National Transportation Safety Board
Aviation Accident Final Report

Location:	Tampa, FL	**Accident Number:**	MIA06FA117
Date & Time:	06/12/2006, 1235 EDT	**Registration:**	N7043G
Aircraft:	Beech 65-A90-1	**Aircraft Damage:**	Destroyed
Defining Event:		**Injuries:**	1 Fatal, 1 Serious
Flight Conducted Under:	Part 91: General Aviation - Other Work Use		

Analysis

The first officer reported that during cruise flight, both propeller secondary low pitch stop (SLPS) lights illuminated, indicating the SLPS system prevented both propellers from going below the low pitch hydraulic mechanical stop. The right occurred first, then the left approximately 1 minute later. Emergency procedures to correct the condition were ineffective. The right propeller feathered at some point during the flight, and the first officer reported that while operating single engine, they experienced a problem with the propeller governor. The flight proceeded direct to an airport with short runways approximately 3.2 nautical miles (nm) northwest of their present position, rather than to an air carrier airport located 8.5 nm away. The captain entered a close-in right base to runway 35 (2,688 feet long runway), while flying at 155 knots (51 knots above single engine reference speed). He turned onto final approach with the landing gear and flaps retracted, but overshot the runway. The airplane contacted a taxiway near the departure end of intended runway, and then collided with several obstacles before coming to rest at a house located past the departure end of runway 35. A postcrash fire consumed the cockpit, cabin, and sections of both wings. Postaccident examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. No determination was made as to the reason for the annunciation of both SLPS lights.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The poor in-flight planning decision by the captain for his failure to establish the airplane on a stabilized approach for a forced landing, resulting in the airplane landing on a taxiway near the departure end of the runway. Contributing to the accident were the failure or malfunction of the primary hydraulic low pitch stop of both propellers for undetermined reasons, the excessive approach airspeed and the failure of the captain to align the airplane with the runway for the forced landing.

Findings

Occurrence #1: AIRFRAME/COMPONENT/SYSTEM FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
Phase of Operation: CRUISE - NORMAL

Findings
1. PROPELLER SYSTEM/ACCESSORIES,HYDRAULIC PITCH CTL - INOPERATIVE
2. (F) REASON FOR OCCURRENCE UNDETERMINED

Occurrence #2: FORCED LANDING
Phase of Operation: EMERGENCY DESCENT/LANDING

Occurrence #3: IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH TERRAIN/WATER
Phase of Operation: EMERGENCY DESCENT/LANDING

Findings
3. TERRAIN CONDITION - GROUND
4. (C) IN-FLIGHT PLANNING/DECISION - POOR - PILOT IN COMMAND
5. (F) AIRSPEED - EXCESSIVE - PILOT IN COMMAND
6. (F) PROPER ALIGNMENT - NOT ATTAINED - PILOT IN COMMAND

Occurrence #4: IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH OBJECT
Phase of Operation: EMERGENCY DESCENT/LANDING

Findings
7. OBJECT - TREE(S)

Factual Information

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 12, 2006, about 1235 eastern daylight time, a Beech 65-A90-1 twin-engine, turboprop airplane, N7043G, registered to Dynamic AvLease, Inc., and operated by Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., of Bridgewater, Virginia, contacted a taxiway then collided with a house during a forced landing at Peter O Knight Airport (TPF), Tampa, Florida. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as an other work use flight, and no flight plan was filed. Daylight marginal visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident for the local flight from Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota, Florida. The airplane, house, and a vehicle parked there were destroyed by impact and a postcrash fire, and the captain was killed. The first officer/disperser (first officer) was seriously injured. The sole person in the house was not injured. The flight originated about 1130, from SRQ.

The purpose of the flight was to disperse sterile, Mediterranean fruit flies (fruit flies) under contract to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and was scheduled to return to SRQ after dispersing was completed. The flight duration was estimated to be slightly over 1 hour.

The first officer reported that the mission dispersing the fruit flies was uneventful, and while returning to SRQ, "...we got a light on the panel for the [propeller] governor. Possibly for the right engine first." The captain began trouble shooting the right propeller annunciation issue by manipulating the power and propeller controls, and was trying to keep up with it as the right propeller was changing pitch. The same annunciation from the left propeller occurred approximately 1 minute after the annunciation for the right propeller. The captain asked him to pull a circuit breaker (CB) located immediately adjacent to his control yoke on the lower instrument panel, but he (first officer) could not recall if this occurred after the first or second annunciation. He also did not recall what CB he pulled, but he pulled the same CB two times at the request of the captain, which had no effect. The captain was manipulating the power and propeller controls for both engines following the left propeller annunciation, but he (first officer) did not think the captain's actions were having any effect. At some point the first officer noticed TPF was off their right wingtip and suggested to the captain to proceed there.

The captain advised him to contact air traffic control (ATC) and then to declare an emergency. At 1232:39, the first officer contacted Tampa Approach Control (Tampa Approach) and advised that they wanted to fly direct to TPF. The controller advised the flight crew to proceed direct to TPF and advise when the airport is in sight. Radar data indicated that, about this time, the airplane was at an altitude of about 1,200 feet mean sea level (msl) and was located about 3.2 nautical miles (nm) east-southeast from TPF, or approximately 8.5 nm southeast from Tampa International Airport. At 1232:54, the first officer declared an emergency with Tampa Approach, and requested a direct vector to TPF. The controller instructed the flight crew that the vector uncorrected for wind was 304 degrees and 3 miles, provided the altimeter setting, and gave the wind as being from 090 degrees at 7 knots. Radar data indicated that from 1232:54 (time first officer declared an emergency) to 1233:40, the flight proceeded in a northwesterly direction towards TPF and descended from 1,300 to 500 feet msl.

At 1233:50, the first officer reported to Tampa Approach that the airport was in sight. The radar data indicated that, about this time, the airplane was flying in a westerly direction at an

altitude of about 500 feet msl, and was located south-southeast of the approach end of runway 35. The controller asked if they needed assistance, to which the first officer responded at 1233:57, "no we're just going to try to land." No further communications were received from the flight crew.

The first officer did not recall any conversation between himself and the captain while on approach to land at TPF. The captain did not advise him to extend the flaps or landing gear, and he did not recall extending either for landing. They were on a short right base for runway 35, and turned onto final approach but were not lined up with it due to the angle approaching the airport. Radar data indicated that from 1234:00 to 1234:13 (last radar target), the airplane descended from 400 to 100 feet msl, and the groundspeed at the last recorded radar target was 155 knots. The first officer was not sure how far abeam the runway they were, did not recall the approach airspeed, and believed both propellers were rotating. After landing it did not feel rough nor did he feel "multiple hits." The airplane began skidding and he knew they were unable to stop. The airplane collided with a fence, and after stopping, he asked the captain if he was OK but there was no response. He (first officer) exited the wreckage and rolled onto the ground to extinguish the fire. He was helped to a vehicle by a nearby person, and passed out in an ambulance. The next memory he had was approximately 10 days later.

Numerous witnesses at TPF reported the airplane was not lined up with the runway while on approach, the landing gear was retracted, and only one engine was operating. Two pilot-rated witnesses reported the wind at the airport at the time of the accident was from the south. One was based on a personal observation, and the other was based on the TPF automated weather observation system (AWOS), which indicated the wind was from 150 degrees at 4 knots.

A pilot-rated witness located at TPF stated that she heard a strange sounding engine directly above her. As she looked up, she saw the accident airplane flying "extremely fast" at about 200 feet above ground level (agl). The witness further stated that the airplane was observed between runways 35 and 03 flying in a northerly direction, and flew over runway 03. The airplane then banked to the left, and it appeared to her that the left wing contacted the ground just off taxiway "F," which is located west of runway 35. The airplane flew through a fence, hit a house, and immediately became engulfed in flames and exploded. She further reported there was no communication by the flight crew on TPF common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF).

Another pilot-rated witness who was located on the north side of the airport immediately adjacent to the accident site, stated the airplane flew towards him about 5 feet agl with the landing gear retracted and yawing to the right. While airborne, the airplane collided with a fence on the north border of the airport, and then collided with trees, a car, and finally a residence. The witness ran to the wreckage and assisted the first officer who exited via the airstair door. The first officer advised him the captain was on-board, but fire prevented the witness from rescuing him. The witness asked the first officer what occurred and he initially responded that they had lost one engine, proceeded towards TPF, then lost the second engine. They were able to restart one engine, and then the propeller governor "ran away on us." The witness further asked the first officer if they had run out of fuel and he reported no, one engine quit and he did not know why.

Local fire rescue responded and extinguished the fire.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The captain, age 41, was hired by Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., on March 30, 2004, as base

maintenance manager/first officer, and upgraded to captain on March 13, 2005. He held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings airplane single and multi-engine land, instrument airplane, issued October 15, 2003. The captain's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class airman medical certificate was issued on April 1, 2006, and contained the limitation that, "Holder shall wear correcting lenses while exercising the [privileges] of his/her airman certificate." The captain indicated on his last medical certificate application that his total time was 2,120 hours.

Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., records indicate that at the date the captain began employment, he did not have any Beech "King Air 90" flight time. His total flight time at that time was 1,519 hours, of which 1,058.9 hours were as pilot-in-command (PIC), and 213 hours in multi-engine airplanes. At the time of the accident, his total time was 1,907 hours, and his total PIC time was 1,451 hours. He had 457 hours total time and 305 hours as PIC in the accident make and model airplane, respectively. His last flight review in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.56 occurred on March 13, 2005, when he upgraded to captain. At that time, he "Satisfactory" demonstrated knowledge of "Secondary Low Pitch Stop system failure."

The first officer, age 25, was hired by Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., on May 3, 2006. He holds a commercial pilot certificate with ratings airplane single and multi-engine land, instrument airplane, issued December 15, 2004. His most recent first-class medical certificate with no limitations was issued on March 14, 2006.

Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., records indicate that at the time the first officer began employment, he did not have any Beech "King Air 90" flight time. His total flight time at that time was 1,123 hours, of which 900 hours were as PIC, and 23 hours were in multi-engine airplanes. The first officer's pilot logbook indicates that at the time of the accident, he logged 44 hours total time in the accident make and model airplane; of which, 15 hours were logged as PIC. His last logged flight occurred on June 9, 2006; the flight was in the accident make and model airplane. Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., personnel reported the first officer did not have any official flight training or ground based systems training since employment, but he (first officer) reported he did "pick things up" while flying in the airplane. His last flight review in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.56 occurred on December 15, 2004.

Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., performs all pilot training in-house, with "flight reviews" occurring every 12-18 months. They train using a cockpit procedures trainer (CPT), and classroom instruction. With respect to training pertaining to the propeller secondary low pitch stop (SLPS), they use the CPT for location of the propeller governor idle stop circuit breaker and simulation of potential failure. With respect to the classroom instruction, they use a cockpit diagram, and Flight Safety software to describe the SLPS system, components, and normal and abnormal operation of the SLPS system. They utilize 2 to 3 hours of classroom time to discuss the propeller, which includes discussion of the SLPS system. The Flight Safety software provides "animated" schematics of the SLPS and related systems.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was manufactured in 1967 by Beechcraft, and entered U.S. military service as model U-21A, military serial number (S/N) 66-18036, manufacturer S/N LM-37. It was powered by two Pratt & Whitney PT6A-20 engines, and was equipped with two constant speed, manual and auto-feathering, full reversing, three-bladed Hartzell HC-B3TN-3B propellers. The airplane was removed from military service in 1996, purchased by Dynamic Aviation Group,

Inc. (under previous company name) in the fall of 1996, and was assigned U.S. registration N7043G in December 1996. The aircraft was in storage until 1998, when it was overhauled.

In August 1998, an FAA standard airworthiness certificate in the normal category was issued; the airplane total time at that time was reported to be 10,690.7 hours. In October 1998, a standard airworthiness certificate in the restricted category was issued, with the listed purpose of "Agriculture and Pest Control." Between certification in 1998, and the accident date, Dynamic Aviation (or previous company names) continuously operated the airplane. The airplane had not been operated between January 24, 2006, and March 1, 2006, during which time extensive maintenance consisting of installation of serviceable propellers was performed.

The airplane was maintained in accordance with the operator's maintenance manual supplement, and an inspection cycle consists of a 100-Hour, and four phase inspections performed at 100-hour intervals. The airplane was last inspected in accordance with a 100-Hour inspection on April 20, 2006. The airplane total time at that time was 15,590.7 hours, and the time since overhaul for the left and right engines at that time was 6,658.2 and 2,591.3 hours, respectively. Including the accident flight, the airplane had accumulated approximately 80.6 hours since the last 100-Hour inspection.

Propeller blade angle is controlled by propeller controls on the throttle quadrant. The propeller blades change position to low pitch (high rpm) and reverse using engine oil increased in pressure by the primary propeller governor. Propeller blade low pitch position (high rpm) is a mechanically monitored hydraulic stop, which senses blade angle. The mechanical linkage closes a valve and prevents oil from entering the propeller dome, thereby stopping the propeller blades from moving past the low pitch stop. A back-up system (SLPS) prevents the propeller blades from going beyond the low pitch stop into reverse in the event of a malfunction of the primary low pitch stop. Activation of the SLPS system illuminates a red annunciator light located in an annunciator panel above the glare shield, which indicates the propeller has attempted to go past the primary low pitch stop, but the SLPS has prevented the propeller from doing so.

Operational testing of the SLPS is performed as indicated in the "Before Takeoff" checklist utilized by the operator. The operator provided documents indicating no pilot noted discrepancies of the SLPS tests during seven flights over the previous 13 days. A list containing the last 30 days of pilot discrepancies was in the airplane and not recovered.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A surface observation weather report (METAR) taken at the Peter O Knight Airport on the day of the accident at 1228, or approximately 7 minutes before the accident, indicates the wind was from 090 degrees at 5 knots, the visibility was 4 statute miles with rain, scattered clouds existed at 400 feet, broken clouds existed at 3,100 feet, and overcast clouds existed at 4,300 feet. The temperature and dewpoint were 23 and 21 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 29.97 inches of mercury.

The first officer later reported that during the flight, visual to marginal visual meteorological conditions prevailed; however, they remained in visual meteorological conditions from the point of the discrepancy to the time of the accident.

COMMUNICATIONS

The flight crew was in contact with Tampa Approach; there were no reported communication

difficulties.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Peter O Knight airport is equipped with two runways designated 3/21 and 17/35. Runway 17/35 is asphalt and is 2,688 feet long and 75 feet wide, while runway 3/21 is 3,405 feet long and 100 feet wide. Taxiway "F" is 35 feet wide, parallels runway 17/35, and is located on the west side of the runway.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The airplane was not equipped with a cockpit voice recorder.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Runways 17/35 and 03/21, taxiway "F," and areas of the approach end of runway 17 at TPF were examined by National Transportation Safety Board, FAA, and airframe manufacturer personnel. Fourteen parallel ground scars were located near the west edge of taxiway "F," and north of the intersection of that taxiway and runway 03/21. That location was also near the departure end of runway 35. The 14 ground scars were oriented on a north-northwesterly heading, measured 35 feet 11 inches in length, and were consistent with contact by the left propeller. The distance between the first and second ground scar measured 28 inches. Several ground scars on grass between the west edge of taxiway "F" and an airport perimeter fence located on the north side of the airport were noted. One of the ground scars was a single arching scar, which was consistent with contact by the right propeller. The airplane collided with the chain link fence, tree, street sign, roadway, a vehicle then a house. The airplane came to rest upright in the front yard of a house located approximately 342 degrees and 500 feet from the last parallel ground scar at the west edge of taxiway "F." The postcrash fire and/or impact damage destroyed the airplane, house, and the vehicle parked at the house.

The cockpit, cabin, and sections of both wings were consumed in the postcrash fire. Heat damage was also noted to both engines and both propellers. All components necessary to sustain flight remained attached or found in close proximity to the main wreckage location. The right propeller blades were in the feathered position, which correlates to the position of the right propeller control in the cockpit. The static impact signatures of the right engine also correlate to the feathered position of the right propeller. The flaps and landing gear were retracted. All secondary flight control trim positions were neutral or near neutral for roll, pitch, and yaw. Examination of the airframe, engines, engine controls and accessories, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The left and right secondary low pitch stop linkages were in place, but the left electrical harness was fire damaged and the electrical wires were separated at the linkage connections. The right electrical harness block was not located. The right subpanel in the cockpit was destroyed, which precluded determination of the position of the propeller governor idle stop CB.

Visual examination of the propeller reversing electrical board and relays revealed heat damage; the canon plug that remained connected though the insulation of the wires was melted. The SLPS box located immediately aft of the rear spar next to the right fuselage sidewall also exhibited heat damage. The insulation of the wires was also melted, and several electrical wires were broken along their length. All electrical wires for the SLPS box were broken at the leading edge of the right butt rib near the right cockpit sidewall. The propeller reversing electrical board and relays, and the SLPS box were retained for further examination.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

A postmortem examination of the captain was performed by Hillsborough County Medical Examiner Department. The cause of death was listed as "Thermal Burns."

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens of the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory (FAA Laboratory), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Hillsborough County Medical Examiner Department. The result of analysis by FAA Laboratory was negative for cyanide, volatiles, and tested drugs. Twelve percent carbon monoxide saturation was detected in the blood specimen. The result of analysis by Hillsborough Medical Examiner Department was negative for tested drugs and volatiles. Twelve percent carbon monoxide saturation was detected in the blood specimen.

SURVIVAL ASPECTS

The airstair door was first observed in the area where normally installed; however, the structure adjacent to the airstair door was destroyed in the post crash fire and the door was rotated up approximately 90 degrees. The inner door handle was in the unlatched and unlocked position. The first officer did not report any difficulty opening it.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Calculations to determine estimated groundspeed were performed by Safety Board personnel using a formula that multiplies the distance between propeller scars (2.34 feet between the first and second), with the estimated engine rpm (1,900), and also the number of propeller blades (3). The result is divided by 101.3, which yielded an estimated groundspeed of approximately 132 knots. Each 100-rpm engine increase, increases the groundspeed approximately 7 knots.

The emergency procedures section of the FAA Approved Pilot's Operating Manual contains a section titled, "Failure of secondary low pitch stop" which lists procedures to perform in the event of annunciation of the secondary low pitch stop light(s). The section describes that if flying at airspeeds greater than 110 knots, and/or power setting above 400 ft. lbs., if either Secondary Low Pitch Stop Warning Light illuminates in flight, and the respective propeller begins feathering, a pilot should:

"1. Power Lever (affected side) - Reduce as Required (to keep torque within limits)

2. "Prop Gov - Idle Stop" Circuit Breaker (co-pilot's right subpanel) - Pull (warning light should extinguish and propeller speed should increase to governor setting)

3. Power Lever (affected side) - Return to Desired Power

Warning

Any malfunction of the Secondary Low Pitch Stop System must be repaired before the next flight."

Radar data indicates that between the time the first officer notified ATC of the need to divert to TPF (1232:39), and the last radar target at 1234:13, the recorded groundspeed never decreased less than 120 knots. As previously reported, the ground speed at the last radar target was 155 knots. The single engine reference speed (VRef) is 104 knots.

The first officer reported pulling a CB to the right of his control yoke, though he could not recall the exact CB he pulled. The propeller governor idle stop CB identified in the emergency procedures listed above is located on the right subpanel, which is to the right of his control

yoke. The first officer also reported that they typically used the airplane's checklist with a challenge response, but they did not use the checklist after either secondary low pitch stop light illuminated. He was also asked who feathered the right propeller and responded that he doesn't think the captain manually feathered it.

Examination of the propeller reversing electrical board and relays with FAA oversight revealed no evidence of electrical shorts of the attached wire bundle, and no mechanical damage to the electrical board. The left and right propeller reversing relays were found in the open position (no power to its respective propeller governor secondary low pitch stop solenoid). The left relay actuated electrically to the open and closed positions, while the right relay could not be actuated electrically. The right relay exhibited greater heat damage than the left relay.

Examination of the SLPS box with NTSB oversight revealed heat damage to both circuit cards, which was the greatest in the area adjacent to cooling holes on both sides of the box. All gold fingers (primary electrical connections for both cards) were physically intact with no melting or deformation. Acceptance testing of both circuit cards revealed discrepancies consistent with fire damage, but there was no evidence of preimpact failure. A switch turn-on test was performed using a slave sensor and target, and each circuit card. This test determines at what gap between the sensor and target is required to activate the SLPS annunciation lights. The testing determined that circuit card "A" activated .017 inch earlier than specified, while circuit card "B" activated within limits.

Pilot Information

Certificate:	Commercial	**Age:**	41, Male
Airplane Rating(s):	Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land	**Seat Occupied:**	Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s):	None	**Restraint Used:**	Seatbelt, Shoulder harness
Instrument Rating(s):	Airplane	**Second Pilot Present:**	Yes
Instructor Rating(s):	None	**Toxicology Performed:**	Yes
Medical Certification:	Class 1 With Waivers/Limitations	**Last FAA Medical Exam:**	04/01/2006
Occupational Pilot:		**Last Flight Review or Equivalent:**	03/01/2005
Flight Time:	2120 hours (Total, all aircraft), 457 hours (Total, this make and model), 1451 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft)		

Other Flight Crew Information

Certificate:	Flight Instructor; Commercial	**Age:**	25, Male
Airplane Rating(s):	Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land	**Seat Occupied:**	Right
Other Aircraft Rating(s):	None	**Restraint Used:**	Seatbelt, Shoulder harness
Instrument Rating(s):	Airplane	**Second Pilot Present:**	Yes
Instructor Rating(s):	Airplane Single-engine; Instrument Airplane	**Toxicology Performed:**	No
Medical Certification:	Class 1 Without Waivers/Limitations	**Last FAA Medical Exam:**	03/01/2006
Occupational Pilot:		**Last Flight Review or Equivalent:**	12/01/2004
Flight Time:	1208 hours (Total, all aircraft), 44 hours (Total, this make and model), 960 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 173 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 53 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 0 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)		

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make:	Beech	**Registration:**	N7043G
Model/Series:	65-A90-1	**Aircraft Category:**	Airplane
Year of Manufacture:		**Amateur Built:**	No
Airworthiness Certificate:	Restricted	**Serial Number:**	LM-37
Landing Gear Type:	Retractable - Tricycle	**Seats:**	2
Date/Type of Last Inspection:	04/01/2006, 100 Hour	**Certified Max Gross Wt.:**	9650 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:	80.6 Hours	**Engines:**	2 Turbo Prop
Airframe Total Time:	15671.3 Hours at time of accident	**Engine Manufacturer:**	Pratt & Whitney Canada
ELT:	Installed, not activated	**Engine Model/Series:**	PT6A-20
Registered Owner:	Dynamic AvLease, Inc.	**Rated Power:**	550 hp
Operator:	Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc.	**Operating Certificate(s) Held:**	On-demand Air Taxi (135)

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site:	Visual Conditions	**Condition of Light:**	Day
Observation Facility, Elevation:	TPF, 8 ft msl	**Distance from Accident Site:**	
Observation Time:	1228 EDT	**Direction from Accident Site:**	
Lowest Cloud Condition:	Scattered / 400 ft agl	**Visibility**	4 Miles
Lowest Ceiling:	Broken / 3100 ft agl	**Visibility (RVR):**	
Wind Speed/Gusts:	5 knots /	**Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:**	/
Wind Direction:	90°	**Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:**	/
Altimeter Setting:	29.97 inches Hg	**Temperature/Dew Point:**	23°C / 21°C
Precipitation and Obscuration:	Rain		
Departure Point:	Sarasota, FL (SRQ)	**Type of Flight Plan Filed:**	None
Destination:		**Type of Clearance:**	None
Departure Time:	1130 EDT	**Type of Airspace:**	

Airport Information

Airport:	Peter O'Knight (TPF)	**Runway Surface Type:**	Asphalt
Airport Elevation:	8 ft	**Runway Surface Condition:**	Wet
Runway Used:	35	**IFR Approach:**	None
Runway Length/Width:	2688 ft / 75 ft	**VFR Approach/Landing:**	Forced Landing

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries:	1 Fatal, 1 Serious	**Aircraft Damage:**	Destroyed
Passenger Injuries:	N/A	**Aircraft Fire:**	On-Ground
Ground Injuries:	N/A	**Aircraft Explosion:**	None
Total Injuries:	1 Fatal, 1 Serious	**Latitude, Longitude:**	27.922222, -82.459167

Administrative Information

Investigator In Charge (IIC):	Timothy W Monville	**Report Date:**	06/30/2008
Additional Participating Persons:	Jose Obregon; NTSB; Miami, FL Thomas Little; NTSB; Seattle, WA Elaine M Summers; Transportation Safety Board of Canada; Gatineau, Linda M Nevin; FAA Flight Standards District Office; Tampa, FL TR Proven; FAA,AAI-100; Washington, DC Christy Eckerman; FAA Aircraft Certification Office; Wichita, KS Carlton N Cochran; FAA MISO; Chicago, IL Karl D Stoltzfus; Dynamic Aviation; Bridgewater, VA Paul E Yoos; Hawker Beecraft; Wichita, KS Thomas Berthe; Pratt & Whitney Canada; Longueuil, Thomas J McCreary; Hartzell Propeller, Inc.; Piqua, OH Gregory W Jones; Crane Aerospace & Electronics - ELDEC; Lynnwood, WA		
Publish Date:			
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