Saint Louis

The airline transport pilot departed on a repositioning flight in the jet airplane. The airplane was in level cruise flight at 39,000 ft mean sea level when the pilot became unresponsive to air traffic controllers. The airplane continued over 300 miles past the destination airport before it descended and impacted the Atlantic Ocean. Neither the pilot nor the airplane were recovered, and the reason for the airplane's impact with water could not be determined based on the available information.

The captain reported that he obtained weather briefings prior to and during the flight. The briefings did not include any NOTAMS indicating a contaminated runway at their destination airport. The captain obtained a report from the local fixed base operator that a Learjet had landed earlier and reported the runway as being okay. The tower was closed on their arrival, so they made a low pass over the airport to inspect the runways. Based on the runway and wind conditions, they decided their best choice for landing was on runway 08L. The captain said the landing was normal and the airplane initially decelerated with normal braking. As they encountered snow and ice patches, the captain said he elected to deploy the thrust reversers. The captain said that as the thrust reversers deployed, the airplane began to yaw to the left and differential braking failed to realign the airplane with the runway. The captain said the airplane departed the left side of the runway and rotated counter clockwise before coming to rest on a southwesterly heading. A witness on the airport said, "I watched them touch down. I heard the [thrust] reversers go on and then off, and then on again. As they came back on for the second time, that's when the plane started making full circles on the runway. This happened two, maybe three times before going off the side of the runway." The airplane's right main landing gear collapsed on departing the runway, causing substantial damage to the right wing, right main landing gear and aft pressure bulkhead. At the accident site, the right engine thrust reverser was partially deployed. The left engine thrust reverser was fully deployed with the blocker doors extended. An examination of the airplane revealed a stuck solenoid on the right engine thrust reverser. No other system anomalies were found. Approximately 33 minutes prior to the accident, the pilot requested from Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center, the weather for the airport. Denver Center reported the conditions as "winds calm, visibility 6 miles with light mist, 3,000 overcast, temperature zero degrees Centigrade (C) dew point -1 degree C, altimeter three zero 30.20, and there was at least a half inch of slush on all surfaces." The pilot acknowledged the information. The NOTAM log for the airport showed that at 2115, the airport issued a NOTAM stating there was "1/2 inch wet snow all surfaces." The airport operations manager reported that at the time of the accident the runway surface was covered with 3/4 inch of wet snow. The airport conducts a 24 hour, 7 days a week operation; however, operations support digresses to fire coverage only after 2300.

The flight was cleared for the VOR/DME approach to runway 17 at the Marco Island Airport. The CVR recorded conversation between the pilot and co-pilot reference to the approach, specifically the MDA both in mean sea level and absolute altitude for a straight-in-approach to runway 17. The flight crew announced that the flight was landing on runway 35. The flight crew did not discuss the missed approach procedure nor the circling minimums. The flight continued and the co-pilot announced that the flight was 5 miles from the airport to descend to the MDA to visually acquire the airport. While descending about 8.5 feet of the left wing of the airplane was severed by a guy wire about 587 feet above ground level from an antenna that was 3.36 nautical miles from the threshold of runway 17. The tower is listed on the approach chart that was provided to the flight crew. The airplane then rolled left wing low, recovered to wings level, then was observed to roll to the left, pitch nose down, and impacted the ground. A fireball was then observed by witnesses. The altimeters, air data computer, and pilot's airspeed indicator were last calibrated about 8 months before the accident. The co-pilots altimeter was found set .01 high from the last known altimeter setting provided to the flight crew. The CVR did not record any conversation pertaining to failure or malfunction of either the pilot or copilot's HSI, the DME or Altimeters. There were no alarms from the VOR/DME monitoring equipment the day of the accident. The flight crew of another airplane executed the same approach about 30 minutes before the accident and they reported no discrepancies with the approach. The MDA for the segment of the approach between where the tower is located is no lower than 974 feet above ground level.

Following an uneventful flight from Saint Louis, the crew was cleared to descend to Dakar-Yoff Airport and was instructed to maintain 3,000 feet over YF VOR. At the same time, a NAMC YS-11A-117 operated by Gambia Airways departed Dakar-Yoff Airport on a regular schedule flight to Banjul. Registered C5-GAA, the aircraft was carrying 34 passengers and a crew of four. Its pilots were instructed to climb via radial 140 and maintain the altitude of 2,000 feet while over YF VOR. When both aircraft reached the YF VOR, they collided. While the crew of the NAMC was able to return to Dakar and land safely despite the left wing was partially torn off, the Twin Otter entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea few km offshore. All three occupants were killed.

While executing a VOR approach, on a dark, foggy night, depth perception and ground contact were lost when the landing lights were turned on short final. A hard landing resulted, before corrective action became effective, resulting in wing spar, engine mounting support and propeller damage. The runway, and entire airport was covered with about 3 inches of mirror smooth ice, causing considerable glare. All four occupants escaped uninjured.

The first takeoff was aborted due to a perceived engine problem. Six minutes later on second takeoff, the aircraft climbed to 50 feet, drifted to the right, rolled right and impacted in the infield. This was a single pilot operation in a complex aircraft. Winds exceeded the demonstrated crosswind limitation of the aircraft. There was no evidence that the pilot was using the seat belt or shoulder harness. Post crash investigation of both engines and props determined that there were no operational defects and that both were producing power at the time of impact. Strong gusty winds varying in intensity from 15 to 30 knots and varying in direction from southwest to northwest were prevalent at the airport on the day of the accident. The prop condition levers were found in the taxi position and the power levers were set with the left engine near flight idle position and the right engine at the takeoff position. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The two aircraft, a Beech U-21A and a Piper PA-31-350, collided nearly head on at 7,000 feet msl over Independence, MO. In daylight VMC conditions with a visibility of 20 miles. The U-21 was in level cruise and the PA-31 was climbing eastbound to an undisclosed altitude enroute to Saint Louis. Both aircraft were equipped with operating mode-c transponders but the controller in contact with the U-21 did not observe the conflict and traffic advisories were not provided. The PA-31 was operating in accordance with visual flight rules. The U-21 was operating in accordance with instrument flight rules. After the collision both aircraft crashed in uncontrolled descent. There was no indication that either aircraft took any evasive action. The conflict alert subprogram of the ARTS III tracking system was not programmed to alert the controllers to the impending collision and the two controllers did not observe any target in the vicinity of the data block representing the U-21. All six occupants in both aircraft were killed.

About 20 minutes after takeoff the pilot reported the right engine had lost power and the aircraft would not maintain altitude. Vectors were provided for an emergency landing, but the aircraft crashed in a wooded area about 3 miles from the airport. There was evidence that the gear and flaps had been extended and the aircraft had entered a turn before impacting. Both props had evidence of low to moderate power and neither was feathered. An exam revealed unsymmetrical wear on the blades of the right turbocharger; its thrust spacer, pn 406990-9004, was worn and there was evidence of oil leakage. The 13 qt, right engine oil system had only 6.85 qts of oil remaining. Both turbochargers had been installed during an annual inspection in april 1983 and previously had been overhauled. The aircraft was estimated to be 844 lbs over its max weight limit and the aircraft cg limit was exceeded by about 4.8 inches. Six of the passengers were not restrained by seat belts. An associate estimated that the pilot had only 4 to 6 hours of rest in the previous 3 to 4 days. All eight occupants were killed.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a ferry flight from Cleveland to Saint Louis. While in normal cruise, he encountered engine problems, informed ATC and was vectored to Dayton-Wilbur Wright Field. On final approach, the airplane was too low, struck power cables and crashed. The pilot was seriously injured.

Following a normal landing and braking procedure at Flint-Bishop Airport, while performing a cargo flight from St Louis, the pilot vacated the runway and rolled to the apron with he collided with a parked Piper PA-28-140 registered N54393. The pilot was uninjured while both aircraft were destroyed by a post crash fire.