

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199100511**

Cessna 207A

7 January 1991

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being omitted. This reduced the bearing area at the bolt head to the control lever, with the possibility that the bolt may have only been clamped to the bush assisting any movement of the bush in the lever. Once the steel bush started moving in the softer bronze material the rate of wear would have been rapid. The aircraft had flown 85 hours since the last periodic inspection, at which time it may have been possible to detect the first signs of wear between the bush and the control lever if information advising of this type of fault had been available.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident

1. Incorrect assembly of the washers on the control cable attachment bolt may have allowed the bush to start moving in the lever.
2. The bush became loose in the control lever, with the subsequent wear elongating the hole allowing the control lever end to fail.
3. The throttle control cable separated from the throttle control lever.
4. The throttle closed sufficiently during flight to reduce engine power.
5. The aircraft was too heavy to maintain flight.
6. The aircraft was operating over an area unsuitable for a forced landing.
7. Wear between the bush and the lever may have been detectable during the previous periodic inspection if advisory information had been available.

Reccomendations:

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority consider issuing an Airworthiness Directive (or Advisory Letter) to all owners and operators of aircraft fitted with Teledyne Continental fuel injected engines :-

1. Advising of the need for correct installation, assembly and attachment of fuel and mixture control rodend nuts, bolts and the location of washers to control lever arms, and
2. Instruction for the critical repetitive visual inspection of the lever arm bolt holes and bushings for wear, and bushings for looseness, with the control rod bolt and washers disassembled.