National Airlines (1934)

Flight 193 operated as a scheduled passenger from Miami to Pensacola, FL, with en route stops at Melbourne and Tampa, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Mobile. About 21:02 CDT the flight departed Mobile on an IFR flight plan to Pensacola and climbed to the cruising altitude of 7,000 feet. At 21:09, the crew were told that they would be vectored for an airport surveillance radar (ASR) approach to runway 25. At 21:13, the radar controller told National 193 that it was 11 nm NW of the airport and cleared it to descend and maintain 1,700 feet. At 21:17 flaps were selected at 15° and two minutes later the flight was cleared to descend to 1,500 feet and shortly after that further down to the MDA (480 feet). As the aircraft rolled out on the final approach heading, the captain called for the landing gear and the landing final checklist. At 21:20:15, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) whooper warning continued for nine seconds until the first officer silenced the warning. Nine seconds later the 727 hit the water with gear down and flaps at 25°. It came to rest in about 12 feet of water. The weather at the time of the accident was 400 feet overcast, 4 miles visibility in fog and haze, wind 190°/7 kts. Three passengers were killed while 55 other occupants were rescued, among them 11 were injured.

On November 15, 1961, at approximately 1710LT, 47 minutes after sunset, a ground collision occurred at Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, between a National Airlines DC-6B, N8228H, attempting a takeoff on runway 09 and a Northeast Airlines Viscount N6592C, during its landing roll on runway 04R. National Airlines Flight 429 originated at Boston. Its destination was Norfolk, Virginia, with five intermediate stops. Northeast Airlines Flight 120 originated at Washington, D. C. Its destination was Boston, Massachusetts, with an intermediate stop at LaGuardia Airport, New York. There were no serious injuries to either the crew or passengers of the DC-6; however, four passengers of the Viscount received minor cuts and abrasions while deplaning. There was major damage to both aircraft. As a result of this accident the Board recommended to the Federal Aviation Agency that consideration be given to requiring that all restrictive clearances or instructions issued by air traffic control be acknowledged by pilot repetition.

Flight 2511 departed New York International (Idlewild) Airport at 2334LT on January 5 on an IFR clearance scheduled as a nonstop flight to Miami, Florida. The flight proceeded routinely in accordance with its flight plan until shortly after passing Wilmington, North Carolina. At 0231 Flight 2511 contacted the company radio station at Wilmington while over Carolina Beach at 18,000 feet, and transmitted a routine progress report. Shortly after the completion of this radio contact a dynamite explosion occurred in the passenger cabin. Following this explosion the aircraft entered a wide descending right turn and crashed 1-1/2 miles north-west of Bolivia at 0238 some 16 miles west of its intended flight path. All 29 passengers and the crew of five were killed. It is believed that Julian Frank was the author of this act of sabotage after he contracted a life-insurance for one million US$. But this assumption was not confirmed as he was himself seating in the aircraft when the explosion occurred.
No reference is made in this report concerning the placing of the dynamite aboard the aircraft or of the person or persons responsible for its detonation. The malicious destruction of an aircraft is a Federal crime. After the Board's determination that such was involved, the criminal aspects of this accident were referred to the Department of Justice through its Federal Bureau of Investigation

While cruising at an altitude of 14,000 feet by night and approaching the Louisiana Coast, the airplane disappeared from radar screens and crashed into the Gulf of Mexico about 30 miles east of Pilottown. Intensive sea and air searches resulted in finding nine floating bodies and a small amount of floating debris the following morning. None of this disclosed conclusive evidence as to the genesis of the accident. The main wreckage has not been located despite several well planned searches. There was no radio message of impending trouble or any distress call from the crew prior to the accident. All 42 occupants were killed in the crash.

The twin engine aircraft landed too far down a wet runway and was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest in a ditch. There were no casualties but the airplane was written off.

After a normal run-up the copilot taxied the aircraft to the end of the 5,010-foot runway. The aircraft was then lined up with the runway slightly to the right of the centerline, the tail wheel was locked, and power was applied. As the aircraft progressed down the runway the tail came up and the copilot applied forward pressure to the control column. Shortly thereafter the airplane began to swerve to the left and when this was corrected it went too far to the right. A series of over-corrections followed which resulted in several swerves in both directions. As these maneuvers began the crew noted a five-inch drop in the manifold pressure of the left engine. At a speed of approximately 80 knots the aircraft again began turning to the left. The captain immediately took over the controls when he noticed a second drop of 25 inches in manifold pressure of the same engine. Both throttles were closed at once and he tried unsuccessfully to stop the turn. The turn developed into a skid and the main landing gear of the aircraft collapsed, rupturing the right wing fuel tank. The airplane cam to rest on the sodded area, off the runway, heading 180 degrees from its original takeoff position. Fire immediately occurred near the right engine nacelle. Under the supervision of the stewardess all passengers left the aircraft in a rapid, orderly manner through the main cabin door. The pilots left through the cockpit windows. The captain and copilot entered the cabin and made a recheck after all passengers were reported out and away from the aircraft. Local weather conditions at the time were: Ceiling 30,000 feet scattered, 600 feet scattered, visibility 12 miles, temperature 70, dewpoint 67, wind south 7. Atmospheric conditions were not conducive to carburetor ice.

Flight 470 departed Tampa at 1543LT. Its flight plan, filed previously at Miami, specified a cruising altitude of 14,500 feet according to Instrument Flight Rules and an estimated elapsed tune of two hours for the direct 498 statute miles to New Orleans. Included among the weather data attached to the captain's copy of the flight plan was a forecast of thunder-storms attended by moderate to severe turbulence in the vicinity of New Orleans, the destination. The CAA Air Route Traffic Control cleared the flight at the 14,500-foot level direct to New Orleans. Flight 470 passed over NA-3 at its cruising altitude of 14,500 feet at 1614, estimating over NA-2 at 1642, and so reported to Radio-Tampa one minute later. At that time the flight also gave the local weather: broken clouds at 6,000 feet, broken clouds at 20,000 feet and temperature 4 degrees Centigrade. Meanwhile, Flight 917 landed at New Orleans at 1612. It reached the ramp at 1617 and at 1624, its captain sent the following message to Miami flight Control and to all company stations between New Orleans and Jacksonville, Florida, including Pensacola, Florida: "Flight 917 advises extreme turbulence all altitudes just east of New Orleans." At 1636, the captain sent the following message to the same stations: "Reference extreme conditions stop at present time severe turbulence No. 1. check (NA-1) to New Orleans weather looks better to west of New Orleans." At 1649, Flight 470 reported passing over NA-2 at 1645 at 14,500 feet, and estimated being over NA-l at 1710. It also reported, "Thunderstorms all quadrants . . ." Pensacola radio received and acknowledged this message, and advised the flight of "severe turbulence" between NA-l and New Orleans as reported by Flight 917. Flight 470 acknowledged, asked what altitude Flight 917 reported turbulence, and was informed "severe turbulence at all altitudes." Again Flight 470 acknowledged. At 1654, the flight advised Pensacola that it was reducing power because of turbulence and five minutes later requested Air Route Traffic Control clearance to descend from 14,500 feet to 4,500 feet. This was granted within a minute or so, with the provision that descent between 10,000 feet and 8,000 feet be visual. At 1703, the Flight advised Pensacola of passing through 10,000 feet, and at 1712 (recorded), advised that it had reached 4,500 feet at 1710. Pensacola repeated this message back to the flight and gave it the 1648 New Orleans special weather. This was: measured 800, overcast, visibility 10 miles, wind north-northeast 25 m.p.h., with gusts to 34, the altimeter 29.61; barometer unsteady. The flight acknowledged and there were no further radio contacts. An attempt by New Orleans at 1718 to contact Flight 470 was unsuccessful, as were subsequent attempts by several other stations, and at 1840 the Coast Guard's air-sea rescue service was alerted. Low clouds and heavy seas hampered the search both by air and sea. However, on the following day (February 15) floating debris and 17 bodies were recovered from a fairly localized area in the Gulf of Mexico at about 30 degrees 38' North Latitude and 87 degrees 46' West Longitude. This position is approximately 38 miles to the right of the aircraft's direct course and is about 20 miles southeast of Mobile Point at the easterly mouth of Mobile Bay. Two wrist watches on bodies were impact stopped at 1710LT.

The aircraft involved arrived at New York International Airport, 2 New York, at 2233, February 10, 1952, as Flight 402 from Miami, Florida This flight was routine, with stops at West Palm Beach, Florida, and Washington, D C. A turn-around inspection at Idlewild performed, and 1911 gallons of 100/130 grade fuel added, bringing the total fuel aboard to 2,700 gallons Also, sufficient oil was added to bring the quantity of each tank to 30 gallons. At 2322 the aircraft departed Idlewild on a ferry flight to Newark with a new crew consisting of Captain W. G. Foster, First Officer C E. St. Clair, flight Engineer I. R. Shea, and Stewardess Nancy J. Taylor. The aircraft arrived at Newark Airport at 2335, from which point it was scheduled to depart at 2359 as Flight 101, non-stop to Miami, Florida. A second inspection was accomplished at Newark and the aircraft was loaded with 2,953 pounds of mail, baggage, air express, air freight, and 59 passengers, including one infant The computed take-off gross weight was 83,437 pounds, or 6,463 pounds less than the allowable gross of 89,900 pounds This weight was so distributed that the center of gravity was within the approved limits. No fuel was added at Newark. The flight was given an instrument clearance from Newark to Miami, with West Palm Beach as alternate. To this clearance was attached the pertinent weather reports which indicated, among other things, that at Newark the ceiling was 20,000 feet, thin overcast, with the entire en route weather generally clear with ceilings of 30,000 feet at Palm Beach and Miami. At 0013, February 11, Newark Control Tower gave the flight taxi clearance to Runway 24, stating the wind was south, variable at six m p.h., and altimeter 29 92. At approximately 0017 the flight advised the tower that it was ready for takeoff Take-off clearance was issued, and the controller observed the aircraft taxi into take-off position and proceed down the runway in a normal manner, becoming airborne at 0018 after a roll of approximately 3,200 feet. The climb-out appeared normal until the aircraft passed the vicinity of the Newark Range Station. Here it was observed by Control Tower personnel to lose altitude suddenly and veer slightly to the right. This sudden loss of altitude and the movement to the right are supported by statements of surviving passengers and ground witnesses. The controller then called the flight and asked if everything was all right, to which he received the following reply, "I lost an engine and am returning to the field." The time was established as 0019. The flight was immediately cleared to land on Runway 6, which clearance was at once amended to land on any runway desired No further radio contacts were made with flight. During the last radio transmission the controller observed the aircraft continue to veer to the right at a low altitude and then disappear from sight. At 0020 cower personnel observed a fire in the vicinity of Elizabeth New Jersey. It was later established that Flight 101 had crashed in Elizabeth near the intersection of Scotland Road and Westminster Avenue. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and three crew members, 26 passengers and four people on the ground were killed.

National Airlines’ Flight 83 departed Newark, New Jersey, at 1333, January 14, 1951, for Norfolk, Virginia, with a scheduled stop at Philadelphia. The crew consisted of Captain Howell C. Barwick, Copilot Edward J Zatarain, and Stewardess Mary Frances Housley. The aircraft’s total weight at takeoff was 58,601 pounds, which was within the allowable gross takeoff weight of 64,211 pounds, the load was properly distributed. Flight 83 was scheduled to leave Newark at 1300, but was delayed 33 minutes due to the replacement of a malfunctioning generator. The company flight clearance was filed at 1215 for the scheduled departure at 1300, and this clearance was also used for the delayed departure. Attached to it was the weather information for the flight, and a notice that the ILS (instrument landing system) glide path at Philadelphia was inoperative until further notice Immediately before taking off, the pilot requested and received from the tower the latest Philadelphia weather (reported on the 1328 CAA teletype sequence report and received at Newark after he boarded the aircraft), which was ceiling measured 1,000 feet, overcast, wind south-southwest at four miles per hour, and visibility 1 1/2 miles, with light snow and smoke Flight 83 was cleared by the New York Air Route Traffic Control to proceed to North Philadelphia range station via Amber Airway No 7, to maintain 4,000 feet, with Newark designated as the alternate airport. Thirteen minutes after takeoff, at 1346, Air Route Traffic Control issued the flight a new clearance to proceed to the Philadelphia ILS outer marker, to maintain 4,000 feet, and to contact Philadelphia Approach Control when passing the Northeast Philadelphia range station. At 1354 the flight reported over Northeast Philadelphia at 4,000 feet and was cleared by Approach Control to descend, crossing the Philadelphia range station at 3,000 feet, and to advise the tower when leaving the 4,000 and 3,000-foot levels. It was also advised that the altitude was unrestricted after passing the range station, and that it was cleared to make a straight-in approach to Runway 9 With the above clearance, local weather was given precipitation ceiling 500 feet, sky obscured, visibility 1, 1/4 miles, snow and smoke, and wind south-southwest two miles per hour. Following this clearance, the flight descended and reported over the Philadelphia range station at 3,000 feet, was again cleared for an approach to Runway 9, and was advised to report leaving thousand-foot levels. The flight acknowledged and reported leaving 3,000 feet at 1404, but no report of leaving 2,000 feet was received by Approach Control. According to the captain, they then proceeded to the outer marker and executed a procedure turn. At 1408 the flight reported over the outer marker, inbound, and stated that it was at 1,600 feet and descending. A clearance was immediately reissued to land on Runway 9, and the wind was given as south-southwest, three miles per hour. The flight was advised that the glide path was inoperative, that the frequency of the ILS localizer was 110 3 mc, that a 2,000-foot extension to the west end of the runway was under construction, and that braking action on Runway 9 was poor-to-fair. According to tower personnel this transmission was acknowledged. The crew, however, stated that they did not receive it. The flight continued its approach past the middle marker to the airport, and was first observed by ground witnesses beneath the overcast and directly over the intersection of Runways 4/22 and 9/27, located approximately 1,200 feet east of the threshold of Runway 9. Although the aircraft was first seen beneath the overcast and within the boundaries of the airport, the crew stated that they became contact at an altitude of approximately 500 feet, between the outer and middle markers. The aircraft was next seen to descend steeply, flare out for a landing in a normal manner, and float a considerable distance. After making contact with the runway the aircraft continued straight ahead, passed beyond the end of the runway, and crashed into a ditch at the east boundary of the airport. Fire immediately followed. Seven of the twenty-eight occupants did not evacuate the aircraft, and were fatally burned. The airport fire-fighting equipment was dispatched immediately to the scene, but efforts to extinguish the fire and rescue the remaining occupants were futile.

Flight 23 departed La Guardia Field at 1842 October 10, 1945, for Miami, Florida, with scheduled stops at Raleigh, N. C., and Jacksonville, Florida. Until landing at Jacksonville, the flight had been of a routine nature. However, during the flight the captain paid particular attention to an oil leak from the right engine which could be seen across the top of the engine cowl. Although the leak appeared to be very slight and had not necessitated excessive refill at either New York or Raleigh, Captain S. E. Stoia reported it to the National Airlines maintenance department at Jacksonville, with instructions that the leak be investigated. The aircraft was removed to a repair hangar and returned to the line after approximately one hour delay during which time two new oil hoses had been replaced. At 0123, October 11, 1945, the flight departed Jacksonville, on an instrument clearance to cruise at 2,000 feet to Miami. In order to avoid a slight turbulence at that flight altitude, Captain Stoia requested change of clearance to 4,000 feet. Approval for change of altitude was obtained after a delay due to traffic, and shortly after passing Daytona Beach, the flight climbed to 4,000 feet. At approximately 0210, First Officer W, S. Blomeley, who was seated in the co-pilot position, called Captain Stoia’s attention to spark which were coming from the right engine. Upon inspecting the engine with a flashlight, it was observed that thick smoke was pouring from under the engine cowl and that a wide band of oil was streaming back over the top of the nacelle. Realizing the danger of an oil fire and being anxious to avoid damage to the engine in the event of complete loss of oil, Captain Stoia immediately shut the engine down and feathered the right propeller. He advised the company station at Jacksonville of his difficulty and elected to continue to Melbourne, Florida, about 15 miles away for an emergency landing. Upon reaching Melbourne, however, the flight was advised by Melbourne Tower that the runway lights were inoperative and that considerable delay would be necessary before the mobile flood light apparatus would be available. Captain Stoia decided, therefore, to proceed to Banana River, 11 miles north, and Banana River Operations was advised by the Melbourne Tower Operator of his intentions and requested to prepare for his arrival. Although the captain had tuned to the Banana River Tower frequency, the tower was not equipped to receive the company frequency and two-way conversation was, therefore, not possible. As the flight approached the Banana River Naval Air Station, the captain observed that runway No. 6 was lighted, and being unable to establish radio contact with the tower, he assumed that it was the direction of landing intended. However, shortly before the aircraft arrived over the field, the tower personnel changed the runway lights to No. 15 since that runway was the longest one available at Banana River. The aircraft passed over the field at an altitude of 1500 feet, but the traffic pattern established by the flight was too close to the landing area, and, when on the final approach, Captain Stoia realized he was too high for a landing. When over the edge of the field at 300 feet with full flaps and gear extended and the airspeed at 100 mph, the captain decided to go around for another approach. Forty inches of manifold pressure was applied with full low pitch, the gear was fully retracted, and the flaps were retracted to the 30% position. During the missed approach procedure the captain intentionally held a nose-low attitude in order to accelerate to a normal climb airspeed; however, in spite of the loss of altitude, no increase in airspeed indication was obtained, and the aircraft continued to lose altitude while maintaining a straight course. Approximately 1/2 mile south southeast of the field, the aircraft struck the ground in a fairly level attitude longitudinally. The right wing made the first impact, the aircraft subsequently turning approximately 270 degrees as it skidded to a stop.