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Crash of a Boeing B-52H-155-BW Stratofortress at Andersen AFB

Date & Time: May 19, 2016 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
60-0047
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Andersen - Andersen
MSN:
474412
YOM:
1960
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
796
Captain / Total hours on type:
387.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
420
Copilot / Total hours on type:
195
Circumstances:
On 19 May 2016, at 0832 hours local time (L), a B-52H, tail number 60-0047 [Mishap Aircraft (MA)], assigned to the 69th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, 5th Bomb Wing, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, departed the prepared-surface overrun of Runway 06 Left (RWY 06L) during a highspeed, heavy-weight, aborted takeoff. The Mishap Crew (MC), which consisted of the Mishap Pilot (MP), Mishap Co-Pilot (MCP), Mishap Radar Navigator (MRN), Mishap Navigator (MN), Mishap Electronic Warfare Officer (MEW), an augment pilot occupying the Mishap Gunner (MG) station, and an Instructor Weapon System Officer occupying the Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) jump seat, were conducting a Higher Headquarters Directed mission. The MC were treated for minor injuries consistent with a ground egress. The MA sustained total damage with a loss valued at $112M. There was no damage to private property. The MC were cleared for takeoff at 0831L. The MA accelerated within performance standards verified by takeoff and landing data calculated performance for S1 timing and S1 decision speed. Approximately three to five seconds after reaching the S1 speed of 111 knots, the MP, MCP, and MN observed birds in front of the MA at wing level. Shortly thereafter, the MP and MCP observed engine indications for numbers 5, 6, and 7 “quickly spooling back” from the required takeoff setting. The MP also observed high oil pressure indications on the number 8 engine and a noticeable left-to-right yawing motion. Accelerating through approximately 142 knots, the MP simultaneously announced and initiated aborted takeoff emergency procedures. With the throttles set to idle thrust and airbrakes set to six, the MP initiated continuous braking pressure. The MCP deployed the drag chute at 135 knots. The drag chute failed to inflate properly. At 2,500 feet runway remaining, the MP shut off the outboard engines (numbers 1/2 and 7/8). Shortly thereafter, the MP announced the MA and MC were going to depart the prepared surface. The MEW jettisoned the defensive compartment, starboard-side hatch and the MP shut off the inboard engines (numbers 3/4 and 5/6). The MA departed the prepared surface shearing the main landing gear. The MA finally came to a rest slightly canted from runway centerline, right wing down approximately 300 feet from the runway, and subsequently caught on fire. The MC performed emergency aircraft shutdown procedures and safely egressed the MA through the MEW hatch.
Probable cause:
The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence the cause of the mishap was the MP analyzed visual bird activity and perceived cockpit indications as a loss of symmetric engine thrust required to safely attain flight and subsequently applied abort procedures after S1 timing. The AIB President also found by a preponderance of the evidence the following factors substantially contributed to the mishap: drag chute failure on deployment and exceeding brake-energy limits resulting in brake failure.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing B-52H-155-BW Stratofortress off Guam Island: 6 killed

Date & Time: Jul 21, 2008 at 0945 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
60-0053
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Andersen AFB - Andersen AFB
MSN:
464418
YOM:
1960
Flight number:
Raider 21
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Andersen AFB on a flight around the Guam Island under call sign 'Raider 21' with 6 crew members on board, taking part to the Guam Liberation Day celebrations. About 15 minutes into the flight, while descending from 14,000 to 1,000 feet, the aircraft became uncontrollable and crashed in the sea about 50 km north of Guam Island. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and only few debris were found. All six crew members were killed.
Crew:
Maj Chris Cooper, pilot,
Cpt Michael Dodson, copilot,
1st Lt Robert Gerren, electronic warfare officer,
1st Lt Joshua Shepherd, navigator,
Maj Brent Williams, radar navigator,
Col George Martin, flight surgeon.
Probable cause:
Malfunctioning parts and late recognition of spiraling problems likely led to the fatal crash of a B-52H Stratofortress in July, an Air Force accident investigation board concluded in a report issued Feb. 13. The problem parts, investigators decided, were the bomber’s rear stabilizers — the large horizontal fins at the jet’s tail that help angle the B-52H up or down. Although the inquiry could not determine what led to the stabilizer problem, the board said it believed the stabilizers malfunctioned while the bomber was in a fast descent from 14,000 feet to 1,000 feet. “Even an experienced aircrew could have found it difficult to recognize, assess and recover from the very rapidly developing situation involving the rear stabilizer trim,” board president Brig. Gen. Mark Barrett concluded. The bomber did not carry a flight data recorder, so the investigation team pieced together events leading up to the crash from air traffic control radar information and from parts recovered from the ocean floor by remote-controlled Navy submarines. One recovered part was a component called a jackscrew that helps control the stabilizers. The jackscrew revealed the stabilizer trim was set at 4.5 to 5 degrees nose down, but parts that could have helped determine why the stabilizers were pointed down were not recovered. Based on flight simulations, the investigative team determined the flight was normal until the jet turned left and began to descend about 33 miles west of Guam. As the 48-year-old bomber dove toward the Pacific at a speed of more than 240 mph, the stabilizers suddenly unhinged, putting the jet into a dive with the nose pointed down 30 degrees and more. One of the pilots likely tried to level the stabilizers manually using a control wheel in the cockpit that moves the stabilizer 1 degree every two to three seconds, the report said. However, because the plane was already low, there wasn’t enough time to level the stabilizers. At least three crew members tried to bail out seconds before the plane hit the water, but the plane’s speed, altitude and angle already were past the point where they could survive the ejection.

Crash of a Boeing 747-251B in Agana

Date & Time: Aug 19, 2005 at 1418 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N627US
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tokyo - Agana
MSN:
21709
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
NW074
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
16
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
324
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7850
Captain / Total hours on type:
7850.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9100
Copilot / Total hours on type:
8695
Aircraft flight hours:
95270
Circumstances:
During the initial approach, the red GEAR annunciator light above the gear lever illuminated, and the landing gear warning horn sounded after the gear handle was selected down and the flaps were selected to 25 degrees. During the go-around, the captain asked the second officer (SO), "what do you have for the gear lights?" The SO responded, "four here." When all gear are down and locked on the Boeing 747-200, the landing gear indication module located on the SO’s instrument panel has five green lights: one nose gear light above four main landing gear lights. The crew then read through the "Red Gear Light Remains On (After Gear Extension)" emergency/abnormal procedure from the cockpit operations manual to troubleshoot the problem. Although the checklist twice presented in boldface type that five lights must be present for the gear to be considered down and locked, the crew did not verbalize the phrase either time. The captain did not directly request a count, and the SO did not verbally confirm, the number of gear down annunciator lights that were illuminated; instead, the flight crew made only general comments regarding the gear, such as "all gear," "all green," or "got 'em all." Because the crew believed that all of the gear annunciator lights were illuminated, they considered all gear down and locked and decided not to recycle the landing gear or attempt to extend any of the gear via the alternate systems before attempting a second approach. During all communications with air traffic control, the flight crew did not specify the nature of the problem that they were troubleshooting. Although the checklist did not authorize a low flyby, if the flight crewmembers had verbalized that they had a gear warning, the controller most likely would have been able to notify the crew of the nose gear position before the point at which a go-around was no longer safe. Multiple gear cycles were conducted after the accident, and the nose gear extended each time with all nose gear door and downlock indications correctly displayed on the landing gear indication module. Post accident examination of the nose gear door actuator found that one of the two lock keys was installed 180 degrees backward. Although this improper configuration could prevent proper extension of the nose gear, the actuator had been installed on the accident airplane since 2001 after the actuator was overhauled by the operator. No anomalies were found with the landing gear indication module, the nose gear-operated door sequence valve, and the nose/body landing gear selector valve.
Probable cause:
The flight crews' failure to verify that the number of landing gear annunciations on the second officer’s panel was consistent with the number specified in the abnormal/emergency procedures checklist, which led to a landing with the nose gear retracted.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 747-3B5 in Agana: 228 killed

Date & Time: Aug 6, 1997 at 0142 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HL7468
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seoul - Agana
MSN:
22487
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
KE801
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
17
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
237
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
228
Captain / Total flying hours:
8932
Captain / Total hours on type:
1718.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4066
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1560
Aircraft flight hours:
50105
Aircraft flight cycles:
8552
Circumstances:
Korean Air Flight 801 was a regular flight from Seoul to Guam. The Boeing 747-300 departed the gate about 21:27 and was airborne about 21:53. The captain was pilot-flying. Upon arrival to the Guam area, the first officer made initial contact with the Guam Combined Center/Radar Approach Control (CERAP) controller about 01:03, when the airplane was level at 41,000 feet and about 240 nm northwest of the NIMITZ VOR/DME. The CERAP controller told flight 801 to expect to land on runway 06L. About 01:10, the controller instructed flight 801 to "...descend at your discretion maintain two thousand six hundred." The first officer responded, "...descend two thousand six hundred pilot discretion." The captain then began briefing the first officer and the flight engineer about the approach and landing at Guam: "I will give you a short briefing...ILS is one one zero three...NIMITZ VOR is one one five three, the course zero six three, since the visibility is six, when we are in the visual approach, as I said before, set the VOR on number two and maintain the VOR for the TOD [top of descent], I will add three miles from the VOR, and start descent when we're about one hundred fifty five miles out. I will add some more speed above the target speed. Well, everything else is all right. In case of go-around, since it is VFR, while staying visual and turning to the right...request a radar vector...if not, we have to go to FLAKE...since the localizer glideslope is out, MDA is five hundred sixty feet and HAT [height above touchdown] is three hundred four feet...." About 01:13 the captain said, "we better start descent;" shortly thereafter, the first officer advised the controller that flight 801 was "leaving four one zero for two thousand six hundred." During the descent it appeared that the weather at Guam was worsening. At 01:24 requested a deviation 10 miles to the left to avoid severe weather. At 01:31 the first officer reported to the CERAP controller that the airplane was clear of cumulonimbus clouds and requested "radar vectors for runway six left." The controller instructed the flight crew to fly a heading of 120°. After this transmission, the flight crew performed the approach checklist and verified the radio frequency for the ILS to runway 06L. About 01:38 the CERAP controller instructed flight 801 to "...turn left heading zero nine zero join localizer;" the first officer acknowledged this transmission. At that time, flight 801 was descending through 2,800 feet msl with the flaps extended 10° and the landing gear up. One minute later the controller stated, "Korean Air eight zero one cleared for ILS runway six left approach...glideslope unusable." The first officer responded, "Korean eight zero one roger...cleared ILS runway six left;" his response did not acknowledge that the glideslope was unusable. The flight engineer asked, "is the glideslope working? glideslope? yeh?" One second later, the captain responded, "yes, yes, it's working." About 01:40, an unidentified voice in the cockpit stated, "check the glideslope if working?" This statement was followed 1 second later by an unidentified voice in the cockpit asking, "why is it working?" The first officer responded, "not useable." The altitude alert system chime sounded and the airplane began to descend from an altitude of 2,640 feet msl at a point approximately 9 nm from the runway 06L threshold. About 01:40:22, an unidentified voice in the cockpit said, "glideslope is incorrect." As the airplane was descending through 2,400 feet msl, the first officer stated, "approaching fourteen hundred." About 4 seconds later, when the airplane was about 8 nm from the runway 06L threshold, the captain stated, "since today's glideslope condition is not good, we need to maintain one thousand four hundred forty. please set it." An unidentified voice in the cockpit then responded, "yes." About 01:40:42, the CERAP controller instructed flight 801 to contact the Agana control tower. The first officer contacted the Agana tower: "Korean air eight zero one intercept the localizer six left." The airplane was descending below 2,000 feet msl at a point 6.8 nm from the runway threshold (3.5 nm from the VOR). About 01:41:01, the Agana tower controller cleared flight 801 to land. About 01:41:14, as the airplane was descending through 1,800 feet msl, the first officer acknowledged the landing clearance, and the captain requested 30° of flaps. The first officer called for the landing checklist and at 01:41:33, the captain said, "look carefully" and "set five hundred sixty feet" (the published MDA). The first officer replied "set," the captain called for the landing checklist, and the flight engineer began reading the landing checklist. About 01:41:42, as the airplane descended through 1,400 feet msl, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) sounded with the radio altitude callout "one thousand [feet]." One second later, the captain stated, "no flags gear and flaps," to which the flight engineer responded, "no flags gear and flaps." About 01:41:46, the captain asked, "isn't glideslope working?" The captain then stated, "wiper on." About 01:41:53, the first officer again called for the landing checklist, and the flight engineer resumed reading the checklist items. About 01:41:59, when the airplane was descending through 1,100 feet msl at a point about 4.6 nm from the runway 06L threshold (approximately 1.3 nm from the VOR), the first officer stated "not in sight?" One second later, the GPWS radio altitude callout sounded: "five hundred [feet]." About 01:42:14, as the airplane was descending through 840 feet msl and the flight crew was performing the landing checklist, the GPWS issued a "minimums minimums" annunciation followed by a "sink rate" alert about 3 seconds later. The first officer responded, "sink rate okay". At that time the airplane was descending 1,400 feet per minute. About 01:42:19, as the airplane descended through 730 feet msl, the flight engineer stated, "two hundred [feet]," and the first officer said, "let's make a missed approach." About one second later, the flight engineer stated, "not in sight," and the first officer said, "not in sight, missed approach." About 01:42:22, as the airplane descended through approximately 680 feet msl, the nose began to pitch up and the flight engineer stated, "go around." When the captain stated "go around" power was added and airspeed began to increase. As the airplane descended through 670 feet msl, the autopilot disconnect warning sounded. The GPWS radio altitude callouts continued: "one hundred...fifty...forty...thirty...twenty [feet]." About 01:42:26, the airplane impacted hilly terrain at Nimitz Hill, Guam, about 660 feet msl and about 3.3 nm from the runway 06L -threshold. It struck trees and slid through dense vegetation before coming to rest. A post-impact fire broke out. It was established a.o. that the software fix for the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) system at Agana Center Radar Approach Control (CERAP) had rendered the program useless. A software patch had been installed since there had been complaints of the high rate of false MSAW alarms at Guam. This made KAL801's descent below MDA go undetected at the Agana CERAP.
Probable cause:
The captain's failure to adequately brief and execute the nonprecision approach and the first officer's and flight engineer's failure to effectively monitor and cross-check the captain's execution of the approach. Contributing to these failures were the captain's fatigue and Korean Air's inadequate flight crew training. Contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's intentional inhibition of the minimum safe altitude warning system and the agency's failure to adequately to manage the system.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas R4D-5 off Guam Island: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 14, 1978 at 1141 LT
Operator:
Registration:
17152
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Agana - Ulithi Atoll
MSN:
12342
YOM:
1942
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
25
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
4500
Captain / Total hours on type:
50.00
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Agana at 0949LT to Ulithi Atoll with a crew of five and 25 passengers, among them officers and musicians with their instruments. About 10 minutes after takeoff, while cruising to the southwest at an altitude of 6,000 feet and a speed of 180 knots, the crew reported an oil leak on the right engine but the situation seemed to be under control. About an hour later, at 1046LT, oil pressure fluctuated and the captain decided to return to Andersen Airbase. About 15 minutes later, the right engine was shut down and its propeller was feathered. Unable to maintain a safe altitude, the crew asked the passengers to jettison the cargo but the airplane continued to lost height. Eventually, the captain decided to ditch the airplane about 13 km southwest of the Guam Island coast. The aircraft landed at 1141LT and came to rest on water. The occupants evacuated the cabin and took refuge in dinghies, the airplane sank about 10 minutes later. 28 people, most of them injured, were evacuated about an hour later. Unfortunately, one passenger and the flight engineer drowned.
Source: Seth P. Washburne
Report: http://thirsty13th.com/Images/Guam_Airplane_Crash_1978.pdf
Probable cause:
The starboard engine developed an oil leak or other malfunction, from an undetermined source, of such severity that it caused cockpit indications of low oil pressure, illuminated the oil pressure warning light, and ultimately resulted in a propeller overspeed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed L-188A Electra in Agana: 46 killed

Date & Time: Jun 5, 1976 at 0047 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RP-C1061
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Wake - Agana - Manila
MSN:
1007
YOM:
1958
Flight number:
UM702
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
33
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
46
Captain / Total flying hours:
10016
Captain / Total hours on type:
2422.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8906
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2037
Aircraft flight hours:
22895
Circumstances:
The aircraft lifted off the 10,015-foot runway about 7,500 feet down the runway. During or just after liftoff the n°3 propeller was feathered. The aircraft climbed to 100 feet while yawing to the right. The crew retracted the landing gear and flaps before the aircraft reached the apex of the climb. It then rotated to a nose-high attitude, appeared to become laterally unstable, and struck the rising terrain in a tail-low attitude. Impact was about 4,300 feet beyond the end of the runway. The aft portion of the aircraft fuselage dragged along the ground for 220 feet in a right wing down attitude, after which the aircraft slid off the brow of a 13-foot embankment, crashed through the chain link perimeter fence at Agana NAS, crossed a highway, and burst into flames. The aircraft came to rest in an open area between residential areas, about 4,900 feet beyond the end of runway 06L. As the aircraft slid across the highway, it struck an automobile on the highway; the driver of the car was killed. A woman and her son, who were standing outside their residence just south of the impact site, were seriously burned by the heat of the burning fuel and were seriously injured by flying debris. All 45 occupants on board the Electra were killed.
Probable cause:
he loss of climb capability after the crew retracted the flaps at too low an altitude to clear the rising terrain. The flaps were retracted after the no.3 propeller feathered as the aircraft lifted off the runway. Contributing to the accident was the captain's decision to continue the take-off after an engine failed before reaching the rotation speed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing B-52D-10-BW Stratofortress off Andersen AFB: 4 killed

Date & Time: Dec 12, 1974
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
55-0058
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Andersen - Andersen
MSN:
464010
YOM:
1955
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a night training mission out from Andersen AFB, Guam. While returning the airbase, control was lost and the airplane crashed into the sea about seven miles southeast of the airfield. Four crew members were killed while two others were rescued. The aircraft sank and was lost.
Crew:
Cpt Stephen R. Roseman, pilot, †
Jack Watson, copilot,
Robert W. Nemeth, †
Cpt Leroy E. Pitman, †
John Y. Whitley, †
Brad Lee Buske.
Probable cause:
It is believed that the loss of control was the consequence of a malfunction of the gyros after the electrical system failed.

Crash of a Lockheed C-130E Hercules in Agana: 6 killed

Date & Time: Apr 20, 1974 at 2100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
62-1841
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Andersen - Agana
MSN:
3804
YOM:
1963
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
The crew departed Andersen AFB on a night training flight. While approaching Agana-Antonio Borja Won Pat Airport, the instructor shut down both engines n°3 & 4 and continued the approach when the airplane lost height and landed hard on runway. On impact, all tires on the right main gear burst. Out of control, the airplane veered off runway to the right, went through the apron, collided with a parked fighter then came to rest in flames against an embankment. The aircraft was destroyed and all six crew members were killed.

Crash of a Convair CV-990-30A-5 Coronado in Agana

Date & Time: Sep 10, 1973 at 1616 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N7876
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jakarta - Agana - Moffett
MSN:
30-10-4
YOM:
1963
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1621.00
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a ferry flight from Jakarta to Moffett AFB with an intermediate stop in Agana. On approach, the crew was informed by ATC about poor weather at destination with thunderstorm activity, strong crosswinds and heavy rain falls. The airplane landed 500 meters past the runway threshold then became uncontrollable. It veered off runway to the left then collided with various obstacles and came to rest. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Improper in-flight decisions on part of the pilot-in-command. The following factors were reported:
- Turbulence associated with clouds and thunderstorms,
- Overload failure,
- No weather briefing received,
- Wind gusting up to 20 knots,
- Agana Tower advised the crew about large storm passing over the approach course.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed C-130 Hercules in Agana: 5 killed

Date & Time: Dec 9, 1972
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
64-0505
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Agana - Agana
MSN:
3989
YOM:
1964
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The aircraft was completing a local training flight at Agana Airport, carrying five crew members and three passengers (two Army officers and one Pan Am flight attendant). On final approach, the airplane stalled and crashed in flames short of runway threshold. It was destroyed by a post crash fire and five occupants were killed while three others were injured. It was reported that one of the engine was not running on final, probably to simulate a failure.