

National Transportation Safety Board  
Washington, DC 20594

Printed on : 9/22/2013 10:26:44 AM

Brief of Accident

Adopted 05/11/2010

NYC08FA265		08/03/2008		Reading, PA		Aircraft Reg No. N827DP		Time (Local): 15:19 EDT			
Make/Model:		Cessna / 550				Fatal		Serious		Minor/None	
Engine Make/Model:		Pratt And Whitney / J-T-15D				Crew		0		0	
Aircraft Damage:		Substantial				Pass		0		0	
Number of Engines:		2									
Operating Certificate(s):		None									
Type of Flight Operation:		Positioning									
Reg. Flight Conducted Under:		Part 91: General Aviation									
Last Depart. Point:		Pottstown, PA				Condition of Light:		Day			
Destination:		Same as Accident/Incident Location				Weather Info Src:		Weather Observation Facility			
Airport Proximity:		On Airport/Airstrip				Basic Weather:		Visual Conditions			
Airport Name:		Reading Regional/Carl A Spaatz				Lowest Ceiling:					
Runway Identification:		31				Visibility:		10.00 SM			
Runway Length/Width (Ft):		6350 / 150				Wind Dir/Speed:		290 / 007 Kts			
Runway Surface:		Asphalt				Temperature (°C):		27			
Runway Surface Condition:		Dry				Precip/Obscuration:		No Obscuration; No Precipitation			
Pilot-in-Command		Age: 50				Flight Time (Hours)					
Certificate(s)/Rating(s)						Total All Aircraft:		12100			
Airline Transport; Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land						Last 90 Days:		44			
						Total Make/Model:		2690			
Instrument Ratings						Total Instrument Time:		850			
Airplane											

\*\*\* Note: NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report. \*\*\*

The air traffic controller, with both ground and local (tower) responsibilities, cleared the accident airplane to land when it was about 8 miles from the runway. Another airplane landed in front of the accident flight, and the controller cleared that pilot to taxi to the hangar. The controller subsequently cleared a tractor with retractable (bat wing) mowers, one on each side, and both in the "up" position, to proceed from the terminal ramp and across the 6,350-foot active runway at an intersection about 2,600 feet from the threshold. The controller then shifted his attention back to the airplane taxiing to its hangar, and did not see the accident airplane land. During the landing rollout, the airplane's left wing collided with the right side of the tractor when the tractor was "slightly" left of runway centerline. Calculations estimated that the airplane was about 1,000 feet from the collision point when the tractor emerged from the taxiway, and skid marks confirmed that the airplane had been steered to the right to avoid impact. Prior to the crossing attempt, the tractor operator did not scan the runway, and was concentrating on the left side bat wing. Federal Aviation Administration publications do not adequately address the need for ground vehicle operators to visually confirm that active runways/approaches are clear, prior to crossing with air traffic control authorization, thus overlooking an additional means to avoid a collision.

Updated at Jul 19 2011 10:31AM

Brief of Accident (Continued)

NYC08FA265				
File No. 26726	08/03/2008	Reading, PA	Aircraft Reg No. N827DP	Time (Local): 15:19 EDT

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OCCURRENCES

Landing-landing roll - Runway incursion veh/AC/person  
Landing-landing roll - Ground collision

FINDINGS

Organizational issues-Support/oversight/monitoring-Safety programs-Adequacy of safety program-FAA/Regulator - F  
Personnel issues-Psychological-Attention/monitoring-Monitoring environment-ATC personnel - C  
Personnel issues-Psychological-Attention/monitoring-Monitoring environment-Airport personnel - C

Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor

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The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:  
The air traffic controller's failure to properly monitor the runway environment. Contributing to the accident was the tractor operator's failure to scan the active runway prior to crossing, and the Federal Aviation Administration's inadequate emphasis on vehicle operator visual vigilance when crossing active runways with air traffic control clearance.