North Carolina

During a night, northbound, international over water flight that paralleled the east coast of the southeast United States, the airplane encountered headwinds. Upon arrival at the intended destination, the weather was below forecasted conditions, resulting in multiple instrument approach attempts. After the first missed approach, the controller advised the crew that there was an airport 36 miles to the north with "much better" weather, but the crew declined, citing a need to clear customs. During the third missed approach, the left engine lost power, and while the airplane was being vectored for a fourth approach, the right engine lost power. Utilizing the global positioning system, the captain pointed the airplane toward the intersection of the airport's two runways. Approximately 50 feet above the ground, he saw runway lights, and landed. The captain attempted to lower the landing gear prior to the landing, but it would not extend due to a lack of hydraulic pressure from the loss of engine power, and the alternate gear extension would not have been completed in time. The gear up landing resulted in damage to the underside of the fuselage and punctures of the pressure vessel. The captain stated that the airplane arrived in the vicinity of the destination with about 1,000 pounds of fuel on board or 55 minutes of fuel remaining. However, air traffic and cockpit voice recordings revealed that the right engine lost power about 14 minutes after arrival, and the left engine, about 20 minutes after arrival. Federal air regulations require, for an instrument flight rules flight plan, that an airplane carry enough fuel to complete the flight to the first airport of landing, fly from that airport to an alternate, and fly after that for 45 minutes at normal cruising speed. The loss of engine power was due to fuel exhaustion, with no preaccident mechanical anomalies noted to the airplane.

While flying a non precision approach, the pilot deliberately descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) and attempted to execute a circle to land below the published circling minimums instead of executing the published missed approach procedure. During the circle to land, visual contact with the airport environment was lost and engine power was never increased after the airplane had leveled off. The airplane decelerated and entered an aerodynamic stall, followed by an uncontrolled descent which continued until ground impact. Weather at the time consisted of rain, with ceilings ranging from 300 to 600 feet, and visibility remaining relatively constant at 2.5 miles in fog. Review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) audio revealed that the pilot had displayed some non professional behavior prior to initiating the approach. Also contained on the CVR were comments by the pilot indicating he planned to descend below the MDA prior to acquiring the airport visually, and would have to execute a circling approach. Moments after stating a circling approach would be needed, the pilot received a sink rate aural warning from the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS). After several seconds, a series of stall warnings was recorded prior to the airplane impacting terrain. EGPWS data revealed, the airplane had decelerated approximately 75 knots in the last 20 seconds of the flight. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact failures or malfunctions with the airplane or any of its systems. Toxicology testing detected sertraline in the pilot’s kidney and liver. Sertraline is a prescription antidepressant medication used for anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and social phobia. The pilot’s personal medical records indicated that he had been treated previously with two other antidepressant medications for “anxiety and depression” and a history of “impatience” and “compulsiveness.” The records also documented a diagnosis of diabetes without any indication of medications for the condition, and further noted three episodes of kidney stones, most recently experiencing “severe and profound discomfort” from a kidney stone while flying in 2005. None of these conditions or medications had been noted by the pilot on prior applications for an airman medical certificate. It is not clear whether any of the pilot’s medical conditions could account for his behavior or may have contributed to the accident.

The right main landing gear collapsed on landing. According to the flight crew, after departure they preceded to Mountain Air Airport, where they performed a "touch-and-go" landing. Upon raising the landing gear following the touch-and-go landing, they got an "unsafe gear" light. The crew stated they cycled the gear back down and got a "three green" normal indication. They cycled the gear back up and again got the "gear unsafe" light. They diverted to Greensboro, North Carolina, and upon landing in Greensboro the airplane's right main landing gear collapsed. After the accident, gear parts from the accident airplane were discovered on the runway at Mountain Air Airport. Metallurgical examination of the landing gear components revealed fractures consistent with overstress separation and there was no evidence of fatigue. Examination of the runway at Mountain Air Airport by an FAA Inspector showed evidence the accident airplane had touched down short of the runway.

At about the 3,000-foot marker on the 8,000-foot long runway witnesses saw the airplane at about 100 to 150-feet above the ground with the landing gear retracted when they heard a loud "bang". They said the airplane made no attempt to land on the remaining 5,000 feet of runway after the noise. The airplane continued climbing and seemed to gain a little altitude before passing the end of the runway. At that point the airplane began a right descending turn and was in a 60 to 80 degree right bank, nose low attitude when they lost sight of it. The airplane collided with the ground about 8/10 of a mile from the departure end of runway 34 in a residential area. Examination of the critical left engine found no pre-impact mechanical malfunction. Examination of the right engine found galling on all of the connecting rods. Dirt and particular contaminants were found embedded on all of the bearings, and spalling was observed on all of the cam followers. The oil suction screen was found clean, The oil filter was found contaminated with ferrous and non-ferrous small particles. The number 3 cylinder connecting rod yoke was broken on one side of the rod cap and separated into two pieces. Heavy secondary damage was noted with no signs of heat distress. Examination of the engine logbooks revealed that both engine's had been overhauled in 1986. In 1992, the airplane was registered in the Dominican Republic and the last maintenance entry indicated that the left and right engines underwent an inspection 754.3 hours since major overhaul. There were no other maintenance entries in the logbooks until the airplane was sold and moved to the United States in 2002. All three blades of the right propeller were found in the low pitch position, confirming that the pilot did not feather the right propeller as outlined in the pilot's operating handbook, under emergency procedures following a loss of engine power during takeoff.

After landing at Cherry Point MCAS, the aircraft went out of control, lost its undercarriage and both wings and came to rest, bursting into flames. There were no casualties.

According to the pilot, an unsafe right gear indication was received during the approach, and the control tower controller confirmed the right gear was not fully extended. On landing roll the right main landing gear collapsed and the airplane slid off of the runway. Examination of the right main landing gear revealed the drag brace was fractured. The fracture was located at the lower side of a transition from a smaller internal diameter on the upper piece to a larger internal diameter on the lower piece. The region of the fracture surface was flat and perpendicular to the tube longitudinal axis. The region had a smooth, curving boundary, also consistent with fatigue. The fatigue features emanated from multiple origins at the inner surface of the tube. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD) requiring an inspections of main landing gear drag stay units. The AD was prompted by the fracture of a drag stay tube from fatigue cracking that initiated from an improperly machined transition radius at the inner surface of the tube. According to Fokker ,the Fokker F27 Mark 500 airplanes (such as the incident airplane) were not equipped with drag stay units having part number 200261001, 200485001, or 200684001. One tube, part number 200259300, had a change in internal diameter (stepped bore), and the other tube, part number 200485300, had a straight internal bore. AD 97-04-08 required an ultrasonic inspection to determine if the installed tube had a straight or stepped bore. A review of maintenance records revealed that the failed drag stay tube had accumulated 28, 285 total cycles.

On January 8, 2003, about 0847:28 eastern standard time, Air Midwest (doing business as US Airways Express) flight 5481, a Raytheon (Beechcraft) 1900D, N233YV, crashed shortly after takeoff from runway 18R at Charlotte-Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina. The 2 flight crewmembers and 19 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, 1 person on the ground received minor injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Flight 5481 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport, Greer, South Carolina, and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

At 0029, the pilot contacted Norfolk Approach and stated he was ready for takeoff on runway 01 at Elizabeth City. The controller instructed the pilot to fly runway heading and climb to 3,000 feet. At 0032, the controller advised the pilot that the flight was radar contact and for the pilot to fly heading 160 degrees. At 0034, the Norfolk Approach controller instructed the pilot to contact the FAA Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center. At 0034, the pilot of N1122Y contacted the controller at Washington Center, stating he was coming up on 3,000 feet. The controller acknowledged, and the pilot requested the non-directional beacon (NDB) approach to runway 5 at Dare County Airport, Manteo. At 0036, the controller instructed the pilot to fly heading 145 degrees for Manteo and fly direct to the NDB when he receives the signal. The pilot acknowledged and the controller also asked the pilot if he had the current weather for Manteo. The pilot responded that he did have the current weather. At 0043, the controller cleared the pilot for the NDB runway 5 approach at Manteo and to maintain 2,000 feet until the flight crossed the beacon outbound. The pilot acknowledged. At 0046, the controller informed the pilot that radar contact with the flight was lost and for the pilot to report a cancellation or a downtime on his radio frequency. The pilot acknowledged. At 0057:21, the controller called the pilot and the pilot responded by reporting the flight was procedure turn inbound. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. When the pilot did not report that he was on the ground, and further radio contact could not be established, controllers initiated search and rescue efforts. The wreckage of the airplane was located in the waters of Croatan Sound, about 1.5 miles west of the Dare County Regional Airport about 1000. The pilot was not located in the airplane. The body of the pilot was located in the waters of Croatan Sound on February 11, 2003. Post crash examination of the airplane, flight controls, and engine showed no evidence of precrash failure or malfunction. The propeller separated from the airplane and was not located after the accident. Damage to the mounting bolts for the propeller was consistent with the propeller separating due to impact with the water. Postmortem examination of the pilot showed no findings which could be considered causal to the accident.

The flight was cleared for the ILS approach to runway 5R. The flight was at mid runway, at 2,100 feet, heading 049 degrees, at a speed of 163 knots, when the pilot stated "...missed approach." He was instructed to maintain 2,000, and to fly runway heading. Radar showed N41003 started a right turn, was flying away from the airport/VOR, descending. At a point 0.57 miles from the airport/VOR, the flight had descended to 1,500 feet, was turning right, and increasing speed. The flight had descended 400 feet, and had traveled about 0.32 miles in 10 seconds. When radio and radar contact were lost, the flight was 2.35 miles from the airport/VOR, level at 1,600 feet, on a heading of 123 degrees, and at a speed of 169 knots. The published decision height (DH) was 620 feet mean sea level (msl). The published minimum visibility was 1/2 mile. The published Missed Approach in use at the time of the accident was; "Climb to 1,000 [feet], then climbing right turn to 2,500 [feet] via heading 130 degrees, and RDU R-087 [087 degree radial] to ZEBUL Int [intersection] and hold." A witness stated that the aircraft was flying low, power seemed to be in a cruise configuration, and maintaining the same sound up until the crash. The reported weather at the time was: Winds 050 at 5 knots, visibility 1/2 statute mile, obscuration fog and drizzle, ceiling overcast 100, temperature and dew point 11 C, altimeter 30.30 in HG. At the time of the accident the pilot had 10 total flight hours in this make and model airplane; 33 total night flight hours; and 59 total instrument flight hours.

The pilot had left the airplane at Asheville on the day before the accident due to low cloud ceilings and visibility at Mountain Air Airport, his destination, and completed the trip by rental car. On the day of the accident the pilot returned the rental car and at 1656 departed Asheville in N396PM, enroute to Mountain Air Airport, 27 miles north of Asheville. The last radio contact with the pilot was at 1701:44, when the pilot told controllers at Asheville that he was in visual flight rule conditions, at 4,000 feet. The last radar contact with the flight was by FAA Atlanta Center, at 1704:00, when the flight was about 5 miles south of the accident site at 3,800 feet. The flight did not arrive at the destination, an emergency locator transmitter signal was received by satellite, and search and rescue operations were begun. The pilot and the wreckage of the airplane was located the next day about 1400. The airplane had collided with 75-foot tall trees, at about the 4,800-foot msl level on the side of Bullhead Mountain, while in a wings level attitude, while on a 170 degree heading. After the initial impact the airplane continued for another 300 feet, causing general breakup of the airplane. The main wreckage came to rest on a northerly heading. All components of the airplane were located at the crash site and there was no evidence of precrash failure or malfunction of the airplane structure, flight controls, airplane systems, engine, or propeller. A witness reported that the weather near the time of the accident on the Blue Ridge Parkway, located about 3/4 mile to the west of the crash site, was very foggy. Satellite images show clouds were present at the crash site and the Asheville airport, located 20 miles south-southwest of the crash site, reported overcast clouds 2,600 feet agl or 4,765 feet msl, and visibility 4 miles in haze, at the time of the accident. An Airmet for mountain obscuration due to clouds, mist, and haze was in effect at the time the pilot departed and the at the time of the accident. No record to show that the pilot received a weather briefing from a FAA Flight Service Station was found.