Operator Image

Crash of a Fairchild-Hiller FH-227C in Lebanon: 32 killed

Date & Time: Oct 25, 1968 at 1717 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N380NE
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Boston – Lebanon – Montpelier
MSN:
517
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
NE946
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
39
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
32
Captain / Total flying hours:
14700
Captain / Total hours on type:
1181.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2499
Copilot / Total hours on type:
281
Aircraft flight hours:
3828
Circumstances:
Northeast Airlines Flight 946 departed Boston 17:42 for a flight to Lebanon, NH and Montpelier, VT. The Fairchild climbed to a cruising altitude of 8000 feet. At 18:08 the crew were cleared for an approach to the Lebanon Airport to cruise at 5,000 feet and report leaving 6,000 feet. At 18:10:45, the controller advised the crew that radar service had been terminated and the flight was cleared to contact the Lebanon Flight Service Station (FSS). One minute later the FSS told the crew that the weather was an estimated ceiling of 2,000 feet overcast; visibility was 10 miles; there were breaks in the overcast; the altimeter setting was 29:55; and the wind was calm. The flight did not perform the published instrument approach procedure but executed an abbreviated approach by making a right turn from their northwesterly heading and then a left turn back to intercept the inbound radial to the VOR station. The inbound radial was intercepted at approximately 8 to 10 miles northeast of the VOR station where it passed through an altitude of about 4500 feet. The crew began the descent but did not level off at 2,800 feet m.s.l., the minimum altitude inbound to the VOR. During the approach to runway 25 the airplane contacted trees on the cloud-shrouded side of a steep, rocky, heavily wooded mountain 57 feet below the summit at 2,237 feet m.s.l. The aircraft cut a swath trough the trees broke up and caught fire. Two crew members and 30 passengers were killed while 10 others were injured.
Probable cause:
The premature initiation of a descent towards the Minimum Descent Altitude, based on navigational instrument indications of an impending station passage in an area of course roughness. The crew was not able to determine accurately its position at this time because they had performed a non standard instrument approach and there were no supplement navigational aids available for their use.

Crash of a Douglas DC-6 in New York

Date & Time: Feb 24, 1967 at 0225 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N8224H
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Philadelphia - Boston
MSN:
43741/290
YOM:
1952
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6232
Captain / Total hours on type:
3348.00
Circumstances:
While cruising at an altitude of 15,500 feet over Holmdel, New Jersey, the aircraft suffered an explosive decompression of the cabin. A 60 by 125 inches 'panel' detached from the fuselage and struck the engine number three, causing the detachment of its propeller. The crew started an emergency descent and was able to complete an emergency landing at New York Airport. All 14 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was later declared as damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Fatigue fracture of the fuselage and explosive decompression caused by an inadequate maintenance and inspection on part of the ground maintenance personnel. Investigations reported that at the time of the decompression, the cabin was pressurized for 2,500 feet while the aircraft was flying at an altitude of 15,500 feet.
Final Report:

Crash of a Vickers 789D Viscount in Boston

Date & Time: Nov 15, 1961 at 1710 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N6592C
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Washington DC – New York – Boston
MSN:
234
YOM:
1957
Flight number:
NE120
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
37
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
17000
Captain / Total hours on type:
2000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
300
Aircraft flight hours:
8328
Circumstances:
On November 15, 1961, at approximately 1710LT, 47 minutes after sunset, a ground collision occurred at Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, between a National Airlines DC-6B, N8228H, attempting a takeoff on runway 09 and a Northeast Airlines Viscount N6592C, during its landing roll on runway 04R. National Airlines Flight 429 originated at Boston. Its destination was Norfolk, Virginia, with five intermediate stops. Northeast Airlines Flight 120 originated at Washington, D. C. Its destination was Boston, Massachusetts, with an intermediate stop at LaGuardia Airport, New York. There were no serious injuries to either the crew or passengers of the DC-6; however, four passengers of the Viscount received minor cuts and abrasions while deplaning. There was major damage to both aircraft. As a result of this accident the Board recommended to the Federal Aviation Agency that consideration be given to requiring that all restrictive clearances or instructions issued by air traffic control be acknowledged by pilot repetition.
Probable cause:
The Board finds that this ground collision accident occurred as the result of commencement of takeoff by National 429 without clearance. Contributing factors were the failure of tower personnel to provide adequate surveillance of the active runways and to issue an appropriate warning message to the pilot of National 429 alerting him to the impending traffic confliction.

Crash of a Convair CV-240-2 in Nantucket: 25 killed

Date & Time: Aug 15, 1958 at 2334 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N90670
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
LaGuardia – Nantucket
MSN:
90
YOM:
1948
Flight number:
NE258
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
31
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
25
Captain / Total flying hours:
5603
Captain / Total hours on type:
1416.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
614
Copilot / Total hours on type:
132
Aircraft flight hours:
18019
Circumstances:
During a night approach to Nantucket, the aircraft went through an area of fog. The crew decided to continue the approach when the airplane struck the ground, crashed and burned about 1,450 feet short of runway 24. All three crew members and 22 passengers were killed while nine others were injured, some of them seriously.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the deficient judgment and technique of the pilot during an instrument approach in adverse weather conditions in failing to abandon the approach when a visibility of one-eights mile was reported, and descending to a dangerously low altitude while still a considerable distance from the runway.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas C-53-DO in New Bedford: 12 killed

Date & Time: Sep 15, 1957 at 2046 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N34417
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Boston – Hyannis – Martha’s Vineyard – New Bedford – New York
MSN:
7337
YOM:
1942
Flight number:
NE285
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
21
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Captain / Total flying hours:
7079
Captain / Total hours on type:
4348.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2097
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1522
Aircraft flight hours:
35685
Circumstances:
Northeast Airlines Flight 285 is a scheduled passenger operation originating at Boston, Massachusetts, and terminating at New York, New York, with intermediate stops serving Hyannis, Nantucket, Martha's Vineyard, and New Bedford, Massachusetts. On September 15, 1957, the flight originated on schedule, its crew consisting of Captain Vincent L. Pitts, Reserve Captain Roger W. Sweetland, serving as copilot, and Stewardess Nancy J. Lehan. Flight 285 was routine until it reached Martha's Vineyard where it landed at 2007 following a missed approach in poor weather conditions. The flight departed Martha's Vineyard for New Bedford at 2019, about 50 minutes behind schedule, the result of the missed approach, IFR delays, and accumulated minor delays. The flight to New Bedford was in and on top of Instrument weather conditions and was conducted according to an IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) flight plan. The clearance given the flight by ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control) through company radio was as follows. "ATC clears Northeast 285 to the New Bedford middle marker, via direct Otis, Red 94, to maintain 4,000, to make climb to 2,500 at the Martha's Vineyard radio beacon before proceeding on course. Report on course and report the Otis radio beacon." At departure there was sufficient fuel for the flight to New Bedford, and, if necessary to the designated alternate airport, Boston, with the required reserve upon arrival there. Also, at this time, according to the company load manifest, the aircraft was loaded to a gross weight of 22,443 pounds, well under the maximum allowable of 25,346 pounds. The load was distributed within the center of gravity limitations of the aircraft. At 2024 the flight reported to the company radio at Martha's Vineyard that it was over the Martha's Vineyard radio beacon, "2,500 feet on course." At 2029 it again contacted the company at Martha's Vineyard and reported it was then over Otis at 4,000 feet. A few minutes later Flight 285 contacted the New Bedford taper controller and informed him it was unable to give the Otis report to the company at Boston. The controller took the progress report and requested the flight to contact Providence approach control (Providence controls IFR flights in the New Bedford area). The flight immediately contacted Providence approach control and was cleared to maintain 4,000 feet to the compass locater at the New Bedford middle marker and to report over the marker. This was acknowledged. Immediately thereafter Providence cleared Flight 285 for an approach to the New Bedford Airport and requested it to report leaving 4,000 feet and then switch to the New Bedford tower. At 2036 the flight reported leaving 4,000 feet. Flight 285 then contacted the New Bedford tower operator and thereafter, at 2038, according to the controller, stated it was starting an ILS approach. The controller gave the flight the latest weather as follows: Indefinite 200, obscuration; visibility one mile; fog; wind southeast 3; altimeter 30.02. He also cleared the flight to land, ILS approach, straight in to runway 5, and requested that it call the tower when inbound at the outer marker. Following this clearance the captain of another Northeast flight, 275, which had shortly before, at 2031, taken off from runway 23, the reciprocal of 5, gave Flight 285 the following information. "It'll be tight." Flight 285 reported that it had completed the procedure turn and was inbound over the outer marker. The controller acknowledged this report which was the last communication with the flight. He logged the report at 2046, shortly after it was received. The airplane clip trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located 4,000 feet short of runway 05 threshold. Both pilots and ten passengers were killed while 12 other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident ins that the pilot, attempted to make a visual approach by descending prematurely in the approach area without adherence to the prescribed ILS approach procedure which was dictated by existing weather conditions. The following findings were reported:
- Flight to the New Bedford area was made in and on top of instrument weather conditions in accordance with an instrument flight rules flight plan,
- Flight 285 reached the New Bedford area and was cleared for an ILS approach,
- Weather conditions at the airport and the surrounding area clearly dictated an ILS approach,
- Airborne and ground equipment necessary to the ILS approach was functioning normally,
- Flight 285 descended prematurely in the approach area without conformity to the ILS procedure,
- Flight 285 descended to a low and unsafe altitude in an attempt to approach the airport visually, assisted by directional instruments,
- The flight did not conform to the ILS glide path,
- From low altitude a descent occurred which was not recognized by the pilots in time for corrective action to be effective,
- The trees struck were located 165 feet to the right of the localizer centerline, nearly 189 feet below the glide path centerline, and about 4,000 feet short of the runway threshold,
- There was no evidence of malfunction of the aircraft, its systems, or powerplants.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-6A in New York: 20 killed

Date & Time: Feb 1, 1957 at 1802 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N34954
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New York – Miami
MSN:
44678
YOM:
1955
Flight number:
NE823
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
95
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
20
Captain / Total flying hours:
16630
Captain / Total hours on type:
85.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8943
Copilot / Total hours on type:
17
Aircraft flight hours:
8317
Circumstances:
Northeast Airlines Flight 8232 a DC-6A, N34954, was scheduled to originate at La Guardia Field, a nonstop to Miami, Florida, with a departure time of 1445. This aircraft and the same crew operating as Flight 822, had arrived at LaGuardia from Miami at 1250. The crew consisted of Captain Alva V. R. Marsh, First Officer Basil S. Dixwell, Flight Engineer Angelo V. Andon, and Stewardesses Doris Steele, Catherine Virchow, and Emily Gately. A short time before the scheduled departure time the crew and passengers boarded the aircraft. Snow, which had started at LaGuardia at 1202, began to accumulate on the aircraft's horizontal surfaces after its arrival at the LaGuardia ramp position. Snow removal by ground personnel, during preflight, was ineffective because of the continuing snowfall. Accordingly, about 1600 the aircraft was taxied, with all occupants aboard, to a nose hangar on the west side of the airport for snow removal. This was accomplished and at 1745 the crew advised LaGuardia ground control that they were ready to taxi from the nose hangar for the IFR, departure to Miami. Flight 823 was then cleared to runway 4 and was advised that the wind was northeast 10, the altimeter setting 30.12, and a time check of 1747-1/2. Air Route Traffic Control cleared the flight as follows. "Cleared to Bellemead, maintain 7,000 feet." A supplementary climb-out clearance was then given: "After takeoff, a left turn direct Paterson, direct Chatham, cross 081-degree radial of Caldwell 4,000 feet or above, cross Paterson between 5,000 and 6,000 feet and cross the northwest course of Idlewild not above 6,000 feet." Both clearances were repeated and acknowledged. Takeoff clearance was issued at 1800 and a tower controller saw the aircraft airborne at approximately 1801.2 The controller advised the flight to contact LaGuardia radar departure control on 120.4 mcs. This message was acknowledged but the radar controller did not receive a call from the flight; however, he did observe a target on the scope that indicated an aircraft over the runway. The next two sweeps on the scope disclosed the target beyond the end of the runway. A subsequent sweep indicated that the target was turning left. The target then disappeared from the scope. The LaGuardia tower controllers observed a large flash at approximately 1802 in the vicinity of Rikers Island, the approximate center of which is about one mile north of the point where the aircraft left the runway. It was learned at 1819, by telephone, that Northeast Airlines Flight 823 had crashed on Rikers Island. The airplane was destroyed by a post crash fire and 20 passengers were killed.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the captain to (1) properly observe and interpret his flight instruments and (2) maintain control of his aircraft. The following findings were reported:
- The weather at the time of takeoff was above the prescribed company minimums,
- The aircraft, immediately following takeoff, made a left turn of approximately 119 degrees and a descent,
- The pilot and flight crew did not observe or interpret any instrument indication of a left turn or descent,
- The heading indications of both fire-seized course indicators corresponded closely to the impact heading of the aircraft,
- These instruments had been functioning properly until the time of impact,
- There was no failure or malfunction of the powerplants,
- There was no airframe failure or control malfunction,
- There was no electrical power failure or malfunction of instruments prior to ground impact,
- There was no fire prior to ground impact,
- As a result of fuselage deformation the main cabin door jammed, hindering evacuation of passengers,
- The main cabin lighting system became Inoperative during deceleration and the emergency inertia lights did not actuate.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-3 near Berlin: 2 killed

Date & Time: Nov 30, 1954 at 1115 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N17891
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Boston – Concord – Laconia – Berlin
MSN:
11745
YOM:
1943
Flight number:
NE792
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
7900
Captain / Total hours on type:
5500.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4300
Copilot / Total hours on type:
831
Aircraft flight hours:
26000
Circumstances:
Flight 792 originated at Boston, Massachusetts, for Berlin, New Hampshire, with stops at concord and Laconia, New Hampshire. The drew consisted of Captain W. P. Carey, First Officer George D. McCormick, Stewardess Mary McEttrick, and Flight Superintendent John C. McNulty. Departure from Boston was at 0930, approximately on schedule, with a company clearance to Laconia under Visual Flight Rules. The first two segments of the flight, Boston-Concord and Concord-Laconia, were routine. Departure from Laconia was on schedule at 1039. The aircraft carried fuel for about four hours., its gross weight was considerably under the max allowable,. and its center of gravity was located within prescribed limits. Scheduled arrival at Berlin was 1112. A minute or so after takeoff the flight requested an IFR clearance f or the 73-mile flight which was at once approved by the company dispatcher at Boston, and Issued by the CAA Air Route Traffic Control Center, "Boston ATC clears Northeast Flight 792 for an approach to the Berlin Airport via Blue 63 to cruise 8,000 feet." At 1103 the flight called the company station at the Berlin Airport and asked for local weather. The station agent immediately gave the 1045 observation: Estimated 3,000 feet overcast; visibility 2-1/2 miles; light snow showers. The flight acknowledged but did not give its altitude and position. The agent then made a special weather observation at 1110 and transmitted the following information to the flight: 2,300 scattered, 39000 overcast; visibility 2-1/2 miles; light snow showers; wind northwest 10; snow showers to the north. (This was close to the Berlin minimums of 2,300 foot ceiling and 2 miles visibility.) The flight's acknowledgement of this transmission was logged at 1114; however, the actual time may have been as much as two minutes earlier as the agent was alone and busy. There was no further contact. No position report was received for North Conway, a company-required reporting point about midway between Laconia, and Berlin. At 1125 the company's Boston station asked by teletype regarding the flight, Accordingly, the Berlin operator called the flight at 1128 but received no reply. At 1130 he sent a special weather report and suggested that, the flight return to Laconia. Again there was no reply. (The accident had already occurred.) This special weather was: Ceiling estimated 1,500 feet broken, 3,000 feet overcast; visibility 2 miles; light snow; wind northwest 10 (below Berlin minimums).
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a premature and unauthorized instrument descent to an altitude that did not permit terrain clearance. The following findings were reported:
- The 1114 company weather message for Berlin reported marginal weather conditions; this was acknowledged,
- The pilot started his descent not in accord with the approved instrument approach procedure for the Berlin, New Hampshire, airport,
- In so doing he struck a hill while letting down directly toward the airport.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-240-13 in New York-La Guardia

Date & Time: Jan 14, 1952 at 0903 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N91238
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Boston – New York
MSN:
158
YOM:
1949
Flight number:
NE801
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
33
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13849
Captain / Total hours on type:
2382.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5100
Copilot / Total hours on type:
700
Aircraft flight hours:
5962
Circumstances:
Flight 801 originated at Boston, Massachusetts, for LaGuardia Field, nonstop, with a crew of Captain A. V. R. Marsh, First Officer Austin Officer Austin E. Briggs, and Stewardess Carolyn Mc Hull. It departed Boston at 0745, as schedules, in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules, via Airways Amber 7 and Red 3 to LaGuardia, Idlewild (New York International) Airport was the specified alternate. Upon departure from Boston the aircraft's gross weight was 38, 23 pounds, with a maximum allowable weight of 39,650 pounds, and the center of gravity was within prescribed limits. The flight proceeded uneventfully at its assigned altitude of 6,000 feet MSL in instrument weather with almost continuous rain. No actual icing occurred although the aircraft's de-icing equipment was used as a precaution because of the near freezing air temperatures. All required position reports were routine. At approximately 0845, the flight contacted LaGuardia approach control and advised, "Northeast 801 over New Canaan - cleared to New Rochelle." (The flight had been cleared to New Rochelle by ARTC.) Approach control then requested the flight to report over the Port Chester, New York, fan marker, and gave it an expected approach clearance time of an the hour (0900), Runway 22, and the 0828 LaGuardia weather, as follows: "estimated 3,000 overcast, one end one-half miles, rain and smoke, Wind southeast six, altimeter zero-zero-zero" (30.00). The light reported over Port Chester at 0849 and was successively cleared to descend to 4,500 foot, to 3,500 foot, and to 2,500 foot altitudes. At 0855 it was cleared to leave New Rochelle, inbound, and shortly was instructed to make a 360-degree turn to assure separation from a preceding aircraft. The flight acknowledged and complied. At 0858 it reported leaving New Rochelle and was cleared for an approach to Runway 22, and at 0859, was told that Ground Control Approach advisories were available on a frequency of 109.9 megacycles. The flight acknowledged, and then was given the 0900 LaGuardia weather, ceiling 1,700 feet and visibility 1 1/2 miles. Flight 801 reported leaving the LaGuardia range at 0900 and was cleared to land on Runway 22. There was no further message from the flight. At 0903 it struck the water of Flushing Bay some 3,600 feet from the approach end of Runway 22. A motorboat operated by the Edo Corporation, docked about one-half mile away, reached the site approximately four minutes later. Passengers and crew, who had climbed out through the emergency exits and who were standing on and holding to the fat sinking aircraft, were taken aboard and then transferred to a tugboat that arrived shortly. All occupants were taken ashore and hospitalized.
Probable cause:
The Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the captain in command to monitor the copilot's approach and take corrective action when the aircraft first went appreciably below a normal approach path. The following findings were pointed out:
- The weather data included a coiling of 1,700 feet and visibility of 1 1/2 miles,
- Authorized minimum ceiling and visibility for the subject approach were 500 feet and one mile, respectively,
- Instrument weather was encountered during the approach,
- The approach was continued visually, despite the instrument weather,
- Air speed was decreased and the aircraft settled rapidly to the water at 0903,
- There was no malfunctioning or failure of the aircraft, or any of its components.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-240-13 in Portland

Date & Time: Aug 11, 1949 at 2117 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
NC91241
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Boston – Portland
MSN:
161
YOM:
1949
Flight number:
NE812A
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
25
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11516
Captain / Total hours on type:
285.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1770
Copilot / Total hours on type:
105
Aircraft flight hours:
506
Circumstances:
The trip from Boston was routine and at 2112 the flight contacted the Portland tower and received landing instructions as follows "Northeast 812 Able cleared to enter traffic pattern Runway 20. Wind east variable southeast 5. The altimeter 2998. Check on base leg." At 2116 the flight reported turning into final approach and was cleared to land on Runway 20. As the aircraft passed over the approach end of the runway, at an estimated altitude of 20 to 25 feet and an indicated airspeed of 120 mph, the throttles were brought back to what was expected to be the closed position, preparatory to landing. However, due to malfunctioning of the propeller reverse lock mechanism, the throttles were actually brought back beyond the closed position and into the propeller reverse pitch position instead. This unexpected reversal of propeller pitch in flight resulted in an extremely hard landing 237 feet past the approach end of the runway with serious damage to the aircraft structure. The airplane, however, continued along the runway a distance of 1,065 feet from the point of initial impact before it came to rest. Fuel which had been spilled along the runway was ignited by sparks from the damaged aircraft and propellers scraping along the runway surface. The fire became concentrated for a period on the right side adjacent to the right engine and right wing root, but subsequently enveloped the major portion of the aircraft. All passengers were evacuated in an orderly manner through the rear cabin exit door. The captain and first officer made their escape through the left cockpit window after all effective action possible had been taken to control the fire. The airport fire equipment arrived shortly thereafter but was unable to extinguish the fire before the aircraft had been damaged beyond economical repair. Five people were slightly injured while all other occupants were unhurt.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was failure of the throttle looking device to function properly thus permitting the movement of the throttles beyond the stop into the propeller reverse pitch position.
Final Report: