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Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Pueblo: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jan 18, 1978 at 1503 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N982FL
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Pueblo - Pueblo
MSN:
465
YOM:
1975
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
15284
Captain / Total hours on type:
307.00
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a local training flight at Pueblo-Memorial Airport. Following an approach to runway 27, the crew completed a circuit then a second approach to runway 17. After the airplane made a complete stop, the crew initiated a takeoff from runway 17. During initial climb, at a height of 100-150 feet, the airplane nosed over, stall and crashed near the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all three occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Stall during initial climb after the crew failed to maintain flying speed. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Failed to follow approved procedures,
- Misused or failed to use flaps,
- Flaps found in fully extended 30° position,
- Flap setting for normal takeoff is 10°.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas C-47A-70-DL in Denver: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 21, 1967 at 1600 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N65276
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Denver – Scottsbluff – Rapid City
MSN:
19202
YOM:
1943
Flight number:
FL2610
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
13011
Captain / Total hours on type:
4860.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3141
Copilot / Total hours on type:
937
Aircraft flight hours:
49282
Circumstances:
On December 21, 1967, Frontier Airlines had a backlog of more than 100,000 pounds of air freight which they were attempting to move during the busy pre-holiday period. Because of this, employees and equipment were pressed into service in a maximum effort to move the freight. Although Frontier did not use its DC-3 equipment in all-cargo operations, the passenger seats of N65276 were removed and the DC-3C was assigned to operate as all-cargo Flight 2610, from the Stapleton International Airport at Denver, Colorado to Rapid City, South Dakota, with an en route stop at Scottsbluff, Nebraska. About 1100 MST the aircraft was moved from the company hangar to the airport freight terminal for loading. About 1030, a Frontier radio communicator who knew how to prepare weight manifests was assigned to prepare the manifest for Flight 2610. He was given the operating and pit weight maximums for the aircraft. The dispatch office prepared a dispatch release for the flight. At 1100 and 1400 the employee called the freight office for specific loading information from which to execute the weight manifest. He was told both times that the information was not yet ready and would be furnished to him later. When this employee's shift ended at 1430 he still had not received the information. He then went off duty, neglecting to inform his relief of the status of the situation. In the meantime N65276 was being loaded. An air cargo service employee listed the cargo before it was loaded and tied down and later totalled its weight. No one engaged in the loading could recall that the cargo was placed in the aircraft according to any formal preloading schedule. The first officer came to the air cargo office about the time the cargo listing was being totalled. He was asked if a weight manifest were needed and he replied, "No, we have our release, that's enough." When he reached the aircraft some of the loading remained to be done and he authorized the loaders to use some of the space left in the fuselage for an aisle to accommodate this cargo. The first officer bearded the aircraft, took the left pilot's seat and had started both engines by the time the captain arrived and got aboard. Just before the flight started to taxi out and while the captain was getting settled in his seat, a Frontier station agent began to remove the control battens and landing gear pins. When he started to remove a gear pin before the pilot signalled that hydraulic pressure on the gear was up, another station agent stopped him and took over. The latter agent subsequently stated that there was no batten on the left elevator and he did not check the right one because it was customary to install the device on the left elevator when only one batten was used. He said that after he finished, he gave the crew a departure salute and that at no time did he see any of the controls move or any indication from the first officer that any of the controls were not movable. Flight 2610, appropriately cleared, left the loading area at 1544 and about 1559 began takeoff using runway 35. Weather conditions were: scattered clouds at 5,000 feet, visibility 60 miles and the wind 270 degrees at 16 knots. According to eyewitnesses, the takeoff appeared normal until after the aircraft became airborne. At this time it entered an increasingly steep climb attitude to an estimated deck angle of 50 to 60 degrees. About 300 feet above the surface, the aircraft rolled to its left and entered a steep nose-down left turning descent and crashed off the left side of the runway. The aircraft burst into flames at impact.
Probable cause:
The failure of the crew to perform a pre-takeoff control check resulting in takeoff with the elevators immobilized by a control batten.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas C-47A-10-DK in Gallup

Date & Time: Jul 27, 1966 at 1453 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N4994E
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Gallup – Albuquerque
MSN:
12442
YOM:
1944
Flight number:
FL188
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8502
Captain / Total hours on type:
4160.00
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll at Gallup-Senator Clark Airport, control was lost. The aircraft veered off runway and came to rest in flames in a ditch. Three passengers were injured while 13 other occupants were unhurt. The aircraft was written off.
Probable cause:
Improper operation of brakes and/or flight controls during takeoff on part of the PIC. Inadequate supervision of flight on part of the PIC who failed to maintain directional control and failed to abort takeoff.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas C-47A-30-DL in Miles City: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 12, 1964 at 2050 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N61442
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Billings – Miles City – Glendive – Sydney
MSN:
9642
YOM:
1943
Flight number:
FL032
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
15335
Captain / Total hours on type:
12830.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3539
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1355
Aircraft flight hours:
30442
Circumstances:
Frontier Airlines Flight 32 of March 12, 1964, crashed and burned during an instrument approach to the Miles City Airport, Miles City, Montana, about 2050 m.s.t. All five occupants, three crew members and two passengers were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed. Weather conditions last reported to the flight were the operational minima of ceiling 400 feet and visibility one mile. Wet snow, strong gusty winds, and near freezing temperatures prevailed. Investigation revealed neither malfunctioning of any of the aircraft's components nor of any of the pertinent airport navigational facilities including the VOR, which was utilized. All applicable FAA certification was in order.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the descent below obstructing terrain, for reasons undeterminable, during an instrument approach in adverse weather conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-340-31 in Grand Island

Date & Time: Dec 21, 1962 at 2030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N73130
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kansas City – Saint Joseph – Omaha – Lincoln – Grand Island – North Platte – Scottsbluff – Denver
MSN:
59
YOM:
1953
Flight number:
FL363
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
39
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
16411
Captain / Total hours on type:
2939.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4602
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1375
Aircraft flight hours:
19654
Circumstances:
The first officer, who was flying, started the approach to runway 17 which does not have approach lights nor Instrument landing System. At the time the aircraft was northbound in the holding pattern of the Grand Island VOR. A 90 degree left turn, then a 270 degree right turn was accomplished which aligned the aircraft, with the runway. The following sequence of events was described by the captain and substantiated by the first officer. The captain stated “. . . We completed the approach checklist and made a turn north of the low frequency range (8391 feet from the threshold of runway 17) which was visible as we went over it. The area around the range and the south half of the distance to the airport was absolutely clear. Our path was one which had the runway lights clearly aligned. (The runway lights were on at position 3 which is medium intensity.) The approach was a normal gradual descent. The radios were tuned to the low frequency range and the Omni. Since we were not ready to land our checklist was complete with the exception of approach flaps and landing flaps and ADI on. There were no ground witnesses to the approach or crash which was in a large level open field. There was no moonlight and the captain testified that except for the lights on the range station, there were no ground lights seen under the approach path. Both he and the first officer testified that they did not observe the runway light appear to "spread," which amounts to a visual warning of being very low - nearly at the level of the lights upon approaching the runway. A weather observation at 2037. seven minutes after the accident was: special, clear, visibility 7 miles, temperature 26 degrees F, dewpoint 26 degrees F, wind south 10 knots, altimeter setting 29.80 inches (aircraft accident) (observation recorded but not transmitted via teletype). The initial point of contact of the nosewheel was about three feet to the right of the extended centerline of runway 17 and approximately 4,061 feet short of the threshold of that runway. Additional marks indicate that the aircraft struck while nearly level longitudinally, in a yaw of about six degrees to the right, and in a shallow left bank. Upon initial impact, the left main landing gear collapsed and was torn free. Both propellers struck the ground and were also torn off with the nose cones of their respective engines. The left wing became detached as the aircraft rolled to the left onto its back and slid, inverted, swerving to the left and coming to rest on a heading of about 045 degrees at a distance of 1,275 feet from the place of first contact. Fire developed in the detached left wing, but not in the fuselage. Consequently all 43 occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft quickly, with the majority going out through the galley service door, which the stewardess opened and the others leaving via the emergency exit at seat 8D. The captain left through a cockpit window; the first officer and one passenger through a hole in the fuselage. Injuries were sustained by both pilots and three passengers. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.
Probable cause:
The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was failure of the crew to monitor altitude properly during a landing approach.
Final Report: