AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
FINAL REPORT # A0619890

Landing Gear System Failure

Cambridge Air Services Limited
Cessna 402C C6-KEV
Freeport, Grand Bahama,
Bahamas

April 21, 2006

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Accident Final Report

In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is not the purpose of aircraft accident investigation to apportion blame or liability. The sole objective of the investigation and the Final Report is the prevention of accidents and incidents.

INTRODUCTION

Operator:	**Cambridge Air Services Limited**
Manufacturer:	Cessna Aircraft Company
Model:	C402C Serial Number 402-0051
Nationality:	Bahamas
Registration:	C6-KEV
Place of Accident:	Freeport International Airport, Freeport, Grand Bahama, Bahamas
Date of Accident:	April 21, 2006
Investigating Authority:	Flight Standards Inspectorate
Investigator in Charge:	Delvin R. Major - Flight Standards Inspectorate
Notification:	Aircraft Manufacturer - Cessna Aircraft Company Propeller Manufacturer – McCauley Propellers Engine Manufacturer - Teledyne Continental Motors
Releasing Authority:	Bahamas Civil Aviation Department Mr. Cyril Saunders - Director
Investigation Team:	Delvin Major Philip Romer
Date of Report:	2006

Mrs. Glenys Hanna-Martin
Minister of Transportation

Mr. Cyril Saunders
Director of Civil Aviation

Captain Patrick Rolle
Manager of Flight Standards Inspectorate

The attached report summarizes an investigation made into the circumstances of an accident involving Cessna C402C aircraft, registration C6-KEV Serial Number 402-0051 that crashed on landing at Freeport International Airport, Freeport, Grand Bahama on April 21, 2006. There were no serious injuries sustained in the accident.

This report is submitted pursuant to Part XII, Regulation 80, and Schedule 19 of the Bahamas Civil Aviation (Safety) Regulation (17 April 2001) and in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO).

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Delvin R. Major,

Aviation Safety Inspectors
Flight Standards Inspectorate
Bahamas Civil Aviation Department

Methods of Investigation - This investigation was conducted at the mishap site. On the investigation team were:

Delvin R. Major	*Investigator- in-Charge*
Nassau, Bahamas	*Bahamas Civil Aviation Department*
Philip C. Romer	*Accident Investigator – Airworthiness*
Nassau, Bahamas	*Bahamas Civil Aviation Department*

SECTION A ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

ADDS	Aviation Digital Data Service
AGL	Above Ground Level
BASR	Bahamas Aviation Safety Regulations (April 17, 2001)
BDCA	Bahamas Department of Civil Aviation
BCAD	Bahamas Civil Aviation Department
C of A	Certificate of Airworthiness
C of R	Certificate of Registration
CAD	Civil Aviation Department
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CG	Center of Gravity
DCA	Director of Civil Aviation
EDT	Eastern Daylight Time (+5 hours to convert to UTC or Zulu time)
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FSI	Flight Standards Inspectorate
FT / ft	Feet
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IFO	International Field Office (FAA)
IFR	Instrument Flight Rules
IMC	Instrument Meteorological Condition
MEL	Minimum Equipment List
METAR	Meteorological Aerodrome Report
NM or nm	Nautical Miles
NTSB	National Transportation Safety Board
UTC	Universal Coordinated Time
USA	United States of America
VFR	Visual Flight Rules
VMC	Visual Meteorological Conditions
Z	Zulu or UTC refers to time in reference to Greenwich Mean Time

SECTION B SYNOPSIS

This accident occurred around 0423UTC 12:23EDT on April 21, 2006 at the Freeport International Airport, Freeport, Grand Bahama, Bahamas. The Cessna 402C aircraft was owned and operated privately by Cambridge Air Services Limited.

The State of Manufacturer of the airframe - Cessna, engines – Teledyne Continental Motors and propellers – McCauley Propellers (United States) was advised of the accident. Instrument Meteorological Conditions (night) prevailed at the time of the accident (see meteorological info section 1.7 of this report). The aircraft sustained substantial damages. The occupants of the aircraft consisted of three (3) passengers and one (1) crew. The pilot in command held a commercial Pilot rating and was certificated by the Federal Aviation Administration, (FAA). The pilot had completed a Bi-annual Flight Review - Instrument on February 22, 2006; however a review of pilot's logbook revealed that many of the data was falsified.

SECTION C OVERVIEW OF THE ACCIDENT

At approximately 0423UTC on April 21, 2006 the pilot reported that approximately 20 miles out of Freeport, both hydraulic pressure lights illuminated on the annunciator panel. He extended the gear and noticed only the right gear safe light illuminated. The pilot obtained the assistance of a passenger, who retrieved the aircraft pilot operating hand book and read the appropriate procedures as the pilot followed the instructions for emergency gear extension.

The pilot stated that he landed the aircraft on the right main gear, hoping this action would release the left main and nose gear. After realizing that this manoeuvre was not successful, he decided to initiate a go-around. Before he could get the aircraft airborne the left propeller made contact with the ground.

The aircraft touched down approximately 9,000 feet from the threshold of runway 06; which has a total length of 11,000 feet. The aircraft travelled approximately 1,500 feet on its right main wheel before it veered off the left shoulder of the runway, struck several trees and finally came to rest pointing in a north westerly direction. The approximate final position was measured to be 180 feet from the side of the runway. The aircraft left wing burst into flames. The left wing and left side of the fuselage was substantially damaged by fire. The four occupants escaped with only minor injuries.

SECTION 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION:

1.0 HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT

This private flight from Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida to Freeport International Airport, Freeport, Grand Bahama, Bahamas, was operated under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). The accident occurred on landing at Freeport International Airport on April 21, 2006.

The pilot reported that on April 20, 2006, he flew C6-KEV to Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport to have the flight control work on. The pilot noted that during the removal of the rudder actuator he noticed what seemed to be a red fluid on the ground. The pilot stated that he reported his observation to Mr. Chris Mackey (one of the share holders of the aircraft) who instructed him to have Mr. E. Bernard (Beetle) Godet (– FAA Mechanic – from T & B Aero), check out the alleged defect. Pilot further stated that Mr. Godet found two chafed hydraulic lines. Mr. Mackey asked Mr. Godet for the part number so that he could get the part. Mr. (Beetle) Godet said he specialized in repairing those lines (hydraulic lines) and asked Mr. Mackey to go to Banyan and buy some 3/8’ line so he could fix the defect.

The pilot stated that when he came back to the aircraft, after completing his shopping, he ran up the aircraft, bought fuel, loaded the aircraft and departed for Freeport, Grand Bahama, Bahamas.

The pilot reported that approximately 20 miles out of Freeport, both hydraulic pressure lights illuminated on the annunciator panel. He stated he extended the gear and noticed only the right gear safe light illuminated. The pilot obtain the assistance of a passenger, who retrieved the aircraft pilot operating hand book and read the appropriate procedures as he (pilot) followed the instructions for emergency gear extension.

The pilot further stated that he landed the aircraft on the right main gear, hoping this action would release the left main and nose gear. After realizing that this manoeuvre was not successful, he decided to initiate a go-around. Before he could get the aircraft airborne, the left propeller made contact with the ground. **The Pilot's statement is contained in Appendix**

The aircraft touched down approximately 9,000 feet from the threshold of runway 06; which is a total length of 11,000 feet. The aircraft travelled approximately 1,500 feet on its right main wheel before veering off the left shoulder of the runway, hitting some trees and finally stopping in a north westerly direction approximately 180 feet from the side of the runway. The left wing and the left side of the fuselage was substantially damaged by post impact fire.

Post accident investigation involved an interview with Mr. Godet the mechanic who worked on the aircraft. Mr. Godet stated the following;

Mr. E. Bernard (Beetle) Godet confirmed he did inspect and found two rigid hydraulic lines leaking. He confirmed placing the aircraft on jacks, fabricating two replacement hydraulic lines, installing those lines, replenishing the hydraulic reservoir with MIL-H-5606 and finally that he **did not** carry out the retraction and leak checks, as the hydraulic mule was not available until the next day.

Mr. (Beetle) Godet stated, he informed Mr. Mackey about not being able to complete the checks until the following day, because he did not have the tooling (hydraulic mule) to complete it. Mr. Beetle stated that Mr. Mackey suggested he (Beetle) therefore run the aircraft on the jacks. Mr. (Beetle) then stated, he told Mr. Mackey that he would only carry out the checks with a hydraulic mule. Mr. (Beetle) then stated, that Mr. Mackey told him that he would take care of the retraction test in the Bahamas. Mr. (Beetle) further stated, he did not return the aircraft to service in the correct manner as he did not complete the required checks. **Mr. Godet's statement is contained in Appendix**

Post accident statement and interview with Grand Bahama Air Traffic Services revealed that the pilot never reported any discrepancies or the fact that he was experiencing problems with his landing gear. **ATC statements contained in Appendix.**

1.2 INJURIES TO PERSONS

Minor.

1.3 DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

Aircraft substantially damaged.

1.4 OTHER DAMAGE

Two [2] runway light destroyed after making contact with left wing of aircraft.

1.5 PILOT INFORMATION

Captain David Nathan Hinds holder of airman license CP 436. He was 23 years old. A review of his logbook revealed the following;

- A biennial flight review was received on February 22, 2006 by Mr. Hinds. The name and license number of the instructor giving the review was illegible.

- On the same date and by the same instructor, an instrument competency check was received my Mr. Hinds.
- **In both above checks, there are no indication of what type of aircraft the checks were conducted in.**

- Flight training started in 2000.
- A private pilot airplane single engine land licence #2652636 was obtained on December 21, 2000 at approx 54.5 hours total time.
- A commercial / multi engine check ride was accomplished on May 17, 2001 in a BE-76 N6011E at approximately 207.6 hours total time, and 20.8 hour multi engine time. See **APPENDIX** .
- On December 15 2001, pilot total multi engine time showed 315.6 hours. One page later, total multi engine times for that page totalled 16.4 hours. The subsequent page totalled 21.4 hours, which for the last 3 pages totalled 353.1 multi engine hours. However pilot logbook shows a total of 525.9 hours an unexplained increase of 172.8 hours.
- Also on page where logbook totalled 16.4 hours, cross country hours totalled 367.5 hours and PIC time totalled 217.6 hours. The very next log page, total showed cross country time and PIC time increased to 525.9 hours a total unexplained increase of 158.4 hours for total cross country time and an increase of 308.3 hours for PIC time.
- On December 23 2001, pilot logged 4 flights in BE99 registration C6-RRM in logbook #2.
  - Freeport to Nassau to Freeport
  - Freeport to Governors Harbour to Freeport
  - Freeport to San Andros to Nassau
  - Freeport to Nassau
- However, in logbook #1 on same date of December 23, 2001, pilot logged 2 flights in a BE 200 N700MS in Orlando, Florida. Pilot logging flights, on same day in two different countries with two different aircraft.
- Numerous instances exist with pilot logging different aircraft numbers and flight times in different countries on the same day. Pilot kept two different logbooks and these different logbooks kept the running totals of the different aircraft and flight times on same day in different countries.
- In logbook #2, up to February 02, 2002, pilot total time was 182.8 hours, yet in another logbook #1 pilot total time was 565.5 hours for the same period up to January 31st 2002.
- In logbook #1up to June 23, 2002 pilot total time logged was 706.4 hours. In logbook #2, however his multi engine time was 787.7 for the same period, which surpassed his total time from previous logbook.
- On page 59 September 20 total multi engine time was 1119.9 hours. On page 60, 18.8 hours later, his total time had increased to 1157.5, a double increase of 18.8 hours.
- Time logged up to January 11, 2003 was 1506 hours second in command. On January 12 2003, times logged above as SIC mysteriously made their way in to the PIC column giving the pilot a brought forward PIC total from 0 hours to 1506 hours over the course of one day. (Page80)
- Up to May 11, 2003 there was no mention made of any time in a Cessna 402 aircraft.
- Also as of May 11 2003, logbook #2 ended with the following totals;
  - PIC total time 1879.3

- Cross country 1879.3
- Turbine time 1879.3
- Multi engine 1879.3
- Total flight 1879.3

- However, logbook #3 which opened sometime in August 2003 shows an opening balance of;
  - PIC total 3013.2
  - Cross country 3263.2
  - Turbine 2913.8
  - Multi engine 3033.5
  - Total flight 3033.5
- Therefore between May 2003 (close of old logbook) and August 2003 (beginning of new logbook) there exist an unexplained increase of;
  - PIC total 1133.9
  - Cross country 1383.9
  - Turbine 1034.5
  - Multi engine 1154.2
  - Total flight 1154.2
- Also of special interest is the addition of night time and actual instrument in logbook # 3 which started in August 2003, yet logbooks # 2 never made any reference to any night or instrument time being brought forward. However logbook #1 does have night and instrument times logged as night – total 43.7 hours and instrument - total 9.3 hours. No where else throughout the other logbooks(# 1 and # 2) is there logged any additional night or instrument time, yet in the brought forward total in logbook # 3, night was brought forward as 400.7 hours and instrument as 475.2 hours.
- From copy of medical certificate application made to the FAA on March 9, 2005 pilot wrote total time as 840 hours. However, up to March 2004, when logbook #3 started pilot total times brought forward was 3,033.5 hours.
- No record or logbook was available to show pilots time from march 2004 up to the time of the accident.

1.6 AIRCRAFT INFORMATION AND HISTORY

The mishap aircraft, C6-KEV a Cessna C402C serial number 402-0051 was manufactured in the United States in 1979. The aircraft was owned by and registered to Cambridge Air Services Limited on June 17, 2002. The aircraft was previously registered as C6-TAS. On November 30, 2005 C6-TAS was lease to Ms Karen Major by Mr. Mario Donato, major shareholder of Cambridge Air Services Limited. On December 21, 2005 the registration was changed from C6-TAS to C6-KEV as per the request of Mr. Mario Donato, owner of the aircraft. The aircraft was privately operated.

The aircraft airframe, propeller and engine logbooks have been reviewed and revealed the following: -

Aircraft:	C6-KEV
Owner by:	Cambridge Air
Operated:	Privately
Annual Inspection:	657.5 Hobbs time 20th December 2005
A/F Time prior to flight:	659.7 Hobbs 5375.7 A/F hours 20th April 2006
Avionics & Radio Checks:	10th November 2005
Weight & Balance:	22nd December 2005
AD Checklist:	21st April 2006
Left Hand Engine:	P/n TSIO-520VBCNBCVB(2), S/n 248270-R, Installed at 286.0 in TSO condition 14th December 2005
Right Hand Engine:	P/n TSIO-520VB(1), S/n 242406-R Installed at 182.00 in TSO condition 14th December 2005 both engine supplied by Certified Engines along with Airworthiness Directives compliance list.
Left Hand Propeller:	P/n 3AF32C505/82NEA S/n 002537 Installed in New condition at 182.7 A/F hobbs 25th April 2002
Right Hand Propeller:	P/n 3AF32C505/82NEA S/n 011126 Installed in New condition at 182.7 A/F hobbs 25th April 2002

1.7 METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The weather report for Grand Bahama from 0000 UTC revealed no significant weather. The forecast called for winds variable at 3 knots, few clouds at 3,000 feet, scattered clouds at levels 2,200 and 2,500 feet.

1.8 AIDS TO NAVIGATION

Navigational Aids not a factor in this mishap. Pilot use the navigational aids to navigate to Freeport and subsequently shot the Freeport ILS Runway 6 Approach.

1.9 COMMUNICATIONS

Communications not a factor. Communication was established with the Freeport Air Traffic Control.

1.10 AIRCRAFT LOADING

Load manifest recovered after the accident showed the aircraft at a maximum takeoff weight of 6,808 and aircraft center of gravity at 154 inches aft of data. From data provided aircraft appeared to be within the maximum allowable range.

1.10.1 AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE

Based on the loading of the aircraft and the center of gravity being within the allowable envelope, aircraft performance should not have been a factor in this accident.

1.11 COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER

Regulations did not require this aircraft to be outfitted with a cockpit voice recorder.

1.12 WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Aircraft wreckage and impact information diagram (not drawn to scale) contained in Appendix.

1.13 MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL

Only minor injuries were reported. No fatalities or serious injuries reported.

1.14 FIRE

There was a post impact fire, for details refer to **Photos APPENDIX**,

1.15 SURVIVAL ASPECTS

The accident was survivable.

1.16 TESTS AND RESEARCH

It has been determined from post accident inspection that the cable that connects the emergency blow down bottle system in the nose well of the aircraft to the T-handle in the cockpit, exhibited excessive play.

Although the cable was pulled to its fullest extent, it did not allow movement of the pin that would have provided activation of the system. (*Annual inspection report completed in December 2005 revealed that the portion of the Annual Inspection that required inspection of the emergency blow down bottle was not signed off by the mechanic as having been accomplished. However, the aircraft was returned to service with this discrepancy outstanding).*

ANALYSIS:

2.1 Immediate Causes of the Accident

Technology

- Aircraft hydraulic lines separated from actuator fitting.
- Aircraft lost all hydraulic fluid.
- Aircraft backup system - blow down bottle - did not discharge.
- Left main and nose gear did not extend.

Environmental Factors and Effects

- Aircraft departed late at night.
- Accident occurred at night.
- Aircraft burst into flames after coming to rest on the side of the runway.

Organisational

- Operator allowed an un-airworthy aircraft to be flown.
- Operator made decision to complete maintenance in Freeport as maintenance facility in Florida could not complete the required maintenance at that time.
- The operator allowed an un-authorized mechanic to perform work on a Bahamas registered aircraft.

People & Human Factors

- Pilot failed to determine the airworthiness status of the aircraft prior to acting as pilot in command (contrary to BASR Schedule 10).
- Pilot made poor decision and landed the aircraft more than 8,000 feet from the threshold of Runway 06. (More than half of the runway was not used initially).
- Pilot failed to execute a go around even though the aircraft was position well above the required glide path for making a safe landing within the appropriate landing zone.

2.2 Root Causes of the Incident

Technology

- Improper maintenance conducted on hydraulic lines.
- Failure of the hydraulic system.
- Depletion of Hydraulic fluid.
- Failure of the back up emergency blow down bottle system. It has been determined from inspection that the cable that connects the emergency blow down bottle system in the nose well of the aircraft to the T-handle in the cockpit, exhibited excessive play. Although the cable was pulled to its fullest extent, it did not allow movement of the pin that would have provided activation of the system. (*Annual inspection report completed in December 2005 revealed that the portion of the Annual Inspection that required inspection of the emergency blow down bottle was not signed off by the mechanic as having been accomplished. However, the aircraft was returned to service with this discrepancy outstanding).*
- Landing gear, left main and nose, failed to extend.

Environmental Factors and Effects

- Accident occurred at night.
- Aircraft departed late at night

Organisational

- Operator allowed aircraft to be flown in an un-airworthy condition.
- Operator allowed unqualified and not current pilot to be in command of aircraft.
- Operator allowed unqualified individual to perform maintenance on aircraft.

People & Human Factors

- Pilot exercised poor judgement by assuming command of an un-airworthy aircraft.
- Pilot's poor decision making ability and his failure to make corrective action in a timely manner indicative of pilot fatigue, as pilot stated that he was out all day shopping and left at such a late hour.
- Possibility exists that pilot may not have been qualified and / or current on type of aircraft, as numerous incidences where pilot falsified qualification and hours of experience on type of aircraft were noted in pilot's logbook.
- Pilot unfamiliar with systems and emergency procedures in type of aircraft evident based on his statement of his actions when he encountered the problem.
- Pilot failed to alert ATC of problem with landing gear system which further underscores his unfamiliarity with this aircraft's systems and emergency procedures and his not realizing the seriousness of his predicament.
- Pilot failed to declare emergency even though he was aware of the problem well in advance. This action seems to further downplay his accepting the seriousness of his condition.
- Review of aircraft records, revealed Annual inspection was completed in December 2005. It was also revealed that the portion of the Annual Inspection that required inspection of the emergency blow down bottle was not signed off by the mechanic as having been accomplished, yet the aircraft was returned to service.
- Mechanic failed to carryout maintenance in accordance with standard maintenance practises.

Others

- Aircraft left wing burst into flames after landing. Left side of the fuselage was extensively damaged and approximately 75% of the left wing was destroyed.
- Annual inspection report completed in December 2005 revealed that the portion of the Annual Inspection that required inspection of the emergency blow down bottle was not signed off by the mechanic as having been accomplished. However, the aircraft was still returned to service with this discrepancy existing.
- The mechanic was not authorized by the Bahamas Civil Aviation Department to perform work or return to service a Bahamas Registered aircraft.
- The mechanic did not complete the appropriate maintenance entry & return to service as required by BASR Schedule 5.

3.0 CONCLUSION

3.1 Probable Cause

The investigation determines that the probable causes of this accident to be the following;

- **Substandard maintenance that was performed.** (Due to the improper flange on the hydraulic line, the hydraulic line came loose from its housing and depleted the fluid from the hydraulic reservoir).

- **Failure of the back up emergency blow down bottle system**. It has been determined from inspection that the cable that connects the emergency blow down bottle system in the nose well of the aircraft to the T-handle in the cockpit, exhibited excessive play. Therefore even though the cable was pulled all the way to its fullest extent, it did not allow movement of the pin that would have provided activation of the system. ***Annual inspection report completed in December 2005 revealed that the portion of the Annual Inspection that required inspection of the emergency blow down bottle was not signed off by the mechanic as having been accomplished. However, the aircraft was returned to service with this discrepancy outstanding.***

- **Pilot's lack of qualification and unfamiliarity with this aircraft, its systems and emergency procedures.** ***(Evidence of falsification of qualification and time requirement exists in pilot's logbook)***

- **Pilot's poor decision making and impaired judgement.** ***(Possibility of impaired judgement due to pilot fatigue).***

- **Pilot's failure in assessing the severity of his situation.**

- **Pilot's failure to notify ATC of his problem.** ***(Problem was discovered 20 miles prior to the accident).***

- **Pilot's failure to properly assess the conditions for landing and maintain vigilant situational awareness while manoeuvring the aircraft after landing.** (From post accident inspection, it was noted that the flaps were not extended for the landing. Had it been extended the aircraft glide path as well as the distance required for roll out after landing may have been greatly decreased).

- **Pilot's failure to take immediate action once he realized his predicament.** ***(Pilot stated that after the propeller made contact with the ground, he decided to apply power and go around, but it was too late. Failure to act also can be attributed to possible pilot fatigue as (pilot was out all day shopping and then decided to leave at such a late hour) well as pilot's unfamiliarity with aircraft systems and performance capabilities).***

- **Pilot's failure to request Emergency Service Assistance**. ***Had this service been requested in a timely manner, preparations could have been made to prevent the fire from spreading to the degree in which it did.***

4.0 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS:

Recommendations of the Investigation

- Recommend that the Flight Standards Inspectorate initiate enforcement action against pilot for flying when not current and qualified and for falsification of records.

- Recommend that the Civil Aviation Department through the Flight Standards Inspectorate develop guidelines that provide stiffer penalties for individuals that violate the regulations by flying when not current or qualified, which could include license suspension or revocation.

- Recommend that the Civil Aviation Department through the Flight Standards Inspectorate develop guidelines to provide stiffer penalties for individuals that violate the regulations by falsifying records, which could include license revocation.

- Recommend that the Flight Standards Inspectorate initiate an investigation into the circumstances that led to an unauthorized mechanic performing work on a Bahamian Registered aircraft and make recommendations so as to prevent this from happening again in the future.

- Recommend that the Flight Standards Inspectorate develop policies that would ensure that all individuals or companies that intend to have their aircraft registered in the Bahamas, are made aware that no one that is not authorized by the department, can perform maintenance on any aircraft that is Bahamian registered.

- Recommend that an investigation be made to determine why gear backup blow down system did not activate as it was supposed to.

- Recommend that an investigation be made to determine why gear backup blow down system check was not accomplished as required by Annual Inspection.

- Recommend that enforcement action be initiated, if it is determined that mechanic was negligent in omitting this inspection required by the Annual Inspection Summary Sheet for this aircraft


CASE NUMBER: A0619890
N
24
N26'33.874 W78'41.064
Aircraft came to rest 10,400 from threshold of Rwy 06 and 180 feet from the shoulder of the runway
10,000'
N 26'33.887 W 78'41.037
Aircraft depart runway 10,100' from threshold of Rwy 06
Contact made with 2 left landing lights approximately 9,700 and 9,900' from threshold of Rwy 06
9,000'
N 26'33.965 W 78'40.962"
Aircraft started to depart runway 8,900 ft from threshold of Rwy 06
8,000'
Aircraft touchdown approx. 8,100' from threshold of Rwy 06
11,000 FEET
06
RAMP
FLIGHT STANDARDS INSPECTORATE
INVESTIGATOR: DELVIN R. MAJOR
LOCATION: FREEPORT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
COUNTRY: BAHAMAS
WEATHER: UNKNOWN
RUNWAY COND.: ASPHALT
DATE OF OCCURENCE: APRIL 21, 2006
TIME OF INCIDENT: 0425Z - 12:25EDT
DRAWN BY: DELVIN R. MAJOR
OCCURENCE: ACCIDENT
DATE DRAWN: APRIL 26, 2006
SCALE: NOT DRAWN TO SCALE


MYGF/FPO
Apt Elev 7'
ZFP 113.2 - On Airport
JEPPESEN
22 NOV 02
11-1
FREEPORT, BAHAMAS
GRAND BAHAMA INTL
N26 33.3 W078 41.9
AWOS
119.27
*GRAND BAHAMA Ground
121.7
*Tower
118.5
UNICOM 118.5
CAUTION: Birds in the vicinity of airport.
Minimum safe altitude over city is 1500'.
Two-way radio required.
05°W
Elev 7'
24
242°
200' 61m Stopway
11,000' 3352m
VOR
ARP
200' 61m Stopway
Elev 7'
06
062°
Control Tower
125'
60'
220'
Building Area
303'
161'
Feet 0 2000 4000 6000
Meters 0 500 1000 1500 2000
78-44
78-43
78-42
78-41
78-40
26-34
26-33
26-32
ADDITIONAL RUNWAY INFORMATION
RWY
06 MIRL REIL PAPI (angle 3.0°)
24 MIRL PAPI (angle 3.0°)
USABLE LENGTHS
LANDING BEYOND
Threshold
Glide Slope
TAKE-OFF
WIDTH
150' 46m
TAKE-OFF
All Rwys
1 & 2 Eng 1
3 & 4 Eng ½
FOR FILING AS ALTERNATE
Authorized Only When Twr operating
ILS Y Rwy 06
ILS Z Rwy 06
LOC Y Rwy 06
LOC Z Rwy 06
Other
A
B
C
D
700-2
800-2
NA
CHANGES: Communications.
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CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY
MODEL 402
MAINTENANCE MANUAL
INSPECTION TIME LIMITS
MODEL 402C

	FIRST 100 HOURS	EACH 100 HOURS OR EVERY YEAR	EACH 200 HOURS OR EVERY YEAR	SPECIAL INSPECTIONS	
				HOURS	YEARS
18. Nose Gear Steering Stop Block - Inspect for condition and security.	•		•		
19. Nose Gear Steering Bellcrank - Inspect for condition and security.	•		•		
20. Nose Gear Fork - Inspect for condition and security.	•				
21. Landing Gear Wheel and Tire - Check wear, pressure and condition.	•				
22. Landing Gear Doors - Inspect for condition and security.	•				
23. Brake System Plumbing - Inspect for leaks, hoses for bulges and deterioration, parking brake for operation.	•				
24. Brake Assemblies - Inspect for wear of lining and disc warpage.					
25. Brake Master Cylinders - Service.	•				
26. Parking Brake Handle Shaft and Pivot Points - Service.	•			EVERY 600	
27. Landing Gear Actuators and Control/Indicating System Functional Test - Perform test every one year or anytime the landing gear emergency blow-down bottle has been discharged or a landing gear actuator is replaced. (Refer to Chapter 32).					EVERY 1
28. Nose Landing Gear Drag Brace Inspection - For drag braces that have been in service for a total of 4,000 hours. Refer to Expanded Inspection for procedure.				EVERY 400	
29. Nose Landing Gear Drag Brace Inspection - For drag braces that have been in service for a total of 4,000 hours and have required crack removal. Refer to Expanded Inspection for procedure.				EVERY 200	
Hydraulic Landing Gear.					
1. Nose Gear Actuator Piston Rod End - Inspect for condition and security.		•			
2. Main Gear Actuator Piston Rod End - Inspect for condition and security.		•			
3. Emergency Blowdown System - Perform blowdown test.					EVERY 1
4. Emergency Gear Blowdown Bottle - Check pressure and hydrostatic test date.					EVERY 1
5. Emergency Gear Blowdown Bottle - Perform hydrostatic test.					EVERY 5
6. Emergency Gear Blowdown Control Cable - Inspect for condition, security and proper rigging.	•		•		

5-10-01 Page 17 Dec 2/96

Page No. _____

DATE	TOTAL TIME IN SERVICE	TACH OR RECORDING METER TIME	DESCRIPTION OF WORK PERFORMED— SIGNATURE & CERTIFICATE NO. OF PERSON PERFORMING WORK
	11,134.6		**TOTAL** brought forward from previous page
30-Oct-03	11,134.6	523.7	
			DATE: 30-10-2003 **HOBBS:** 523.7 **AC REG:** C6-TAS **AC S/N:** 4002C0051
			REPLACED ELT BATTERY IAW CESSNA 402C MM CHPT 34-43-00. PEFORMED FUNCTION TEST. PERFORMANCE SATIFACTORY.
			----------END----------
			GARY JOHNSON BAA 304
6/20/2005	11,268.4	657.8	Performed and complete annual Inspection in accordance with Cessna's maintenance manual check sheet 05-10-01. Washed aircraft down as required. Washed down all landing gears and greased as required. Placed aircraft on jacks. Inspect all tires for wears, cuts and uneven balancing. Removed all wheels and inspect bearings for free movement and operation. repacked bearings with greased and reinstalled all wheels in accordance with Cessna's maintenance manual. Inspect main wheel brake linings for wear and condition. Inspect gear shock struts for evidence of leakage and proper extension. Inspect nose gear torque links for condition and security. Inspect main wheel gear torque links for condition and security. Cleared all landing gear micro-switches with contact. P.T.O.
			SUB-TOTAL this page
	11,268.4		**TOTAL**—Carry forward to next page

Page No. ____

DATE	TOTAL TIME IN SERVICE	TACH OR RECORDING METER TIME	DESCRIPTION OF WORK PERFORMED— SIGNATURE & CERTIFICATE NO. OF PERSON PERFORMING WORK
		TOTAL brought forward from previous page	Conti ....
12/20/2005	11,268.4	657.8	Cleaner. Serviced hydraulic and brake reservoirs
			with mil 5606 fluid. Performed retraction
			test as required. Retraction performed satis-
			factory. Removed all seats and floorboards
			from aircraft interior. removed all inspection
			plates and fairings from aircraft. Inspect all
			flight controls and trim tabs for proper operation
			and travel. Inspect all roller bearings, turnbuckles,
			pulleys and cable for condition and operation
			lubricate inside of aircraft flooring with
			LPS #3. reinstalled all inspection plates
			and panels removed for inspection. removed
			aircraft from jacks as required. check
			aircraft navigational lights for condition and
			operation. cleaned surface corrosion from aircraft
			in accordance with AC.43.13-1B. Replaced both left
			and right main landing gears bolts. part nos.
			AN176-31 and AN176-42. Removed and replaced
			left and right main gear uplock roller bearings
			part number. 5141206-1. Replaced nose gear
			uplock roller bearing part no. 5141206-1.
			I certify that this aircraft has been inspected
			in accordance with an annual inspection is
			was determined to be in an airworthy
			condition.
			[signature] AMT 286IA
		SUB-TOTAL this page	
		TOTAL—Carry forward to next page	

FAA Registry
Name Inquiry Results

DAVID NATHEN HINDS

Address

Street	233 FLYING FISH ST		
City	FREEPORT	**State**	
County		**Zip Code**	F41181
Country	BAHAMAS		

Medical

Medical Class : First **Medical Date:** 03/2005

Certificates

1 of 1

Certificate: COMMERCIAL PILOT

FOR INFORMATION ON THIS AIRMAN'S CERTIFICATE YOU MUST CONTACT THE AIRMEN CERTIF TOLL FREE AT (866) 878-2498

Page 1 06-05-17 08:52:50

(WCAISM1) (AYSONR7)

ISIS Airman Report CAIS Information - Basic Information

Cert Pfx: Cert No: 2652636 Cert Sfx: Soc.Sec.No: 888010002

Name: HINDS, DAVID NATHEN Name-Sfx:

DOB: 1982 03 03 Sex: M Hair: BLACK Eyes: BROWN Ht: 69 Wt: 238

POB: FREEPORT, BAHAMAS

Status: Info: Name/Address Source: Airm

Date of Address Update: 2005 04 18 Citizenship: BAHAMAS

Street: 233 FLYING FISH ST County:

City: FREEPORT State: Zip: F41181

Country: BAHAMAS

TOT CIVIL HOURS: 00840

THIS INFORMATION IS PROTECTED BY THE PRIVACY ACT. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

(WCAISM3) (AYSONR7)

ISIS Airman Report CAIS Information - Medical Information

Cert Pfx: Cert No: 2652636 Cert Sfx:

Medical Information for: HINDS, DAVID NATHEN

Class: First

Certificate Desc.: CLEAR

Medical Date: 2005 03 09 Medical ID#: 200002399050

Restriction:

THIS INFORMATION IS PROTECTED BY THE PRIVACY ACT. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

:42 PM

N EACH		
AND MODEL	PILOT-IN-CMD.	DUAL REC'D.

BIENNIAL FLIGHT REVIEW	INSTRUMENT COMPETENCY CHECK
MR./MS. DAVID W. HILLS HOLDER OF PILOT CERTIFICATE NO. 2652636 HAS SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED A BIENNIAL FLIGHT REVIEW. NEXT BFR DUE 2-08 SIGNED [signature] DATE 02-22-06 CFI NO. 1745345CFI[illegible] EXPIRATION DATE 08-06	MR./MS. DAVID W. HILLS, HOLDER OF PILOT CERTIFICATE NO. 2652636, HAS SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED AN INSTRUMENT COMPETENCY CHECK ON 2-22-06 SIGNED [signature] DATE 2-22-06 CFI NO. 1735385[illegible] EXPIRATION DATE 08-06
MR./MS. ______, HOLDER OF PILOT CERTIFICATE NO. ______ HAS SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED A BIENNIAL FLIGHT REVIEW. NEXT BFR DUE ______. SIGNED ______ DATE ______ CFI NO. ______ EXPIRATION DATE ______	MR./MS. ______, HOLDER OF PILOT CERTIFICATE NO. ______, HAS SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED AN INSTRUMENT COMPETENCY CHECK ON ______. SIGNED ______ DATE ______ CFI NO. ______ EXPIRATION DATE ______
MR./MS. ______, HOLDER OF PILOT CERTIFICATE NO. ______ HAS SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED A BIENNIAL FLIGHT REVIEW. NEXT BFR DUE ______. SIGNED ______ DATE ______ CFI NO. ______ EXPIRATION DATE ______	MR./MS. ______, HOLDER OF PILOT CERTIFICATE NO. ______, HAS SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED AN INSTRUMENT COMPETENCY CHECK ON ______. SIGNED ______ DATE ______ CFI NO. ______ EXPIRATION DATE ______

CIVIL AVIATION DEPARTMENT
MAY 15 2006
RECEIVED
FLIGHT STANDARD INSPECTORATE

P.01



Beginning of 2001

@ 12/23/01 +173.4 hrs 189.2 padded

DECEMBER (SIM - co

DATE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT IDENT	ROUTE OF FLIGHT FROM	ROUTE OF FLIGHT TO	NR INST. APP.	REMARKS AND ENDORSEMENTS	NR T/O	NR LDG	AIRCRAFT CATEGORY SINGLE-ENGINE LAND	AIRCRAFT CATEGORY MULTI-ENGINE LAND
18	BE-100	N525CJ	MCO	MCO	1	VOL 14 MCO				2.0
18	BE-100	N525CJ	MCO	MCO	1	IIS 9 MCO				2.0
19	BE-100	N525CJ	MCO	MCO	1	VOL ME 27 MCO				2.0
20	BE-100	N525CJ	MCO	MCO	1	IIS 9 MCO				2.0
20	BE100	N525CJ	MCO	MCO	1	IIS 9 MCO				2.0
21	BE-100	N525CJ	MCO	MCO	1	IIS 27 MCO				.3
21	BE200	700MS	MCO	MCO	1	IIS 27 MCO				2.0
21	BE200	700MS	MCO	MCO	2	IIS 9 MCO UMC demo				2.0
22	BE-200	700MS	MCO	MCO	1	IIS 9 single engine				2.0
22	BE200	700MS	MCO	MCO	1	VOL 14 MCO				2.0
22	BE200	700MS	MCO	MCO	1	VOR 14 MCO				2.0
23	BE-200	700MS	MCO	MCO	1	VOL 14 MCO				.4
23	BE200	700MS	MCO	MCO	1	VOL SME 27 single engine				.3
I certify that the entries in this log are true, PILOT SIGNATURE						TOTALS THIS PAGE				21.1
						AMT. FORWARDED				504.8
						TOTALS TO DATE				525.9

AND CLASS		CONDITIONS OF FLIGHT NIGHT	ACTUAL INSTRUMENT
	Multie		
2.0	2.0		
2.0	2.0		
2.0	2.0		
2.0	2.0		
2.0	2.0		
.3	.3		
2.0	2.0		
2.0	2.0		
2.0	2.0		
2.0	2.0		
2.0	2.0		
.4	.4		
.3	.3		
21.1	21.1		
504.8	504.8		
525.9	525.9		

on 15/12/01 pilot total Multi time 315.6
one page between last a total of 16.4 hr
on 23/12/01 pilot total Multi time jumped to 525.9

193.9 hours unaccounted for.



ROUTE OF FLIGHT

DATE | AIRCRAFT TYPE | AIRCRAFT IDENT | FROM | TO | NR INST. APP. | REMARKS AND ENDORSEMENTS | NR T/O | NR LDG | AIRCRAFT CATEGORY: SINGLE-ENGINE LAND | MULTI-ENGINE LAND | AND CLASS | NIGHT

I certify that the entries in this log are true,

PILOT SIGNATURE

TOTALS THIS PAGE

AMT. FORWARDED

TOTALS TO DATE



DATE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT IDENT	ROUTE OF FLIGHT FROM	TO	NR INST. APP.	REMARKS AND ENDORSEMENTS	NR T/O	NR LDG	AIRCRAFT CATEGORY SINGLE-ENGINE LAND	MULTI-ENGINE LAND	AND CLASS Comp/Ca			CONDITIONS NIGHT
9/12	N25162	PA-27-250	MYGF	MYNN-MYBS			4	4		2.7	2.7			
9/12	N4116D	PA 27 250	MYGF	MYBS			2	2		1.3	1.3			
9/12	N62601	PA27250	MYGF	MYAT-MYAM			3	3		2.5	2.6			
10/12	N62601	PA 27 250	MYGF	MYNN	1	ILS 6 RO	2	2		2.5	2.5			1.5
11/12	N25162	PA 27 250	MYGF	MYNN			2	2		2.5	1.5			
11/12	N6940Y	PA-27-250	MYGF	KFLL	1	ILS 9L	3	2		1.5	1.5			1.5
12/12	N25162	PA-27 250	MYGF	KFLL			2	2		1.0	1.0			
13/12	N25162	PA 27 250	KFLL	MYGF			2	2		1.0	1.0			
14/12	C6-BGZ	PA-27 250	MYGF	MYNN			2	2		1.5	1.5			1.5
14/12	N6940Y	PA-27 250	MYGF	MYBS			2	2		1.3	1.3			
14/12	C6-BGZ	PA27250	MYGF	MYAT			2	2		1.0	1.0			
15/12	25162	PA 27 250	MYGF	KFLL			2	2		1.5	1.8			
15/12	25162	PA 27 250	KFLL	MYNN			2	2		1.7	1.8			
I certify that the entries in this log are true,						TOTALS THIS PAGE				21.2	21.2			4.5
						AMT. FORWARDED				294.4	294.8			39.2
PILOT SIGNATURE						TOTALS TO DATE				315.6	316.0			43.7

26



Beginning of 2002 ??

Oct 19, 2000

Dec 01

Jan 02 → 2/27/01 2/7/00

5/16/01

ENDORSEMENTS	NR T/O	NR LDG	AIRCRAFT CATEGORY: SINGLE-ENGINE LAND	AIRCRAFT CATEGORY: MULTI-ENGINE LAND	AND CLASS: Complex	AND CLASS	CONDITIONS OF FLIGHT: NIGHT	CONDITIONS OF FLIGHT: ACTUAL INSTRUMENT	CONDITIONS OF FLIGHT: SIMULATED INSTRUMENT (HOOD)	FLIGHT SIMULATOR	TYPE OF PILOTING TIME: CROSS COUNTRY	TYPE OF PILOTING TIME: AS FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR	TYPE OF PILOTING TIME: DUAL RECEIVED	TYPE OF PILOTING TIME: PILOT IN COMMAND (INCL. SOLO)	TOTAL DURATION OF FLIGHT
15 6 PPO	2	2		1 6	1 6		1 6	1 6			1 6			1 6	
	2	2		1 5	1 5						.5			.5	
	2			1 5	1 5						1 5			1 5	
	2			1 0	1 2						1 2			1 2	
5 8	2			1 3	1 3						1 3			1 3	
L 6	2	2		1 0	1 0				1 0				1 0		
	2	2		1 2	1 2						1 2			1 2	
	2	2		1 1	1 1						1 1			1 1	
	2	2		1 2	1 2						1 2			1 2	
	2	2		1 2	1 2						1 2			1 2	
	2	2		1 2	1 2						1 2			1 2	
	2	2		1 1	1 1						1 1			1 1	
	2	2		1 5	1 5						1 5			.5	
TOTALS THIS PAGE				[illegible] 4											
AMT. FORWARDED					316 0		43 7	9 3	44 3	12 9	136 5		35 6	217 6	50
TOTALS TO DATE															



REMARKS AND ENDORSEMENTS	NR T/O	NR LDG	AIRCRAFT CATEGORY: SINGLE-ENGINE LAND	AIRCRAFT CATEGORY: MULTI-ENGINE LAND	AND CLASS	AND CLASS (Turbine)	CONDITIONS OF FLIGHT: NIGHT	ACTUAL INSTRUMENT	SIMULATED INSTRUMENT (HOOD)	FLIGHT SIMULATOR	TYPE OF PILOTING TIME: CROSS COUNTRY	AS FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR	DUAL RECEIVED	PILOT IN COMMAND (INCL. SOLO)	TOTAL DURATION OF FLIGHT
14 MCO				2 0	2 0	2 0					2 0			2 0	[illegible]
9 MCO				2 0	2 0	2 0					2 0			2 0	[illegible]
ME 27 MCO				2 0	2 0	2 0					2 0			2 0	[illegible]
9 MCO				2 0	2 0	2 0					2 0			2 0	[illegible]
9 MCO				2 0	2 0	2 0					2 0			2 0	[illegible]
27 MCO				. 3	. 3	. 5					. 3			. 3	
27 MCO				2 0	2 0	2 0					2 0			2 0	[illegible]
9 MCO UMC demo				2 0	2 0	2 0					2 0			2 0	[illegible]
9 single engine				2 0	2 0	2 0					2 0			2 0	[illegible]
14 MCO				2 0	2 0	2 0					2 0			2 0	[illegible]
14 MCO				2 0	2 0	2 0					2 0			2 0	
14 MCO				. 4	. 4	. 4					. 4			. 4	
27 single engine				. 3	. 3	. 3					. 3			. 3	
TOTALS THIS PAGE				21 1	21 1	21 1					21 1			21 1	21
AMT. FORWARDED				504 8	504 8	504 8					504 8			504 8	504
TOTALS TO DATE				525 9	525 9	525 9					525 9			525 9	525



RECORD OF CERTIFICATES AND RATINGS

DAVID HINDS
PILOT'S NAME

933 Flying FISH Street
PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

CERTIFICATES			RATINGS	
GRADE	NUMBER	DATE OF	CATEGORY, CLASS, OR TYPE	DATE OF ORIGINAL ISSUE
STUDENT			AIRPLANE SINGLE-ENGINE LAND	
PRIVATE			AIRPLANE MULTI-ENGINE LAND	
COMMERCIAL	2652636		INSTRUMENT	
FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR			ROTORCRAFT HELICOPTER	
AIRLINE TRANSPORT				
GROUND INSTRUCTOR				

JS506048-006

2



RECORD OF CERTIFICATES AND RATINGS

DAVID HINDS NAthen.
PILOT'S NAME

7431 N.W 33rd Street APT 68 Hollywood Florida 33024
PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS

FreePort Grand BAHAMA 933 Flying Fish st
CHANGE OF ADDRESS

CERTIFICATES			RATINGS	
GRADE	NUMBER	DATE OF	CATEGORY, CLASS, OR TYPE	DATE OF ORIGINAL ISSUE
STUDENT	FF0276987	10/31/2000	AIRPLANE SINGLE-ENGINE LAND	12/2/00
PRIVATE	2652636	12/31/00	AIRPLANE MULTI-ENGINE LAND	5/17/02
COMMERCIAL	2652636	5/17/02	INSTRUMENT	05/02/01
FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR			ROTORCRAFT HELICOPTER	
AIRLINE TRANSPORT				
GROUND INSTRUCTOR				

JS506048-006

1



RECORD OF CERTIFICATES AND RATINGS

PILOT'S NAME: DAVID HINDS

PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS: 233 flying fish street

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

CHANGE OF ADDRESS:

PLACE OF BIRTH: freeport Grand Bahama

REWARD FOR RETURN OF THIS LOGBOOK. CALL COLLECT (242) 350 - 2463

CERTIFICATES			RATINGS	
GRADE	NUMBER	DATE OF ORIGINAL ISSUE	CATEGORY, CLASS, OR TYPE	DATE OF ORIGINAL ISSUE
PRIVATE	2652636		AIRPLANE SINGLE-ENGINE LAND	
COMMERCIAL	2652636		AIRPLANE MULTI-ENGINE LAND	
AIRLINE TRANSPORT				
FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR				
GROUND INSTRUCTOR			ROTORCRAFT HELICOPTER	
			GLIDER	
RESTRICTED RADIOTELEPHONE OPERATOR PERMIT	----		INSTRUMENT	

Date	Aircraft	From	To	MEI	DAY	Sim / Instr	Remarks
23 FEB-06	C6-KEV	MYGF	MYNN	.9	.9	.6	1 ILS
23 FEB-06	" "	MYNN	MYGF	.9	.9	.3	SAFTY R. Laing.
25 FEB 06	" "	MYGF	MYNN	.9	.9	.3	SAFTY R-Laing
25 FEB 06	" "	MYNN	MYGF	.9	.9	.2	SAFTY R. Laing
28 FEB 06	" "	MYGF	MYNN	.9	.9	.3	R. Laing SAFTY
10 MAR 06	" "	MYAT-	MYAN	.7	.7		
10 MAR 06	" "	MYAN -	MYGF	.7	.7		
14 MAR 06	" "	MYGF -	MYGF	1.0	1.0		SAFTY R Laing Touch and go
15 MAR 06	N27447 PA 31	MYGF -	MYNN	.9	.9		
15 MAR 06	" "	MYNN -	MYGF	.9	.9		
16 MAR 06	" "	MYGF	MYNN	.9	.9		
16 MAR 06	" "	MYNN	MYGF	.9	.9		
25 MAR 06	" "	MYGF	MYAW	.4	.4		
25 MAR 06	" "	MYAW	MYGF	.4	.4		
25 MAR 06	" "	MYGF	MYNN	.9	.9	.3	SAFTY L. Laing
25 MAR 06	" "	MYNN	MYGF	.9	.9	.2	SAFTY L. Laing
14 APR 06	C6-KEV	MYGF	MYAM	.7	.7		
14 APR 06	C6-KEV	MYAM	MYGF	.7	.7		
14 APR 06	C6-KEV	MYGF	MYGF	1.0	1.0		SAFTY E. Major Touch and GO
16 APR 06	C6-KEV	MYGF	MYAM	.7	.7		
16 APR 06	C6-KEV	MYAM	MYGF	.7	.7		1 ILS 6 FPO
17 APR 06	C6-KEV	MYGF	MYEH	.8	.8		
17 APR 06	C6-KEV	MYEH	MYGF	.8	.8		
19 APR 06	C6-KEV	MYGF	MFXE	.7	.7		
22 APR 06	C6-KEV	MFXE	MYGF	.7	.7	1 VOR 6	1 ILS 6

TOTAL hours from Feb - Apr - 21 hrs

TOTAL Instrument is 2.2 hrs

OFFICAL STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS
Print or type. Do not write in shaded areas, these are for DCA use only. Submit original only to the Flight Standards Inspectorate or a DCA-FSI Authorized Person. If additional space is required, use an attachment

NAME:	DAVID HINDS
POSITION	PILOT
EMPLOYER	CAMBRIDGE AIR
PHONE NUMBER	(242) 352-9463
E-MAIL	HINDS385@Hotmail.com
ADDRESS	953 FLYING FISH STREET

I CERTIFY THE FOLLOWING TO BE TRUE:

I DAVID HINDS holder of Certificate 43662 a COMMERCIAL PILOT CARRYED the AIRCRAFT (C6 KEV) PASSING 4000 TO the UNITED STATES of AMERICA (EXECUTIVE AIRPORT) TO GET the AIRPLANE CHECK this WAS (20 APRIL 2006). I ARRIVED in FORT LAUDERDALE EXECUTIVE AROUND 11:50am THURSDAY MORNING CLEARED CUSTOMS AND TAXIED OVER TO BANYAN and TAKE KNOWN that I WAS TO TAXI UP TO the (CHARLIE RAMP). APOND REACHING the HANGER the MACHINES STARTED TO WORK ON the (ACUATORS) FLAP, RUDDER, ELEVATOR. BEING IN the MIDDLE of the WORK, HE NOTICED that there ASEPAMED TO be on the FLOOR SOME HYDROLIC FLUID he then FINISED the ACUATORS and then STARTED TO LOOK for the HYDROLIC LEAK he found 1 CHAFE 3'8 LINE and OTHER STARTED TO CHAFE TO SO then he put JACKS UNDER the PLANE for SUPPORT and then take the 2 LINES OUT, I then WENT TO BANYAN AIR PARTS for the 3'8 LINE that he SAID he NEEDED, DROP the LINE off to HIM and then HEADED into TOWN for SOME SHOPING that I NEEDED to DO. I FINISHED MY SHOPING and then RETURN BACK to the AIRPORT and the LINE WAS ALREADY ON the AIRPLANE. SO I WENT and STARTED LOOKING AROUND the AIRPLANE and all the PARTS that WAS WORKED ON I CHECKED OVER and OVER, and also CHECK the HYDROLIC RESUBOC for HYDROLIC FLUID which I NOTICE WAS FULL SO I WENT and STARTED a PREFLIGHT. AND DURING the COMPLEACING of the AIRPLANE I STARTED to LOAD the AIRPLANE ACCORDING to WEIGHT

Continued to Page # BACK HALF

SIGNATURE	[signature]	**DATE**	01/04/06

Page _____ of _____ Pages

WITNESSED BY		DATE	

so the airplane was loaded and I started the engine and went to World Jet for fuel. I uploaded 77 gallons of fuel and then went into the run up bapice for the final check to make sure the airplane was ready for flight, every thing appeals to be alright so I started for the runway when I take took of headed for freeport In flight around Padus Intersection about 20 miles south west of freeport I notice my left and right hydrolic light came on. So I immeadiliky select gear down left the switch down for down then the right main indicator was green but the left and the nose stayed up so I Quicky recycle the gear to see if It came down but did not So I called out for gear emergency check list and started comply for the checklist. I then slow the plane to the disired speed which is 130 knots pull the gear hydrolic Circuit breaker and pull the T handle and nothing accured so I went back to the check list and went over it again and reach the same proceedor over again still no right so I started down and tryied to land hard on the right to see if I could get the left and the nose to unlocked but didn't My intention is to go around and declared emergency but the left prop hit the ground before i could go around again resulting a prop strike And lost of lift resulting in a crash.

April 26 06

To: Flight Standards Inspectorate.
Attn: Mr. Delvin R. Major/Mr. Philip Romer

I David Hinds pilot of the twin Cessna 402 C6-KEV arrived in fort Lauderdale around 10:30am Thursday 20th 2006 .the airplane arrived at (beetle's) hanger around 11,11:30 that morning .He started to work on the airplane as soon as we reached. Starting with the left aileron working his way around to the rudder of the airplane, followed by the elevator. During the removal of the rudder actuator he noticed what seemed to be a red fluid on the ground . So one of the share holders (CHRIS MACKEY)told him to check it out, so he looked into it a found out it was two chafed lines, so Mackey then asked him for the part number so he could get the item, he (beetle) then said he specializes in repairing those lines meaning the (hydraulic lines) so he said to go to banyan and buy a 3/8' line so he can fix it. So Mackey and I went out to buy the line and brought it to him. Then I went out came back and jacks were under the plane and the lines was done. Mackey then asked if he did the gear retraction, he(beetle) said he don't need to do it just put the jacks under the plane for support and start the right engine to check for any leaks. At the point and time that I was there at the facility, Mr. Stanley Hudson was present during the time the airplane was in for service.

DAVID HINDS

E. Bernard Godet
1805 NW. 51ST Place
Hangar #8
Ft Lauderdale, FL 33309

April 27, 2006

Department of C.A.D. Flight Standards Office,
Bahamas Airport, 59244 P.O. Box,
Nassau, Bahamas

Attn: Mr. Devlin Majors

With reference to work performed on Cessna 402C S/N 0051 Bahamas registered C6-KEV.

The above mentioned aircraft was brought to us for servicing of flight control surface trim tab actuators, aileron, rudder and elevators. After servicing the actuators, they were installed and rigged I.A.W. Cessna 402C Service Manual. All trim actuators function normally to their full ranges and were reset to their center positions. See the attached log entry given to the owner. All actuators were functionally check good.

I was informed by the owner/agent that the aircraft needed hydraulic systems serviced after each flight. The owner/agent then asked me to troubleshoot the cause of the problem. After inspecting the hydraulic system I found two rigid lines leaking, located in the floor panel behind the pilot seat. The aircraft was placed on jacks and the defective lines removed. I then fabricated two lines and installed them. The hydraulic reservoir was replenished with MIL-H-5606. I notified the owner/agent that I would need to perform a retraction test, which could not be accomplished until the following day. The owner/agent suggested that I run the aircraft engines, while the aircraft was still on jacks in order to perform the retraction test. I then replied that I will only do the test with a hydraulic mule. The owner/agent then responded that he would take care of the retraction test in the Bahamas. As a result of the owner/agent's response, I could not return the aircraft to service in the correct manner with a logbook entry due to the fact the job task being incomplete for return to service.

Respectfully,

E. Bernard Godet

CIVIL AVIATION DEPARTMENT
APR 28 2006
RECEIVED
FLIGHT STANDARD INSPECTORATE

Department of Civil Aviation
Flight Standards Inspectorate
Nassau International Airport,
Nassau Bahamas.

Stanley Hutson
3224 N.W. 84TH Ave Suite 232
Sunrise Florida 33351.

To Whom It May Concern:

I Stanley Hutson holder of authorization number CAD/2666033/IA issued to me by the officials of the Bahamas Flight Standard Inspectorate/Civil Aviation Department to release aircraft registered under the said authority had been approached by Mr. E.Bernard Godet A&P 2875795 to overhaul three trim tab actuators, (Aileron, Rudder and Elevator trims) after supervising him performing overhaul/service inspections and installation of the units afore mentioned, having exclusive rights by means of current approved technical data (CESSNA 402C Maintenance Manual provided by E.A. Management Services.

On April 20th 2006 at approximately 4:45 PM I had given him the release for the maintenance performed on the trim tab Actuators and was not privilege to know about any other maintenance activities that was supposed to have been performed on the aircraft, neither had I seen any additional work being done.

The following morning I learned by means of a voice mail from Mr. Bernard that the aircraft had developed landing gear problems landing at Freeport International Airport some time around 1:00am in the morning and did not make a safe landing resulting in a catastrophe.

As a reputable Aviation professional I regret that much could not have been done to prevent this accident based on the fact that I was not informed of the additional maintenance activities performed.

I will however continue to assist the Authority in any way I can with fort coming information.

Sincerely

.....
Stanley Hutson
LIC# : CAD/2666033IA

CIVIL AVIATION DEPARTMENT
APR 27 2006
RECEIVED
FLIGHT STANDARD INSPECTORATE



Emergency gear extension system cable prior to selector handle being pull to activate system.



Emergency gear blow down bottle after handle pulled to activate system. Although handle was pulled, back up system did not activate due to the excessive play in the cable linking the emergency gear blow down bottle activation handle and the emergency system located at the firewall in the nose of the aircraft.

Emergency gear blow down bottle showing a positive pressure charge on the nitrogen bottle.



Hydraulic line shown as it disengaged from the housing.

Improper flange on hydraulic line cause line to separate from housing resulting in all hydraulic fluids being depleted from hydraulic system.



Enlarged shot showing flange work carried out on hydraulic line.

Signature marks of touchdown point on Runway 06 approximately 8,100 feet from the threshold of the 11,000 feet runway.

The aircraft departed the runway approximately 9,700feet from the threshold of Runway 06. Aircraft came to rest approximately 10,400 feet from the threshold of Runway 06 and 180 feet from the shoulder of the runway. Aircraft hit trees and rock prior to stopping. Aircraft burst into flames on the left side shortly thereafter.

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C6-KEV


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C6-KEV


C6-KEV


CG-KEV


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C6-KEV