Crash of a Cessna 208B Super Cargomaster off Saba Island

Date & Time: Aug 12, 2015 at 1205 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N924FE
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
San Juan – Basseterre
MSN:
208B-0024
YOM:
1987
Flight number:
FDX8124
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The pilot departed San Juan-Luis Muñoz Marín Airport at 1049LT on a cargo flight to Basseterre-Robert L. Bradshaw International Airport, Saint Kitts & Nevis. The flight was performed by Mountain Air Cargo on behalf of FedEx. The pilot continued the flight at FL110 until 1139LT, reduced his altitude down to FL100 and maintained this level until 1153LT. At this moment, the aircraft was descending between 600 and 800 feet per minute and the pilot decided to divert to the Juancho E. Yrausquin Airport located on Saba Island, Dutch Antilles. While approaching to island from the south, the pilot realized he would not make it, so he attempted to ditch the aircraft some 900 metres off shore. The pilot evacuated the cabin and was quickly rescued while the aircraft sank by a depth of about 1,500 feet. According to the pilot, he decided to divert to the nearest airport due to a loss of engine power.

Crash of a Canadair CL-601 Challenger off Aruba: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jan 29, 2015
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N214FW
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
3008
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The aircraft left an airfield located somewhere in the State of Apure, Venezuela, apparently bound for the US with three people on board. While flying north of Punto Fijo, above the sea, the crew was contacted by ATC but failed to respond. Convinced this was an illegal flight, the Venezuelan Authorities decided to send a fighter to intercept the Challenger that was shot down. Out of control, it dove into the Caribbean Sea and crashed off the coast of Aruba Island. All three occupants were killed and on site, more than 400 boxes containing cocaine were found.
Probable cause:
Shot down by the pilot of a Venezuelan Air Force fighter.

Crash of a Short 360-200 off Sint Maarten: 2 killed

Date & Time: Oct 29, 2014 at 1840 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N380MQ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sint Maarten - San Juan
MSN:
3702
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
SKZ7101
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
5318
Captain / Total hours on type:
361.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1040
Copilot / Total hours on type:
510
Aircraft flight hours:
25061
Aircraft flight cycles:
32824
Circumstances:
On October 29, 2014, at about 1840 Atlantic Standard Time, a Shorts SD3-60, United States registered N380MQ was destroyed when it crashed into the sea shortly after takeoff from Runway 28 at Princess Juliana International Airport, Sint Maarten, Dutch Antilles, Kingdom of the Netherlands. The two crewmembers on board sustained fatal injuries. The aircraft was operated by SkyWay Enterprises Inc. on a scheduled FedEx contract cargo flight to Luis Munoz Marin International Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico. At 1839 local, Juliana Tower cleared the aircraft for takeoff Runway 28 - maintain heading 230 until passing 4000 feet. At 1840 local, Tower observed the aircraft descending visually and the radar target and data block disappeared. There were no distress calls. Night conditions and rain prevailed at the time of the accident. Coast Guard search crews discovered aircraft debris close to the shoreline about 1 ½ hours later. The Sint Maarten Civil Aviation Authority initiated an investigation in accordance with ICAO Annex 13. Local investigation authority personnel were joined by Accredited Representatives and advisors from the following states: the USA (NTSB/FAA), United Kingdom (AAIB and Shorts Brothers PLC), and Canada (TSB, TC, PWC). Organization of the investigation included the following groups: Operations, Accident Site and Wreckage, Powerplants, Aircraft Maintenance, Air Traffic Services, Meteorology, and GPS Study. The operator made available personnel for interviews but deferred to participate in the groups. Flight recorders were not installed nor required on this cargo configured aircraft. The original FDR and CVR were removed following conversion to cargo only operations. A handheld GPS recovered from submerged wreckage was successfully downloaded. Data revealed the aircraft past the departure runway threshold on takeoff and attained a maximum GPS recorded altitude of 433 feet at 119 knots groundspeed at 18:39:30. The two remaining data points were over the sea and recorded decreasing altitude and increasing airspeed. The wreckage was recovered from the sea and examined by technical experts. Assessment of the evidence concluded there were no airframe or engine malfunctions that would have affected the airworthiness of the aircraft. The experts concluded that the aircraft struck the sea while under normal engine operation. Operations and human performance investigators evaluated the evidence and analyzed extensive interviews. The investigation concluded that the aircraft departed from the expected flight path in an unusual attitude. The pilot flying most likely experienced a somatographic illusion as a result of a stressful takeoff and acceleration from flap retraction. The pilot’s reaction to pitch down while initiating a required heading change led to an extreme unusual attitude. Circumstances indicate the pilot monitoring did not perceive/respond/intervene to correct the flight path and recover from the unusual attitude. The aircraft exceeded the normal maneuvering parameters, the crew experienced a loss of control, and lacking adequate altitude for recovery, the aircraft crashed into the sea.
Probable cause:
The investigation believes the PF experienced a loss of control while initiating a turn to the required departure heading after take-off. Flap retraction and its associated acceleration combined to set in motion a somatogravic illusion for the PF. The PF’s reaction to pitch down while initiating a turn most likely led to an extreme unusual attitude and the subsequent crash. PM awareness to the imminent loss of control and any attempt to intervene could not be determined. Evidence show that Crew resource management (CRM) performance was insufficient to avoid the crash. Contributing factors to the loss of control were environmental conditions including departure from an unfamiliar runway with loss of visual references (black hole), night and rain with gusting winds.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C90GTi King Air off Oranjestad

Date & Time: Apr 3, 2012 at 0920 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N8116L
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Wichita - Fort Lauderdale - Willemstad - Belo Horizonte
MSN:
LJ-2042
YOM:
2011
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11700
Captain / Total hours on type:
2600.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3649
Copilot / Total hours on type:
33
Aircraft flight hours:
14
Circumstances:
On April 3, 2012, about 0920 atlantic standard time (ast), a Hawker Beechcraft C90GTx, N8116L, operated by Lider Taxi Aereo, was substantially damaged after ditching in the waters of the Caribbean Sea, 17 miles north of Aruba, following a dual loss of engine power during cruise. The flight departed Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and was destined for Hato International Airport (TNCC), Willemstad, Curacao. The airline transport pilot and the pilot rated passenger were uninjured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight plan was filed for the delivery flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The Amsterdam arrived at the ditching location at 1120. The airplane was partially submerged. The crew of the Amsterdam attempted to prevent the airplane from sinking by placing a cable around it and hoisting it onboard. However during the attempted recovery, the fuselage broke in half and the airplane sank.
Probable cause:
Review of the fuel ticket revealed that the misspelled words; "Top Neclles" was handwritten on it. It was also signed by the pilot. Further review revealed that only 25 gallons had been uploaded to the airplane, and this number had been entered in the box labeled "TOTAL GALLONS DELIVERED". Review of the start reading and end reading from the truck meter also concurred with this amount. Furthermore, It was discovered that the "134 gallons" that the pilot believed had been uploaded to the airplane was in fact the employee number of the fueler that had topped off the nacelle tanks and had entered his employee number on the "FUEL DEL BY:" line. Utilizing the information contained on the fuel ticket, it was determined that the airplane had departed with only 261 gallons of fuel on-board. Review of performance data in the POH/AFM revealed that in order to complete the flight the airplane would have needed to depart with 328 gallons on-board.
Final Report:

Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A-8 Islander off Kralendijk: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 22, 2009 at 1017 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PJ-SUN
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Willemstad – Kralendijk
MSN:
377
YOM:
1973
Flight number:
DVR014
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1738
Captain / Total hours on type:
565.00
Aircraft flight hours:
16670
Circumstances:
On 22 October the pilot concerned got up at 05.00 and drove towards the airport at about 05.30. After preparing the aircraft, with registration PJ-SUN, he piloted two return flights from Curaçao International Airport (hereinafter to be referred to as Hato airport) to Bonaire International Airport (hereinafter to be referred to as Flamingo airport). No problems occurred during these four flights. The departure for the next flight, “DVR014”, was planned at 09.30. The nine passengers booked for this flight, who had already had their luggage weighed, had to wait before they could board because the pilot had ordered the aircraft to be refuelled prior to this flight. The refuelling invoice of flight DVR014 specifies that fuel was taken up between 09.28 and 09.38. The luggage of these passengers and some additional cargo consisting of a few boxes had already been loaded on to the aircraft. The passengers were welcomed by the pilot when they boarded. The pilot informed them they should keep their waist belts fastened during the flight and that the safety cards were located in the seat pockets. From the passenger statements it can be deduced that these instructions were not heard by all of the passengers. The pilot and the passenger seated next to him fastened their waist and shoulder belts. Approximately ten minutes after the estimated time of departure, after having received the required approval from the Hato Tower air traffic control tower (hereinafter to be referred to as Hato Tower) via the on-board radio the engines were started without any problems. The flight manual engine ground checks were not extensively performed because these are part of the first flight of the day engine checks in accordance with the General Operating Manual. Around 09.47 the PJ-SUN took off for a flight with visual flight rules (VFR) to Bonaire. After take-off the aircraft climbed to flight level 035 (FL035). Some of the passengers had flown for some years, several times in a week with Divi Divi Air. From the passenger statements it can be deduced that the pilot brought the aircraft into level flight at FL035 and reduced the power from climb power to cruise power. The passenger next to the pilot stated that engine power ceased the moment that the pilot was adjusting (one of) the levers on the throttle quadrant. Some passengers reported they felt a jolt that moment. Some passengers reported the engine sputtered shortly before it ceased. No sound from which a mechanical problem was heard and no smoke was detected. Passengers stated that the pilot increased the left engine power, feathered the right propeller and trimmed away the forces to the rudder pedals due to the failure of the right engine. They also reported that the pilot attempted to restart the right engine two or three times but to no avail. Around 09.52 the pilot reported to the Hato Tower controller: Divi 014 requesting to switch to Flamingo, priority landing with Flamingo, have lost one of the engines. The controller acknowledged this message. The pilot continued the flight to Bonaire flying with the left engine running and contacted Flamingo Tower air traffic control (hereinafter to be referred to as Flamingo Tower) at 09.57 and reported: 014, Islander inbound from Curaçao, showing, I got one engine out, so we are landing with one engine, no emergency at this stage, I’m maintaining altitude at, 3000 feet, we request priority to landing runway 10, currently 24 miles out, estimating at, 18. The Flamingo Tower controller authorized the approach to runway 10. The air traffic controller requested the pilot to report when he left 3000 feet altitude, which he immediately did. The radar data shows that the PJ-SUN descended approximately 140 feet per minute on average from the moment the engine failed up to the emergency landing. According to the statements of a few of the passengers, the aircraft pitch attitude increased during the descent of the aircraft and it was higher than usual. The indicated airspeed on the airspeed indicator was lower than when flying with two working engines. The pilot did not inform the passengers regarding the failure of the right engine or his intentions. A few passengers were concerned and started to put on the life jackets having retrieved them from under their seats. The passenger next to the pilot could not find his life jacket, while others had some trouble opening the plastic bags of the life jackets. They also agreed on a course of action for leaving the aircraft in case of an emergency landing in the water. At 10.08 the pilot informed the Flamingo Tower that he was approaching and was ten nautical miles away, flying at 1000 feet and expected to land in ten minutes. At 10.12 the pilot reported the distance to be eight nautical miles and that he was having trouble with the altitude which was 600 feet at that moment. The traffic controller authorized the landing. At 10.14 the pilot reported to be six nautical miles away and flying at an altitude of 300 feet. During the last radio contact at 10.15 the pilot indicated to be at five nautical miles distance flying at 200 feet and that he was still losing altitude. The pilot was going to perform an emergency landing near Klein Bonaire. The aircraft subsequently turned a little to the left towards Klein Bonaire. According to a few passengers, the pilot turned around towards them and indicated with hand signals that the aircraft was about to land and he gave a thumbs-up signal to ask whether everyone was ready for the approaching emergency landing. There were life jackets for all people on-board. The pilot, the passenger seated next to him and two passengers seated in the back row did not have their life jackets on. The passengers in rows two through to four had put on their life jackets. One passenger had put on his life jacket back to front. According to the statements of the passengers, the stall warning (loud tone) was activated on and off during this last part of the flight. A short time before the emergency landing until the moment of impact with the water the stall warning was continuously audible. From the statements of the passengers it follows the all cabin doors were closed throughout the descent and the landing. The passenger’ statements differ in describing the last part of the flight until the impact of the aircraft with the water surface. One passenger stated that the aircraft fell down from a low height and impacted the water with a blow. Other passengers mentioned a high or low aircraft pitch attitude during impact. Most of the passengers stated that during impact the left wing was slightly down. The aircraft hit the water at 10.17 at a distance of approximately 0.7 nautical miles from Klein Bonaire and 3.5 nautical miles west of Bonaire. The left front door broke off from the cabin and other parts of the aircraft on impact. The aircraft was lying horizontally in the water. The height of the waves was estimated 0.5 meter by one of the passengers. The cabin soon filled with water because the left front door had broken off and the windscreen had shattered. The passenger behind the pilot was trapped, but was able to free herself from this position. All nine passengers were able to leave the aircraft without assistance using the left front door opening and the emergency exits. A few passengers sat for a short time on the wings before the aircraft sank. The passengers formed a circle in the water. The passengers who were not wearing life jackets kept afloat by holding onto the other passengers. One passenger reported that the pilot hit his head on the vertical door/window frame in the cockpit or the instrument panel at impact causing him to lose consciousness and may even have been wounded. The attempts of one or two passengers to free the pilot from his seat were unsuccessful. A few minutes after the accident, the aircraft sank with the pilot still on-board. Approximately five minutes after the emergency landing, two boats with recreational divers who were nearby arrived on the scene. Divers from the first boat tried to localise the sunken aircraft based on indications from the passengers. The people on the other boat took nine passengers out of the water and set course to Kralendijk where they arrived at approximately 10.37. The police and other emergency services personnel were awaiting the passengers on the quay. Six passengers were transported to the hospital where they were discharged after an examination. The other three went their own way.
Probable cause:
The following factors were identified:
1. After one of the two engines failed, the flight continued to Bonaire. By not returning to the nearby situated departure airport, the safest flight operation was not chosen.
- Continuing to fly after engine failure was contrary to the general principle for twin-engine aircraft as set down in the CARNA, that is, to land at the nearest suitable airport.
2. The aircraft could not maintain horizontal flight when it continued with the flight and an emergency landing at sea became unavoidable.
- The aircraft departed with an overload of 9% when compared to the maximum structural take-off weight of 6600 lb. The pilot who was himself responsible (self-dispatch and release) for the loading of the aircraft was aware of the overloading or could have been aware of this. A non-acceptable risk was taken by continuing the flight under these conditions where the aircraft could not maintain altitude due to the overloading.
3. The pilot did not act as could be expected when executing the flight and preparing for the emergency landing.
- The landing was executed with flaps up and, therefore, the aircraft had a higher landing speed.
- The pilot ensured insufficiently that the passengers had understood the safety instructions after boarding.
- The pilot undertook insufficient attempts to inform passengers about the approaching emergency landing at sea after the engine failure and, therefore, they could not prepare themselves sufficiently.

Contributing factors:
Divi Divi Air
4. Divi Divi Air management paid insufficient supervision to the safety of amongst others the flight operation with the Britten-Norman Islanders. This resulted in insufficient attention to the risks of overloading.
Findings:
- The maximum structural take-off weight of 6600 lb was used as limit during the flight operation. Although this was accepted by the oversight authority, formal consent was not
granted for this.
- A standard average passenger weight of 160 lb was used on the load and balance sheet while the actual average passenger weight was significantly higher. This meant that passenger weight was often lower on paper than was the case in reality.
- A take-off weight of exactly 6600 lb completed on the load and balance sheet occurred in 32% of the investigated flights. This is a strong indication that the luggage and fuel weights completed were incorrect in these cases and that, in reality, the maximum structural take-off weight of 6600 lb was exceeded.
- Exceedances of the maximum structural landing weight of 6300 lb occurred in 61% of the investigated flights.
- The exceedance of the maximum allowed take-off weight took place on all three of the Britten-Norman Islander aircraft in use and with different pilots.
- Insufficient attention was paid to aircraft weight limitations during training.
- Lack of internal supervision with regard to the load and balance programme.
- Combining management tasks at Divi Divi Air, which may have meant that insufficient details were defined regarding the related responsibilities.
5. The safety equipment and instructions on-board the Britten-Norman Islander aircraft currently being used were not in order.
Findings:
- Due to the high noise level in the cabin during the flight it is difficult to communicate with the passengers during an emergency situation.
- The safety instruction cards did not include an illustration of the pouches under the seats nor instructions on how to open these pouches. The life jacket was shown with two and not a single waist belt and the life jackets had a different back than the actual life jackets on-board.
Directorate of Civil Aviation Netherlands Antilles (currently the Curaçao Civil Aviation Authority)
6. The Directorate of Civil Aviation’s oversight on the operational management of Divi Divi Air was insufficient in relation to the air operator certificate involving the Britten-Norman Islander aircraft in use.
Findings:
- The operational restrictions that formed the basis for using 6600 lb were missing in the air operator certificate, in the certificate of airworthiness of the PJ-SUN and in the approved General Operating Manual of Divi Divi Air. The restrictions entail that flying is only allowed during daylight, under visual meteorological conditions, and when a route is flown from where a safe emergency landing can be executed in case of engine failure.
- The required (demonstrable) relation with the actual average passenger weight was missing in relation to the used standard passenger weight for drawing up the load and balance sheet.
- The failure of Divi Divi Air’s internal supervision system for the load and balance programme.
- Not noticing deviations between the (approved) safety instruction cards and the life jackets on-board during annual inspections.
- The standard average passenger weight of 176 lb set after the accident offers insufficient security that the exceedance of the maximum allowed take-off weight of flights with Antillean airline companies that fly with the Britten-Norman Islander will not occur.

Other factors:
Recording system of radio communication with Hato Tower
7. The recording system used for the radio communication with Hato Tower cannot be used to record the actual time. This means that the timeline related to the radio communication with Hato Tower cannot be exactly determined.
The alerting and the emergency services on Bonaire
8. There was limited coordination between the different emergency services and, therefore, they did not operate optimally.
Findings:
- The incident site command (Copi) that should have taken charge of the emergency services in accordance with the Bonaire island territory crisis plan was not formed.
- Insufficient multidisciplinary drills have been organized and assessed for executive officials who have a task to perform in accordance with the Bonaire island territory crisis plan and the airport aircraft accident crisis response plan in controlling disasters and serious accidents. They were, therefore, insufficiently prepared for their task.
9. The fire service and police boats could not be deployed for a longer period of time.
Final Report:

Crash of a Dassault Falcon 20C in Oranjestad

Date & Time: Feb 13, 2005
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PR-SUL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Porlamar - Oranjestad
MSN:
129
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful positioning flight from Porlamar, the aircraft landed at Oranjestad-Reina Beatrix Airport with its undercarriage retracted. The aircraft slid on ity belly for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-35 Marquise in Kralendijk

Date & Time: Nov 2, 2003 at 2331 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N630HA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oranjestad – Kralendijk
MSN:
630
YOM:
1974
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On November 2, 2003, about 2331 Atlantic standard time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-35, N630HA, registered to Hezemans Air, Inc., collided with terrain short of the runway at Flamingo Airport, Bonaire, Netherlands Antilles, while on a CFR Part 91 positioning flight from Aruba to Bonaire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage and the airline transport-rated pilot received serious injuries. The flight originated from Aruba, the same day about 2250. The pilot stated that when on a 1- mile final approach for landing both engines lost power. The airplane descended and collided with terrain about 300 meters from the runway. Postaccident examination of the airplane by Civil Aviation Authorities showed the airplane did not contain any usable fuel and there was no evidence of fuel leakage from the airplane prior to the accident or after the accident.

Crash of a Lockheed L-188CF Electra in Oranjestad

Date & Time: Jul 14, 1990 at 1627 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N4465F
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oranjestad – Panama City
MSN:
1096
YOM:
1959
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6060
Captain / Total hours on type:
3150.00
Aircraft flight hours:
31829
Circumstances:
While in climb at 18,000 feet the crew heard and explosion and lost n°3 and 4 engines. They visually noted that the propellers and portions of the gearboxes were also missing. They then shut down no 2 engine due to erratic indications. They declared an emergency and landed. The gear boxes and propellers were not recovered from the caribbean sea.
Probable cause:
The inflight loss of the n°3 and 4 propellers and gearboxes for undetermined reasons. The failed components were not recovered from the Caribbean Sea.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed PV-1 Ventura off Aruba

Date & Time: Jul 7, 1979 at 2100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N721N
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Atlanta - Fort Lauderdale
MSN:
5272
YOM:
1943
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2623
Captain / Total hours on type:
23.00
Circumstances:
The crew was supposed to make a training flight from Atlanta to Fort Lauderdale. En route, an electrical failure occurred and the crew became lost and disoriented. The aircraft continued to the southeast for about 1,800 km when both engines failed due to a fuel exhaustion. The crew was able to ditch the aircraft off Aruba Island. While all three occupants were rescued, the aircraft sank and was not recovered.
Probable cause:
Aircraft ditched after the crew became lost/disoriented. The following findings were reported:
- Fuel exhaustion,
- Aircraft came to rest in water,
- Complete failure of both engines,
- Forced landing off airport on water,
- Pilot reported electrical failure,
- Aircraft not recovered.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo off Willemstad: 10 killed

Date & Time: Dec 24, 1977
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N9164Y
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Charlotte Amalie - Willemstad
MSN:
31-217
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
10
Circumstances:
While approaching Willemstad-Hato Airport on a schedule flight from Charlotte Amalie-Cyril E. King Airport, the twin engine airplane nosed down and crashed into the Caribbean Sea few km offshore. The aircraft was destroyed and all 10 occupants were killed.