Royal Air Freight - Royal Air Charter

The crew departed Pontiac-Oakland County Airport on a cargo service to Livingston-Mission Field Airport (flight RAX698). After touchdown on runway 22, the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance and overran. It went down into a ravine, lost its undercarriage and came to rest with both engines torn off. Both crew members evacuated safely.

The flight was scheduled to pick up cargo at the destination airport and then deliver it to another location. During the descent and 14 minutes before the accident, the airplane encountered a layer of moderate rime ice. The captain, who was the pilot flying, and the first officer, who was the monitoring pilot, made multiple statements which were consistent with their awareness and presence of airframe icing. After obtaining visual flight rules conditions, the flight crew canceled the instrument flight rules clearance and continued with a right, circling approach to the runway. While turning into the base leg of the traffic pattern, and 45 seconds prior to the accident, the captain called for full flaps and the engine power levers were adjusted several times between 50 and 95 percent. In addition, the captain inquired about the autopilot and fuel balance. In response, the first officer stated that he did not think that the spoilerons were working. Shortly thereafter, the first officer gave the command to add full engine power and the airplane impacted terrain. There was no evidence of flight crew impairment or fatigue in the final 30 minutes of the flight. The cockpit voice recorder showed multiple instances during the flight in which the airplane was below 10,000 feet mean sea level that the crew was engaged in discussions that were not consistent with a sterile cockpit environment, for example a lengthy discussion about Class B airspeeds, which may have led to a relaxed and casual cockpit atmosphere. In addition, the flight crew appears to have conducted checklists in a generally informal manner. As the flight was conducted by a Part 135 operator, it would be expected that both pilots were versed with the importance of sterile cockpit rules and the importance of adhering to procedures, including demonstrating checklist discipline. For approximately the last 24 seconds of flight, both pilots were likely focusing their attention on activities to identify and understand the reason for the airplane's roll handling difficulties, as noted by the captain's comment related to the fuel balance. These events, culminating in the first officer's urgent command to add full power, suggested that neither pilot detected the airplane's decaying energy state before it reached a critical level for the conditions it encountered. Light bulb filament examination revealed that aileron augmentation system and stall warning lights illuminated in the cockpit. No mechanical anomalies were found to substantiate a failure in the aileron augmentation system. No additional mechanical or system anomalies were noted with the airplane. A performance study, limited by available data, could not confirm the airplane's movements relative to an aileron augmentation system or spoileron problem. The level of airframe icing and its possible effect on the airplane at the time of the accident could not be determined.

Approximately 3 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was flying in a northeast direction, at 17,100 feet, and was instructed by air traffic controllers to contact Boston Center. He acknowledged the instruction, and no further transmissions were received from the pilot. Radar data indicated the airplane continued level at 17,100 feet on a northeasterly heading, and maintained a groundspeed of 255 knots, for approximately 2 minutes after the last transmission. The airplane then climbed 300 feet, and descended abruptly, losing 10,700 feet during the next 46 seconds, while maintaining an approximate ground speed of 255 knots. The airplane then initiated a climb from 6,700 feet to 7,600 feet, maintained an altitude of 7,600 feet for 4 seconds, and then entered a continuous descent until the last radar contact 17 seconds later, at an altitude of 2,400 feet. Several witnesses observed the airplane prior to it impacting the ground. All of the witness described the airplane in a "flat spin" with the engines running prior to impact. Examination of recorded weather data revealed several areas of light-to-moderate precipitation echoes in the vicinity of the accident site. The maximum echo tops were depicted ranging from 14,000 to 25,000 feet, with tops near 17,000 feet in the immediate vicinity of the accident site. Recorded radar images depicted the airplane traveling through an area of lower echoes for approximately 5-minutes immediately prior to the accident. AIRMET Zulu was current for icing conditions from the freezing level to 22,000 feet over the route of flight and the accident site. Four PIREPs were also issued indicating light-to-moderate rime to mixed icing in the clouds from the freezing level to 16,000 feet. Cloud tops were reported from 16,000 to 17,000 feet by two aircraft. Examination of the airplane and engines revealed no pre-impact mechanical anomalies. Additionally, examination of the cockpit overhead switch panel indicated propeller de-ice, engine intake heat, windshield anti-ice, and wing de-ice were all in the 'off' position. According to the pilot's toxicology test results, pseudoephedrine and diphenhydramine was detected in the pilot's urine. Diphenhydramine was not detected in the blood.

The right engine lost power during the initial climb after lift-off. A witness heard a noise and observed flames coming from the right engine cowling as the airplane climbed. The airplane entered a turn after climbing about 200 feet, descended through a small grove of trees, crashed in a pasture, and burned. During takeoff, the plane's gross weight was about 11,050 lbs and the cg was behind the aft limit. Its maximum certified weight limit was 9,700 lbs. The pilot was aware of a gross weight problem before takeoff. An exam revealed evidence that the left engine propeller was in the feathered position and the right propeller was not feathered at impact. A check of the right engine disclosed that the n°3 cylinder intake valve had failed from fatigue. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.