Country
code

Moscow oblast

Crash of a Sukhoi Superjet 100-95B in Moscow: 41 killed

Date & Time: May 5, 2019 at 1830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-89098
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow - Murmansk
MSN:
95135
YOM:
2017
Flight number:
SU1492
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
73
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
41
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed runway 24C at Moscow-Sheremetyevo Airport at 1803LT on a schedule service to Murmansk. Few minutes after takeoff, while climbing to an altitude of 10,000 feet, the crew encountered problems with the communication systems and informed ATC about an emergency situation via the transponder codes before returning to the airport. The crew completed a circuit then prepared for a landing on runway 24L. Upon touchdown, the airplane bounced then nosed down and landed a second time. On impact, the main landing gear collapsed and the airplane caught fire, slid for few hundred metres then veered off runway to the right and came to rest in flames. The aircraft was destroyed by fire. 37 occupants were evacuated while 41 people, among them a crew member, were killed.

Crash of an Antonov AN-148-100 in Argunovo: 71 killed

Date & Time: Feb 11, 2018 at 1428 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-61704
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Moscow – Orsk
MSN:
27015040004
YOM:
2010
Flight number:
6W703
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
65
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
71
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed runway 14R at Moscow-Domodedovo Airport at 1421LT. Six minutes later, while climbing to an altitude of 6,000 feet in light snow showers, the airplane descended then disintegrated in a snow covered field located in Argunovo, about 37 km southeast of the Airport, one minute later. The aircraft was totally destroyed and debris were scattered on more than one km. All 71 occupants were killed. Both recording systems have been recovered. A day after the crash, Russian Authorities confirmed that the aircraft was intact until the final impact with the ground. Preliminary reports indicates speed variations on all three ASI's three minutes after rotation. 50 seconds after the automatic pilot was disconnected, the airplane experienced vertical loads between 0,5 and 1,5 G. then pitched down to an angle of 35°. Five seconds prior to impact, the airplane banked right to 25°. Preliminary investigations shows that the incorrect data on ASI's was caused by icing of the Pitot tubes as the heating systems was off, apparently because the crew failed to activate it.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2 in Chernoye: 2 killed

Date & Time: Sep 2, 2017
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-35171
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Chernoye - Chernoye
MSN:
1G113-10
YOM:
30
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The pilot and his passenger were taking part to an airshow at Chernoye Aerodrome, celebrating the 70th anniversary of the Antonov AN-2. The pilot was completing a steep turn to the left to join the grassy runway when the airplane lost height and struck the ground with its left wing and crashed in flames. Both occupants were killed and the aircraft was totally destroyed.

Crash of a Dassault Falcon 50EX in Moscow-Vnukovo: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 20, 2014 at 2357 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
F-GLSA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Moscow - Paris
MSN:
348
YOM:
2006
Flight number:
LEA074P
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
6624
Captain / Total hours on type:
1266.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1478
Copilot / Total hours on type:
246
Aircraft flight hours:
2197
Aircraft flight cycles:
1186
Circumstances:
During the takeoff run on runway 06 at Moscow-Vnukovo Airport, the three engine aircraft hit a snowplow with its left wing. The aircraft went out of control, rolled over and came to rest upside down in flames. All four occupants were killed, three crew members and Mr. Christophe de Margerie, CEO of the French Oil Group Total, who was returning to France following a meeting with the Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. At the time of the accident, the RVR on runway 06 was estimated at 350 meters due to foggy conditions. The pilot of the snow-clearing vehicle was slightly injured.
Probable cause:
The accident occurred at nighttime under foggy conditions while it was taking off after cleared by the controller due to collision with the snowplow that executed runway incursion and stopped on the runway. Most probably, the accident was caused by the combination of the following contributing factors:
- lack of guidance on loss of control over an airdrome vehicle and/or situational awareness on the airfield in pertinent documents defining the duties of airdrome service personnel (airdrome shift supervisor and vehicle drivers);
- insufficient efficiency of risk mitigation measures to prevent runway incursions in terms of airdrome peculiarilies that is two intersecling runways;
- lack of proper supervision from the airdrome service shift supervisor, alcohol detected in his organism, over the airfield operations: no report to the ATM or request to the snowplow driver as he lost visual contact with the snowplow;
- violation by the airdrome service shift supervisor of the procedure for airdrome vehicles operations, their entering the runway (RWY 2) out of operation (closed for takeoff and landing operations) without requesting and receiving clearance from the ground controller;
- violations by the medical personnel of Vnukovo AP of vehicle driver medical check requirements by performing formally (only exterior assessment) the mandatory medical check of drivers after the duty, which significantly increased the risk of drivers consuning alcohol during the duty. The measures and controls applied at Vnukovo Airport to mitigate the risk of airdrome drivers doing their duties under the influence of alcohol were not effective enough;
- no possibility for the snowplow drivers engaged in airfield operations (due to lack of pertinent equipment on the airdrome vehicles) to continuously listen to the radio exchange at the Departure Control frequency, which does not comply with the Interaction Procedure of the Airdrome Service with Vnukovo ATC Center.
- loss of situational awareness by the snowplow driver, alcohol detected in his organism, while perfonning airfield operations that led to runway incursion and stop on the runway in use.
His failure to contact the airdrome service shift supervisor or ATC controllers after situational awareness was lost;
- ineffective procedures that resulted in insufficiently trained personnel using the airfield surveillance and control subsystem A3000 of A-SMGCS at the Vnukovo ATC Center, for air traffic management;
- no recommendation in the SOP of ATM personnel of Vnukovo ATC Center on how to set up the airfield surveillance and control subsystem A3000, including activation and deactivation of the Reserved Lines and alerts (as a result, all alerts were de-activated at the departure controller and ground controller's working positions) as well as how to operate the system including attention allocation techniques during aircraft takeoff and actions to deal with the subsystem messages and alerts;
- the porting of the screen second input of the A3000 A-SMGCS at the ATC shift supervisor WP for the display of the weather information that is not envisaged by the operational manual of the airfield surveillance and control subsystem. When weather information is selected to be displayed the radar data and the light alerts (which were present during the accident takeoff) become un available for the specialist that occupies the ATC shift supervisor's working position;
- the ATC shift supervisor's decision to join the sectors at working positions of Ground and Departure Control without considering the actual level of personnel training and possibilities for them to use the information of the airfield surveillance and control system (the criteria for joining of sectors are not defined in the Job Description of ATC shift supervisor, in particular it does not take into account the technical impossibility to change settings of the airfield surveillance and control system);
- failure by the ground controller to comply with the SOPs, by not taking actions to prevent the incursion of RWY 2 that was closed for takeoff and landing operations by the vehicles though having radar information and alert on the screen of the airfield surveillance and control system;
- failure by the out of staff instructor controller and trainee controller (providing ATM under the supervision of the instructor controller) to detect two runway incursions by the snowplow on the runway in use, including after the aircrew had been cleared to take off (as the clearance was given, the runway was clear), provided there was pertinent radar information on the screen of the airfield surveillance and control subsystem and as a result failure to inform the crew about the obstacle on the runway;
- lack of recommendations at the time of the accident in the Operator's (Unijet) FOM for flight crews on actions when external threats appear (e.g. foreign objects on the runway) during the takeoff;
- the crew failing to take measures to reject takeoff as soon as the Captain mentioned «the car crossing the road». No decision to abort takeoff might have been caused by probable nonoptimal psycho-emotional status of the crew (the long wait for the departure at an unfamiliar airport and their desire to fly home as soon as possible), which might have made it difficult for them to assess the actual threat level as they noticed the snowplow after they had started the takeoff run;
- the design peculiarity of the Falcon 50EX aircraft (the nose wheel steering can only be controlled from the LH seat) resulting in necessity to transfer aircraft control at a high workload phase of the takeoff roll when the FO (seated right) performs the takeoff.
Final Report:

Ground fire of an Ilyushin II-96-300 in Moscow

Date & Time: Jun 3, 2014 at 1425 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-96010
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
74393201007
YOM:
25
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
51427
Aircraft flight cycles:
7625
Circumstances:
The aircraft that was parked on the tarmac at Moscow-Sheremetyevo took fire at 1425LT. Fire bombers took more than one hour to extinguish the fire that destroyed all the cabin and the roof of the aircraft. Built in 1994, the four engine aircraft was stored since April and not in service anymore. The fire spread from the cockpit area for unknown reason.

Crash of a Tupolev TU-204-100V in Moscow: 5 killed

Date & Time: Dec 29, 2012 at 1633 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-64047
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pardubice - Moscow
MSN:
1450744864047
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
RWZ9268
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
14975
Captain / Total hours on type:
3080.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
10222
Copilot / Total hours on type:
579
Aircraft flight hours:
8676
Aircraft flight cycles:
2484
Circumstances:
Crew was performing a ferry flight from Pardubice to Moscow-Vnukovo Airport. After landing on runway 19 in marginal weather conditions, aircraft did not stop on the remaining runway, overrun at high speed and collided with an embankment separating the airport with the M3 Highway. Aircraft broke in three parts and four crew were killed (captain, copilot, engineer and one stewardess). Four other flight attendants were seriously injured. At the time of the accident, wind was gusting to 29 knots and the ceiling was 2,400 feet. A day later, one of the stewardess died from her injuries. According to MAK, aircraft landed 900-1000 meters past the runway threshold. Despite the fact that crew applied brake, aircraft did not decelerate as expected. It overrun 32 seconds after touch down at a speed of 215 km/h before hitting an embankment located 320 meters further on at a speed of 190 km/h. The AOC of Red Wings has been suspended few days later and on 18JUN2013, Rosaviatsia renewed the AOC, so the company was again authorized to operate commercial flights.
Probable cause:
Misalignment of mechanism and locks of thrust reversers on both engines as well as inappropriate actions (inappropriate provisions in the flight crew operating manual) by the crew during the landing run that resulted in lack of effective braking overrunning the runway and colliding with obstacles at high speed (about 190 kph/102 knots), the destruction of the aircraft and loss of life.
Contributing factors were:
- lack of documentation in what sequence the adjustments and checks of the engine control system should be performed upon replacing the engine control system as well as lack of documentation of rigidity of the controls and thrust reverser locks. This factor only becomes relevant in a handling of the thrust reversers in violation of the flight crew operating manual.
- inconsistencies and contradictions in the maintenance manuals of the aircraft and engines.
- lack of a formal procedure for maintenance organisations engaged in replacing engine management systems (including control mechanism and thrust reverser locks) to provide feedback to the aircraft and engine manufacturer in a timely manner to eliminate defects.
- unstable approach and significant speed exceedance (45 kph/24 knots), that resulted in a prolonged flare, significantly increased landing distance (by about 950 meters), soft touchdown ( 1.12G) preventing simultaneous activation of left and right gear compressed signals and thus preventing automatic extension of spoilers and air brakes.
- lack of checks by the crew for extension of spoilers and air brakes
- lack of extending the spoilers manually
- violation of the flight crew operating manual by the crew with respect to the use of reverse thrust, evidenced by the application of maximum reverse thrust in one motion without pause at low reverse thrust and without checking whether the thrust reversers had deployed, which resulted in an increase of (forward) engine thrust.
- absence of a (combined) gear compressed signal (more than 5.5 tons of weight on each main landing gear) throughout the entire landing roll and the crew's failure to extend the spoilers manually resulted in the thrust reversers remaining stowed.
- poor cockpit resource management by the commander throughout the entire flight, which in the approach phase led to lack of monitoring of flight remaining within stabilized approach criteria and the runway overrun
- unsatisfactory organisation of flight operations and non-functional safety management system at the operator, unsatisfactory formal verification of qualification of flight instructors to conduct pilot proficiency verification, lack of proper monitoring of qualifications and flight operations by objective criteria by the operator made it impossible to identify and eliminate systemic weaknesses in pilot techniques including speed control on landing and use of thrust reversers.
- absence of periodic training of flight crew in reacting to scenarios involving the malfunction of landing gear switches requiring the manual extension of spoilers and speed brakes. The technical possibilities at the simulators do not permit to work such scenarios.
Source: AvHerald
Final Report: