohol, salicylic acid, barbiturates, alkaloids and other common drugs-negative.

SUMMARY

This 44 year old white male was killed when two water bombers collided at the scene of a helicopter crash.

The body was found to be extensively burnt and damaged to the point that it was beyond recognition and all the remaining tissue showed extensive coagulation necrosis.

The cause of death is attributed to severe thermal burns and multiple traumatic injuries.

Pathologist: T Y Thay

NECROPSY REPORT I

133 70

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL

NECROPSY REPORT - Continued

Name KOSHYLANYK, Mr. Bill Necropsy # 71-174 Page

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

The body is so extensively burned and damaged that it is beyong recognition. The main part of the remains are part of the base of the skull with attached spinal column, part of the pelvic bones and part of the upper thighsa Nearly all the skin, soft tissues and muscular tissues are burnt or damaged that only some can be seen covering part of the back and buttock. Also attached to the main piece are partially burnt and well cooked lungs; spleen; left kidney; left adrenal gland; a few pieces of blood clot; loops of bowel; the diaphragm and a few fibs. The rest of the remains includes the bones from the upper and lower extremities, the shoulders; the pelvis; skull and a the ashes of the burnt internal organs, soft tissues, skin and muscle.

INTERNAL EXAMINATION

Circulatory System:

The heart weighs approximately 60 gms. contracted and shows evidence of coagulation necrosis. The proximal aorta shows no significant athermatosis. The distal aorta is burnt and no pericardial tissue seen.

Respiratory System:

Both lungs are collapsed, contracted and show evidence of coagulation necrosis. Around the lungs are masses of coagulated blood clots. They also show evidence of coagulation necrosis.

Endocrine System

The left adrenal gland shows a yellow cortex and red medulla and shows evidence of coagulation necrosis. No other endocrine organs are identified.

Genito-Urinary System

The left kidney weighed approximately 30 gms. and shows evidence of coagulation necrosis.

Digestive System

The few loops of bowel seen show evidence of coagulation necrosis. The liver is partially burnt.

Skeletal System

See external examination.

Brain

Only a tiny amount of burnt brain can be seen.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL

NECROPSY REPORT - Continued

Name KOSHYLANYK: Mr.Bill Necropsy # 71-174 Page

MICROSCOPICS:

Heart: Extensive coagnulation necrosis; the blodd vessels are emptied and contracted and only a small amount of proteinaceous material remained.

Lungs: Shows extensive coagulation necrosis with hemorrhage and edema seen in some of the alveolar spaces. Most of them (vessels) are rather contracted and contains many disintigrated R.B.C.s

Aorta: Extensive coagulation necrosis.

Adrenals: Coagulation necrosis, extensive.

Skin: Subcutaneous tissue and muscle evidence of coagulation necrsis.

Lungs:Coagulation necrosis, extensive.
Spleen, and kidneys .

Bowel: Extensive coagulation necrosis involving all the layers.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PARK GENERAL HOSPITAL — 111 JASPER AVENUE — TEL. 482-2442

GIVEN NAMES	SOCIAL INSURANCE NUMBER	CASE NUMBER
KOSHYLANYK MR. BILL		330396

	ELIGIBLE YES NO	PHONE NUMBER	SEX AND MAR STAT	PREVIOUS ADM	DATE OF ADMISSION
Prince Albert					SEPT 4/71

PAT OR OF PATIENT	INSURANCE COVERAGE	INS. OPTION	FORMS SIGNED

E OF BIRTH	AGE	TIME OF ADM	WALKING	CHAIR	STRETCHER	RELIGION	DOCTOR
	44	6:15AM	☐	☐	☐		~~HANSON~~ Willoughby

ADDRESS AND RELATIONSHIP TO PATIENT	EMPLOYER OF GUARANTOR	LENGTH OF STAY PLOTED
	DOA	

PRELIMINARY DIAGNOSIS

HELICOPTER CRASH VICTIM DOA FROM FORT SMITH BROUGHT IN FOR AUTOPSY BY PARK MEMORIAL

ACCIDENT FORM COMPLETED	IF WCB STATE HOW AND WHERE ACCIDENT OCCURRED
YES ☐ NO ☐	EG

TREATMENT RECORD

161-71

HISTORY AND CLINICAL FINDINGS

For autopsy.

FINAL DIAGNOSIS

TREATMENT

DISPOSITION
ADMIT ☐ HISTORY ☐ DONE ☐ NOT DONE ☐ DICTATED DISCHARGE ☐ OTHER ☐

TIME DISCHARGED 6:45

NURSES NOTES

VISION: CHECK WITH ☐ OR WITHOUT GLASSES ☐
RIGHT EYE / LEFT EYE /

TEMP	PULSE	RESP.	BLOOD PRESSURE
			/

Body directly to morgue - in steel
Sealed casket that was lay.

SIGNATURE OF PHYSICIAN

SIGNATURE OF PHYSICIAN

SIGN THE FOLLOWING:
PRIVATE ☐ STAFF ☐ INTERN ☐ NAME OF INTERN

EMERGENCY MEDICAL RECORD

PHYSICIAN 000161

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL
111 11 JASPER AVE.
DEPARTMENT OF LABORATORY MEDICINE

Name TILLMS: Mr. Peter Case # 71-D.O.A. Age 28 Sex M Necropsy # 71-175

Doctor Willoughby Ward not admitted Pathologist Dr. T.Y. Thay

Date of Admission not admitted Date & Hour of Death Sept. 1/71

Date & Hour of Necropsy Sept. 4/71 Necropsy Hours after Death.

ANATOMICAL DIAGNOSIS

- WATER BOMBER AIRPLANE CRASH AT THE SCENE OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT.

- SEVERE THERMAL BURN WITH MULTIPLE TRAUMATIC INJURIES.

- Water bomber airplane collided at the scene of helicopter crash.
- Severe thermal burns of the body with multiple traumatic injuries.
- Coagulation necrosis of the viscera (Brain, liver, lung, heart, spleen, adrenal, pancreas, kidney, bowel and thyroid).
- Pulmonary congestion, edema and hemorrhage, bilateral, moderate.
- Epicardial hemorrhage, focal.
- Blood and brain for ethyl alcohol, carbon monoxide, salicylic acid, barbiturates, alkaloids and other common toxic substances - negative.

SUMMARY

This 28 year old white male was killed when two water bomber airplanes collided at the scene of a helicopter crash.

AT AUTOPSY the body was found to be severely burned and all the remaining tissues showed varying degress of coagulation necrosis.

The cause of death is attributed to severe thermal injury and multiple traumatic injuries.

Pathologist: T.Y. Thay

NECROPSY REPORT I

155-70

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Name Willms, Mr. Peter Necropsy # 71-175 Page

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

The body is so extensively burnt and damaged that the only skin, subcutaneous fate and muscular tissue left are those covering parts of the scalp, parts of the back, neck, buttocks and anterior chest wall.
The main piece consists of the head, the spinal column, both shoulders, the pelvis and part of the upper thighs.
The skin subcutaneous tissue, muscular tissue of the nose and the eyes of the face are practically all burnt and the underlying facial bones are exposed.

INTERNAL EXAMINATION

The chest wall and the head is opened with the usual V-shaped and intermastoid scalp incisions. Only several partially burnt ribs are seen overlying the chest organs. The soft tissue and muscular tissue covering the abdomen are all burnt out. A few loops of partially burnt intestines with burnt spleen, right kidney and right adrenal gland are seen in the abdominal region.

CIRCULATORY SYSTEM

The heart weighs approximately 60 gms. contracted with evidence of coagulation necrosis. The proximal aorta shows no evidence of atheromatosis. Only a patch of burnt pericardium is seen to cover the heart. The diaphragm is mostly burnt out.

RESPIRATORY SYSTEM

Both lungs are collapsed and contracted. Their outer surface is covered by blood clots. The bronchi contains no abnormal contents. They all show evidence of coagulation necrosis.

DIGESTIVE SYSTEM

Only a few partially burnt loops of bowel can be recognized. The liver is partially burnt. The pancreas can not be located.

ENDOCRINE SYSTEM

The thyroid is red brown in color.

GENITO-URINARY SYSTEM

Only the right kidney and part of the right ureter can be seen. They are partially burnt.

HEMATOPOETIC SYSTEM

The spleen is also partially burnt.

SKELETAL SYSTEM

Most of the bone is either partially burnt or badly damaged. The best preserved piece is the skull.

BRAIN

The brain shows evidence of autolysis as well as coagulation necrosis.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL

NECROPSY REPORT - Continued

Name WILLMS: Mr. Peter Necropsy # 71-175 Page

MICROSCOPICS:

Thyroid: Shows evidence of coagulation necrosis.

Heart: Coagulation necrosis with hemorrhage in the epicardium.

Lungs: Shows evidence of coagulation necrosis along with focal areas of edema, congestion and hemorrhage.

Bronchioles: Some of the bronchiles are filled with some mucoid and hemorrhagic material

Liver: Coagulation necrosis and mild post mortem autolysis.

Adrenals: Mild cagulation necrosis.

Spleen: Coagulation necrosis.

Kidneys: Coagulation necrosis of the cortex and medulla.

Skin: Soft brown red muscle; extensive coagulation necrososis.

Small Bowel: Coagulation necrosis.

Brain: Mild coagulatinn necrosis and post mortem autolysis.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL

LAST NAME: ~~REID~~ MR. WILLMS | GIVEN NAMES: Peter. | SOCIAL INSURANCE NUMBER | CASE NUMBER: 336351

ADDRESS: Borden Sask. | ELIGIBLE YES NO | PHONE NUMBER | SEX AND MAR. STAT | PREVIOUS ADM. | DATE OF ADMISSION: SEPT 4/71

OCCUPATION OF PATIENT | INSURANCE COVERAGE | INS. OPTION | FORMS SIGNED

DATE OF BIRTH | AGE: 28 | TIME OF ADM: 6:15AM | WALK ☐ CHAIR ☐ STRETCHER ☐ | RELIGION | DOCTOR: ~~HAMSON~~ Willoughby

GUARANTOR AND RELATIONSHIP TO PATIENT | EMPLOYER OF GUARANTOR | LENGTH ESTIMATED

PROVISIONAL DIAGNOSIS

HELICOPTER CRASH VICTIM BROUGHT IN BY PARK MEMORIAL FROM FORT SMITH FOR AUTOPSY EG

ACCIDENT: FORM COMPLETED YES ☐ NO ☐ | IF WCB STATE HOW AND WHERE ACCIDENT OCCURRED

161-71

TREATMENT RECORD

CLINICAL FINDINGS

For autopsy only.

FINAL DIAGNOSIS

TREATMENT

DISPOSITION: ADMIT ☐ HISTORY ☐ DONE ☐ NOT DONE ☐ DICTATED | DISCHARGE ☐ | OTHER ☒ to morgue. | TIME DISCHARGED 6 a.m.

NOTES | VISION CHECK WITH ☐ OR WITHOUT GLASSES ☐ RIGHT EYE / LEFT EYE / | TEMP | PULSE | RESP. | BLOOD PRESSURE /

Directly to morgue — body in sealed logged casket

SIGNATURE R.N. A. Mathews

CONSULTATION: STAFF ☐ INTERN ☐ NAME OF INTERN

Dr. Hanson

EMERGENCY MEDICAL RECORD

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL
111 11 JASPER AVE
DEPARTMENT OF LABORATORY MEDICINE

Name HALES: Mr. Gordon Case # 71-DO.A. Age Sex M Necropsy # 71-173

Doctor Willoughby Ward not admitted Pathologist Dr. T.Y. Thay

Date of Admission not admitted Date & Hour of Death Sept. 1/71

Date & Hour of Necropsy Sept. 4/71 Necropsy Hours after Death.

ANATOMICAL DIAGNOSIS

- WATER BOMBERS COLLIDED OVER THE SCENE OF HELICOPTER CRASH.

- RUPTURED HEART WITH HEMOPERICARDIUM, HEMOTHORAX, FRACTURED SKULL AND MULTIPLE TRAUMATIC INJURIES.

1. Water bomber collided over the scene of helicopter crash.
2. Ruptured heart and ruptured pericardium.
3. Hemopericardium (150 cc. of blood).
4. Hemothorax (450 cc. of blood, rt, 300 cc. of blood, left)-bilateral.
5. Transverse fractures, base of skull involving both mastoid bones.
6. Subarachnoid hemorrhage; occipital lobes, focal.
7. Laceration of liver, anterior and inferior surfaces, right and left lobes.
8. Hemoperitoneum (250 cc. of blood).
9. Multiple rib fractures (2nd to 10th on left side along posterior and lateral aspects, 3rd to 7th on righ along lateral aspects).
10. Bilateral fractures of humeri, tibia and fibula at the junction of middle and distal thirds.
11. Separation of symphysis pubis.
12. Ruptured urinary bladder.
13. Multiple abrasions and lacerations of skin.
14. Pulmonary congestion, edema and hemorrhage, bilateral, mild to moderate.
15. Fatty metamorphosis of the liver, marked.
16. Generalized visceral congestion, mild to moderate.
17. Obesity (approx. 250 lbs.).
18. Blood for ethyl alcohol, carbon monoxide, salicylate, barbiturates, alkaloids and other alkaloids and other common drugs-negative.

SUMMARY

This white male was killed when two water bombers collided over the scene of a helicopter crash.

AT AUTOPSY; the major findings are:- ruptured heart and ruptured pericardium with hemopericardium and bilateral hemothorax, fracture of the middle fossa of the base of the skull with subarachnoid hemorrhages. Multiple rib fractures; lacerations of the liver with hemoperitoneum and numerous other traumatic injuries.
The casue of death is attributed to ruptured heart, fractured skull, laceration of liver and hemorrhage.

Pathologist: T.Y. Thay

NECROPSY REPORT I

155-70

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL

NECROPSY REPORT - Continued

Name HAIES: Mr. Gordon Necropsy # 71-173 Page 2

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

An obese white male in early forties, weighing 250 lbs. and measuring 177 cm. Rigor mort is generalized with post mortemlividity an d this is seen in the back. Irides are blue in color; pupils are round, each measured 0.4 cm. in diameter. No discharge from externa orifices. There are multiple traumatic injuries seen on the skinl-

Abrasions:- Left side of face, multiple 6 x 5.5 cm.
Left anterior chest wall, multiple 6 x 5.5 cm. and 30 x 19 cm.
Right upper anterior chest wall and right upper arm, several small abrasions 2.5 x 2 cm.
Left upper arm, several abrasions 1.5 x 2 cm.

Lacerations of full thickness of skin:-
Transverse top of scalp 5 cm.
Left anterior frontal region transverse and oblique 4 x 3.5 cm.
Chin, oblique 2.5 cm.
Left posterior neck extending to the left ear, transverse 11 cm,
Inner surface of right upper arm, oblique 1.5 cm.
Ventral surface of left upper and mid thigh, transverse, and 2 cm. and 2 cm. respectively.
Anterior surface of left knee, transverse 17 x 5 cm.
Outer surface of left ankle; oblique 10 xz 4
Below right anterior knee; transverse 5 x 1.5 cm.
Inner ankle; oblique 11 x 4 cm.

Manyof the skin injuries are covered by sand and dirt expeccially the face. There was no edema, no jaundice.

INTERNAL EXAMINATION

The body is opened by the usual Y-shaped and intramastoid scalp incisions; Subcutaneous fat measured 4 inches around umbilicus and 6 inches in its maximum thickness at the lowe abdomen. Subcutaneous fat and red blood musculature slightly hydrated. All organs in nor mal antomical position. The neck veins are somehwat collapsed. The mediastinum is in the midline and unremarkable.

CIRCULATORY SYSTEM

Thepericardial cavity:- The pericardium is smooth, thin and shiny and containimg an estimated 150 cc. of blood clot. There is a ruptured hole measuring 3 x 5 cm. seenin the left anterior aspect of the pericardial sac. The pulmonaryarteries are free of abnormal contents. Theheart weighs 420 gms. There is rupture of ~~left~~ anterior and aspect of left atrium and ventricle measuring 6 x7cm. The left ventricle measured 1.4 cm. and the right ventricle masured 0.3 cm. in thickness. The aorta, mitral, tricuspid and pulmonic valves are unremarkable. The myocardium is red brown and flabby. The epicardium is unremarkable. Both coronary arteries show mild atheromatosis, patent throughout and free of abnormal contents. The chordae tendinae and papillary muscles are unremarkable. The aorta shows slight atheromatosis.

156-70

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL

NECROPSY REPORT - Continued

RESPIRATORY SYSTEM

Pleural cavities:- The left pleural cavity contained approximately 450 cc. of blodd and the right contains 300 cc. of blood. The combined weight of both lungs is 620 gms. There are two oblique lacerations of the left lower lobe, consisting of both lungs and is that of fine crepitance and somewhat congested area over the left lower lobe. Outer surfaces are generally grey with the usual amonnt of anthracotic pigment. No tumor, no consolidation seen. The trachea, bronchi contain some mucoid material.

DIGESTIVE SYSTEM

The peritoneal cavity contains some 250 cc . of hemorrhagic fluid. The stomach contains some 40 cc. of semi digested food. The rest of the bowel is unremarkable except for the usual autolyiic changes.

The liver weighs 3000 gms. There are several oblique lacerations seen on the anterior surface measuring 10 - 12 cm. length. There is one oblique laceration measuring 6 cm. seen on the inferior surface of the left lobe. The liver is yellow and soft and fatty. The galbladder, extrahepatic bile ducts and the ampulla are unremarkable. The pancreas weighs 180 gms. and shows evidence of autolysis and well lobulated parenchyma.

ENDOCRINE SYSTEM

Both adrenals weighs approximately 7 gms. with yellow cortex and red medulla. The thyroid gland weighs approximately 20 gms. and is unremarkable.

GENITOURINARY SYSTEM

Both kindyes weighs 200 gms. each. Both capsules peel off with ease.The cortex measures 1.2 cm. in thickness with a well demarcated cortico medullary junction. The cortex is pale and medulla red brown. The renal pelvis and ureters are unremarkable. The urinary bladder is ruptured at its anterior and upperaspect. The ruptured hole measures 2 cm. in length. The prostate gland is unremarkable so are the testes.

SKELETAL SYSTEM

SkulFracture of the base of the skull througfh the middle fossa involving both mastoid bones.
Chest:- Fractures of left ribs from 2nd to 10th on their posterior and lateral aspects.
Multiple fractures of ribs are seen also on the right side.
Humeri: Bilaterally there are fractures of the junction of the middle and distaal third s.
Pelvis and Legs:-Separation of the symphysis pubis.
Bilateral fractures of tibia and fibula at the junction of the k middle and distal thirds.

HEMTOPOETIC SYSTEM

The spleen weighs 200 gms., red brown and soft. Bone marrow red brown in color.

BRAIN The brain weighed 1500 gms. Serial sections of the coronal planes reveals no diffuse nor focal abnomalities, in the brain substance. However there are focal areas of subarachnoid hemorrhage at the occipital region.The vertebro-basilar arteries and circle of Willis reveals no atheromatosis.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

MICROSCOPICS:

Thyroid: The thyroid gland is composed of many acini lined by cuboidal to columnar epithelium and distended with colloid. The vessels are somewhat congested.

Trachea: The vessels are moderately congested with hemorrhage into the mucosa.

Lungs: The alveoli are filled with some pinkish proteinaceous material some of them are distended with numerous R.B.C.s Several of the alveoli are over distended and many are rather collapsed. There are heavy pigmented laden histiocytes seen at the pleural and pulmonary lymphatics. A few of the bronchioles are filled with mucoid material.

Heart: There are areas of interstitial hemorrhage with separation of the myocardial fibers There are also hemorrhages in the epicardium and around the blood vessels. There are fatty stromal infiltrate into into the epicardium and myocardium especially prominent in the right atrium. The coronary arteries show minimal atheromatosis. The lumen is patent. The myocardium reveals no recent or old myocardial infarction. The endocardium is unremarkable

Liver:The liver shows moderate to marked fatty metamorphosis with hemorrhage in the sub-capsular space and on the surface of the Glisson's capsule.

Spleen: Wwith rather prominent white pulp but collapsed red pup. There is evidence of post mortem change.

Pancreas: post mortem autolysis.

Adrenal: Shows evidence of post mortem change and miniaml congestion.

Kidneys: Shows evidence of post mortem change and congestion.

Aorta: Shows minamal atheromatosis and hemorrhage around the adventitia.

Stomach: Shows mimimal mucosal congestion.

Urinary Bladder: Unremarkable.

Testes:Unremarkable.

Bone Marrow:Unremarkable.

Brain: Shows focal areas of subarachnoid hemorrhage and congestion of the blood vessels.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

LAST NAME: HALES MR. GORDON | GIVEN NAME | FE0284

ADDRESS: Vancouver | ELIGIBLE YES NO | PHONE NUMBER | SEX AND MAR. STAT. | PREVIOUS ADM. | DATE OF ADMISSION: SEPT 4/71

OCCUPATION OF PATIENT | INSURANCE COVERAGE | INS. OPTION | FORMS SIGNED

DATE OF BIRTH | AGE | TIME OF ADM: 6:15AM | WALKING ☐ | CHAIR ☐ | STRETCHER ☐ | RELIGION | DOCTOR: ~~WILSON~~ Willoughby

GUARANTOR AND RELATIONSHIP TO PATIENT | EMPLOYER OF GUARANTOR | LENGTH EMPLOYED

PROVISIONAL DIAGNOSIS
HELICOPTER CRASH VICTIM BROUGHT IN BY PARK MEMORIAL FROM FORT SMITH. FOR AUTOPSY

WCB YES ☐ NO ☐ | FORM COMPLETED YES ☐ NO ☐ | IF WCB STATE HOW AND WHERE ACCIDENT OCCURRED: EG

DOA

TREATMENT RECORD 161-71

HISTORY AND CLINICAL FINDINGS

Aeroplane crash
for autopsy only.

FINAL DIAGNOSIS

TREATMENT

DISPOSITION: ADMIT ☐ HISTORY ☐ DONE ☐ NOT DONE ☐ DICTATED | DISCHARGE ☐ OTHER ☐ | TIME DISCHARGED

NURSES NOTES

VISION CHECK WITH ☐ OR WITHOUT GLASSES ☐ RIGHT EYE / LEFT EYE /

TEMP	PULSE	RESP.	BLOOD PRESSURE
			/

Body directly to morgue -
in steel casket - Tag on casket.

CHECK THE FOLLOWING:
PRIVATE ☐ STAFF ☐ INTERN ☐ NAME OF INTERN

SIGNATURE OF PHYSICIAN

Dr Hamilton

EMERGENCY MEDICAL RECORD

PHYSICIAN

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL
111 11 JASPER AVE.
DEPARTMENT OF LABORATORY MEDICINE

Name KURYLUK: Mr. Peter Case # 71-D.O.A. Age 36 Sex M Necropsy # 71-176

Doctor Willoughby Ward not admitted Pathologist Dr. T.Y. Thay

Date of Admission not admitted Date & Hour of Death Sept. 1/71

Date & Hour of Necropsy Sept. 4/71 Necropsy Hours after Death.

ANATOMICAL DIAGNOSIS

- WATER BOMBER AIRPLANES COLLIDED AT THE SCENE OF A HELICOPTER CRASH.

- RUPTURED DIAPHRAGM, TORN MESENTERY, RUPTURED BOWEL, AORTIC TEAR WITH HEMOTHORAX, AND SUBARACHNOID HEMORRHAGE.

- Water bomber airplane collided at the scene of helicopter crash.
- Multiple fractures of left lower ribs (8,9,10, & 11th) along the lateral clavicular line.
- Tear of thoracic aorta with bilateral hemothorax (left 600 cc. Rt.50 cc.).
- Ruptured left hemidiaphragm with stomach, loops of large and small bowel seen in the left pleural cavity.
- Ruptured loops of large and small bowel with hemorrhage into the peritoneal cavity.
- Torn mesentery.
- Multiple facial bone fractures and left side of mandible.
- Subarachnoid hemorrhage, focal, temporal and d occipital lobes.
- pulmonary congestion and hemorrhage, bilateral, moderate.
- Amputation of right mid humerus.
- Comminuted fractures of both femur, tibia and fibula as well as left humerus, with dislocation of left elow.
- Laceration of scrotum 2 x 3 cm.
- Multiple abrasions, lacerations of the skin of the body, extensive.
- Penetrating wound, right anterior chest wall, close to shoulder 3 x 5 x 4 cm.
- Post mortem autolysis of viscera, mild to moderate.
- Post mortem blood for ethyl alcohol, carbon monoxisde, salicylic acid, barbiturates, alkaloids and other common toxic substances-negative.

SUMMARY

This 36 year old white male was killed when two water bombers collided at the scene of a helicopter crash.

AT AUTOPSY the major findings are as follows:- Aorta tear with hemorrhage into both chest cavities, ruptured bowel and torn mesentery with hemoperitoneum and fecal contamination; ruptured left hemidiaphragm with loops of large and small bowel and stomach herniated intot left pleural cavity. Multiple facial bone fractures with focal subarachnoid hemorrhages and other multiple traumatic injuries.

The c ause of death is attributed to multiple traumatic injuries listed above.

Pathologist: T.Y. Thay

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL

NECROPSY REPORT - Continued

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

A moderately developed white male in mid thirties, B.W. 150 lbs and B.L. 161 cm. Rigor mortis over extremities and livor mortis over the back. Iridies blue, pupils round with the right and left measuring each 0.4 cm. No discharge from external orifices. There are multiple traumatic injuries seen on the body surface:-

Atrasions: Multiple, chin and lower face 2 x2.5 cm.
Transverse, lower anterior chest wall 35 x 5 cm.
Multiple left anterior abdominal wall 6.5 x 10 cm.
Both shoulders and upper arm, multiple.
Multiple both upper thighs.

Lacerations: (involving full thickness of skin).
Transverse, top of scalp , 10 cm.
Triangular shape, Rt. frontal area 10 x 5 x 10 cm.
Oblique, left fronto temporal 9 x 10 cm.
Oblique, left upper eyelid, 5.5 cm.
Oblique outer canthus right eye 2.5 cm.
Transverse chin, 4 cm.
Transverse anterior neck 2 cm.
Multiple oblique lacerations dorsal surface left hand 5.5 x 2.5 cm.
Transverse laceration, anterior surface left knee 26 x 5 cm.
Oblique laceration, scrotum 3 x 2 cm.
Oblique anterior surface rt. upper thigh 22.5 x 4.5 cm.
Oblique anterior suface of right lower leg 2 cm.

Penetrating wound: (to subcutaneous tissue and muscle:)
Rt. anterior chest wall below clavicle and close to right shoulder 3 x 5 x 4 cm.

Amputation:- Traumatic amputation of right upper arm mid humerus. Many of the skin injuries are covered by sand, ash and drit especially those of the face.

INTERNAL EXAMINATION

The body is opened with the usual Y-shaped and intermastoid scalp incision. Subcutaneous fat measures 0.4 cm. around the umbilicus and 1.0 cm. at lower end of abdomen. Subcutaneous fat and red brown musculature slightly dehydrated. The whole stomach, loops of large and small bowel are seen in the chest cavity through the ruptured diaphragm and left side The neck veins are collapsed. The mediastinum shifts to the right side.

CIRCULATORY SYSTEM

Thepericardial cavity; the pericardium is smooth, thin and shiny. The heart weighs 300 gms The left ventricle measures 1.2 cm. and theright measures 0.2 cm. in thicknesss. The valves are unremarkable. The endometrium, myocardium and epicardium are unremarkable. The coronary arteries are patent, throughout and reveals no significant atheromatosis. The pulmomary vesselsare free of abnormal contents. The aorta reveals a small tear measuring 1.5 cm. in length seen in mid thoracic portion and there are some blood clots around it. Otherwise the aorta are unremarkable.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL

NECROPSY REPORT - Continued

RESPIRATORY SYSTEM

The left pleural cavity contained approximately 600 cc. of blood. The right contains 50 cc. of blood. The combined weight of both lungs is about 600 gms. Outer surfaces generally palegrey with slight amount of anthracotic pigment, except on left lower lobe where it is dark red. Consistency generally of fine crepitence and firm over left lower lobe due to congestion. Thelarynx, trachea and bronchi are unremarkable.

DIGESTIVE SYSTEM

There is rupture of left hemidiaphargm and rutpured loops of bowel; large and small. The stomach , some loops of small and large bowel are seen in the left pleural cavity. There are feacal matters scattered in the peritoneal cavity. The mesentery and omentum are also tornin several places. There are about 100 to 150 cc. of blood mixed with fecal material in the peritoneal cavity. The esophagus is unremarkable.The stomach cintaons some mucoid material.The liver weighs approximately 1300 gms..Outer surface is dark green due to putrification. Cut surface is also dark green and soft. The gallbladder, extrahepatic bile duc and ampulla of vater is unremarkable and free of abnormal contents. The pancreas weighs approximately 90 gms. shows some evidenceof autolysis.

ENDOCRINE SYSTEM

Both adrenal glands weighs 7.5 gms. with yellow cortex and red cortex. There is also sign of autolysis.Thyroid gland is red brown and firm. The left testicle is seen outside the scrotal sac due to lacerations of the scrotum.

GENITOURINARY TRACT

Both kidneys weigh approximately 130 gms. and shows sligt signs of autolysis. The pelvis ureters are unremarkable. The urinary ladder is distended with some 150 cc. of watery clear urine. The mucosa is unremarkable. Prostate not enlarged. There is an oblique lacer tion of the scrotum measuring 3 x 2 cm.

HEMATOPOETIC SYSTEM

Spleen weighs 110 gms. and is red brown and soft. Bone marrow deep red.

a
SKELETAL SYSTEM:
Skull: Extensive facial bone fractures involving the right orbit. Fracture of the neck of left mandible.
Chest: Fractures of left lower ribs along the lateral aspect (8,9,10, and 11th).
Humeri: Ampuatation of the right humerus and dislocation of the left elbow.
Femora: Communuted fracture upper third of left femur; fracture of mid shaft of rt. femur
Tibia: Extensive comminuted fracture of tibiae and fibulae.
Pelvis: No lesions seen.

BRAIN:Showed signis of autolysis.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Form 113

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL

NECROPSY REPORT - Continued

Name KURYLUK: Mr. Peter Necropsy # 71-176 Page 4

MICROSCOPICS:

Thyroid: Shows evidence of post mortem change, otherwise unremarkable.

Parathyroid: Unremarkable.

Trachea: Minimal mucosal congestion.

Lungs: Many of the alveolar spaces are filled with R.B.C.s The blood vessels are moderate congested. There is a fair amount of anthracotic pigment seen in the pleural and pulmonar lymphatics. Some of the alveoli are over distended.

Heart: The endocardium, myocardium and epicardium are unremarkable. The coronary artery shows no appreciable atheromatosis.

Aorta: The adventitia is covered by blood. The intima shows no appreciable atheromatosis.

Skin: Shows evidence of subcutaneous hemorrhage and coagulation necrosis.

Scrotum: Shows hemorrhage and congestion.

Liver and Spleen: Unremarkable.

Pancreas: Autolytic change.

Omentum: ;Mesentery: Show evidence of hemorrhage, fecal contamination and autolytic chang

Small and large bowel: Shows fecal material on the serosal surface and post mortem autoly sis.

Testis: Shows x congestion and hemorrhage.

Bone Marrow: Unremarkable.

Brain: Shows focal subarachnoid hemorrhage and congestion of vessels.

Pericardcium. Shows hemorrhage, congestion and focal contamination.

Kidneys_ Shows minimal congestion.

Urinary Bladder: Unmremarkable.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

LAST NAME: KURYLUK MR. PETER 36 — GIVEN NAMES — HOSPITAL NO. — CHART NO. A 530595

ADDRESS: 11519 - 134 St. — ELIGIBLE YES NO — PHONE NUMBER — SEX AND MAR. STAT. — PREVIOUS ADM. — DATE OF ADMISSION: SEPT 4/71

OCCUPATION OF PATIENT — INSURANCE COVERAGE — INS. OPTION — FORMS SIGNED

DATE OF BIRTH: Aug 15-36 | AGE: 35 | TIME OF ADM: 6:15AM | WALKING ☐ | CHRONIC ☐ | STRETCHER ☐ | RELIGION | DOCTOR: HARRISON Wilkinson

GUARANTOR AND RELATIONSHIP TO PATIENT — EMPLOYER OF GUARANTOR — LENGTH EMPLOYED

PROVISIONAL DIAGNOSIS: HELICOPTER CRASH VICTIM DOA FROM FORT SMITH BROUGHT IN FOR AUTOPSY BY PARN MEMORIAL

WCB	FORM COMPLETED	IF WCB STATE HOW AND WHERE ACCIDENT OCCURRED
YES ☐ NO ☐	YES ☐ NO ☐	EG

TREATMENT RECORD

HISTORY AND CLINICAL FINDINGS

FINAL DIAGNOSIS

TREATMENT

Autopsy only.

DISPOSITION: ADMIT ☐ HISTORY ☐ DONE ☐ NOT DONE ☐ DICTATED — DISCHARGE ☐ OTHER ☑ to morgue — TIME DISCHARGED 6 p.m.

NURSES NOTES

VISON CHECK WITH GLASSES		TEMP	PULSE	RESP.	BLOOD PRESSURE
RIGHT EYE /	LEFT EYE /				/

Directly to morgue - body in sealed steel casket - that was Legard.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SIGNATURE R.N.

THE FOLLOWING: ☐ STAFF ☐ INTERN ☐ NAME OF INTERN

ENTER ON PATIENT'S MEDICAL RECORD

PHYSICIAN

000175

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

CALL
MAIL
C.O.D.
DEL.

NAME Regional Supt., Accident Invest. 337316
ADD. Rm. 945 Federal Bldg.
PHO. 423-5327 ORDER CONFIRMED – INITIALED BY CUSTOMER RB

NO. OF ENVELOPES FOR THIS CUSTOMER 1 DATE Sept 7/71 DEPOSIT $ –

CIRCLE AND FILL IN COMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS –

QUANTITY	ITEM	SIZE
2	NEGATIVES OR ROLLS OR SLIDES	116 (120) 126 127 135 828 616 620 8 MM. 16 MM.

ENCLOSED IS – KODACOLOR • EKTACHROME • ANSCOCHROME
KODACHROME • BLACK/WHITE • OTHER - TRI-EX.

DEVELOP ONLY ☐ DEVELOP & MOUNT FOR SLIDES ☐
FINISH 2 PRINTS OF EA. FINISH _____ DUPLICATE SLIDES OF EA.
OR, AS MARKED INSIDE ☐

REMARKS – 2 prints of ea please. Thanks Eb.

WESTERN BUSINESS FORMS LIMITED

SHIPLEY PHOTO SERVICE

DJD HTN & IDS

358
288

TOTAL PRICE 6.46

ALL COLOR • BLACK-&-WHITE FILMS and FINISHING

1/2

REGIONAL SUPERINTENDENT (INST.
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION,
ROOM 945, FEDERAL BLDG.,
EDMONTON, ALBERTA.

1/2

1/2

CAMERAS • BULBS

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*




Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

CF-HTN & CF-IDS W1801 W1802



General view of area.

1. Indicates severed wing panels of the two Canso aircraft. The left or northerly speck is the CF-HTN panel.

2. The burned out hulk of CF-IDS which appeared to have gone straight in and burned. The white smoke in the top centre of the picture is the still burning area which was being fire bombed.

3. The wreckage of CF-HTN which did not catch fire.

4. The point of impact of the helicopter CF-OKV which CF-HTN had been circling and toward which they appear to have been moving for a low pass.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

B U F F A L O

P A R K

CF-HTN W1801


CF-IDS W1802

CF-OKV W1069

CRASH LOCATIONS

60° 32' 30" N 113° 07' 30" W

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS



See "Index to Maps Available" for sheets published.

The general public may obtain copies of this map from the Map Distribution Office Dept. of Mines and Technical Surveys, Ottawa, at 25 cents per copy.

BEAR CREEK

DISTRICT OF MACKENZIE N.W.T.

85 A/11 EAST HALF

FIRST EDITION
(PRELIMINARY)

Scale 1:50,000

1 0 1 2 3 Miles


1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Metres

1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Yards


MAGNETIC DECLINATION 31°21' EAST AT CENTRE OF SHEET 1953.
Annual magnetic change 8' westerly.

000195

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

B U F F A L O

P A R K

CF-HTN W1801


CF-IDS W1802

CF-OKV W1069

CRASH LOCATIONS

60° 32' 30" N 113° 07' 30" W

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS



See "Index to Maps Available" for sheets published.

The general public may obtain copies of this map from the Map Distribution Office Dept. of Mines and Technical Surveys, Ottawa. at 25 cents per copy.

BEAR CREEK

DISTRICT OF MACKENZIE N.W.T.

85 A/11 EAST HALF

FIRST EDITION
(PRELIMINARY)

Scale 1:50,000

3 Miles


4000 Metres

4000 Yards

MAGNETIC DECLINATION 31°21' EAST
AT CENTRE OF SHEET 1953.
Annual magnetic change 8' westerly.

000198

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Henry Calumet
Fort Resolution

I am a firefighter and I have been on fire 6 most of the summer.

I didn't see the helicopter crash but I heard a motor race up. I went to the helicopter and across the prairie. We pulled the pilot back. He was lying about 4 feet away from the helicopter. He didn't say anything about what had happened.

I saw a bomber circle overhead but I don't know which direction. I wasn't paying much attention. The other one was coming also. The second one dropped water. After dropping water he pulled up. The other one was coming toward us. I saw a wing or something fall off. One blew up & hit the ground first. The other one just turned and went down & I heard it crash. We ran to the one that didn't burn. There was no sign of life at it.

Henry Calumet

Witnessed by
D Lamothe
12 Sept 71

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ENGINE(S) MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.	NUMBER INSTALLED
Pratt + Whitney	R-1830-92	65359 & 323354	Two

TYPE: SUPERCHARGED PISTON ☐ PISTON ☒ TURBO-COMPOUND ☐ JET TURBINE WITH AFTERBURNER ☐ TURBO PROP ☐ JET TURBINE ☐ OTHER ☐ IF OTHER SPECIFY

POWER: 1100 RATED H.P. ____ RATED THRUST

PROPELLER(S) MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.
Hamilton Standard	23E50-473	RRE-7480 RRC-3636

TYPE: FIXED WOODEN ☐ FIXED METAL ☐ VARIABLE PITCH ☐ CONSTANT SPEED ☒ CONSTANT SPEED FULLY FEATHERING ☒

SUB-TYPE: REVERSIBLE ☐ NOT REVERSIBLE ☒

ENVIRONMENT IDENTIFICATION (1)

OPERATION

SCOPE THIS FLIGHT: INTERNATIONAL ☐ DOMESTIC ☒ NOT KNOWN ☐

LOAD DESCRIPTION: NONE ☒ PASSENGERS ☐ PARACHUTIST ☐ FREIGHT/EXPRESS ☐ CARGO/PASSENGERS ☐ WATER/CHEMICAL ☐ PESTICIDES ☐ POLES/TOWERS ☐ FISH/FISH EGGS ☐ PHOTO EQUIPMENT ☐ FERTILIZER ☐ SIGN/DROGUE ☐ GLIDER ☐ OTHER ☐ IF OTHER SPECIFY:

LOAD POSITION: INTERNAL ☐ EXTERNAL ☐ N/A. ☒

OBJECTIVE (2)

ADVERTISING ☐ CONTROL ☐ DEMONSTRATION ☐ FIRE CONTROL ☒ HOISTING ☐ INSPECTION ☐
TRANSPORTATION ☐ SURVEY ☐ SPRAY/DUST/SEEDING ☐ SEARCH ☐ RECREATION ☐ TESTING ☐ SPECIFY:
TOWING ☐ TRAINING ☐ FERRYING ☐ POSITIONING ☐ OTHER ☐

PRELIMINARY VERSION OF ACCIDENT (3)

PROVIDE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT AND NARRATE AS MANY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT AS ARE KNOWN AT THIS TIME, BEGINNING WITH THE FIRST IRREGULARITY OF THE FLIGHT.

CF-HTN was involved in a collision with Canso CF-IDS. CF-HTN was circling to the right over a helicopter CF-OKV, which had crashed 30-45 minutes earlier. CF-IDS had completed dropping a load of water on a fire just prior to the collision.

PRELIMINARY POST-OCCURRENCE DATA

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: NONE ☐ MINOR ☐ SUBSTANTIAL ☐ DESTROYED ☒ UNKNOWN ☐

NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

	KILLED	SERIOUS INJURY	MINOR INJURY	UNINJURED
PILOT-IN-COMMAND	1			
OTHER CREW	1			
PASSENGERS				
PERSONS OUTSIDE AIRCRAFT				

INVESTIGATION: BY CIVIL AVIATION INSPECTOR(S) ONLY ☐ BY CIVIL AVIATION AND AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTORS ☒ BY AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTOR(S) ONLY ☐ BY CORRESPONDENCE ☐ D.N.H.W. ASSISTANCE ☐ TECHNICAL/METALLURGICAL EXAM. ☐

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

Typed 3 copies to Ottawa

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION DIVISION

REGIONAL REF. W1801 + W1802
H.Q. REF. 500
AIRCRAFT REG. CF-IDS

REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO AN AIRCRAFT

(1) ACCIDENT ☒ DISAPPEARANCE ☐ INCIDENT ☐
NEAR MISS ☐ OTHER ☐

FOR INSTRUCTIONS SEE REVERSE SIDE OF EACH PAGE

AT (Name of nearest gazetted place): 60 miles north west of Fort Smith		PROVINCE: N.W.T.
GEOGRAPHIC CO-ORDINATES: 60°35'N, 113°16'W	DATE: DAY 1 MONTH Sept YEAR 1971	TIME (Standard Time Local): 1445 MST

REGION: PACIFIC ☐ WESTERN ☒ CENTRAL ☐ ONTARIO ☐ QUEBEC ☐ ATLANTIC ☐

PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION (2)

OWNER
NAME: North Canada Air Ltd.
ADDRESS: P.O. Box 850, Prince Albert, Sask.

OPERATOR
NAME: SAME AS OWNER ☒ OR
ADDRESS:
ATC LICENCE NUMBER: 291/47 (C)
H.Q. USE OPER. CODE:
STATUS RESPECTIVE TO THIS AIRCRAFT: UNKNOWN ☐ OWNER ☒ RENTER ☐ LESSEE ☐

A.T.C. LICENCE CLASSIFICATION THIS FLIGHT
NONE ☐ 4 ☐ 7 RF ☐ 7 AAD ☐ 7 AAM ☐
1 ☐ 5 ☐ 7 FT ☐ 7 AIRA ☐ 8 ☐
2 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 AP ☐ 7 AC ☒ 9 ☐
3 ☐ 7 APS ☐ 7 A CONST. ☐

PILOT IN COMMAND
NAME: SAME AS OWNER ☐ OPERATOR ☐ OR
William Koshylanyk
ADDRESS: Suite 4 501 28 St. West, Prince Albert, Saskatchewan
LICENCE NUMBER: WGA-1163

STATUS IF NOT OWNER OR OPERATOR:
UNAUTHORIZED USER ☐ EMPLOYEE ☒
RENTER ☐ BORROWER ☐
CLUB MEMBER ☐ OTHER ☐
SPECIFY:

OTHER CREW ON BOARD (3)
NONE ☐ THIRD PILOT ☐ FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐ FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐ NO. OF CABIN ATTENDANT(S):
SECOND PILOT ☒ NAVIGATOR ☐ CREWMAN ☐ TECHNICIAN ☐

PASSENGERS NUMBER ON BOARD: Nil

MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION

Serial # 11629

AIRCRAFT	REGISTRATION	MAKE	MODEL	TOTAL HRS.	MAXIMUM CERT. TAKE-OFF WEIGHT	YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
	CF-IDS	Consolidated	285ACF	10,765+	30,500lbs	1942

CATEGORY
AEROPLANE ☒ GLIDER ☐ VTOL ☐
HELICOPTER ☐ GYRO COPTER ☐ GYRO GLIDER ☐
DIRIGIBLE ☐ FREE BALLOON ☐ OTHER ☐
IF OTHER SPECIFY:
HOME BUILT YES ☐ NO ☒
ULTRA LIGHT YES ☐ NO ☒

LANDING GEAR
AMPHIBIOUS (HULL) ☒ FLOATS ☐
RETRACTABLE WHEELS ☐ FIXED WHEELS ☐
SKI-WHEEL ☐ WHEEL FLOATS ☐
HULL ☐ SKIDS ☐
SKIS ☐ FLOAT-SKID ☐
OTHER ☐ IF OTHER SPECIFY

LANDING GEAR CONFIGURATION
TRICYCLE ☒ OTHER ☐
TAIL WHEEL ☐

WING/ROTOR
LOW-WING ☐ BI-PLANE ☐
HIGH-WING ☒ MID-WING ☐
SINGLE-ROTOR ☐ TWIN-ROTOR ☐
OTHER ☐

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
NONE ☐ TOWING GEAR ☐
AMBULANCE ☐ AIR-DROP (CARGO) ☐
AIR-DROP (PARACHUTIST) ☐ PHOTO ☐
MAGNETOMETER ☐ SLING/HOIST ☐
WATER BOMBING ☒ SPRAY DUST ☐
MONSOON GEAR ☐ OTHER ☐
IF OTHER SPECIFY:

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ENGINE(S) MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.	NUMBER INSTALLED
Pratt and Whitney	R 1830-92	A 81137 & 363858	Two

TYPE: SUPERCHARGED PISTON ☐ | PISTON ☒ | TURBO-COMPOUND ☐ | JET TURBINE WITH AFTERBURNER ☐ | TURBO PROP ☐ | JET TURBINE ☐ | OTHER ☐ IF OTHER SPECIFY

POWER: 1100 RATED H.P. | RATED THRUST

PROPELLER(S) MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.
Hamilton Standard	23 E50-473	AP 306 & 76098

TYPE: FIXED WOODEN ☐ | FIXED METAL ☐ | VARIABLE PITCH ☐ | CONSTANT SPEED ☒ | CONSTANT SPEED FULLY FEATHERING ☒

SUB-TYPE: REVERSIBLE ☐ | NOT REVERSIBLE ☒

ENVIRONMENT IDENTIFICATION (1)

OPERATION

SCOPE THIS FLIGHT: INTERNATIONAL ☐ | DOMESTIC ☒ | NOT KNOWN ☐

LOAD DESCRIPTION: NONE ☒ | FREIGHT/EXPRESS ☐ | PESTICIDES ☐ | PHOTO EQUIPMENT ☐ | SIGN/DROGUE ☐ | PASSENGERS ☐ | CARGO/PASSENGERS ☐ | POLES/TOWERS ☐ | FERTILIZER ☐ | GLIDER ☐ | PARACHUTIST ☐ | WATER/CHEMICAL ☐ | FISH/FISH EGGS ☐ | OTHER ☐ | IF OTHER SPECIFY:

LOAD POSITION: INTERNAL ☐ | EXTERNAL ☐ | N/A. ☐

OBJECTIVE (2): ADVERTISING ☐ | CONTROL ☐ | DEMONSTRATION ☐ | FIRE CONTROL ☒ | HOISTING ☐ | INSPECTION ☐ | TRANSPORTATION ☐ | SURVEY ☐ | SPRAY/DUST/SEEDING ☐ | SEARCH ☐ | RECREATION ☐ | TESTING ☐ | TOWING ☐ | TRAINING ☐ | FERRYING ☐ | POSITIONING ☐ | OTHER ☐ | SPECIFY:

PRELIMINARY VERSION OF ACCIDENT (3)

PROVIDE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT AND NARRATE AS MANY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT AS ARE KNOWN AT THIS TIME, BEGINNING WITH THE FIRST IRREGULARITY OF THE FLIGHT.

The aircraft collided with Canso CF-HTN. CF-IDS had just dropped a load of water on a forest fire. CF-HTN was turning right in the vicinity of a crashed helicopter. The right outer span of CF-IDS and the left outer span of CF-HTN were severed from their respective aircraft and the aircraft fell out of control to the ground.

PRELIMINARY POST-OCCURRENCE DATA

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: NONE ☐ | MINOR ☐ | SUBSTANTIAL ☐ | DESTROYED ☒ | UNKNOWN ☐

NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

	KILLED	SERIOUS INJURY	MINOR INJURY	UNINJURED
PILOT-IN-COMMAND	1			
OTHER CREW	1			
PASSENGERS				
PERSONS OUTSIDE AIRCRAFT				

INVESTIGATION: BY CIVIL AVIATION INSPECTOR(S) ONLY ☐ | BY CIVIL AVIATION AND AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTORS ☒ | BY AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTOR(S) ONLY ☐ | BY CORRESPONDENCE ☐ | D.N.H.W. ASSISTANCE ☐ | TECHNICAL/METALLURGICAL EXAM. ☐

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

1 Sept 71

FS 30 Φ E80 ⊕ 120 ⊕ 15 69 53 09 10 29.32
Cu1 Ac6 Ac2

FR 30 Φ 50 Φ 120 - ⊕ E220 ⊕ 15 74 52 03 15
29.37 CuF1 SCu3 Acu1 Cu1

HY -X80 Φ E 10 ⊕ 12 63 56 07 13 29 38
K1 Acu 4 ACu 4

000204

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS - CREW

(1) AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION: CF-HTN

PERSONAL DATA-QUALIFICATIONS

COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER. (2)

CREW MEMBER

PILOT-IN-COMMAND [X] | 2ND PILOT [ ]
3RD PILOT [ ] | FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ]
NAVIGATOR [ ] | CREWMAN [ ]
CABIN ATTENDANT [ ] | FLIGHT OBSERVER [ ]
OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

STATION OCCUPIED

NOT KNOWN [ ] | PILOT SEAT [X]
SECOND IN COMMAND SEAT [ ] | FLIGHT ENGINEER SEAT [ ]
NAVIGATOR SEAT [ ] | REST POSITION [ ]
PASSENGER CABIN [ ] | OTHER [ ]
SPECIFY:

SPECIAL FUNCTION

NONE [X] | INSTRUCTOR [ ]
COMPANY EXAMINER [ ] | D.O.T. EXAMINER [ ]
TECHNICIAN [ ] | STUDENT [ ]
OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

PERSONAL DATA

AGE	SEX	SURNAME	INITIALS	LICENCE NUMBER
43	Male	Hales	G.F.	XDA-1070

LICENCES AND PERMITS HELD

CANADIAN [X] | FOREIGN [ ]
NONE [ ]
UNKNOWN [ ] | AIRLINE TRANSPORT [X]
SENIOR COMMERCIAL [ ] | COMMERCIAL [ ]
PRIVATE [ ] | STUDENT PERMIT [ ]
FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ] | NAVIGATOR [ ]
GLIDER [ ] | GYROPLANE [ ]
BALLOON [ ] | MAINTENANCE ENGINEER [ ]

AIRCRAFT CLASSIFICATIONS

HELICOPTER ONLY [ ]
SINGLE-ENGINE LAND [ ] | SINGLE-ENGINE SEA [ ]
S.E. LAND AND SEA [ ] | S. & MULTI ENGINE LAND [ ]
S. & MULTI ENGINE SEA [ ] | S. & M.E. LAND AND SEA [X]

AIRCRAFT TYPE ENDORSEMENTS

HELICOPTER [ ] | GYROPLANE [ ]
PBY5A, C-46

RATINGS

NONE [ ]
INSTRUCTOR CL 1 [ ]
INSTRUCTOR CL 2 [ ]
INSTRUCTOR CL 3 [ ]
INSTRUMENT 1 [X] Expired
INSTRUMENT 2 [ ]
BLOCK AIRSPACE [ ]
NIGHT [ ]

EXPERIENCE - FLYING TIME (To nearest hour - if unknown complete with X)

	ALL TYPES	THIS TYPE	DUAL ON THIS TYPE	THIS U/C CONFIGURATION	SINGLE ENGINE	MULTI ENGINE	ACTUAL INSTRUMENT	NIGHT	NIGHT X-COUNTRY	ROTOR-CRAFT
TOTAL HOURS	7908	961	2:00	961	2882	5026	290	140	130	Nil
HRS. LAST 90 DAYS	245	245	Nil	245	Nil	245	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil

FATIGUE FACTORS

FLYING TIME	TOTAL LAST 3 DAYS	TOTAL THIS FLIGHT	HOURS AWAKE SINCE LAST REST PERIOD
	Approx 2 HRS.	Approx 2 HRS.	Approx. 8 HRS.

PILOT FLIGHT PREPARATION

COMPLETE ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

WEATHER BRIEFING

ACCREDITED BRIEFER [ ]
NONE [X] | COMPANY FACILITY [ ]
UNKNOWN [ ] | OTHER PILOT [ ]
ACCREDITED FORECASTER [ ] | OTHER OBSERVER [ ]
SELF BRIEFING [ ]

OTHER BRIEFINGS

NONE [X]
UNKNOWN [ ] | ROUTE [ ]
DEPARTURE PROCEDURES [ ] | OPERATION [ ]
ARRIVAL PROCEDURES [ ] | NOTAMS [ ]

DOCUMENTS CARRIED

NONE [ ]
COCKPIT CHECK LIST [ ] | FLIGHT OR OPERATING MANUAL [ ]
ADEQUATE VFR [X] | INADEQUATE VFR [ ]
ADEQUATE IFR [ ] | INADEQUATE IFR [ ]

FLIGHT PLAN FILED

NONE [ ] | SVFR [ ]
IFR [ ] | CONTROLLED VFR [ ]
VFR [ ] | FLIGHT NOTIFICATION [X]

EXECUTION OF FLIGHT TO START OF OCCURRENCE

ADHERENCE TO PLAN

NO DEVIATION [ ]
ALTERATION FOR WX [ ]
ALTERATION FOR TRAFFIC [ ]
BECAME LOST [ ]
ALTERATION FOR U/S [ ]
OTHER [X]
SPECIFY: Deviation for helicopter crash

PHASE OF FLIGHT DURING WHICH FIRST IRREGULARITY OCCURRED

GROUND

START-UP [ ] | MOORING [ ]
STATIONARY [ ] | DOCKING [ ]
TAXIING [ ] | RAMPING (AMPHIBIOUS) [ ]
AIR-TAXIING [ ] | SHUT DOWN [ ]
STEP-TAXIING [ ] | PARKING [ ]
BEACHING [ ]

TAKEOFF

LINE-UP [ ]
RUN [ ]
LIFTOFF [ ]
HOVER [ ]

IN-FLIGHT

CLIMB [ ]
DESCENT [ ]
CRUISE [ ]
LEVEL TURN [X]
CLIMBING TURN [ ]
DESCENDING TURN [ ]
TRANSLATION [ ]
HOVER [ ]

LANDING

INITIAL APPROACH [ ]
FINAL APPROACH [ ]
FLARE [ ]
HOVER [ ]
TOUCH-DOWN [ ]
RUN-OUT [ ]
TURN-OFF [ ]

OTHER

LOAD-PICKUP [ ]
LOAD DROP [ ]
LOAD POSITIONING [ ]

NAVIGATION AND APPROACH AIDS

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE [ ]

AIDS AVAILABLE	V.H.F. D.F.	DME	VOR	TACAN	ILS	ASR	PAR	ADF	LORAN	L.F. RNG	NONE
IN AIRCRAFT			X					X		X	
ON GROUND											
IN USE BY A/C AT TIME OF OC.											

000205

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS - CREW

(1) AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION: CF-HTN

PERSONAL DATA-QUALIFICATIONS

COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER. (2)

CREW MEMBER

PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐ | 2ND PILOT ☒
3RD PILOT ☐ | FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐
NAVIGATOR ☐ | CREWMAN ☐
CABIN ATTENDANT ☐ | FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐
OTHER ☐ SPECIFY:

STATION OCCUPIED

NOT KNOWN ☐ | PILOT SEAT ☐
SECOND IN COMMAND SEAT ☒ | FLIGHT ENGINEER SEAT ☐
NAVIGATOR SEAT ☐ | REST POSITION ☐
PASSENGER CABIN ☐ | OTHER ☐
SPECIFY:

SPECIAL FUNCTION

NONE ☒ | INSTRUCTOR ☐
COMPANY EXAMINER ☐ | D.O.T. EXAMINER ☐
TECHNICIAN ☐ | STUDENT ☐
OTHER ☐ SPECIFY:

PERSONAL DATA

AGE	SEX	SURNAME	INITIALS	LICENCE NUMBER
35	Male	Kuryluk	P.	XDS-797

LICENCES AND PERMITS HELD

CANADIAN ☒ | FOREIGN ☐
NONE ☐

UNKNOWN ☐ | AIRLINE TRANSPORT ☐
SENIOR COMMERCIAL ☒ | COMMERCIAL ☐
PRIVATE ☐ | STUDENT PERMIT ☐
FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐ | NAVIGATOR ☐
GLIDER ☐ | GYROPLANE ☐
BALLOON ☐ | MAINTENANCE ENGINEER ☐

AIRCRAFT CLASSIFICATIONS

HELICOPTER ONLY ☐
SINGLE-ENGINE LAND ☐ | SINGLE-ENGINE SEA ☐
S.E. LAND AND SEA ☐ | S. & MULTI ENGINE LAND ☐
S. & MULTI ENGINE SEA ☐ | S. & M.E. LAND AND SEA ☒

AIRCRAFT TYPE ENDORSEMENTS

HELICOPTER ☐ | GYROPLANE ☐
B-25

RATINGS

NONE ☐
INSTRUCTOR CL 1 ☐
INSTRUCTOR CL 2 ☒
INSTRUCTOR CL 3 ☐
INSTRUMENT 1 ☐
INSTRUMENT 2 ☐
BLOCK AIRSPACE ☐
NIGHT ☒

EXPERIENCE – FLYING TIME (To nearest hour - if unknown complete with X)

	ALL TYPES	THIS TYPE	DUAL ON THIS TYPE	THIS U/C CONFIGURATION	SINGLE ENGINE	MULTI ENGINE	ACTUAL INSTRUMENT	NIGHT	NIGHT X-COUNTRY	ROTOR-CRAFT
TOTAL HOURS	6100+	59	Nil	59	4938	1162+	10+	118+	115+	Nil
HRS. LAST 90 DAYS	119	59	Nil	59	Nil	119	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil

FATIGUE FACTORS

FLYING TIME	TOTAL LAST 3 DAYS	TOTAL THIS FLIGHT	HOURS AWAKE SINCE LAST REST PERIOD
	Approx 2 HRS.	Approx 2 HRS.	Approx 8 HRS.

PILOT FLIGHT PREPARATION COMPLETE ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

WEATHER BRIEFING

ACCREDITED BRIEFER ☐
NONE ☒ | COMPANY FACILITY ☐
UNKNOWN ☐ | OTHER PILOT ☐
ACCREDITED FORECASTER ☐ | OTHER OBSERVER ☐
SELF BRIEFING ☐

OTHER BRIEFINGS

NONE ☒
UNKNOWN ☐ | ROUTE ☐
DEPARTURE PROCEDURES ☐ | OPERATION ☐
ARRIVAL PROCEDURES ☐ | NOTAMS ☐

DOCUMENTS CARRIED

NONE ☐
COCKPIT CHECK LIST ☐ | FLIGHT OR OPERATING MANUAL ☐
ADEQUATE VFR ☒ | INADEQUATE VFR ☐
ADEQUATE IFR ☐ | INADEQUATE IFR ☐

FLIGHT PLAN FILED

NONE ☐ | SVFR ☐
IFR ☐ | CONTROLLED VFR ☐
VFR ☐ | FLIGHT NOTIFICATION ☒

EXECUTION OF FLIGHT TO START OF OCCURRENCE

ADHERENCE TO PLAN

NO DEVIATION ☐
ALTERATION FOR WX ☐
ALTERATION FOR TRAFFIC ☐
BECAME LOST ☐
ALTERATION FOR U/S ☐
OTHER ☐ SPECIFY: Deviation Turn due helicopter crash

PHASE OF FLIGHT DURING WHICH FIRST IRREGULARITY OCCURRED

GROUND

START-UP ☐ | MOORING ☐
STATIONARY ☐ | DOCKING ☐
TAXIING ☐ | RAMPING (AMPHIBIOUS) ☐
AIR-TAXIING ☐ | SHUT DOWN ☐
STEP-TAXIING ☐ | PARKING ☐
BEACHING ☐

TAKEOFF

LINE-UP ☐
RUN ☐
LIFTOFF ☐
HOVER ☐

IN-FLIGHT

CLIMB ☐
DESCENT ☐
CRUISE ☐
LEVEL TURN ☒
CLIMBING TURN ☐
DESCENDING TURN ☐
TRANSLATION ☐
HOVER ☐

LANDING

INITIAL APPROACH ☐
FINAL APPROACH ☐
FLARE ☐
HOVER ☐
TOUCH-DOWN ☐
RUN-OUT ☐
TURN-OFF ☐

OTHER

LOAD-PICKUP ☐
LOAD DROP ☐
LOAD POSITIONING ☐

NAVIGATION AND APPROACH AIDS

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: ADEQUATE ☒ INADEQUATE ☐

AIDS AVAILABLE	V.H.F. D.F.	DME	VOR	TACAN	ILS	ASR	PAR	ADF	LORAN	L.F. RNG	NONE
IN AIRCRAFT			X					X		X	
ON GROUND											
IN USE BY A/C AT TIME OF OC.											X

000206

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS

MATERIAL (1)

DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM CONDITIONS Condition A B S U A – NOT DETERMINED S – SERVICEABLE B – NOT INSTALLED U – UNSERVICEABLE	FUNCTION AFFECTED	COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM CAUSING PROBLEM	NATURE OF COMPONENT SUB-SYSTEM FAILURE
S – CANOPY WINDSCREEN			
S – DE-ICING-AIRFRAME			
S – ELECTRICAL SYSTEM - UP TO CONSUMER DEVICE			
S – EMPENNAGE - FIXED SURFACES			
S – ENGINES, ANCILLARIES AND CONTROLS			
S – FLIGHT CONTROLS			
S – FLAPS-SPOILERS-DIVEBRAKES AND CONTROLS			
S – FLUIDS AND GASES			
S – FUEL SYSTEM-UP TO MIXTURE CONTROL DEVICE			
S – FUSELAGE-STRUCTURE SKIN			
S – HYDRAULIC SYSTEM & ALL HYDRAULIC DEVICES			
S – INSTRUMENTS, FLIGHT DATA; DETECTORS, CIRCUITS			
S – INSTRUMENTS, SYSTEMS DATA; DETECTORS, ETC.			
B – LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM; OXYGEN-CABIN PRESS			
A – LIGHTING-INTERNAL/EXTERNAL			
S – PANELS/DOORS/WINDOWS/HATCHES/HOUSINGS			
S – PROPELLER(S) AND CONTROLS			
S – RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM			
A – RADIO NAVIGATION SYSTEM-AURAL, VIS, AUTO.			
B – MAIN ROTOR-BLADES, STRUCTURE, DRIVETRAIN			
B – TAIL ROTOR-BLADES, STRUCTURE, DRIVETRAIN			
S – LANDING GEAR, WHEELS, TIRES, BRAKES, STRUC.			
S – WARNING SYSTEMS-VISUAL, AURAL			
S – WING-STRUCTURE, SKIN			
B – AUTO PILOT			

BASIC DATA (2)

PRE-OCCURRENCE

I.A.S. Approx. 85 KTS | FUEL ON BOARD Approx 300 IMP. GALS. | CALCULATED A.U.W. 22,902 LBS | MIXTURE RICH ☒ LEAN ☐ AUTO ☐ | CARB. HEAT POSITION HOT ☐ PARTIAL ☐ COLD ☒

C OF G POSITION _____ % MAC OR 244.4 INS AFT OF DATUM ☒ FORWARD OF DATUM ☐

C OF G PERMISSIBLE RANGE _____ % MAC TO _____ % MAC OR 242.3 INS TO 251.5 INS AFT OF DATUM ☒ FORWARD OF DATUM ☐

AT GROUND CONTACT

I.A.S. Approx 90 KTS | POWER SETTING NONE ☐ PARTIAL ☒ ASYMMETRIC ☐ FULL ☐ | LANDING GEAR POS'N UNLOCKED ☐ UP ☒ FIXED GEAR ☐ DOWN ☐ | FLAP POSITION NO FLAPS ☐ UP ☒ PARTIAL ☐ DOWN ☐

23-0003 (8-69)

000207

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS (1)

AT POINT OF FIRST IRREGULARITY OF FLIGHT IF APPLICABLE (2)

AIRCRAFT CONDITIONS
HEIGHT AGL ____ FT
TERRAIN ELEVATION ____ FT. ASL

CLOUD NONE ☐ UNKNOWN ☐

	HT. AGL	HT. ASL	VERTICAL EXTENT	AMOUNT
LOWEST LAYER	FT	FT	FT	/10
SECOND LAYER	FT	FT	FT	/10

VISIBILITY
AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT ____ MILES
RESTRICTING PHENOMENA: NONE ☐ SMOKE ☐ CLOUD ☐ BLOWING DUST ☐ BLOWING SNOW ☐ FOG ☐ HAZE ☐ PRECIPITATION ☐ BLOWING SAND ☐ ICE CRYSTALS ☐

PRECIPITATION
NONE ☐ RAIN ☐ DRIZZLE ☐ SNOW ☐ FREEZING DRIZZLE ☐ HAIL ☐ FREEZING RAIN ☐
LIGHT ☐ MODERATE ☐ HEAVY ☐

TEMPERATURE AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT
°F
°C

WIND UNKNOWN ☐
AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT
DIRECTION °TRUE
SPEED KTS

ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY
NONE ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ STATIC ☐ ST. ELMOS FIRE ☐ VIOLENT DISCHARGE ☐

SPECIAL HAZARDS
NONE ☐ BIRDS ☐ PARACHUTIST ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ AIRFRAME ICING ☐ TURBULENCE ☐ TALL STRUCTURE ☐ WHITE OUT ☐ AIR TRAFFIC ☐ HOAR FROST ☐ GLASSY WATER ☐ OTHER ☐
SPECIFY:

IN AREA WHERE AIRCRAFT CAME TO REST (3)

CLOUD NONE ☒ UNKNOWN ☐ — Middle + high cloud only.

	BASE HT.	TOP HT.	AMOUNT
LOWEST BASE	FT AGL	FT AGL	SCATTERED ☐ BROKEN ☐ OVERCAST ☐
SECOND LAYER	FT AGL	FT AGL	SCATTERED ☐ BROKEN ☐ OVERCAST ☐

VISIBILITY
AT SURFACE 15 MILES RVR ____ FT.
RESTRICTING PHENOMENA: NONE ☒ CLOUD ☐ BLOWING DUST ☐ HAZE ☐ PRECIPITATION ☐ BLOWING SAND ☐ FOG ☐ ICE CRYSTALS ☐ BLOWING SNOW ☐ SMOKE ☐
Some smoke but not restricting.

PRECIPITATION
NONE ☒ RAIN ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ FREEZING RAIN ☐ DRIZZLE ☐ SNOW ☐ FREEZING DRIZZLE ☐ HAIL ☐

TEMPERATURE AT GROUND LEVEL -70 °F. UNKNOWN ☐
DEW POINT AT GROUND LEVEL Approx -52 °F. UNKNOWN ☐

WIND AT GROUND LEVEL UNKNOWN ☐
DIRECTION North easterly °MAGNETIC
SPEED 10 - 15 M.P.H.
CHARACTERISTICS: STEADY ☒ SWINGING ☐ GUSTY ☐ UPWARD COMPONENT ☐ SUBSIDENCE ☐

SPECIAL HAZARDS
NONE ☒ UNKNOWN ☐ HOAR FROST ☐ BIRDS ☐ TURBULENCE ☐ SUN GLARE ☐
WIND SHEAR ☐ AIRFRAME ICING ☐ AIR TRAFFIC ☐ WHITE OUT ☐ GLASSY WATER ☐ OTHER ☐ DESCRIBE:

WEATHER DATA SOURCE
EYEWITNESS ☒ PILOT ☐ MET. OBSERVATIONS ☒ AFTERCAST ☐

LOCALE DESCRIPTION
GENERAL: MOUNTAINS ☐ HILLS ☐ ROLLING ☐ FLAT ☒
SPECIFIC: AERODROME ☐ CLEARING ☒ URBAN AREA ☐ ROAD ☐ SWAMP/MUSKEG ☐ TIDAL WATER ☐ RIVER ☐ BUSH ☐ LAKE ☐

OBSTRUCTIONS TO APPROACH/DEPARTURE N/A
NONE ☐ TREE(S) ☐ POLELINE ☐ HIGH GROUND ☐ TOWER(S) ☐ BUILDINGS ☐

SURFACE
GENERAL: PAVED ☐ SAND/GRAVEL ☐ SOIL ☒ SNOW ☐ ICE ☐ WATER ☐ ROCK ☐
SPECIFIC: CONCRETE ☐ ASPHALT ☐ COMPACTED ☒ LOOSE ☐ LOW VEGETATION/GRASS ☐ HIGH WAVES ☐ SWELLS ☐
HAZARDS: N/A — NONE ☐ WATER FILM ☐ PUDDLES ☐ ICE PATCHES ☐ SLUSH ☐ SOFT ☐ ROUGH ☐ SNOW DRIFTS ☐
OBSTRUCTIONS TO T.O./LDG. RUN: N/A — NONE ☐ VEHICLES ☐ DITCHES/HOLES ☐ ANIMALS ☐ ROCKS/DEBRIS ☐ PEDESTRIANS ☐ RIDGES/SANDBARS ☐ SNOW BANK ☐ POSTS/FENCES ☐ OTHER ☐
SPECIFY:
VITAL DATA: USABLE LENGTH FT; USABLE WIDTH FT; ELEVATION FT; BRAKING ACTION NIL ☐ POOR ☐ FAIR ☐ GOOD ☐ N/A
RUNWAY PROFILE: LEVEL ☒ UP ☐ DOWN ☐
AVERAGE SLOPE IN DEGREES: UP ____ DN ____ UP ____ DN ____
LIGHT CONDITIONS: BRIGHT DAY ☒ DARK DAY ☐ BRIGHT NIGHT ☐ DARK NIGHT ☐ TWILIGHT ☐ UNKN ☐

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

(R)

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER										
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☒	2ND PILOT ☐	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐	
COLD/ CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/ TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
OTHER:	
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
22 June 1971	Edmonton	Brand 4061 – 124

MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	SPECIFY
1-1-1-1	Nil	YES ☐ NO ☐	

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

N/A

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

000209

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Gordon Hall

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER									
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐	2ND PILOT ☐	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS — NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3) — ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐	
COLD/CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
	OTHER:
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER	
MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	YES ☐ NO ☐ SPECIFY

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

Compound fracture of both ankles, fractured sternum, open fracture of left humerus, fractured middle fossa of base of skull, fractured pelvis + ruptured bladder, tear of left atrium and ventricle of the heart, ruptured liver. The injuries were consistent with his being in the left hand seat but not controlling the aircraft at the moment of the crash ~~when the aeroplane rolled to the right~~. The fractures of pelvis + skull were associated with force applied to the lower spine. Drugs found on him appeared to be tandearil (against arthritic pain), 292 (against pain), amphetamine (probably being used to control appetite for slimming), but there was no evidence that he was incapacitated at the time of the crash.

000210

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER										
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐	2ND PILOT ☒	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐	
COLD/ CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/ TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
OTHER:	
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
12 July 1971	Edmonton	McAllister 4455-124

MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	SPECIFY
1-1-1-1	Nil	YES ☐ NO ☐	

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

000211

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Peter Kuryluk

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER									
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐	2ND PILOT ☐	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS — NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3) — ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐	
COLD/CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
OTHER:	
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER	
MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	YES ☐ NO ☐ SPECIFY

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

Bilateral open fractured tibia + fibula, right arm amputated near shoulder, deep wound over front of right chest (not penetrating), lacerations of front of left knee, and abrasions of right upper thigh and scrotum and lower chest, Open fractures of frontal bones, ruptured left diaphragm with stomach in chest, torn mesenteries, some bowel rupture, small tear in aorta, multiple rib fractures (near site of torn mesentery).
The findings are consistent with the pilot being in the right seat ~~doing a banking manoeuvre to the right~~ when the aeroplane crashed ~~while doing a roll to the right~~, and the control wheel ~~entered the~~ caused the wound of the right chest.
The abrasions appeared due to dragging, + also the abrasions over the chest were consistent with being caused by the big seat belt of the C-5.
There was no evidence of incapacitation of the pilot before the cra

000212

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

OCCURRENCE DESCRIPTION (1) (R)

FIRST IRREGULARITY OF FLIGHT (2)

NARRATE THE EVENT(S) WHICH FIRST INDICATED THAT THE FLIGHT WAS NOT PROCEEDING AS DESIRED.

after completing a water drop the crew sighted a crashed helicopter.

RESULTANT ACTION(S) • REACTION(S) (3)

NARRATE ALL THE ACTIONS OF THE PILOT; ALL THE REACTIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT TO PILOT DEMANDS; ALL INTERACTIONS OF PILOT, AIRCRAFT, AND ENVIRONMENT.


The Captain advised by radio that he was proceeding to the crashed helicopter and would be circling over it. Since this aircraft was at low level and was turning right it is considered probable that the co-pilot was flying the aircraft while the Captain passed radio messages and identified the crash location etc.


TERMINAL EVENT (4)

DESCRIBE THE MOVEMENTS OF THE AIRCRAFT FROM THE MOMENT BEYOND WHICH CORRECTIVE ACTION COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO RETRIEVE THE SITUATION, OR FROM TOUCHDOWN PRECEDING A LANDING UNDER EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES.

The aircraft was in collision with another Canso and a large portion of left wing was severed from CF-HTN.

- CIRCLE THE SILHOUETTES WHICH MOST CLOSELY DESCRIBE ANGLE OF GROUND CONTACT
- DRAW A SQUARE AROUND SILHOUETTES TO DESCRIBE ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT AT REST





23-0003
(8-69)

000213

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ELEVATION VIEW OF LOCALE (1)

(R)

SKETCH IN SIGNIFICANT RUNWAYS, OBSTRUCTIONS, FLIGHT PATH, ETC.

SHOW IMPORTANT DISTANCES, DIMENSIONS.

Nothing pertinent in profile.

PLAN VIEW OF LOCALE (2) SKETCH IN SIGNIFICANT LANDING AREA, OBSTRUCTIONS, AIRCRAFT PATH, ETC.

SHOW IMPORTANT DISTANCES, DIMENSIONS.

N(Mag.)

Please refer to a blown up aerial photograph which contains relevant data and a directional arrow.

W

E

S

000214

23-0003

(8)

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

POST OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS

PERSONNEL

CREW	FATAL	SERIOUS	MINOR	UNINJURED	NOT PERTINENT	DIED AFTER 30 DAYS
PILOT-IN-COMMAND	1					
SECOND PILOT	1					
THIRD PILOT						
FLIGHT ENGINEER						
ALL OTHER CREW – NUMBER						
PASSENGER(S) – NUMBER						
PERSONS OUTSIDE A/C						

INJURY PATTERNS	HEAD	CHEST	LOWER TORSO	SPINE	ARM(S)	HAND(S)	LEG(S)	FOOT FEET	INTERNAL	MASSIVE
CREW/NO. OF PERSONS										2
PASS./NO. OF PERSONS										
PERSONS OUTSIDE										

EVENT CAUSING INJURY — NO. OF PERSONS INVOLVED	CREW	PASSENGERS	PERSONS OUTSIDE A/C
CONTACT WITH PROPELLER/INTAKE/EXHAUST			
FELL FROM AIRCRAFT (OR THROWN)			
STRUCK INTERIOR OF AIRCRAFT AT IMPACT	2		
STRUCK INTERIOR OF AIRCRAFT IN TURBULENCE			
STRUCK BY FLYING OBJECT INSIDE AIRCRAFT			
STRUCK BY AIRCRAFT			
BURNS ONLY			
BURNS FOLLOWING OTHER INJURIES			
CRUSHED IN WRECKAGE			
PULLED UNDERWATER			
CAME IN CONTACT WITH MAIN ROTOR			
CONTACT WITH TAIL ROTOR			
OTHER (SPECIFY)			

AIRCRAFT

DEGREE OF DAMAGE
- NONE ☐
- UNKNOWN ☐
- MINOR ☐
- SUBSTANTIAL ☐
- DESTROYED ☒

DAMAGE PATTERN
- ENGINE ☐
- PROPELLER ☐
- NONE ☐
- AFT FUSELAGE ☐
- COCKPIT ☐
- EMPENNAGE ☐
- NACELLE(S) ☐
- NOSE ☐
- WING(S) ☐
- UNDERCARRIAGE ☐
- MAIN ROTOR ☐
- TAIL ROTOR ☐
- TOTAL ☒

EVENT CAUSING DAMAGE
- AIRBORNE COLLISION ☒
- AIRBORNE COLLISION AND GROUND IMPACT ☐
- COLLISION ON GROUND/WATER ☐
- EXPLOSION ☐
- FIRE ☐
- AERIAL BREAK UP ☐
- SUBMERGENCE ☐
- GROUND/WATER IMPACT ☒
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

OBJECT OF AIR COLLISION
- AIRCRAFT ☒
- BIRD(S) ☐
- BUILDING ☐
- DETACHED PORTION OF AIRCRAFT ☐
- POLE(S)/POST(S) ☐
- TOWER ☐
- TREE(S) ☐
- WIRE(S) ☐
- OTHER AIRBORNE OBJECT ☐
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

OBJECT OF GROUND COLLISION
- AIRCRAFT ☐ BUILDING ☐
- DETACHED PORTION OF A/C ☐ FENCE(S) ☐
- PEDESTRIAN ☐ TREE(S) ☐
- POST/WIRE ☐ VEHICLE ☐
- DITCH ☐ RIDGE ☐
- SNOW BANK ☐ OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

ENVIRONMENT

PROPERTY DAMAGE
- NONE ☒
- MINOR ☐
- EXTENSIVE ☐

PROPERTY DAMAGED
- RESIDENCE ☐
- PUBLIC BUILDING ☐
- PUBLIC UTILITIES INSTALLATION ☐
- VEHICLE ☐
- AIRFIELD FACILITY ☐
- DOMESTIC ANIMAL(S) ☐
- BARN/STORAGE ☐
- FARM CROP ☐
- AIRCRAFT ☐
- FENCE ☐
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

000215

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

LIFE - PROTECTION DATA

(R)

CRASH PROTECTION

DEVICES

		SEAT(S)	SEAT ANCHORS (SETS)	LAP BELT(S)	SHOULDER HARNESS	BAGGAGE RESTRAINTS
CREW	NUMBER INSTALLED	2	X	2	2	0
	NUMBER USED	2	X	2	2	0
	NUMBER FAILED IN CRASH	0	0	0	0	0
PASSENGERS	NUMBER INSTALLED	4	X	4	0	X
	NUMBER USED	0	X	0	0	X
	NUMBER FAILED IN CRASH	0	0	0	0	X

CRASH EVACUATION

AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

	ESCAPE SLIDE	ESCAPE LADDER/ROPE	DINGHY	NORMAL EXITS	ESCAPE HATCHES	PORTABLE EXTINGUISHER
NUMBER INSTALLED	☐	☐	☐	9	☐	1
NUMBER USED	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0
NUMBER FAILED IMPROPER OPERATION	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0
NUMBER FAILED IN USE	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

PERSONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT

None being used.

DEVICES	OXYGEN MASK	CRASH HELMET	LIFE VEST/INDIVIDUAL FLOTATION DEVICE	FILTER MASK	PARACHUTE	IMMERSION SUIT
NUMBER BEING USED			0			
NUMBER FAILED DUE TO IMPROPER USE			0			
NUMBER FAILED IN OPERATION			0			

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

SEARCH AND RESCUE

PERTINENT ☐ NOT PERTINENT ☒

SEARCH SUCCESS

BY

NONE ☐ PROVINCIAL POLICE ☐
SAR ORGANIZATION ☐ MUNICIPAL POLICE ☐
PRIVATE AGENCY ☐ D.O.T. ☐
COMMERCIAL AGENCY ☐ OTHER ☐
R.C.M.P. ☐ SPECIFY:

DURATION

LESS THAN 4 HRS ☐
4 HRS. BUT LESS THAN 12 ☐
12 HRS. BUT LESS THAN 24 ☐
1 DAY BUT LESS THAN 2 ☐
2 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 4 ☐
4 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 7 ☐
7 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 14 ☐
14 DAYS OR MORE ☐

TYPE

GROUND ☐
AIR ☐
BOAT ☐
COMBINED AIR/BOAT ☐
COMBINED GROUND/AIR ☐
ALL ☐

LOCATING METHOD

L/F RADIO ☐ VISUAL-SMOKE/FIRE ☐
SARAH ☐ VISUAL-WRECKAGE ☐
AUTOMATIC CPI ☐ VISUAL PYROTECHNICS ☐
VHF/UHF HOMING ☐ VISUAL OTHER ☐
VISUAL-MIRROR ☐ OTHER ☐
NOT SUCCESSFUL ☐
IF OTHER SPECIFY ▶

SURVIVAL

PERTINENT ☐ NOT PERTINENT ☒

DEVICES

	TENT	SLEEPING BAG	FIRST AID KIT	EMERGENCY RATIONS	WEAPON	FISHING GEAR	FIRE SOURCE	PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
AVAILABLE-NOT USED	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
NOT AVAILABLE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
FAILED-IMPROPER USE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
NOT SATISFACTORY	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

000216

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Draft Appraisal HTN & IDS

Crew flying hours included in this report were based on information obtained from pilot and aircraft log books, company information, plus 5802 files for each crew member. A pilot log book for Mr. Hales was found by investigators and this log book was complete right up to but not including the accident flight. The pilot log book for Mr. Kuryluk was supplied to Investigators at their request by Mr. Terry Harold, a partner of Mr. Kuryluk. This log book was not current but provided background experience, Company records and the 5802 file were used to supplement his log book. The pilot log books were not available for Mr. Koshylanyk or Mr. Willms. In their case flying hours were based completely on company records, aircraft journey log sheets and 5802 files.

We have concluded in our report that there was no malfunction in either aircraft. This conclusion cannot be proven by physical evidence but is based on a lack of any radio messages indicating any problem, corroborated to the extent possible by evidence of witnesses, None of the witnesses reported anything which would tend to indicate an apparent malfunction prior to the collision. The Investigators considered the possibility of malfunction and carried out some technical investigation of each aircraft, ~~however~~ It was considered that there was sufficient evidence to exclude malfunction as a likely factor, ~~and~~ The technical investigation was not detailed except to determine how the collision occurred.

The weight and balance data included in the report was based on approved weight and balance calculations in the 5008 files for each aircraft. Conclusions as to the amount of fuel on board the aircraft were reached after discussing this point with ~~the~~ each operator, ~~in each case.~~ Each aircraft was within limits although the C of G locations ~~was~~ were very close to the forward limits ~~in each aircraft.~~ This is normal without water on board.

The investigating team concluded that weather was not a factor in this collision and this conclusion was based primarily on the observations of the several witnesses in the immediate area. From their observations and the observations of an accident investigator who arrived at the accident scene approximately 2½ hours after the accident, visibility was substantially unrestricted, Smoke was certainly not a problem over this fire. The wind /2

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

direction and speed included in the report ~~is concluded~~ are based on witnesses' observations. The temperature and dew point however were determined by interpellation using Ft. Smith and Ft. Resolution weather sequences.

The pre-occurrence and post occurrence condition for crew has been discussed by the medical investigator. One or two further comments might be added. In the case of Mr. Kuryluk, an MOT Accident Investigator had spent approximately half the day with Mr. Kuryluk on the day of his death. This Investigator met with Mr. Kuryluk at the Edmonton Industrial Airport at approximately ~~0930~~ 0830 hours MST on the 1st of September, 1971, and visited with him, his wife and small daughter, ~~approximately 6 years old~~, then Mr. Kuryluk and the Investigator sat together on PWA flight 761 ~~xx~~ enroute to Ft. Smith and parted company at Ft. Smith at noon while the Investigator went to "sort out some crew problems" he was having with his Canso CF-HTN. Mr. Kuryluk appeared to be in good spirits, well rested and this visit would tend to exclude fatigue or ~~incompasitation~~ incapacitation as factors in the accident. It was, however, apparent that Mr. Kuryluk considered he was having problems with his Captain Hales who had had numerous co-pilots and Mr. Kuryluk indicated that he was going to "sort" the problem out or "fly the aircraft" himself. He indicated that his captain was acting too much the part of the captain and was being difficult on co-pilots and the co-pilots would eventually refuse to fly with him. The co-pilot who came out from Ft. Smith on the day of the accident was Mr. ~~Kenny~~ Henry Stanford and a statement from Mr. Stanford is attached as an appendix. Mr. Willms who had at one time been a ~~Mennonite~~ Mennonite minister was the son of a minister and according to Mr. Keith Hornseth was an absolute "~~-teetaller~~ -totaller" which would tend to exclude ~~incapacitation~~ incapacitation from alcohol and fatigue caused by parties. Mr. Hales was known to several of the Accident Investigators in the Western Region. He tended to be a person who would exagerate his flying experience and in conversation seem to show extreme confidence but whether he was confident or not is not known. He was a person who talked constantly and tended to indicate that he knew almost everything about ~~almost~~ every type of aircraft ~~made~~, tended toward rapid nervous-like movements, was somewhat of a bore and tended to be an unpleasant person to associate with. However if ~~However~~ our Investigators never let it ~~this~~ show, ~~and~~ considered him unpleasant compan

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

According to Mr. Stanford in conversation on the 23rd of September, 1971, Mr. Hales at one ~~point~~ time made a comment about MOT Accident Investigators and indicated that they used to consult him about the characteristics of different aircraft to assist them in their investigations. The ~~investigating~~ investigating team did not have first hand knowledge about Mr. Koshylanyk except through his employer, However, there is every indication that ~~he~~ he was a competent pilot and there is no indication that he would have been fatigued or incapacitated. Conversely Mr. Koshylanyk and Mr. Willms had just come to the Ft. Smith area from ~~standby~~ stand-by duty at Rocky Mountain House and they should have been well rested and quite ready to go on to fire duties. If cumulative fatigue could have had any bearing on this accident it would only be through Mr. Hales. There is some indication that Mr. Hales was on medication, pain killers and reducing pills, (diet pills), and this possibility will be discussed further when the report comes back from IEM.

There is no record of any previous accidents involving any of the pilots (in their 5802 files). Mr. Keith Hornseth, however, indicated that Mr. Hales had at one time worked for them and had been involved in one or ~~two previous~~ more minor accidents.

The witnesses to the collision all were cooperative and attempted to be as helpful as possible, However, the majority of them were pre-occupied with other duties, mostly related to the previous crash of the helicopter, CF-OKV, and none of them were actually watching the Cansos for any appreciable time. It is considered that this explains some of the inconsistencies in the statements although it is quite normal for different witnesses to see things slightly differently. In the case of Mr. Hoffius, the injured helicopter pilot, he was not interviewed in detail in connection with the Canso collision until October due to the fact that he was seriously injured and we wished him to save his strength during the first few weeks after the accident for maximum assistance ~~for his~~ in the investigation of his own accident. However, he indicated that he remembered the Canso collision very vividly and was very definite in telling the Investigators how the collision occurred. The way he described the collision, however, is not consistent with the physical evidence, that is marks and damage to the wings of each aircraft, Therefore some of his evidence must be discounted ~~and~~ including his ~~evidence of~~ comment about evasive action. It would seem that the only

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

valid points in his statement are that one aircraft was coming toward him and the other aircraft was on a path close to 90° to that of the first aircraft. It is considered possible that the evasive action he mentions could have been merely a turn or on the other hand it seems possible considering that he was in shock after his own accident that he is now remembering things slightly differently to the way he actually saw them. Investigators intend to keep in touch with Mr. Hoffius from time to time to see whether his recollection of the collision changes at all. The majority of the witnesses to the collision have HTN turning right and IDS turning left.

Statements from persons who did not witness the accident but who were able to supply useful background information to assist in understanding possible reasons for the collision are also attached. The statement of Mr. Stanford is quite useful. Comments from his statement that are considered valid by the investigating team are: "cutting corners", "my mistakes, I thought upset him more than it would a good pilot", "agitated man", "no real close friends", "bird dog had trouble keeping track of him", "seemed difficult for him to integrate himself into the pattern with the other three Cansos", "felt compelled to be accepted by or impress the other pilots" "I think there should be some sort of traffic control and thought this on the job", "seeing a crash on the ground would take his last bit of concentration and he would have none left for other things", "friction between Hales and Kuryluk".

When the statements were obtained from Norcan Air, it was considered that some of the comments in their statements would contain a degree of bias. This may still be so but it is remarkable reading the statements together how similar they are to that made by Mr. Stanford and investigators, from their personal knowledge of the operators involved and the persons involved, consider that the majority of the comments in the statements supplied by Norcan Air are in fact valid. Mr. S. McKnight of Norcan Air stated that he was a firm believer in using a bird dog. This will be discussed further when we discuss reasons for a recommendation included in our report.

The accident scene: As can be seen in the photographs , this accident occurred in a flat, open area and even though the total fire area was large the fire area consisted of small scattered fires only with very little

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

smoke involved. The fire area had remained approximately the same size all summer, did not seem to be spreading, ~~and in fact~~ was not burning valuable timber and in the opinion of the investigating team there was no real urgency to this particular bombing operation. The accident scene and the nature of the fire therefore are excluded as accident causal factors. In fact conditions would have been much better than at the majority of forest fires. There is only one exception to this however and possibly this is also due to the fact that it was ~~such~~ an easy operation. There was no bird dog aircraft in the area at the time ~~and~~ nor any other form of control ~~or direction to the bombing operation~~. If there had been control at the time this collision would most likely not have occurred. This is the basis of our recommendation relating to control.

Linked events in the accident: - An ELAN ~~elan~~ plot has been prepared and is attached as an appendix. It is believed that this is self-explanatory, ~~however additional comments might help understand the elan plot.~~ The ELAN plot illustrates the interaction of factors ~~in the~~ which caused the accident. There are always hazards associated with fire bombing. a helicopter crash created an additional irregularity. The ~~increased additional~~ hazard caused by this additional irregularity was compounded by the fact that there was no one person directing the bombing operation e.g. bird dog aircraft carrying a bird dog officer.

000221

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Recommendations:

(1) If there had been ~~a bird dog~~ positive control (aircraft) ~~director~~ of this bombing operation it is very unlikely that this accident would have occurred. This investigation has indicati

000222

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

that unacceptable risks exist ~~if~~ unless ~~the~~ control is well coordinated. At the present time the best method of control seems to be to utilize a "bird dog" aircraft as an airborne platform ~~for a bird~~ flown by a pilot familiar with bombing, and with ~~a bird dog~~ a bird dog officer on board, able to decide what tasks to give to the bombers.

It is recommended that all officials who might have to hire bombers be advised that unacceptable risks exist unless there is one bird dog aircraft ~~is not as well~~ for each group of bombers.

(2.) In the Fire 6 area and generally in the Northwest Territories the radio frequency used by the bombers tends to become cluttered with messages related to ground support & other ground tasks. This also reduces flight safety because urgent messages can easily be missed. It is recommended that officials who may have to hire bombers be advised that portable radios should be provided to enable the bird dog officer to communicate with the fire line without ~~interfering~~ utilizing the flight frequency used by the bombers and the bird dog aircraft.

The most appropriate air to air frequency for bombing operations should be decided upon in advance and be made public information.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ANALYSIS

(R)

INVESTIGATOR'S APPRAISAL (1)

INDICATE WHICH ITEMS OF THE RECORDED FACTUAL DATA, IN THE VIEW OF THE INVESTIGATOR, CAUSED THE ACCIDENT.
DESCRIBE IN NARRATIVE HOW THE ITEMS INTERACTED TO CAUSE THE ACCIDENT.

RECOMMENDATIONS (2)

FOR REGIONAL USE

CAUSES

Cause Concern for an injured helicopter pilot caused one bomber to alter his circuit in the fire area. Subsequently the two bombers were on converging paths. None of the crew members saw the other bomber in sufficient time to take effective evasive action. The collision occurred at a time when all 4 crew members would be busy.

000224

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

AFFIRMATION OF THE CONTENT OF THIS REPORT

INVESTIGATOR(S) SIGNATURE(S)

REGIONAL SUPERINTENDENT COMMENTS (1)

REGIONAL SUPT. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION — DATE

REGIONAL CONTROLLER, CIVIL AVIATION — DATE

DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING THE DETAILS OF THIS REPORT AND APPENDED HERETO

POLICE REPORT ☐	MEDICAL REPORT ☐	MATERIAL LABORATORY REPORT ☐	WEATHER INFORMATION ☐
CRIME LABORATORY REPORT ☐	PATHOLOGIST'S REPORT ☒	PILOT'S STATEMENT (S) ☐	ATC TAPE/ TRANSCRIPTION ☐
CORONER'S REPORT ☐	CASUALTY LIST ☐	WITNESSES' STATEMENT (S) ☒	TECHNICAL REPORTS ☒
MAPS AND CHARTS ☒	PASSENGER STATEMENTS ☐	OTHER ☐ SPECIFY:	

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL

INVESTIGATION

ELAPSED TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO INVESTIGATOR'S ARRIVAL ON THE SCENE: 2 1/2 HRS.

ELAPSED TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO RECEIPT OF NOTIFICATION BY REGION: 1/4 HRS.

EXPENDITURES

CASH: COST OF FARES, CHARTERS, ETC.: $

ALL OTHER CASH EXPENSES: $


TOTAL CASH EXPENDITURES: $

MAN-HOURS: TIME SPENT ON THIS CASE BY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR(S) INCLUDING TIME. HOURS:

H.Q. USE

CAUSE FACTORS ASSIGNED

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'informatio*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'informat*

Bob Craft
Mardair Yellowknife
did 50 hr + 100 hr.
- HTN

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

CF - HTN.

16 : 340
7669 : 20
21 : 40
7690 : 60


MR. HAROLD RICHARDS
4140 - BURKE HILL ROAD,
WEST VANCOUVER,

922-8528

BROTHER - IN - LAW OF HALES.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

NATIONAL TOPOGRAPHIC SYSTEM 1:250,000 CANADA




000229

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

FIRST EDITION (1967)

SHEET 85 A




~~Refer to this map as: ~~

Refer to this map as:	85 A EDITION 1 MCE SERIES A 502	(1967)

60° 32′ 30″ N

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



THE DECLINATION OF THE COMPASS NEEDLE 1958



The declination of the compass needle at any place along a red line is the declination given on that red line. At other places the declination is between those given on the neighbouring red lines; thus at the place marked A, the declination is between 30°00'E and 30°30'E. The declination of the compass needle is decreasing 7½ minutes annually.

Produced and printed by the SURVEYS AND MAPPING BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND TECHNICAL SURVEYS, 1959, from air photographs taken in 1955.

Interim corrections 1967.

Transverse Mercator Projection

REFERENCE

Roads:	more than 2 lanes	2 lanes	less than 2 lanes
hard surface, all weather	2 lanes or more	less than 2 lanes	dry weather
loose surface, all weather			
wagon; cart track		Trail or portage	
Boundaries:		Contours:	
provincial		elevation	3000
Indian reserve, park, etc.		depression	2500
township, surveyed		approximate	2000
township, unsurveyed		Spot elevation (in feet)	.1885

LITTLE BUFFALO

NORTHWEST TERRITOR

WEST OF FOURTH MERIDIAN

Scale 1:250,000

1 Inch to 4 Miles Approximately

Miles 5 0 5 10


Kilometres 5 0 5 10 15 20

000231

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

60° 32' 30" N.

113° 07' 30" W.



Contour Interval 100 Feet
Elevations in Feet above Mean Sea Level
North American Datum 1927 (1953)


RIVER

IES

REFERENCE

Village or settlement	○	Building or cabin	▪
Boundary monument	□	School	
Horizontal control point	△	Church	
Streams: intermittent or dry		Intermittent lake	
indefinite		Marsh or swamp	
Irrigation canal or ditch		Sand, gravel or mud	
Rapids; falls	R F	Forest	

15 20 Miles
25 30 Kilometres



Index to adjoining sheets

GRID ZONE DESIGNATION	100,000 M. SQUARE IDENTIFICATION
12 V	UC VC / UB VB — 670 / 40

TO GIVE A REFERENCE TO NEAREST 1000 METRES

EXAMPLE: LAKE

SQUARE: Read letters of 100,000 m. square	UC
EASTING: Read number on grid line immediately to left of point. Estimate tenths of a square from this line eastward to point.	8 — 8 — 88
NORTHING: Read number on grid line immediately below point. Estimate tenths of a square from this line northward to point.	3 — 2 — 32
MILITARY GRID REFERENCE (to nearest 1,000 metres)	UC8832


If reporting beyond 18° in any direction, prefix Grid Zone Designation as: 12VUC8832

TEN THOUSAND METRE
UNIVERSAL TRANSVERSE MERCATOR GRID
ZONE 12

LITTLE BUFFALO RIVER
85A


EDITION 1 (1967)

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act* .
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*




3 **AIR PHOTO DIVISION - ENERGY, MINES & RESOURCES - CANADIAN GOVT. COPYRIGHT**

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*




3 **AIR PHOTO DIVISION - ENERGY, MINES & RESOURCES - CANADIAN GOVT. COPYRIGHT**

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act* .
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*




3 AIR PHOTO DIVISION - ENERGY, MINES & RESOURCES - CANADIAN GOVT. COPYRIGHT

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act* .
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



3 AIR PHOTO DIVISION - ENERGY, MINES & RESOURCES - CANADIAN GOVT. COPYRIGHT

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



3 **AIR PHOTO DIVISION - ENERGY, MINES & RESOURCES - CANADIAN GOVT. COPYRIGHT**

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Ken Cooper
Chief Warden
Wood Buffalo National Park

- great concern - know these fellows are flying. helicopter people especially trying to make a years pay in summer months. over 12 hours a day for extended period.
- fatigue may have been a factor
- no more than 8 hrs flying hrs a day
- hours meter in chopper.
- up to us - we're contractors
- land hours - as far boss up to us - without stress of flying - we may be keep this up day after day.

Darndest holes
- 5 or 6 accidents in the Mackenzie last season - non in our area.
- in some cases bombers drop every 3 minutes. that is work - average about every 5 - 8 minutes.
- won't shut themselves down.
- if have to put in more than 8 hrs. a fire will work in extend that so must have double crew.
- have to release if rain.
- 2nd crew should be a plane call away.
- we are responsible for our men.
- costing a lot of money.
- you are the boss tell pilot what want done - not how to fly his machine.

---

10 - 12 - 13 hrs a day from check of accounts.

#2 kind of hot on Bird dogging
- if more than one machine got to have it. Even with one

000238

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

radios & we on ground get to have.
One of duties is to keep these bombers separated & to protect ground crews
should be a lot well for boss.
by - communication - we supply 4 radios - single side band
- VHF
& DOT

2 Mitchells & Otter - other had no radio - had close call.
- we had sent him out & didn't realize he didn't have radio 122.8
- we sent him away.
- Gordo Sherman was flying it.

Joe McBryan was bird dogging & when Joe was spotted he turned radio on & Joe told him somehow & told him to leave.

frequency of radio for com 166.05
with for boss.
Single side band 4270

Bird dog at least needs 166.05
- not necessarily Bombers if have a bird dog.

- not too well regarded with N. dept as had just come in
Hales all summer. Seemed to be pretty fair bomber pilot
Had no negatives just back.

reliably - don't hardly that so
- sent for Norcanair as had to have more bombers - primed for NWAL & Keating.

000239

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

- were working for McKenzie a day
  2 accident.
- had nothing to do with them that day

Interview 1100 – 1200 Cogens Office
30 Nov 71

Agree that Bird dog o/c is essential.
- Bird dog officer?

- How should a bird dog o/c
  be used? Used in just traffic officer?

Still ground fire in fire 6 area.

Park officer can make a decision.
Are we wasting money? etc.
If can keep same person all the time
on the bird dogging it's O.K.
- good comm. with fire boss.
- always a fire boss on ground.

2 groups of bombers?

essential bird dog gets instruction.
- never had problem of pilots not
listening to bird dog but
Re designates fire is in charge.
fire to go to B.C. Forestry course at Nelson this winter.
- some case may be necessary to lead
in but always question this in my own
mind.
- if bird dog has made run on any
> want you to let bird dog get
in first then to worked other bombers.

1 bird dog o/c can't look after more than
3 bombers.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

just pilots

How is air to air frequency selected? don't know
Could this be improved? yes
Should it be advertised? yes.
why or why not? very good idea

helicopters maybe worse.

fire should be 10 hour rather than
four hours
stress must have air to air
clusters ought come to fire base

Warden's school.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

CIVIL AVIATI
This Folio
To Be Actioned By:
WCAE
WCAI 90
WCAR
WCAT
WCAW

CENTRAL REGISTRY
EDMONTON
SEP 2 10 21 AM 71

1801
1802?

5002 - ~~W-1801~~
~~1802~~

EBK036 021639

JJ CYEGYK

021638 CYWGYK

WCAI EDMONTON

CCAI181 THIS OFFICE ALERTED SEPTEMBER FIRST 2200 HOURS RE NORCANAIR CANSO FIREFIGHTER OPERATION FORT SMITH AREA. FILES 5802/8802 KOSHYLANYK 5802/8756 WILLMS AND 5008/UAW FORWARDED TODAY SEPARATE MAIL

CCAI WINNIPEG

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

Room 945, Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton 2, Alberta.

14 October 1971.

R E G I S T E R E D

Mr. Terry Harrold,
Box 270,
Lamont, Alberta.

Dear Sir:

Enclosed please find the following documents which have served their purpose in our office:

(A) Pilot's Flying Log Book - Peter Kuryluk

(B) 3 Invoice Books

(C) Non-Contract Daily Flying Log

Thank you for your assistance in regards to our investigation.

Yours very truly,

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

Encls.

/eb

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

[redacted]

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

Room 945, Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton 2, Alberta.

3 December 1971

Mr. Pete Ferguson,
MacKenzie Forest Service,
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

Dear Sir:

I am sorry I missed you on my recent visit to Fort Smith. I had hoped to be able to discuss the Canso collision with you prior to conclusion of our report. Perhaps it would be convenient for you to drop into our office on your next visit to Edmonton. If this is not possible please advise and we will make alternate arrangements to see you in some other manner.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Yours very truly,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
D. J. DOUGLAS

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

DJD/eb

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

NORCANAIR / PRINCE ALBERT, SASKATCHEWAN / PHONE 764-4271 / AREA CODE 306

November 10th, 1971

Nov 12 71 31284

5002-W 1801
1802

Mr. D. J. Douglas
Ministry of Transport
Rm 945 Federal Bldg.
9820 - 107th Street
EDMONTON, Alberta

Dear Don:

In reply to your letter dated October 26th, 1971. I have not as yet received the statements from the other persons that were flying Kenting's Cansos up on the same fires. However, I was speaking with Frank Smith, Kenting General Manager the other day and he was going to jog their emories and I will supply you with copies of anything I receive.

I am still most interested in going thru the accident with you whenever you are ready.

Thanking you. I remain,

Yours very truly,

Keith Hornseth
Operations Manager

Noted WJP. BF 22.11.71 WCAI info DJ Douglas.

KH/ej

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information A*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'informa*

5002-W1801 (WCAI)
5002-W1802

Room 945, Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton 2, Alberta.

29 October 1971.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Fort Smith, N.W.T.

Dear Sir/s:

Reference is made to our letter of October 22nd, 1971 in which we enclosed autopsy reports for: Gordon Hales, Bill Koshylanyk and Peter Willms.

Attached you will find a copy of the autopsy report for Peter Kuryluk which has just been received by this office.

Yours very truly,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
D. J. DOUGLAS

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

Att.

/eb

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

5002-1801 (WCAI)
~~5002-1802~~

Room 945, Federal Bldg.
9820 - 107th Street
Edmonton 2, Alberta

October 26, 1971

Mr. Keith Hornseth
Operations Manager
Norcan Air
Prince Albert, Saskatchewan

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of 14 September, 1971. As we indicated on the telephone we have been delayed somewhat in concluding our investigation of the Canso collision due to other urgent commitments. We are now attempting to conclude the Canso investigation. You will recall that you mentioned in your letter of 14 September, 1971, that you are proceeding with obtaining statements from personnel other than your own employees. The statements which you have supplied so far have certainly assisted us in understanding the accident and we would very much appreciate it if you would forward to us any other statements which you now have available.

As we discussed on the telephone we would be building models of Cansos to assist us in understanding the collision. This has now been completed. We will contact you once again when our investigation is nearing completion and we might then decide on a mutually agreeable date to get together and discuss some of the apparent lessons that may be derived from this accident. Thank you very much for your assistance.

Yours very truly,

D. J. Douglas
Regional Superintendent
Accident Investigation

DJD/lj

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

~~5002-1801~~ (WCAI)
5002-1802

Room 945, Federal Bldg.
9820 - 107th Street
Edmonton 2, Alberta

October 26, 1971

Mr. Keith Hornseth
Operations Manager
Norcan Air
Prince Albert, Saskatchewan

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of 14 September, 1971. As we indicated on the telephone we have been delayed somewhat in concluding our investigation of the Canso collision due to other urgent commitments. We are now attempting to conclude the Canso investigation. You will recall that you mentioned in your letter of 14 September, 1971, that you are proceeding with obtaining statements from personnel other than your own employees. The statements which you have supplied so far have certainly assisted us in understanding the accident and we would very much appreciate it if you would forward to us any other statements which you now have available.

As we discussed on the telephone we would be building models of Cansos to assist us in understanding the collision. This has now been completed. We will contact you once again when our investigation is nearing completion and we might then decide on a mutually agreeable date to get together and discuss some of the apparent lessons that may be derived from this accident. Thank you very much for your assistance.

Yours very truly,

D. J. Douglas
Regional Superintendent
Accident Investigation

DJD/lj

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

[redacted]

5002-W1801 (NCAI)
5002-W1802

Room 945, Federal Building,
9820 - 107th Street,
Edmonton 2, Alberta.

22 October 1971.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Fort Smith,
N.W.T.

Dear Sir/s:

This letter refers to our telephone conversation of October 22nd, 1971.

Attached you will find copies of autopsy reports for Gordon Hales, Bill Koshylanyk and Peter Willms. Please be advised that we will forward the autopsy report for Peter Kuryluk when it is received and are still awaiting results of tests done at the Institute of Environmental Medicine, Toronto.

Yours very truly,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
D. J. DOUGLAS

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

Atts.

/eb

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

MESSAGE FORM

FILE NO. 5002-W1801 & 5002-W1802

DATE 7 SEPTEMBER 19 71

COMPLETE THIS SECTION FOR COMMERCIAL MESSAGES ONLY | CHARGE

CAI
OTTAWA

WCAI 165 ACCIDENT REPORT (FILE NOS: 5002/W1801 & 5002/W1802):

(A) CANSOS CF/HTN & CF/IDS.

(B) CF/HTN BEING OPERATED BY NORTHWESTERN AIR LEASE OWNERSHIP NOT CERTAIN AT PRESENT. POSSIBLY FIELD AVIATION.
CF/IDS OWNED BY NORCANAIR.

(C) CF/IDS CAPTAIN WILLIAM KOSHYLANYK WGA/1163. CO/PILOT PETER JOHN WILLMS WGC/8606.
CF/HTN CAPTAIN GORDON FREDERICK HALES XDA/1070. CO/PILOT PETER KURYLUK XDS/797.

(D) 1 SEPTEMBER 1971 APPROXIMATELY 1445 M.S.T.

(E) FT. SMITH TO FT. SMITH AFTER NUMEROUS RIVER PICK/UPS AND WATER DROPS AT FIRE 6.

(F) FIRE 6 68 MILES NORTH/WEST OF FT. SMITH.

G1) ALL CREW INSTANTLY KILLED AT GROUND IMPACT.

G2) NO PASSENGERS.

(H) CF/HTN WAS CIRCLING A CRASHED HELICOPTER AND REPORTING THE CRASH ON A FREQUENCY OTHER THAN THE FIRE CONTROL FREQUENCY. CF/IDS CAME THROUGH ON A NORMAL WATER DROP CMA DROPPED WATER PULLED UP CMA DID A NORMAL TURN TO THE LEFT AND COLLIDED WITH CF/HTN WHICH WAS CIRCLING TO THE RIGHT. RIGHT WING OF CF/IDS

38-0014
9-63

FILE COPY

PART TWO FOLLOWING ....

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

MESSAGE FORM

FILE NO.

DATE 19

COMPLETE THIS SECTION FOR COMMERCIAL MESSAGES ONLY | CHARGE

- PART TWO CONTINUED -

(H) AND LEFT WING OF CF/HTN BECAME DETACHED NEAR THE ATTACHMENT POINT OF OUTER SPAN. BOTH AIRCRAFT SPIRALLED TO THE GROUND. CF/IDS REPORTEDLY ON FIRE PRIOR TO STRIKING GROUND. CF/IDS ALMOST TOTALLY CONSUMED BY FIRE. CF/HTN DID NOT BURN, BUT VERY EXTENSIVELY BROKEN UP. SCENE VISITED. REPORT TO FOLLOW.

WCAI, EDMONTON.

DJD/eb
12:00 PM

FILE COPY

38-0014
9-63

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

MEMORANDUM
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

NOTE DE SERVICE
GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

FROM / DE: W.C.A.I.
EDMONTON

OUR FILE – N/RÉFÉRENCE: 5002-W1801 & 5002-W1802

YOUR FILE – V/RÉFÉRENCE:

DATE: 13 September 1971

TO / À: C.A.I.
OTTAWA

REFER REPLY TO / ENVOYER LA RÉPONSE À:

TEL. NO. / TÉL.:

SUBJECT / SUJET:

Accident - Cansos CF-IDS & CF-HTN
- 60 miles north-west Ft. Smith, N.W.T.
- 1 September 1971

1. Enclosed please find two copies of Pages 1 and 2 concerning the subject accident.

D. J. Douglas,
Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

Encls.

/eb

CGSB STANDARD FORM 22CP 7540-21-855-4389-xxx-xxxx

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION DIVISION

REGIONAL REF. W1801 & W1802
H.Q. REF. 500
AIRCRAFT REG. CF-IDS

REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO AN AIRCRAFT

(1) ACCIDENT [X] DISAPPEARANCE [ ] INCIDENT [ ]
NEAR MISS [ ] OTHER [ ]

FOR INSTRUCTIONS SEE REVERSE SIDE OF EACH PAGE

AT (Name of nearest gazetted place): 60 miles north-west of Fort Smith		PROVINCE: N.W.T.
GEOGRAPHIC CO-ORDINATES: 60°35'N, 113°16'W	DATE: DAY 1 MONTH Sept. YEAR 1971	TIME (Standard Time Local): 1445 M.S.T.

REGION: PACIFIC [ ] WESTERN [X] CENTRAL [ ] ONTARIO [ ] QUEBEC [ ] ATLANTIC [ ]

PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION (2)

OWNER
NAME: North Canada Air Ltd.
ADDRESS: P.O. Box 850, Prince Albert, Sask.

OPERATOR
NAME: SAME AS OWNER [X] OR
ADDRESS:
ATC LICENCE NUMBER: 291/47 (c)
H.Q. USE OPER. CODE:
STATUS RESPECTIVE TO THIS AIRCRAFT: UNKNOWN [ ] OWNER [X] RENTER [ ] LESSEE [ ]

A.T.C. LICENCE CLASSIFICATION THIS FLIGHT
NONE [ ] 4 [ ] 7 RF [ ] 7 AAD [ ] 7 AAM [ ]
1 [ ] 5 [ ] 7 FT [ ] 7 AIRA [ ] 8 [ ]
2 [ ] 6 [ ] 7 AP [ ] 7 AC [X] 9 [ ]
3 [ ] 7 APS [ ] 7 A CONST. [ ]

PILOT IN COMMAND
NAME: SAME AS OWNER [ ] OPERATOR [ ] OR
William Koshylanyk
ADDRESS: Ste. 4, 501 - 28 St. West, Prince Albert, Saskatchewan
LICENCE NUMBER: WGA-1163
STATUS IF NOT OWNER OR OPERATOR: UNAUTHORIZED USER [ ] EMPLOYEE [X] RENTER [ ] BORROWER [ ] CLUB MEMBER [ ] OTHER [ ]
SPECIFY:

OTHER CREW ON BOARD (3)
NONE [ ] THIRD PILOT [ ] FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ] FLIGHT OBSERVER [ ] NO. OF CABIN ATTENDANT(S):
SECOND PILOT [X] NAVIGATOR [ ] CREWMAN [ ] TECHNICIAN [ ]

PASSENGERS NUMBER ON BOARD: Nil

MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION

Serial No. 11629

AIRCRAFT	REGISTRATION	MAKE	MODEL	TOTAL HRS.	MAXIMUM CERT. TAKE-OFF WEIGHT	YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
	CF-IDS	Consolidated	28SACF	10,765+	30,500 lbs.	1942

CATEGORY
AEROPLANE [X] GLIDER [ ] VTOL [ ]
HELICOPTER [ ] GYRO COPTER [ ] GYRO GLIDER [ ]
DIRIGIBLE [ ] FREE BALLOON [ ] OTHER [ ]
IF OTHER SPECIFY:
HOME BUILT YES [ ] NO [X]
ULTRA LIGHT YES [ ] NO [X]

LANDING GEAR
AMPHIBIOUS (HULL) [X] FLOATS [ ]
RETRACTABLE WHEELS [ ] FIXED WHEELS [ ]
SKI-WHEEL [ ] WHEEL FLOATS [ ]
HULL [ ] SKIDS [ ]
FLOAT-SKID [ ]
SKIS [ ]
OTHER [ ] IF OTHER SPECIFY

LANDING GEAR CONFIGURATION
TRICYCLE [X] OTHER [ ]
TAIL WHEEL [ ]

WING/ROTOR
LOW-WING [ ] BI-PLANE [ ]
HIGH-WING [X] MID-WING [ ]
SINGLE-ROTOR [ ] TWIN-ROTOR [ ]
OTHER [ ]

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
NONE [ ] TOWING GEAR [ ]
AMBULANCE [ ] AIR-DROP (CARGO) [ ]
AIR-DROP (PARACHUTIST) [ ] PHOTO [ ]
MAGNETOMETER [ ] SLING/HOIST [ ]
WATER BOMBING [X] SPRAY DUST [ ]
MONSOON GEAR [ ] OTHER [ ]
IF OTHER SPECIFY:

23-0003 (8-69)

000253

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ENGINE(S) MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.	NUMBER INSTALLED
Pratt & Whitney	R 1830-92	A81137 & 363858	Two

TYPE: SUPERCHARGED PISTON ☐ PISTON ☒ TURBO-COMPOUND ☐ JET TURBINE WITH AFTERBURNER ☐ TURBO PROP ☐ JET TURBINE ☐ OTHER ☐ IF OTHER SPECIFY

POWER: 1100 RATED H.P. ____ RATED THRUST

PROPELLER(S) MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.
Hamilton Standard	23E50-473	AP306 & 76098

TYPE: FIXED WOODEN ☐ FIXED METAL ☐ VARIABLE PITCH ☐ CONSTANT SPEED ☒ CONSTANT SPEED FULLY FEATHERING ☐

SUB-TYPE: REVERSIBLE ☐ NOT REVERSIBLE ☒

ENVIRONMENT IDENTIFICATION (1)

OPERATION

SCOPE THIS FLIGHT: INTERNATIONAL ☐ DOMESTIC ☒ NOT KNOWN ☐

LOAD DESCRIPTION: NONE ☒ PASSENGERS ☐ PARACHUTIST ☐ FREIGHT/EXPRESS ☐ CARGO/PASSENGERS ☐ WATER/CHEMICAL ☐ PESTICIDES ☐ POLES/TOWERS ☐ FISH/FISH EGGS ☐ PHOTO EQUIPMENT ☐ FERTILIZER ☐ SIGN/DROGUE ☐ GLIDER ☐ OTHER ☐ IF OTHER SPECIFY:

LOAD POSITION: INTERNAL ☐ EXTERNAL ☐ N/A. ☐

OBJECTIVE (2)

ADVERTISING ☐ CONTROL ☐ DEMONSTRATION ☐ FIRE CONTROL ☒ HOISTING ☐ INSPECTION ☐
TRANSPORTATION ☐ SURVEY ☐ SPRAY/DUST/SEEDING ☐ SEARCH ☐ RECREATION ☐ TESTING ☐
TOWING ☐ TRAINING ☐ FERRYING ☐ POSITIONING ☐ OTHER ☐ SPECIFY:

PRELIMINARY VERSION OF ACCIDENT (3)

PROVIDE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT AND NARRATE AS MANY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT AS ARE KNOWN AT THIS TIME, BEGINNING WITH THE FIRST IRREGULARITY OF THE FLIGHT.

The aircraft collided with Canso CF-HTN. CF-IDS had just dropped a load of water on a forest fire. CF-HTN was turning right in the vicinity of a crashed helicopter. The right outer span of CF-IDS and the left outer span of CF-HTN were severed from their respective aircraft and the aircraft fell out of control to the ground.

PRELIMINARY POST-OCCURRENCE DATA

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: NONE ☐ MINOR ☐ SUBSTANTIAL ☐ DESTROYED ☒ UNKNOWN ☐

NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

	KILLED	SERIOUS INJURY	MINOR INJURY	UNINJURED
PILOT-IN-COMMAND	1			
OTHER CREW	1			
PASSENGERS				
PERSONS OUTSIDE AIRCRAFT				

INVESTIGATION: BY CIVIL AVIATION INSPECTOR(S) ONLY ☐ BY ~~CIVIL AVIATION AND AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTORS~~ Accident Investigators Tech. & Oper. ☒ BY AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTOR(S) ONLY ☐ BY CORRESPONDENCE ☐ D.N.H.W. ASSISTANCE ☐ TECHNICAL/METALLURGICAL EXAM. ☐

000254

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION DIVISION

REGIONAL REF. W1801 & W1802
H.Q. REF. 500
AIRCRAFT REG. CF-HTN

REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO AN AIRCRAFT

(1) ACCIDENT [X] DISAPPEARANCE [ ] INCIDENT [ ]
NEAR MISS [ ] OTHER [ ]

FOR INSTRUCTIONS SEE REVERSE SIDE OF EACH PAGE

AT (Name of nearest gazetted place): 60 miles north-west of Fort Smith
PROVINCE: N.W.T.
GEOGRAPHIC CO-ORDINATES: 60°35'N, 113°16'W
DATE: DAY 1 MONTH Sept. YEAR 1971
TIME (Standard Time Local): 1445 M.S.T.
REGION: PACIFIC [ ] WESTERN [X] CENTRAL [ ] ONTARIO [ ] QUEBEC [ ] ATLANTIC [ ]

PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION (2)

OWNER
NAME: Field Aviation Company Limited
ADDRESS: Box 6023, Toronto AMF

OPERATOR
NAME: SAME AS OWNER [ ] OR Northwestern Air Lease Ltd.,
ADDRESS: 11519 - 134th St., Edmonton 41, Alta.
ATC LICENCE NUMBER: 1948/70 (c)
H.Q. USE OPER. CODE:
STATUS RESPECTIVE TO THIS AIRCRAFT: UNKNOWN [ ] OWNER [ ] RENTER [ ] LESSEE [X]

A.T.C. LICENCE CLASSIFICATION THIS FLIGHT
NONE [ ] 4 [ ] 7 RF [ ] 7 AAD [ ] 7 AAM [ ]
1 [ ] 5 [ ] 7 FT [ ] 7 AIRA [ ] 8 [ ]
2 [ ] 6 [ ] 7 AP [ ] 7 AC [X] 9 [ ]
3 [ ] 7 APS [ ] 7 A CONST. [ ]
However apparently not valid for PBY5A

PILOT IN COMMAND
NAME: SAME AS OWNER [ ] OPERATOR [ ] OR Gordon Frederick Hales
ADDRESS: 10706 - 106 Ave., Edmonton, Alta.
LICENCE NUMBER: XDA-1070
STATUS IF NOT OWNER OR OPERATOR: UNAUTHORIZED USER [ ] EMPLOYEE [X] RENTER [ ] BORROWER [ ] CLUB MEMBER [ ] OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

OTHER CREW ON BOARD (3)
NONE [ ] THIRD PILOT [ ] FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ] FLIGHT OBSERVER [ ] NO. OF CABIN ATTENDANT(S) [ ]
SECOND PILOT [X] NAVIGATOR [ ] CREWMAN [ ] TECHNICIAN [ ]

PASSENGERS NUMBER ON BOARD: Nil

MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION

Serial No. 48275

AIRCRAFT	REGISTRATION	MAKE	MODEL	TOTAL HRS.	MAXIMUM CERT. TAKE-OFF WEIGHT	YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
	CF-HTN	Consolidated Vultee	PBY-5A	5750+	30,500 lbs.	1942

CATEGORY
AEROPLANE [X] GLIDER [ ] VTOL [ ]
HELICOPTER [ ] GYRO COPTER [ ] GYRO GLIDER [ ]
DIRIGIBLE [ ] FREE BALLOON [ ] OTHER [ ]
IF OTHER SPECIFY:
HOME BUILT YES [ ] NO [X]
ULTRA LIGHT YES [ ] NO [X]

LANDING GEAR
AMPHIBIOUS (HULL) [X] FLOATS [ ]
RETRACTABLE WHEELS [ ] FIXED WHEELS [ ]
SKI-WHEEL [ ] WHEEL FLOATS [ ]
HULL [ ] SKIDS [ ]
FLOAT-SKID [ ]
SKIS [ ]
OTHER [ ] IF OTHER SPECIFY

LANDING GEAR CONFIGURATION
TRICYCLE [X] OTHER [ ]
TAIL WHEEL [ ]

WING/ROTOR
LOW-WING [ ] BI-PLANE [ ]
HIGH-WING [X] MID-WING [ ]
SINGLE-ROTOR [ ] TWIN-ROTOR [ ]
OTHER [ ]

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
NONE [ ] TOWING GEAR [ ]
AMBULANCE [ ] AIR-DROP (CARGO) [ ]
AIR-DROP (PARACHUTIST) [ ] PHOTO [ ]
MAGNETOMETER [ ] SLING/HOIST [ ]
WATER BOMBING [X] SPRAY DUST [ ]
MONSOON GEAR [ ] OTHER [ ]
IF OTHER SPECIFY:

23-0003 (8-69)

000255

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ENGINE(S) MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.	NUMBER INSTALLED
Pratt & Whitney	R-1830-92	65359 & 323354	Two

TYPE: SUPERCHARGED PISTON ☐ PISTON ☒ TURBO-COMPOUND ☐ JET TURBINE WITH AFTERBURNER ☐ TURBO PROP ☐ JET TURBINE ☐ OTHER ☐ IF OTHER SPECIFY

POWER: 1100 RATED H.P. ____ RATED THRUST

PROPELLER(S) MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO.
Hamilton Standard	23E50-473	RRE-7480 RRC-3636

TYPE: FIXED WOODEN ☐ FIXED METAL ☐ VARIABLE PITCH ☐ CONSTANT SPEED ☒ CONSTANT SPEED FULLY FEATHERING ☐

SUB-TYPE: REVERSIBLE ☐ NOT REVERSIBLE ☒

ENVIRONMENT IDENTIFICATION (1)

OPERATION

SCOPE THIS FLIGHT: INTERNATIONAL ☐ DOMESTIC ☒ NOT KNOWN ☐

LOAD DESCRIPTION: NONE ☒ PASSENGERS ☐ PARACHUTIST ☐ FREIGHT/EXPRESS ☐ CARGO/PASSENGERS ☐ WATER/CHEMICAL ☐ PESTICIDES ☐ POLES/TOWERS ☐ FISH/FISH EGGS ☐ PHOTO EQUIPMENT ☐ FERTILIZER ☐ SIGN/DROGUE ☐ GLIDER ☐ OTHER ☐ IF OTHER SPECIFY:

LOAD POSITION: INTERNAL ☐ EXTERNAL ☐ N/A. ☒

OBJECTIVE (2)

ADVERTISING ☐ CONTROL ☐ DEMONSTRATION ☐ FIRE CONTROL ☒ HOISTING ☐ INSPECTION ☐
TRANSPORTATION ☐ SURVEY ☐ SPRAY/DUST/SEEDING ☐ SEARCH ☐ RECREATION ☐ TESTING ☐
TOWING ☐ TRAINING ☐ FERRYING ☐ POSITIONING ☐ OTHER ☐ SPECIFY:

PRELIMINARY VERSION OF ACCIDENT (3)

PROVIDE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT AND NARRATE AS MANY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT AS ARE KNOWN AT THIS TIME, BEGINNING WITH THE FIRST IRREGULARITY OF THE FLIGHT.

CF-HTN was involved in a collision with Canso CF-IDS. CF-HTN was circling to the right over a helicopter CF-OKV, which had crashed 30 - 45 minutes earlier. CF-IDS had completed dropping a load of water on a fire just prior to the collision.

PRELIMINARY POST-OCCURRENCE DATA

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE: NONE ☐ MINOR ☐ SUBSTANTIAL ☐ DESTROYED ☒ UNKNOWN ☐


NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

	KILLED	SERIOUS INJURY	MINOR INJURY	UNINJURED
PILOT-IN-COMMAND	1			
OTHER CREW	1			
PASSENGERS				
PERSONS OUTSIDE AIRCRAFT				

INVESTIGATION: BY CIVIL AVIATION INSPECTOR(S) ONLY ☐ BY Accident Investigators Tech. & Oper. ☒ BY AIRWORTHINESS INSPECTOR(S) ONLY ☐ BY CORRESPONDENCE ☐ D.N.H.W. ASSISTANCE ☐ TECHNICAL/METALLURGICAL EXAM. ☐

000256

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Feb.

ACCIDENT NUMBERING SYSTEM

The introduction of computer data storage of aircraft accident information ... the Ministry of Transport has resulted in a new accident numbering system. Thi system will also have several improvements over the previous numbering:

- The file number assigned will apply to all agencies eliminating the present confusion caused by Region and Headquarters file numbers being different.
- The numbering will incorporate a coding whereby the accident number will convey at a glance several pieces of information: Region of origin, year of occurrence, collisions, foreign aircraft accidents.
- Reports released to the aviation community will carry this number; correspondents to the ministry will therefore employ a number known to all agencies.

Description of New System

1. Each Region will be assigned a block of 9999 for each decade in increments of 1000 per year. This means that in 1970 the numbers will run from 0001-0999; in 1976 the numbers will run from 6001-6999, and so on.
2. These blocks of numbers will be prefixed by the region code letter as follows:

Atlantic	A
Central	C
Ontario	Ø
Pacific	P
Quebec	Q
Western	W
Headquarters	H

(an accident to a Canadian aircraft outside Canada will be prefixe

3. Accidents other than collisions and foreign aircraft will be numbe sequentially from 001-799.
4. Accidents involving two or more aircraft in collision will be ass numbers from 801-899. A number will be assigned to each aircra involved; this is a departure from the previous system in whic number was assigned to one accident.
5. Accidents to foreign aircraft in Canada will be assigned n 901-999.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Library and Archives Canada
395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, ON KIA 0N4

Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
395, rue Wellington
Ottawa, ON KIA 0N4

For material still subject to legislative, contractual or institutional obligations, users warrant that they will respect those obligations and not use LAC collections in a manner that would infringe the rights of others. Liability that may arise in the use of a copy is assumed in full by the user. LAC accepts no responsibility for unauthorized use of collection material by users.


To ensure proper citation and to facilitate relocation of an item, the source of the material and its reference number should always accompany the copy.

Pour les documents faisant encore l'objet d'obligations législatives, contractuelles ou institutionnelles, les usagers s'engagent à respecter ces obligations et à ne pas utiliser les documents des collections de BAC de façon à nuire aux droits d'autrui. Ils doivent assumer entièrement toute responsabilité qui pourrait découler de l'utilisation d'une reproduction de document. BAC décline toute responsabilité quant à l'utilisation non autorisée de documents provenant de ses collections.

Afin de citer un document avec exactitude et d'en faciliter le repérage, sa source et son numéro de référence doivent toujours accompagner la reproduction.

TITLE/TITRE Aircraft- Accidents and Collisions - CF-HTN Canso & CF-IDS Canso , 1971-09-01 - 1972-05-14
RG 012 - Transport MG ____ R- ____ SERIES/SÉRIE____
ACCESSION 1986-87/039 VOL ____PAGE(S) ____
BOX/BOÎTE 37 REEL/BOBINE ____
FILE/DOSSIER 5002-W-1801/ 5002-W-1802, v. 1
DATE October 24, 2018

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



South

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Lawrence Caseway
Fort Resolution


I am employed as a firefighter. I have been on this fire about 6 weeks.
I heard the helicopter crash yesterday but did not see it. It sounded like the engine went fast. I went over to the helicopter. The pilot sat up once as we ran to him & went back down again. We didn't see him get up anymore. He was lying right against the chopper & it was burning & so was the grass so we moved him. We put out the grass fire. It lit again & then we put it out again.

One bomber was circling overhead & one was coming. The one with the red wing dropped the water & was flying straight. I saw wings fall down, black smoke & the planes fall down. I didn't go to the bombers.

Lawrence Caseway

witnessed by
D Denyka
2 Sept 71

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Laurence Casaway

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Marcel Norn
Fort Resolution


Yesterday we were cutting a fire line & we saw the helicopter pass by. Not very long after we heard a big noise. It was just a bang like something hitting the ground. I didn't know what it was until after we got on the prairie and we saw the helicopter was down. We went to it & the pilot was lying on the ground. We pulled him away and put the fire out. We wait there & finally another helicopter came & we signalled and he landed. He was talking then to somebody on the radio. He took off again & we wait & wait & while we wait 2 planes came. A big one circled 2 or 3 times & the other one was coming & dropped his water & took off & then went down again after he hit the other one. The wings fell down. The one that was circling was coming down looking like he was going to land and was turning left. The bomber that dropped the water came up and the started going back down again with level & the he hit the other one and they both went down. I heard the aircraft hit but heard no other strange noises.

(Witness unable to read)

D Doyle
12 Sept 71

000263

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Herbert Beaulieu
Fort Resolution

I am employed as a firefighter. I have been on fire 6 for about 2 months.
I heard the helicopter hit the ground. We ran. It was down. Mike sat up when we were 200 feet away. He fell back down. We moved him. It kept burning because gas was leaking.
After a while we saw the Canso. One was circling & the other Canso was coming from the Slave River. One was circling. The other one bombed water. He turned to the left. The other one was turning right. I saw them hit each other. As soon as they hit one blew up & the other one didn't.

Witnessed by
D Davies
12 Sept 71

Herbert Beaulieu

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Herbert Brunsdon

pds

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Statement of Henry Pierrot
Fort Resolution

I was working as a firefighter yesterday at Henry's Camp.
I heard a helicopter crash at about 2 o'clock but didn't see it. It sounded like an explosion. I ran to the helicopter and it was burning. The pilot was right beside the chopper so we moved him away. The grass was burning. He didn't talk. 2 guys I don't know bandaged him.

While I was at the helicopter I saw one bomber circle around to the right. Another one came through and dropped water east of the helicopter. Both bombers disappeared from my sight. I heard a noise at about 3 o'clock and saw both bombers crash to the ground + one burst into flames immediately. I saw the wings come off. I believe when they hit the bomber circling was still banked about 30° to the right + going down but I don't know the height. The bomber that had dropped water I believe was banked to the left about the same angle as the other one and he was pulling up just as they do after dropping the water.

There wasn't much smoke in the area at the time of the accident.


Witnessed by
D Douglas
12 Sept 71

Henry Pierrot

000267

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

South



H Pierrat

DD

North

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Modest


Statement of Mandeville
Fort Resolution

I am a firefighter — camp cook.
I have been in this camp since 20 Aug 71. Yesterday I was in camp. The Pierrot came in camp & told me there was a chopper crash. Then I got up & grabbed a towel & some water & ran to the scene which was about ½ mile away. Then I tried to give help. All I see was this guys mouth was full of dirt & I cleared it as much as I could. I could see that he was conscious. While doing this the bomber was flying around. Then I noted a second one coming. I didn't pay too much attention at the time as I was busy with Mike — the helicopter pilot. Then looked up & just as I looked up I noticed the plane was sort of banking & that was at the point they crashed. I would say she burst into flames immediately in the air. Then there was flies around so me & Henry decided to come over & see if there were any survivors. We knew that it was hopeless to go to where the plane was burning so we started looking for this other one. Found them & they were beyond help. At the time of the crash in the air I could only see one aircraft and it was turning (going west turning south). I think this was the one that dropped water

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

that burned and also the one I saw at the time of the crash in the air.
I saw the wing fall off.

Frederick Vandervelde



Just starting to bank
struck something & then saw wings falling.

witnessed by
[illegible] 2 Sept 71

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

5002 - W1801
- W1802.

NORCANAIR / PRINCE ALBERT, SASKATCHEWAN / PHONE 764-4271 / AREA CODE 306

September 9th, 1971

Mr. Don Douglas
Superintendent of Accident Investigation
Ministry of Transport
Federal Bldg.
9820 - 107th Street
EDMONTON, Alberta

Dear Sir:

Enclosed as per your request are the Technical Log books for Canso 28 - 5 ACF aircraft registration CF - I D S which was involved in a mid-air collision and destroyed by fire, the Certificate of Registration and Certificate of Airworthiness were destroyed with the aircraft.

Enclose also are copies of the Company journey log book for the year 1971 up to and including August 27th which was the last sheet received at Head Office, the original log and any subsequent copies were destroyed in the aircraft.

It should be noted that all Technical Logs are kept at our Head Office and data from the journey log sheets and check sheets is transposed into them by our Secretary.

Advise if you should require more engineering information regarding subject aircraft.

Yours truly,

ALBERT MALENA, Manager
Engineering and Maintenance

AM/ej
Encl.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Inform*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à*

Let Keith Hansell

know when our report is

just about ready to go

so that he can come

here + discuss our

conclusions +


recommendations with us

to ensure maximum

validity.

000272

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL
11111 - Jasper Avenue

Name of Deceased: KURYLUK: MR. PETER Case No: 71-D.O.A.

Service of Doctor WILLOUGHBY/CANTOR

Date of Autopsy Sept. 4/71 Autopsy No: PM- 176

Cause of Death:

Primary: ① Laceration of diaphragm, mesentery & rupture of Aorta
② Multiple fractures, ribs, sternum, skull.
③ Hemorrhage into the chest & cavity.
④ Water bomber air plane crash

Immediate:

T D
Signature of Pathologist

Report Flow:

- ☐ Administration
- ☑ Medical Record
- ☐ Attending Physician
- ☐ File

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL
11111 - Jasper Avenue

Name of Deceased: WILLMS: MR. PETER Case No: 71-D.O.A.

Service of Doctor WILLOUGHBY/CANTOR

Date of Autopsy Sept. 4/71 Autopsy No: 71- 175

Cause of Death:

Primary: ① Awa burn of the body including the internal organ
② Multiple traumatic injuries, fractures - th
③ Water-borne airplane crash.

Immediate:

T R
Signature of Pathologist

Report Flow:

- ☐ Administration
- ☑ Medical Record
- ☐ Attending Physician
- ☐ File

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL
11111 - Jasper Avenue

Name of Deceased: KOSHYLANYK: BILL Case No: 71-D.OA.

Service of Doctor WILLOUGHBY/CANTOR

Date of Autopsy Sept. 4/71 Autopsy No: 71- 174

Cause of Death:

Primary: ① Severe burn of the body beyond recognition
② Multiple fractures & injuries.
③ Water burn air plane crash.

Immediate:

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

KOSHYLANYK MR. PETE
Pm

Signature of Pathologist

176

Report Flow:

- ☐ Administration
- ☑ Medical Record
- ☐ Attending Physician
- ☐ File

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL
11111 - Jasper Avenue

Name of Deceased: HALES: MR. GORDON Case No: 71-D.O.A.

Service of Doctor WILLOUGHBY/CANTOR

Date of Autopsy Sept/ 4/71 Autopsy No: 71- 173

Cause of Death:

Primary: Laceration of the heart, liver, and lung.
Multiple traumatic fractures, ribs, sternum, base of skull.
Multiple abrasion injury, skin of body.
Hemhge int the chest cavity.
Water Borne Air plane crash

Immediate:

T Pg
Signature of Pathologist

Report Flow:

- ☐ Administration
- ☑ Medical Record
- ☐ Attending Physician
- ☐ File

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

~~0830~~ 2145
1
14:45

MEMORANDUM

TO:

File No.:

Date:

FROM: WCAI

SUBJECT: **Aircraft Accident Notification.**

Aircraft: Canso PBY-5A - HTN SM
- IDS SM
F/N.

Owner and Operator:

Pilot and Crew:

Date and Time: ~~pm~~ afternoon Sept 1/71

Point of Departure: unk Work out ~~FS~~ SM base

Intended Landing: unk

Location: So. Shore G.T. Slave L. Fire 6. 60 N. S.M.

Names of Passengers: unk.

Injuries: nil survivors

Nature of accident: Mid-air coll.

Damage:

Info Received: From: Dept of Forestry N.W.T. Via:

Time: 15:45

Infractions:


Action Taken: Proceed to SM

Action to be Taken:


Reported to OW
Stby No
at 16:30 Sept. 1/71

.....


Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*




Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*



Document [redacted] ed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*




CF-1 DS


Cpt - William KOSHYLANYK ~~Koshylanyk~~ ANYK

1st Officer Peter WILLIAMS

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*




HIN
Care — contact with ground
to be left
Cut sharp ends in trees
Right wing rolled a



Propeller





Propeller

000283

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

#1. From unburned Canso. - Radios.

Mk 12A Narco.

Left head set to 122.8
Knob not movable from above.
R head set to 109.5
dial mangled but knob movable.

#2

Mk 12A Narco.

Left 122.8
Knob not movable from above.
Right 110.2
Knob movable

#3

HF sel switch
set to Chan. 7.

From RCMP. SM
Sept 23/71

W. Jabik.
&
R.H. Cook.

000284

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

DOCUMENT TRANSIT AND RECEIPT

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

WITH DOCUMENT		WITHOUT DOCUMENT
☐	TOP SECRET	☐
☐	SECRET	☐
☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐
☐	RESTRICTED	☐
☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐

TO
Dr. M.S. Beare
R.M.O.
750 Federal Building
Edmonton, 14, Alberta.

4085(TRL)
FILE OR SERIAL NUMBER

QTY.	COPY NO. (S)	REFERENCE	DESCRIPTION
			Re: IEM 71-51 - G. Hales IEM 71-52 - B. Koshylanyk IEM 71-53 - P. Kuryluk IEM 71-54 - P. Willms Results Ethanol and Carbon Monoxide (in duplicate)

RECEIPT REQUIRED YES ☑ NO ☐

SIGNATURE

DATE

FROM
Defence & Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine
1107 Avenue Road, Toronto 305, Ontario.
SIGNATURE
RANK
UNIT
DATE 8 Oct 71

DND 728
7530-21-562-7371

CONSIGNEE'S COPY

000285

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

EDMONTON GENERAL HOSPITAL

LAST NAME	GIVEN NAMES	HOSPITAL NUMBER
KIRBY	MR DAVID ALBAD	549931

ADDRESS	ELIGIBLE YES	ELIGIBLE NO	PHONE NUMBER	SEX AND MAR. STAT.	PREVIOUS ADM.	DATE OF ADMISSION
8X28 10149-161 ST EDM						AUG 29,71

OCCUPATION OF PATIENT	INSURANCE COVERAGE	INS. OPTION	FORMS SIGNED

DATE OF BIRTH	AGE	TIME OF ADM.	WALKING	CHAIR	STRETCHER	RELIGION	DOCTOR
XXXXXX		8:20 p.m.	☐	☐	☐		STAFF / Easton / Graham

GUARANTOR AND RELATIONSHIP TO PATIENT	EMPLOYER OF GUARANTOR	LENGTH EMPLOYED

PROVISIONAL DIAGNOSIS: D.B. A 8AX PLANE CRASH — EAS

WCB	FORM COMPLETED	IF WCB STATE HOW AND WHERE ACCIDENT OCCURRED
YES ☐ NO ☐	YES ☐ NO ☐	

TREATMENT RECORD

161-71

HISTORY AND CLINICAL FINDINGS

Plane accident approx 4:30 p.m. today

FINAL DIAGNOSIS

TREATMENT

Treatment — D.O.H. 8:20 p.m. — Dr. Graham.

DISPOSITION: ADMIT ☐ HISTORY ☐ DONE ☐ NOT DONE ☐ DICTATED DISCHARGE ☑ OTHER ☐ — TIME DISCHARGED 8:30 p.m.

NURSES NOTES

VISON CHECK WITH ☐ OR WITHOUT GLASSES ☐ — RIGHT EYE / LEFT EYE /

TEMP	PULSE	RESP.	BLOOD PRESSURE
			/

To morgue for autopsy
Clothes at Body - Valuables taken by R.C.M.P.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

CHECK THE FOLLOWING:
PRIVATE ☑ STAFF ☐ INTERN ☐ NAME OF INTERN _____

SIGNATURE R.N.

SIGNATURE M.D.

EMERGENCY MEDICAL RECORD

PHYSICIAN

000286

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

479 - 5921

Frank Platt

1. What in his opinion is best bombing procedure? Does he have literature on it?
2. Is a bird dog necessary? Why?
3. What is best method of using bird dog? Why?
4. Is it necessary for bird dog to lead bombers on their runs or is it satisfactory or maybe better for the bird dog to remain above bombers & provide coordination & control?
5. What are the relative merits of helicopters versa fixed wing as the bird dog vehicle?
6. Are any modifications to bombing procedure being currently studied?
7. Are there any issues of controversy about bombing procedure & if so what are they?

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

- natural tenders can lowest bid
- assess pursuit skill : a/c
- ~~a~~ what is already required
- skills + judgment should not be overlooked
  or cost unless staggering.

Nat Parks + N.W.T. not foggiest concept.
Ottawa's fault.
dy procedures, training
- not the bomber group unless they provide a bird dog a/c + that co. not some other co. - ideal
  always have to sell for less.
- bird dog pilot be highest skilled bomber pilot + group lead bomber 2nd most skilled.

Is function a/c platform for 2 people with different duties
- pilot - delivery of retardant
- recon targets before run from aerial safety point of view.
- once it is decided area can be bombed
- Bird dog officer decides what amount of retardant is needs + where
- the pilot goes in + ensures bombers can do what they are visiting to do snags, updrafts downdrafts, never lose sight of lead direction to approach, etc.

One is against strategy vs. safety

000288

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

bird dog leads — 2 methods
- peel off over fire or waggle wings — agree bird dog pilot / bomber pilot.
- vis on bell bombs where to peel off.
Improved technique which we subscribe to if vis good enough — goes into circuit / checks bombs gone / circuit below / ahead of them.
Bomber then does nothing or his own judgement left / right, hold on, etc., now pull trigger.

- more than one a/c a group of bombers appoint air attack boss. Coordinate movements of a/c on that fire dropper or fixed wing main concern — right fires bombed - group one, group two, etc.

Air attack boss

plus one bird dog a/c for each group of bombers.

Para cargo work

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Stay away from sector 3 will be dropping cargo

Bird dog – rotating beacon + warbler siren. Supplied by Forestry – war ground crews. circuit procedures are responsibility of bird dog pilot – our manual has no responsibility in air safety. do not coerce pilots

better aim from behind) helicopter is out because of speed.

Contract calls for bomber + bird dog.

may be set out + recovers to land spot fire all done but only if we are sure of his ability + experience.

so our policy that no bomber goes in without bird dog.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

B.C. duplicate Alb. procedure
Ont convinced Alta syst is best.

122.5
122.8 AFS

Do not allow bird dog officer to talk to pilots at all.
None to ground except by differed radio. BDO gets video for fix loss. Five line frequency — never the 2 should mix.

Communication is a real part of the safety problem

Minimum specs for pilots?
What should these be?

000291

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Sept 1/71.

MEMORANDUM

TO: WCA
WCAW
WCAR
WCAE
WCAT

File No.: 5008-1 (WCAI)

Date: 7 Sept. 1971

FROM: WCAI

SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident Notification.

Aircraft: Cansos CF-HTN & CF-IDS

Owner and Operator: CF-HTN being operated by Northwestern Air Lease, ownership not certain at present. Possibly Field Aviation.
CF-IDS owned by Norcanair.

Pilot and Crew: CF-IDS: Capt. William Koshylanyk, WGA-1163; Co-Pilot Peter John Willms WGC-8606
CF-HTN: Capt. Gordon Frederick Hales, XDA-1070
Co-Pilot: Peter Kuryluk XDS-797.

Date and Time: 1 September 1971, approximately 1445 hrs. M.S.T.

Point of Departure: Fort Smith

Intended Landing: Fort Smith after numerous river pick-ups and water drops at Fire 6

Location: Fire 6 - 68 miles N.W. of Fort Smith

Names of Passengers: None

Injuries: All crew instantly killed at ground impact.

Nature of accident: CF-HTN was circling a crashed helicopter and reporting the crash on a frequency other than the fire control frequency. CF-IDS came through on a normal water drop, dropped water, pulled up, did a normal turn to the left and collided with CF-HTN which was circling to the right. Right wing of CF-IDS and left wing of CF-HTN became detached near the attachment point of outer span. Both aircraft spiralled to the ground. CF-IDS reportedly on fire prior to striking ground.

Damage: CF-IDS almost totally consumed by fire; CF-HTN did not burn but was very extensively broken up.

Info Received: From: RCMP Via: Telephone

Time: 1500 hrs. M.S.T., 1 Sept. 1971

Infractions: None apparent

Action Taken: Scene visited. Autopsies performed.

Action to be Taken: Full investigation by WCAI.

.....

Regional Superintendent,
Accident Investigation.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS - CREW

(1) AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION: CF-IDS

PERSONAL DATA-QUALIFICATIONS

COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER. (2)

CREW MEMBER

PILOT-IN-COMMAND [X] | 2ND PILOT [ ]
3RD PILOT [ ] | FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ]
NAVIGATOR [ ] | CREWMAN [ ]
CABIN ATTENDANT [ ] | FLIGHT OBSERVER [ ]
OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

STATION OCCUPIED

NOT KNOWN [ ] | PILOT SEAT [X]
SECOND IN COMMAND SEAT [ ] | FLIGHT ENGINEER SEAT [ ]
NAVIGATOR SEAT [ ] | REST POSITION [ ]
PASSENGER CABIN [ ] | OTHER [ ]
SPECIFY:

SPECIAL FUNCTION

NONE [X] | INSTRUCTOR [ ]
COMPANY EXAMINER [ ] | D.O.T. EXAMINER [ ]
TECHNICIAN [ ] | STUDENT [ ]
OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

PERSONAL DATA

AGE: 44 | SEX: Male | SURNAME: Koshylanyk | INITIALS: W | LICENCE NUMBER: WGA-1163

LICENCES AND PERMITS HELD

CANADIAN [X] | FOREIGN [ ]
NONE [ ]
UNKNOWN [ ] | AIRLINE TRANSPORT [X]
SENIOR COMMERCIAL [ ] | COMMERCIAL [ ]
PRIVATE [ ] | STUDENT PERMIT [ ]
FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ] | NAVIGATOR [ ]
GLIDER [ ] | GYROPLANE [ ]
BALLOON [ ] | MAINTENANCE ENGINEER [ ]

AIRCRAFT CLASSIFICATIONS

HELICOPTER ONLY [ ]
SINGLE-ENGINE LAND [ ] | SINGLE-ENGINE SEA [ ]
S.E. LAND AND SEA [ ] | S. & MULTI ENGINE LAND [ ]
S. & MULTI ENGINE SEA [ ] | S. & M.E. LAND AND SEA [X]

AIRCRAFT TYPE ENDORSEMENTS

HELICOPTER [ ] | GYROPLANE [ ]
DC3, PBY 5A

RATINGS

NONE [ ]
INSTRUCTOR CL 1 [ ]
INSTRUCTOR CL 2 [ ]
INSTRUCTOR CL 3 [ ]
INSTRUMENT 1 [X]
INSTRUMENT 2 [ ]
BLOCK AIRSPACE [ ]
NIGHT [ ]

EXPERIENCE – FLYING TIME (To nearest hour - if unknown complete with X)

	ALL TYPES	THIS TYPE	DUAL ON THIS TYPE	THIS U/C CONFIGURATION	SINGLE ENGINE	MULTI ENGINE	ACTUAL INSTRUMENT	NIGHT	NIGHT X-COUNTRY	ROTOR-CRAFT
TOTAL HOURS	5025+	400+	2+05	400+	2073:30+	2951:30+	56:00+	100:20+	95:00+	N:1
HRS. LAST 90 DAYS	193	193	N:1	193	N:1	193	None	Probably	none	N:1

FATIGUE FACTORS

FLYING TIME	TOTAL LAST 3 DAYS	TOTAL THIS FLIGHT	HOURS AWAKE SINCE LAST REST PERIOD
	Approx 2 HRS.	Approx 2 HRS.	Approx 8 HRS.

PILOT FLIGHT PREPARATION

COMPLETE ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

WEATHER BRIEFING

NONE [X] | ACCREDITED BRIEFER [ ] | COMPANY FACILITY [ ] | OTHER PILOT [ ] | OTHER OBSERVER [ ]
UNKNOWN [ ] | ACCREDITED FORECASTER [ ] | SELF BRIEFING [ ]

OTHER BRIEFINGS

NONE [X]
UNKNOWN [ ] | ROUTE [ ]
DEPARTURE PROCEDURES [ ] | OPERATION [ ]
ARRIVAL PROCEDURES [ ] | NOTAMS [ ]

DOCUMENTS CARRIED

NONE [ ]
COCKPIT CHECK LIST [ ] | FLIGHT OR OPERATING MANUAL [ ]
ADEQUATE VFR [X] | INADEQUATE VFR [ ]
ADEQUATE IFR [ ] | INADEQUATE IFR [ ]

FLIGHT PLAN FILED

NONE [ ] | SVFR [ ]
IFR [ ] | CONTROLLED VFR [ ]
VFR [ ] | FLIGHT NOTIFICATION [X]

EXECUTION OF FLIGHT TO START OF OCCURRENCE

ADHERENCE TO PLAN

NO DEVIATION [X]
ALTERATION FOR WX [ ]
ALTERATION FOR TRAFFIC [ ]
BECAME LOST [ ]
ALTERATION FOR U/S [ ]
OTHER [ ] SPECIFY:

PHASE OF FLIGHT DURING WHICH FIRST IRREGULARITY OCCURRED

GROUND
START-UP [ ] | MOORING [ ]
STATIONARY [ ] | DOCKING [ ]
TAXIING [ ] | RAMPING (AMPHIBIOUS) [ ]
AIR-TAXIING [ ] | SHUT DOWN [ ]
STEP-TAXIING [ ] | PARKING [ ]
BEACHING [ ]

TAKEOFF
LINE-UP [ ]
RUN [ ]
LIFTOFF [ ]
HOVER [ ]

IN-FLIGHT
CLIMB [ ]
DESCENT [ ]
CRUISE [ ]
LEVEL TURN [ ]
CLIMBING TURN [X]
DESCENDING TURN [ ]
TRANSLATION [ ]
HOVER [ ]

LANDING
INITIAL APPROACH [ ]
FINAL APPROACH [ ]
FLARE [ ]
HOVER [ ]
TOUCH-DOWN [ ]
RUN-OUT [ ]
TURN-OFF [ ]

OTHER
LOAD-PICKUP [ ]
LOAD DROP [ ]
LOAD POSITIONING [ ]

NAVIGATION AND APPROACH AIDS

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE [ ]

AIDS AVAILABLE	V.H.F. D.F.	DME	VOR	TACAN	ILS	ASR	PAR	ADF	LORAN	L.F. RNG	NONE
IN AIRCRAFT								X		X	
ON GROUND											X
IN USE BY A/C AT TIME OF OC.											

000293

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS - CREW

(1) AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION: CF-IDS

PERSONAL DATA-QUALIFICATIONS

COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER. (2)

CREW MEMBER

- PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐
- 2ND PILOT ☒
- 3RD PILOT ☐
- FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐
- NAVIGATOR ☐
- CREWMAN ☐
- CABIN ATTENDANT ☐
- FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐
- OTHER ☐
- SPECIFY:

STATION OCCUPIED

- NOT KNOWN ☐
- PILOT SEAT ☐
- SECOND IN COMMAND SEAT ☒
- FLIGHT ENGINEER SEAT ☐
- NAVIGATOR SEAT ☐
- REST POSITION ☐
- PASSENGER CABIN ☐
- OTHER ☐
- SPECIFY:

SPECIAL FUNCTION

- NONE ☒
- INSTRUCTOR ☐
- COMPANY EXAMINER ☐
- D.O.T. EXAMINER ☐
- TECHNICIAN ☐
- STUDENT ☐
- OTHER ☐
- SPECIFY:

PERSONAL DATA	AGE	SEX	SURNAME	INITIALS	LICENCE NUMBER
	28	Male	Willms	P.J.	WGC-8606

LICENCES AND PERMITS HELD

- CANADIAN ☒ FOREIGN ☐
- NONE ☐
- UNKNOWN ☐
- AIRLINE TRANSPORT ☐
- SENIOR COMMERCIAL ☐
- COMMERCIAL ☒
- PRIVATE ☐
- STUDENT PERMIT ☐
- FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐
- NAVIGATOR ☐
- GLIDER ☐
- GYROPLANE ☐
- BALLOON ☐
- MAINTENANCE ENGINEER ☐

AIRCRAFT CLASSIFICATIONS

- HELICOPTER ONLY ☐
- SINGLE-ENGINE LAND ☐
- SINGLE-ENGINE SEA ☐
- S.E. LAND AND SEA ☐
- S. & MULTI ENGINE LAND ☐
- S. & MULTI ENGINE SEA ☐
- S. & M.E. LAND AND SEA ☐

AIRCRAFT TYPE ENDORSEMENTS

- HELICOPTER ☐
- GYROPLANE ☐

RATINGS

- NONE ☐
- INSTRUCTOR CL 1 ☐
- INSTRUCTOR CL 2 ☒
- INSTRUCTOR CL 3 ☐
- Expired INSTRUMENT 1 ☒
- INSTRUMENT 2 ☐
- BLOCK AIRSPACE ☐
- NIGHT ☒

EXPERIENCE – FLYING TIME (To nearest hour - if unknown complete with X)

	ALL TYPES	THIS TYPE	DUAL ON THIS TYPE	THIS U/C CONFIGURATION	SINGLE ENGINE	MULTI ENGINE	ACTUAL INSTRUMENT	NIGHT	NIGHT X-COUNTRY	ROTOR-CRAFT
TOTAL HOURS	1700+	193	5	193	1520	180+	44	Not Known		Nil
HRS. LAST 90 DAYS	157	157	Nil	157	Nil	157	Nil	Probably none		Nil

FATIGUE FACTORS

FLYING TIME	TOTAL LAST 3 DAYS	TOTAL THIS FLIGHT	HOURS AWAKE SINCE LAST REST PERIOD
	Approx. 2 HRS.	Approx. 2 HRS.	Approx. 8 HRS.

PILOT FLIGHT PREPARATION

COMPLETE ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

WEATHER BRIEFING

- ACCREDITED BRIEFER ☐
- NONE ☒
- COMPANY FACILITY ☐
- UNKNOWN ☐
- OTHER PILOT ☐
- ACCREDITED FORECASTER ☐
- OTHER OBSERVER ☐
- SELF BRIEFING ☐

OTHER BRIEFINGS

Probably NONE ☒

- UNKNOWN ☐
- ROUTE ☐
- DEPARTURE PROCEDURES ☐
- OPERATION ☐
- ARRIVAL PROCEDURES ☐
- NOTAMS ☐

DOCUMENTS CARRIED

- NONE ☐
- COCKPIT CHECK LIST ☐
- FLIGHT OR OPERATING MANUAL ☐
- ADEQUATE VFR ☒
- INADEQUATE VFR ☐
- ADEQUATE IFR ☐
- INADEQUATE IFR ☐

FLIGHT PLAN FILED

- NONE ☐
- SVFR ☐
- IFR ☐
- CONTROLLED VFR ☐
- VFR ☐
- FLIGHT NOTIFICATION ☒

EXECUTION OF FLIGHT TO START OF OCCURRENCE

ADHERENCE TO PLAN

- NO DEVIATION ☒
- ALTERATION FOR WX ☐
- ALTERATION FOR TRAFFIC ☐
- BECAME LOST ☐
- ALTERATION FOR U/S ☐
- OTHER ☐
- SPECIFY:

PHASE OF FLIGHT DURING WHICH FIRST IRREGULARITY OCCURRED

GROUND

- START-UP ☐
- MOORING ☐
- STATIONARY ☐
- DOCKING ☐
- TAXIING ☐
- RAMPING (AMPHIBIOUS) ☐
- AIR-TAXIING ☐
- SHUT DOWN ☐
- STEP-TAXIING ☐
- PARKING ☐
- BEACHING ☐

TAKEOFF

- LINE-UP ☐
- RUN ☐
- LIFTOFF ☐
- HOVER ☐

IN-FLIGHT

- CLIMB ☐
- DESCENT ☐
- CRUISE ☐
- LEVEL TURN ☐
- CLIMBING TURN ☒
- DESCENDING TURN ☐
- TRANSLATION ☐
- HOVER ☐

LANDING

- INITIAL APPROACH ☐
- FINAL APPROACH ☐
- FLARE ☐
- HOVER ☐
- TOUCH-DOWN ☐
- RUN-OUT ☐
- TURN-OFF ☐

OTHER

- LOAD-PICKUP ☐
- LOAD DROP ☐
- LOAD POSITIONING ☐

NAVIGATION AND APPROACH AIDS

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: ADEQUATE ☒ INADEQUATE ☐

AIDS AVAILABLE	V.H.F. D.F.	DME	VOR	TACAN	ILS	ASR	PAR	ADF	LORAN	L.F. RNG	NONE
IN AIRCRAFT								X		X	
ON GROUND											X
IN USE BY A/C AT TIME OF OC.											

000294

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS

MATERIAL (1)

DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM CONDITIONS Condition A B S U A – NOT DETERMINED S – SERVICEABLE B – NOT INSTALLED U – UNSERVICEABLE	FUNCTION AFFECTED	COMPONENT/SUB-SYSTEM CAUSING PROBLEM	NATURE OF COMPONENT SUB-SYSTEM FAILURE
CANOPY WINDSCREEN (S)			
DE-ICING-AIRFRAME (S)			
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM - UP TO CONSUMER DEVICE (S)			
EMPENNAGE - FIXED SURFACES (S)			
ENGINES, ANCILLARIES AND CONTROLS (S)			
FLIGHT CONTROLS (S)			
FLAPS-SPOILERS-DIVEBRAKES AND CONTROLS (S)			
FLUIDS AND GASES (S)			
FUEL SYSTEM-UP TO MIXTURE CONTROL DEVICE (S)			
FUSELAGE-STRUCTURE SKIN (S)			
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM & ALL HYDRAULIC DEVICES (S)			
INSTRUMENTS, FLIGHT DATA; DETECTORS, CIRCUITS (S)			
INSTRUMENTS, SYSTEMS DATA; DETECTORS, ETC. (S)			
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM; OXYGEN-CABIN PRESS (B)			
LIGHTING-INTERNAL/EXTERNAL (A)			
PANELS/DOORS/WINDOWS/HATCHES/HOUSINGS (S)			
PROPELLER(S) AND CONTROLS (S)			
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (S)			
RADIO NAVIGATION SYSTEM-AURAL, VIS, AUTO. (A)			
MAIN ROTOR-BLADES, STRUCTURE, DRIVETRAIN (B)			
TAIL ROTOR-BLADES, STRUCTURE, DRIVETRAIN (B)			
LANDING GEAR, WHEELS, TIRES, BRAKES, STRUC. (S)			
WARNING SYSTEMS-VISUAL, AURAL (S)			
WING-STRUCTURE, SKIN (S)			
AUTO PILOT (B)			

BASIC DATA (2)

PRE-OCCURRENCE

I.A.S. Approx 85 KTS

FUEL ON BOARD Approx 200 IMP. GALS.

CALCULATED A.U.W. 22,747.6 LBS

MIXTURE: RICH [X] LEAN [ ] AUTO [ ]

CARB. HEAT POSITION: HOT [ ] PARTIAL [ ] COLD [X]

C OF G POSITION _____ % MAC OR 242.4 INS AFT OF DATUM [X] FORWARD OF DATUM [ ]

C OF G PERMISSIBLE RANGE _____ % MAC TO _____ % MAC OR 242.2 INS TO 251.0 INS AFT OF DATUM [X] FORWARD OF DATUM [ ]

AT GROUND CONTACT

I.A.S. Approx 90 KTS

POWER SETTING: NONE [ ] PARTIAL [X] ASYMMETRIC [ ] FULL [ ]

LANDING GEAR POS'N: UNLOCKED [ ] UP [X] FIXED GEAR [ ] DOWN [ ]

FLAP POSITION: NO FLAPS [ ] UP [X] PARTIAL [ ] DOWN [ ]

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS (2)

AT POINT OF FIRST IRREGULARITY OF FLIGHT IF APPLICABLE

AIRCRAFT CONDITIONS
HEIGHT AGL ____ FT
TERRAIN ELEVATION ____ FT. ASL

CLOUD NONE ☐ UNKNOWN ☐

	HT. AGL	HT. ASL	VERTICAL EXTENT	AMOUNT
LOWEST LAYER	FT	FT	FT	/10
SECOND LAYER	FT	FT	FT	/10

VISIBILITY
AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT ____ MILES

RESTRICTING PHENOMENA: NONE ☐ SMOKE ☐ CLOUD ☐ BLOWING DUST ☐ BLOWING SNOW ☐ FOG ☐ HAZE ☐ PRECIPITATION ☐ BLOWING SAND ☐ ICE CRYSTALS ☐

PRECIPITATION
NONE ☐ RAIN ☐ DRIZZLE ☐ SNOW ☐ FREEZING DRIZZLE ☐ HAIL ☐ FREEZING RAIN ☐
LIGHT ☐ MODERATE ☐ HEAVY ☐

TEMPERATURE AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT
°F
°C

WIND UNKNOWN ☐ AT AIRCRAFT HEIGHT
DIRECTION °TRUE
SPEED KTS

ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY
NONE ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ STATIC ☐ ST. ELMOS FIRE ☐ VIOLENT DISCHARGE ☐

SPECIAL HAZARDS
NONE ☐ BIRDS ☐ PARACHUTIST ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ AIRFRAME ICING ☐ TURBULENCE ☐ TALL STRUCTURE ☐ WHITE OUT ☐ AIR TRAFFIC ☐ HOAR FROST ☐ GLASSY WATER ☐ OTHER ☐
SPECIFY:

IN AREA WHERE AIRCRAFT CAME TO REST (3)

CLOUD NONE ☒ But middle & high cloud. UNKNOWN ☐

	BASE HT.	TOP HT.	AMOUNT
LOWEST BASE	FT AGL	FT AGL	SCATTERED ☐ BROKEN ☐ OVERCAST ☐
SECOND LAYER	FT AGL	FT AGL	SCATTERED ☐ BROKEN ☐ OVERCAST ☐

TEMPERATURE AT GROUND LEVEL 70 °F. UNKNOWN ☐

DEW POINT AT GROUND LEVEL Approx 52 °F. UNKNOWN ☐

WIND AT GROUND LEVEL UNKNOWN ☐
DIRECTION North Easterly ° MAGNETIC
SPEED 10 – 15 M.P.H.
CHARACTERISTICS: STEADY ☒ SWINGING ☐ GUSTY ☐ UPWARD COMPONENT ☐ SUBSIDENCE ☐

VISIBILITY
AT SURFACE 15 MILES RVR ____ FT.

RESTRICTING PHENOMENA: NONE ☒ CLOUD ☐ BLOWING DUST ☐ HAZE ☐ PRECIPITATION ☐ BLOWING SAND ☐ FOG ☐ ICE CRYSTALS ☐ BLOWING SNOW ☐ SMOKE ☐

PRECIPITATION
NONE ☒ RAIN ☐ UNKNOWN ☐ FREEZING RAIN ☐ DRIZZLE ☐ SNOW ☐ FREEZING DRIZZLE ☐ HAIL ☐

SPECIAL HAZARDS
NONE ☒ UNKNOWN ☐ HOAR FROST ☐ BIRDS ☐ TURBULENCE ☐ SUN GLARE ☐ WIND SHEAR ☐ AIRFRAME ICING ☐ AIR TRAFFIC ☐ WHITE OUT ☐ GLASSY WATER ☐ OTHER ☐ DESCRIBE:

WEATHER DATA SOURCE
EYEWITNESS ☒ PILOT ☐ MET. OBSERVATIONS ☒ AFTERCAST ☐

LOCALE DESCRIPTION
GENERAL: MOUNTAINS ☐ HILLS ☐ ROLLING ☐ FLAT ☒
SPECIFIC: AERODROME ☐ CLEARING ☒ URBAN AREA ☐ ROAD ☐ SWAMP/MUSKEG ☐ TIDAL WATER ☐ RIVER ☐ BUSH ☐ LAKE ☐

OBSTRUCTIONS TO APPROACH/DEPARTURE N/A
NONE ☐ TREE(S) ☐ POLELINE ☐ HIGH GROUND ☐ TOWER(S) ☐ BUILDINGS ☐

SURFACE
GENERAL: PAVED ☐ SAND/GRAVEL ☐ SOIL ☒ SNOW ☐ ICE ☐ WATER ☐ ROCK ☐
SPECIFIC: CONCRETE ☐ ASPHALT ☐ COMPACTED ☒ LOOSE ☐ LOW VEGETATION/GRASS ☐ HIGH WAVES ☐ SWELLS ☐
HAZARDS N/A: NONE ☐ WATER FILM ☐ PUDDLES ☐ ICE PATCHES ☐ SLUSH ☐ SOFT ☐ ROUGH ☐ SNOW DRIFTS ☐

OBSTRUCTIONS TO T.O./LDG. RUN N/A
NONE ☐ VEHICLES ☐ DITCHES/HOLES ☐ ANIMALS ☐ ROCKS/DEBRIS ☐ PEDESTRIANS ☐ RIDGES/SANDBARS ☐ SNOW BANK ☐ POSTS/FENCES ☐ OTHER ☐
SPECIFY:

VITAL DATA
USABLE LENGTH ____ FT
USABLE WIDTH ____ FT
ELEVATION ____ FT
BRAKING ACTION: NIL ☐ POOR ☐ FAIR ☐ GOOD ☐ N/A

RUNWAY PROFILE / **AVERAGE SLOPE IN DEGREES**
LEVEL ☒ UP ☐ DOWN ☐ UP/DN ☐ UP/DN ☐

LIGHT CONDITIONS
BRIGHT DAY ☒ DARK DAY ☐ BRIGHT NIGHT ☐ DARK NIGHT ☐ TWILIGHT ☐ UNKNOWN ☐

000296

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

R

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER									
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☒	2ND PILOT ☐	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	**CARBON MONOXIDE**	**EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE**	**PESTICIDES**	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐	
COLD/ CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/ TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
	OTHER:
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
1 May 1971	Prince Albert	3-230-382

MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT		SPECIFY
1-1-1-1	Nil		YES ☐ NO ☐	

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

000297

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Bill Koshylowych

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER										
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐	2ND PILOT ☐	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐	
COLD/CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
	OTHER:
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER

MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	YES ☐ NO ☐	SPECIFY

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

Extremely burned + fragmented body of this pilot is compatible with immediate and prolonged burning of the aircraft after the crash.

000298

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER										
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐	2ND PILOT ☒	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐	
COLD/ CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/ TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
	OTHER:
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
5 Jan 1971	Regina	Bradley 3062-396

MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	SPECIFY
1-1-1-1	Nil	YES ☐ NO ☐	

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

000299

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Peter Williams (R)

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER										
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐	2ND PILOT ☐	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐	
COLD/CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
	OTHER:
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER	
MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	YES ☐ NO ☐ SPECIFY

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

Extreme burning and fragmented body of this passenger is compatible with immediate and prolonged burning of the aircraft after the Crash.

000300

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

OCCURRENCE DESCRIPTION (1) (R)

FIRST IRREGULARITY OF FLIGHT (2)

NARRATE THE EVENT(S) WHICH FIRST INDICATED THAT THE FLIGHT WAS NOT PROCEEDING AS DESIRED.

There is no evidence that the crew of CF-IDS was aware of any irregularity until the collision with CF-HTN occurred. It is probable that the crew of CF-IDS heard some radio messages from CF-HTN but this cannot be determined.

RESULTANT ACTION(S) • REACTION(S) (3)


NARRATE ALL THE ACTIONS OF THE PILOT; ALL THE REACTIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT TO PILOT DEMANDS; ALL INTERACTIONS OF PILOT, AIRCRAFT, AND ENVIRONMENT.

There majority of the evidence excludes evasive action having been taken prior to the collision. The aircraft would be completely uncontrollable after the collision.

TERMINAL EVENT (4)


DESCRIBE THE MOVEMENTS OF THE AIRCRAFT FROM THE MOMENT BEYOND WHICH CORRECTIVE ACTION COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO RETRIEVE THE SITUATION, OR FROM TOUCHDOWN PRECEDING A LANDING UNDER EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES.

The collision with CF-HTN severed a large portion of right wing from CF-IDS.




- CIRCLE THE SILHOUETTES WHICH MOST CLOSELY DESCRIBE ANGLE OF GROUND CONTACT
- DRAW A SQUARE AROUND SILHOUETTES TO DESCRIBE ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT AT REST

FRONT ELEVATION ▶



STARBOARD ELEVATION ▶



23-0003
(8-69)

000301

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ELEVATION VIEW OF LOCALE (1)

SKETCH IN SIGNIFICANT RUNWAYS, OBSTRUCTIONS, FLIGHT PATH, ETC.

(R)

SHOW IMPORTANT DISTANCES, DIMENSIONS.

Nothing pertinent in profile.

PLAN VIEW OF LOCALE (2) SKETCH IN SIGNIFICANT LANDING AREA, OBSTRUCTIONS, AIRCRAFT PATH, ETC.

SHOW IMPORTANT DISTANCES, DIMENSIONS.

N(Mag.)

Please refer to a blown up aerial photograph which contains relevant data and a directional arrow.

W

E

S

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

POST OCCURRENCE CONDITIONS

(R)

PERSONNEL

CREW	FATAL	SERIOUS	MINOR	UNINJURED	NOT PERTINENT	DIED AFTER 30 DAYS
PILOT-IN-COMMAND	☒	☐	☐	☐		☐
SECOND PILOT	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
THIRD PILOT	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
FLIGHT ENGINEER	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ALL OTHER CREW – NUMBER						
PASSENGER(S) – NUMBER						
PERSONS OUTSIDE A/C						

INJURY PATTERNS	HEAD	CHEST	LOWER TORSO	SPINE	ARM(S)	HAND(S)	LEG(S)	FOOT FEET	INTERNAL	MASSIVE
CREW/NO. OF PERSONS										2
PASS./NO. OF PERSONS										
PERSONS OUTSIDE										

EVENT CAUSING INJURY — NO. OF PERSONS INVOLVED	CREW	PASSENGERS	PERSONS OUTSIDE A/C
CONTACT WITH PROPELLER/INTAKE/EXHAUST			
FELL FROM AIRCRAFT (OR THROWN)			
STRUCK INTERIOR OF AIRCRAFT AT IMPACT	2		
STRUCK INTERIOR OF AIRCRAFT IN TURBULENCE			
STRUCK BY FLYING OBJECT INSIDE AIRCRAFT			
STRUCK BY AIRCRAFT			
BURNS ONLY			
BURNS FOLLOWING OTHER INJURIES			
CRUSHED IN WRECKAGE			
PULLED UNDERWATER			
CAME IN CONTACT WITH MAIN ROTOR			
CONTACT WITH TAIL ROTOR			
OTHER (SPECIFY)			

AIRCRAFT

DEGREE OF DAMAGE
- NONE ☐
- UNKNOWN ☐
- MINOR ☐
- SUBSTANTIAL ☐
- DESTROYED ☒

DAMAGE PATTERN
- ENGINE ☐
- PROPELLER ☐
- NONE ☐
- AFT FUSELAGE ☐
- COCKPIT ☐
- EMPENNAGE ☐
- NACELLE(S) ☐
- NOSE ☐
- WING(S) ☐
- UNDERCARRIAGE ☐
- MAIN ROTOR ☐
- TAIL ROTOR ☐
- TOTAL ☒

EVENT CAUSING DAMAGE
- AIRBORNE COLLISION ☒
- AIRBORNE COLLISION AND GROUND IMPACT ☐
- COLLISION ON GROUND/WATER ☐
- EXPLOSION ☐
- FIRE ☐
- AERIAL BREAK UP ☐
- SUBMERGENCE ☐
- GROUND/~~WATER~~ IMPACT ☒
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

OBJECT OF AIR COLLISION
- AIRCRAFT ☒
- BIRD(S) ☐
- BUILDING ☐
- DETACHED PORTION OF AIRCRAFT ☐
- POLE(S)/POST(S) ☐
- TOWER ☐
- TREE(S) ☐
- WIRE(S) ☐
- OTHER AIRBORNE OBJECT ☐
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

OBJECT OF GROUND COLLISION
- AIRCRAFT ☐ BUILDING ☐
- DETACHED PORTION OF A/C ☐ FENCE(S) ☐
- PEDESTRIAN ☐ TREE(S) ☐
- POST/WIRE ☐ VEHICLE ☐
- DITCH ☐ RIDGE ☐
- SNOW BANK ☐ OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

ENVIRONMENT

PROPERTY DAMAGE
- NONE ☒
- MINOR ☐
- EXTENSIVE ☐

PROPERTY DAMAGED
- RESIDENCE ☐
- PUBLIC BUILDING ☐
- PUBLIC UTILITIES INSTALLATION ☐
- VEHICLE ☐
- AIRFIELD FACILITY ☐
- DOMESTIC ANIMAL(S) ☐
- BARN/STORAGE ☐
- FARM CROP ☐
- AIRCRAFT ☐
- FENCE ☐
- OTHER ☐

SPECIFY:

000303

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

LIFE - PROTECTION DATA

(R)

CRASH PROTECTION

DEVICES

		SEAT(S)	SEAT ANCHORS (SETS)	LAP BELT(S)	SHOULDER HARNESS	BAGGAGE RESTRAINTS
CREW	NUMBER INSTALLED	2	X	2	2	0
	NUMBER USED	2	X	2	2	0
	NUMBER FAILED IN CRASH					
PASSENGERS	NUMBER INSTALLED		X			X
	NUMBER USED		X			X
	NUMBER FAILED IN CRASH					X

CRASH EVACUATION

AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT

	ESCAPE SLIDE	ESCAPE LADDER/ROPE	DINGHY	NORMAL EXITS	ESCAPE HATCHES	PORTABLE EXTINGUISHER
NUMBER INSTALLED	☐	☐	☐	9	☐	1
NUMBER USED	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0
NUMBER FAILED IMPROPER OPERATION	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0
NUMBER FAILED IN USE	☐	☐	☐	0	☐	0

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

PERSONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT

None being used.

DEVICES	OXYGEN MASK	CRASH HELMET	LIFE VEST/INDIVIDUAL FLOTATION DEVICE	FILTER MASK	PARACHUTE	IMMERSION SUIT
NUMBER BEING USED			0			
NUMBER FAILED DUE TO IMPROPER USE			0			
NUMBER FAILED IN OPERATION			0			

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

SEARCH AND RESCUE

PERTINENT ☐ NOT PERTINENT ☒

SEARCH SUCCESS

BY

NONE ☐ PROVINCIAL POLICE ☐
SAR ORGANIZATION ☐ MUNICIPAL POLICE ☐
PRIVATE AGENCY ☐ D.O.T. ☐
COMMERCIAL AGENCY ☐ OTHER ☐
R.C.M.P. ☐ SPECIFY:

DURATION

LESS THAN 4 HRS ☐
4 HRS. BUT LESS THAN 12 ☐
12 HRS. BUT LESS THAN 24 ☐
1 DAY BUT LESS THAN 2 ☐
2 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 4 ☐
4 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 7 ☐
7 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 14 ☐
14 DAYS OR MORE ☐

TYPE

GROUND ☐
AIR ☐
BOAT ☐
COMBINED AIR/BOAT ☐
COMBINED GROUND/AIR ☐
ALL ☐

LOCATING METHOD

L/F RADIO ☐ VISUAL-SMOKE/FIRE ☐
SARAH ☐ VISUAL-WRECKAGE ☐
AUTOMATIC CPI ☐ VISUAL PYROTECHNICS ☐
VHF/UHF HOMING ☐ VISUAL OTHER ☐
VISUAL-MIRROR ☐ OTHER ☐
NOT SUCCESSFUL ☐
IF OTHER SPECIFY ▶

SURVIVAL

PERTINENT ☐ NOT PERTINENT ☒

DEVICES

	TENT	SLEEPING BAG	FIRST AID KIT	EMERGENCY RATIONS	WEAPON	FISHING GEAR	FIRE SOURCE	PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
AVAILABLE-NOT USED	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
NOT AVAILABLE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
FAILED-IMPROPER USE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
NOT SATISFACTORY	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

000304

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

ANALYSIS

INVESTIGATOR'S APPRAISAL (1)

INDICATE WHICH ITEMS OF THE RECORDED FACTUAL DATA, IN THE VIEW OF THE INVESTIGATOR, CAUSED THE ACCIDENT.
DESCRIBE IN NARRATIVE HOW THE ITEMS INTERACTED TO CAUSE THE ACCIDENT.

RECOMMENDATIONS (2)

FOR REGIONAL USE

CAUSES

Photostat

There will only be one appraisal Page

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

AFFIRMATION OF THE CONTENT OF THIS REPORT

INVESTIGATOR(S) SIGNATURE(S)

REGIONAL SUPERINTENDENT COMMENTS (1)

REGIONAL SUPT. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION — DATE

REGIONAL CONTROLLER, CIVIL AVIATION — DATE

DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING THE DETAILS OF THIS REPORT AND APPENDED HERETO

POLICE REPORT ☐	MEDICAL REPORT ☐	MATERIAL LABORATORY REPORT ☐	WEATHER INFORMATION ☐
CRIME LABORATORY REPORT ☐	PATHOLOGIST'S REPORT ☒	PILOT'S STATEMENT (S) ☐	ATC TAPE/TRANSCRIPTION ☐
CORONER'S REPORT ☐	CASUALTY LIST ☐	WITNESSES' STATEMENT (S) ☒	TECHNICAL REPORTS ☒
MAPS AND CHARTS ☒	PASSENGER STATEMENTS ☐	OTHER ☐ SPECIFY:	

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL

INVESTIGATION

ELAPSED TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO INVESTIGATOR'S ARRIVAL ON THE SCENE: 2½ HRS.

ELAPSED TIME FROM ACCIDENT TO RECEIPT OF NOTIFICATION BY REGION: ¼ HRS.

EXPENDITURES

CASH: COST OF FARES, CHARTERS, ETC.: $

ALL OTHER CASH EXPENSES: $

TOTAL CASH EXPENDITURES: $

MAN-HOURS: TIME SPENT ON THIS CASE BY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR(S) INCLUDING TIME. HOURS:

H.Q. USE

CAUSE FACTORS ASSIGNED

Photostat.

We will only use one page 12.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER									
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND [X]	2ND PILOT [ ]	FLIGHT ENGINEER [ ]	CABIN ATTENDANT [ ]	OTHER [ ]	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR [ ]	3RD PILOT [ ]	CREWMAN [ ]	FLIGHT OBSERVER [ ]		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE [ ]

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	CARBON MONOXIDE	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	PESTICIDES	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED [ ] OBSERVED [ ] NOT INVESTIGATED [ ]

PHYSICAL

NONE [ ]	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION [ ]	FATIGUE [ ]
DROWSINESS [ ]	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS [ ]	NAUSEA [ ]
FEVERISHNESS/HOT [ ]	PAIN [ ]	DROWSINESS [ ]
NUMBNESS [ ]	DIARRHOEA [ ]	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES [ ]	STOMACH CRAMPS [ ]	
COLD/ CHILLS [ ]	DIZZINESS [ ]	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION [ ]	DEPRESSION [ ]
ANGER [ ]	ELATION [ ]
IMPATIENCE [ ]	LISTLESSNESS [ ]
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/ TENSENESS [ ]	PREOCCUPATION [ ]
	OTHER:
NONE EXPERIENCED [ ]	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE		NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
22 June 1971	Edmonton		Brand 4061-124
MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	SPECIFY
1-1-1-1	Nil	YES [ ] NO [ ]	

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY N/A

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

Compound fracture of both ankles, fractured sternum, open fracture of left humerus, fractured middle fossa of base of skull, fractured pelvis and ruptured bladder, tear of left atrium and ventricle of the heart, ruptured liver. The injuries were consistent with his being in the left hand seat but not controlling the aircraft at the moment of the crash. [redacted] The fractures of pelvis and skull were associated with force applied to the lower spine. Drugs found on him appeared to be tandearil (against arthritic pain), 292 (against pain), amphetamine (probably being used to control appetite for slimming) but there was no evidence that he was incapacitated at the time of the crash.

000307

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

(R)

(1) PRE-OCCURRENCE CONDITION - CREW

PERSONAL – COMPLETE A SEPARATE PAGE FOR EACH PERTINENT CREW MEMBER

CREW MEMBER									
	PILOT-IN-COMMAND ☐	2ND PILOT ☒	FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐	CABIN ATTENDANT ☐	OTHER ☐	SPECIFY:
	NAVIGATOR ☐	3RD PILOT ☐	CREWMAN ☐	FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐		

TESTS AND FINDINGS (2) QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

NO TESTS DONE ☐

ALCOHOL	BLOOD SUGAR	FOOD POISONING	DRUGS	OTHER TEST (S)
HYPOXIA	**CARBON MONOXIDE**	**EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE**	**PESTICIDES**	

SENSATIONS EXPERIENCED (3)

ADMITTED ☐ OBSERVED ☐ NOT INVESTIGATED ☐

PHYSICAL

NONE ☐	EXCESSIVE PERSPIRATION ☐	FATIGUE ☐
DROWSINESS ☐	MUSCLE SPASMS CRAMPS ☐	NAUSEA ☐
FEVERISHNESS/HOT ☐	PAIN ☐	DROWSINESS ☐
NUMBNESS ☐	DIARRHOEA ☐	OTHER:
VISION DIFFICULTIES ☐	STOMACH CRAMPS ☐	
COLD/ CHILLS ☐	DIZZINESS ☐	

EMOTIONAL

CONFUSION ☐	DEPRESSION ☐
ANGER ☐	ELATION ☐
IMPATIENCE ☐	LISTLESSNESS ☐
NERVOUSNESS ANXIETY/ TENSENESS ☐	PREOCCUPATION ☐
	OTHER:
NONE EXPERIENCED ☐	

MEDICAL HISTORY – LAST ROUTINE MEDICAL

DATE	PLACE	NAME AND/OR NUMBER OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
12 July 1971	Edmonton	McAllister 4455-124

MEDICAL PROFILE	RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED	RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT	SPECIFY
1-1-1-1	Nil	YES ☐ NO ☐	

TESTS OF PASSENGER CONDITIONS (4) TO BE COMPLETED ON PILOT-IN-COMMAND PAGE ONLY

CARBON MONOXIDE	FOOD POISONING	EXPLOSIVES RESIDUE	HYPOXIA	NONE PERFORMED

MEDICAL ANALYSIS – REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER TO DISCUSS ANY MEDICAL FACTORS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WERE INVOLVED IN THE OCCURRENCE.

Bilateral open fractured tibia and fibula, right arm amputated near shoulder, deep wound over front of right chest (not penetrating), lacerations of front of left knee, and abrasions of right upper thigh and scrotum and lower chest, open fractures of frontal bones, ruptured left diaphragm with stomach in chest, torn mesenteries, some bowel rupture, small tear in aorta, multiple rib fractures (near site of torn mesentery). The findings are consistent with the pilot being in the right seat ~~doing a banking manoeuver to the right~~ when the aeroplane crashed ~~while doing a roll to the right~~ and the control WHEEL caused the wound of the right chest. The abrasions appeared due to dragging and also the abrasions over the chest were consistent with being caused by the big seat belt of the Canso. There was no evidence of incapacitation of the pilot before the crash.

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

Tupper 1 Sec 2 Hgs 71

CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION DIVISION

REGIONAL REF. W1801 & W1802

H.Q. REF. 500

AIRCRAFT REG. CF-HTN

REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO AN AIRCRAFT

① ACCIDENT ☒ DISAPPEARANCE ☐ INCIDENT ☐

NEAR MISS ☐ OTHER ☐

FOR INSTRUCTIONS SEE REVERSE SIDE OF EACH PAGE

AT (Name of nearest gazetted place): 60 miles north west of Fort Smith — PROVINCE: N.W.T.

GEOGRAPHIC CO-ORDINATES: 60° 35' N, 113° 16' W — DATE: DAY 1 MONTH Sept YEAR 1971 — TIME (Standard Time Local): 1445 MST

REGION: PACIFIC ☐ WESTERN ☒ CENTRAL ☐ ONTARIO ☐ QUEBEC ☐ ATLANTIC ☐

PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION ②

OWNER

NAME: Field Aviation Company Limited — ADDRESS: Box 6023, Toronto AMF

OPERATOR

NAME: SAME AS OWNER ☐ OR: Northwestern Air Lease Ltd.

ADDRESS: 11519 134 St. Edmonton 41, Alberta

ATC LICENCE NUMBER: 1948/70(C) — H.Q. USE OPER. CODE:

A.T.C. LICENCE CLASSIFICATION THIS FLIGHT

NONE ☐ 4 ☐ 7 RF ☐ 7 AAD ☐ 7 AAM ☐
1 ☐ 5 ☐ 7 FT ☐ 7 AIRA ☐ 8 ☐
2 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 AP ☐ 7 AC ☒ 9 ☐
3 ☐ 7 APS ☐ 7 A CONST. ☐

However apparently not valid for PBY5A

STATUS RESPECTIVE TO THIS AIRCRAFT: UNKNOWN ☐ OWNER ☐ RENTER ☐ LESSEE ☒

PILOT IN COMMAND

NAME: SAME AS OWNER ☐ OPERATOR ☐ OR: Gordon Frederick Hales

ADDRESS: 10706 106 Ave. Edmonton, Alberta

LICENCE NUMBER: XDA-1070

STATUS IF NOT OWNER OR OPERATOR: UNAUTHORIZED USER ☐ EMPLOYEE ☒ RENTER ☐ BORROWER ☐ CLUB MEMBER ☐ OTHER ☐ SPECIFY:

OTHER CREW ON BOARD ③

NONE ☐ THIRD PILOT ☐ FLIGHT ENGINEER ☐ FLIGHT OBSERVER ☐ NO. OF CABIN ATTENDANT(S)

SECOND PILOT ☒ NAVIGATOR ☐ CREWMAN ☐ TECHNICIAN ☐

PASSENGERS NUMBER ON BOARD: Nil

MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION

Serial # 48275

AIRCRAFT	REGISTRATION	MAKE	MODEL	TOTAL HRS.	MAXIMUM CERT. TAKE-OFF WEIGHT	YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
	CF-HTN	Consolidated Vultee	PBY-5A	5750+	30,500 lbs	1942

CATEGORY

AEROPLANE ☒ GLIDER ☐ VTOL ☐
HELICOPTER ☐ GYRO COPTER ☐ GYRO GLIDER ☐
DIRIGIBLE ☐ FREE BALLOON ☐ OTHER ☐
IF OTHER SPECIFY:

HOME BUILT: YES ☐ NO ☒
ULTRA LIGHT: YES ☐ NO ☒

LANDING GEAR

AMPHIBIOUS (HULL) ☒ FLOATS ☐
RETRACTABLE WHEELS ☐ FIXED WHEELS ☐
SKI-WHEEL ☐ WHEEL FLOATS ☐
HULL ☐ SKIDS ☐
SKIS ☐ FLOAT-SKID ☐
OTHER ☐ IF OTHER SPECIFY

LANDING GEAR CONFIGURATION

TRICYCLE ☒ OTHER ☐
TAIL WHEEL ☐

WING/ROTOR

LOW-WING ☐ BI-PLANE ☐
HIGH-WING ☒ MID-WING ☐
SINGLE-ROTOR ☐ TWIN-ROTOR ☐
OTHER ☐

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

NONE ☐ TOWING GEAR ☐
AMBULANCE ☐ AIR-DROP (CARGO) ☐
AIR-DROP (PARACHUTIST) ☐ PHOTO ☐
MAGNETOMETER ☐ SLING/HOIST ☐
WATER BOMBING ☒ SPRAY DUST ☐
MONSOON GEAR ☐ OTHER ☐
IF OTHER SPECIFY:

000309