SouthCentral Air

The certificated commercial pilot was departing on a 14 CFR 135 cargo flight. The airplane lifted off and climbed to about 200 feet. Instead of turning right toward the intended destination, the airplane began a left turn toward the runway. The angle of bank increased to about 45 degrees. The airplane then nosed down, and descended into snow covered terrain, about 200 yards north of the runway. Examination of the engine revealed the number six cylinder head was fractured, and slightly separated from the cylinder barrel. The area around the point of separation was blackened and oily. Similar discoloration was noted on the inside of the engine cowl. A metallurgical examination of the cylinder head revealed a fatigue fracture along a large segment of the thread root radius between the 5th and 6th threads. The engine's cylinder compression is part of the operator's approved airworthiness inspection program. The number six cylinder compression, recorded 121 hours before the accident, was noted as 60 PSI. The last engine inspection, 27 hours before the accident, did not include a record of the engine compression.

The CFR Part 135 cargo flight departed at night on an IFR flight with a load of mining equipment. Route of flight was over remote/mountainous terrain. About 2 hours after takeoff, while cruising at 12,000' feet msl, the right engine and propeller began to overspeed. The captain feathered the #2 engine and declared an emergency. He began to divert to an alternate destination, about 120 miles away in an area of lower terrain, but the aircraft would not maintain altitude (single engine service ceiling, as loaded, was about 8,700 feet). The captain increased power to the left engine, but it began to produce banging and coughing noises. The captain elected to perform an emergency landing at a nearby, remote, military airfield (A/F). The A/F was located in mountainous terrain and had a one-way, daylight only approach. The captain lowered the gear and flaps, and began a visual approach while attempting to keep the runway end identifier lights (REIL) in view. The aircraft encountered severe turbulence, and the captain applied full throttle to the left engine in an attempt to climb. The REIL disappeared from view, and the aircraft collided with snow covered terrain about 2 miles west of the A/F. Ground personnel at the A/F reported high winds and blowing snow with limited visibility. Postcrash exam of the right engine revealed a loss of the propeller control system hydraulic oil. Flight at 12,000 feet was conducted without crew oxygen. The crew had exceeded their maximum allowable duty day without adequate crew rest.

The pilot reportedly flew a route along the power lines between Kenai and Homer. The flight took place on a dark moonless night over rising terrain. The accident site was located 200 yards east of the power lines. Radar data shows the airplane in the area of the crash site at a steady state heading, airspeed, and level altitude. This flight marked the first time that the pilot did not complete a company flight plan. On his off days, the pilot got 9-11 hours of sleep. His wife said he was not a morning person. The pilot had commented to her that when away from home, the quality of his sleep was poor. On the day of the accident, the pilot was awake at 0340 for the 0500 departure; he had about 6 hours of sleep.

The flight was level at 10,000 feet msl in IMC conditions when the controller noticed the airplane take a sharp right turn and descend rapidly. Attempts to contact the flight were negative. Examination of the accident showed all the major components present, however, impact damage precluded any flight control continuity check. The engines could not be recovered from the impact crater. The accident site was not accessible with specialized equipment. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was on an IFR flight from Kenai to the Beluga Airport. The airport did not have an instrument approach procedure, a co-located navaid or a co-located intersection or fix. Reportedly, pilots would routinely file IFR for the route, fly outbound from Kenai for 34.5 miles, then atmt visibility acquisition of the airport. On this flight, ARTCC cleared the pilot to fly direct to the airport at an altitude of 2,000 feet. Before reaching the airport, the pilot acknowledged receipt of a clearance to cruise at 2,000 feet and to report cancellation of IFR, then there was no further communication between ARTCC and the flight. Mode C radar data showed the aircraft descended to 600 feet as it was approaching about 5 miles south of the Beluga Airport. Subsequently, the aircraft flew past the uncontrolled airport and crashed into trees about 8 miles northwest of the airport. Marks on the trees showed the aircraft was in a right descending turn on an easterly heading, when it crashed. Elevation of the crash site was 560 feet. Minimum safe (IFR) altitude for the Beluga Airport area was 2,000 feet. There were indications that the destination weather was below VFR conditions. No preimpact mechanical problem was found that would have resulted in the accident. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot had just departed the runway when he reported to the flight service station that he had engine problems. The aircraft was observed by witnesses to be about 300 feet on a descending downwind. The pilot stated that he was circling for runway 01. Surviving passengers described the engines as running rough and uneven. The investigation revealed that the aircraft's weight was more than the pilot had calculated and the CofG was 3.4 inches further aft than was calculated. However, the weight and CofG were within limits. Examination of the engine disclosed that the right engine had an extensive cylinder head crack, a partially disconnected intake pipe, and was capable of producing 55% of rated power. The left engine had seven severely worn cam lobes. The rudder trim was deflected full left at impact. The evidence indicated that the pilot had retarded the throttle for the left engine and was using only the right engine to sustain flight. Exam of company checklist usage revealed several different improper versions. The pilot and five passengers were killed. Two others passengers and two people on the ground were injured.

The aircraft crashed one mile short of the runway. The accident occurred during an ILS approach in instrument meteorological conditions. During a post accident interview with the pilot he stated that he did not recognize and react in a timely manner to the gross deviation of the decision height. He continued down until striking the ground short of the runway.

A Piper PA-31, N35206, (South Central Air flight 59) was cleared to taxi to runway 06L. The weather at that time was foggy with about 1/8 mile visibility, but the RVR was improving and the airport was expected soon to be acceptable for takeoffs. The PA-31 crew taxied and waited in the holding area for the visibility to improve. A Douglas DC-10, HL7339, Korean Air Lines flight 084, was cleared to runway 32; however, while taxiing in the fog, the DC-10 crew inadvertently taxied to runway 06L/24R. Tower personnel were unable to see the aircraft in the fog and were unaware of the DC-10's position. The DC-10 was cleared to take-off on runway 32 and the PA-31 was cleared to hold on runway 06L. The DC-10 crew taxied on runway 24R and began taking off toward the PA-31 with 2,400 feet of runway remaining. Its estimated takeoff distance was 8,150 feet. Subsequently, the DC-10 collided with the PA-31, continued off the runway and hit stanchion lights, small trees and rough terrain. An investigation revealed the DC-10 pilot did not confirm his position by using his compass and that there was a lack of legible taxiway and runway signs.