Crash of a Cessna 560XLS+ Citation Excel in Plainville: 4 killed

Date & Time: Sep 2, 2021 at 0951 LT
Registration:
N560AR
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Plainville – Manteo
MSN:
560-6026
YOM:
2009
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
17400
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5594
Aircraft flight hours:
2575
Circumstances:
The flight crew was conducting a personal flight with two passengers onboard. Before departure, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) captured the pilots verbalizing items from the before takeoff checklist, but there was no challenge response for the taxi, before takeoff, or takeoff checklists. Further, no crew briefing was performed and neither pilot mentioned releasing the parking brake. The left seat pilot, who was the pilot flying (PF) and pilot-in-command (PIC), initiated takeoff from the slightly upsloping 3,665-ft-long asphalt runway. According to takeoff performance data that day and takeoff performance models, the airplane had adequate performance capability to take off from that runway. Flight data recorder (FDR) data indicated each thrust lever angle was set and remained at 65° while the engines were set and remained at 91% N1. During the takeoff roll, the CVR recorded the copilot, who was the pilot monitoring (PM) and second-in-command (SIC), making callouts for “airspeed’s alive,” “eighty knots cross check,” “v one,” and “rotate.” A comparison of FDR data from the accident flight with the previous two takeoffs showed that the airplane did not become airborne at the usual location along the runway, and the longitudinal acceleration was about 33% less. At the time of the rotate callout, the airspeed was about 104 knots calibrated airspeed, and the elevator was about +9° airplane nose up (ANU). Three seconds after the rotate callout, the CVR recorded the sound of physical straining, suggesting the pilot was likely attempting to rotate the airplane by pulling the control yoke. The CVR also captured statements from both the copilot and pilot expressing surprise that the airplane was not rotating as they expected. CVR and FDR data indicated that between the time of the rotate callout and the airplane reaching the end of the airport terrain, the airspeed increased to about 120 knots, the weight-on-wheels (WOW) remained in an on-ground state, and the elevator position increased to a maximum value of about +16° ANU. However, the airplane’s pitch attitude minimally changed. After the airplane cleared the end of the airport terrain where the ground elevation decreased 20 to 25 ft, FDR data indicate that the WOW transitioned to air mode with near-full ANU elevator control input, and the airplane pitched up nearly 22° in less than 2 seconds. FDR data depicted forward elevator control input in response to the rapid pitch-up, and the CVR recorded a stall warning then stick shaker activation. An off airport witness reported seeing the front portion of the right engine impact a nearby pole past the departure end of the runway. The airplane then rolled right to an inverted attitude, impacted the ground, then impacted an off airport occupied building. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed. On ground, four other people were injured, one seriously.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command’s failure to release the parking brake before attempting to initiate the takeoff, which produced an unexpected retarding force and airplane-nose-down pitching moment that prevented the airplane from becoming airborne within the takeoff distance available and not before the end of the airport terrain. Contributing to the accident were the airplane’s lack of a warning that the parking brake was not fully released and the Federal Aviation Administration’s process for certification of a derivative aircraft that did not identify the need for such an indication.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 550 Citation II in Manteo

Date & Time: Oct 1, 2010 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N262Y
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tampa - Manteo
MSN:
550-0291
YOM:
1981
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9527
Captain / Total hours on type:
2025.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3193
Copilot / Total hours on type:
150
Aircraft flight hours:
9643
Circumstances:
According to postaccident written statements from both pilots, the pilot-in-command (PIC) was the pilot flying and the copilot was the pilot monitoring. As the airplane approached Dare County Regional Airport (MQI), Manteo, North Carolina, the copilot obtained the current weather information. The automated weather system reported wind as 350 degrees at 4 knots, visibility at 1.5 miles in heavy rain, and a broken ceiling at 400 feet. The copilot stated that the weather had deteriorated from the previous reports at MQI. The PIC stated that they would fly one approach to take a look and that, if the airport conditions did not look good, they would divert to another airport. Both pilots indicated in phone interviews that, although they asked the Washington air route traffic control center controller for the global positioning system (GPS) runway 5 approach, they did not expect it due to airspace restrictions. They expected and received a GPS approach to runway 23 to circle-to-land on runway 5. According to the pilots' statements, the airplane was initially fast on approach to runway 23. As a result, the copilot could not deploy approach flaps when the PIC requested because the airspeed was above the flap operating range. The PIC subsequently slowed the airplane, and the copilot extended flaps to the approach setting. The PIC also overshot an intersection but quickly corrected and was on course about 1 mile prior to the initial approach fix. The airplane crossed the final approach fix on speed (Vref was 104) at the appropriate altitude, with the flaps and landing gear extended. The copilot completed the approach and landing checklist items but did not call out items because the PIC preferred that copilots complete checklists quietly. The PIC then stated that they would not circle-to-land due to the low ceiling. He added that a landing on runway 23 would be suitable because the wind was at a 90-degree angle to the runway, and there was no tailwind factor. Based on the reported weather, a tailwind component of approximately 2 knots existed at the time of the accident, and, in a subsequent statement to the Federal Aviation Administration, the pilot acknowledged there was a tailwind about 20 degrees behind the right wing. The copilot had the runway in sight about 200 feet above the minimum descent altitude, which was 440 feet above the runway. The copilot reported that he mentally prepared for a go around when the PIC stated that the airplane was high about 300 feet above the runway, but neither pilot called for one. The flight crew stated that the airplane touched down at 100 knots between the 1,000-foot marker and the runway intersection-about 1,200 feet beyond the approach end of the 4,305-foot-long runway. The speed brakes, thrust reversers, and brakes were applied immediately after the nose gear touched down and worked properly, but the airplane departed the end of the runway at about 40 knots. According to data extracted from the enhanced ground proximity warning system, the airplane touched down about 1,205 feet beyond the approach end of the 4,305-foot-long wet runway, at a ground speed of 127 knots. Data from the airplane manufacturer indicated that, for the estimated landing weight, the airplane required a landing distance of approximately 2,290 feet on a dry runway, 3,550 feet on a wet runway, or 5,625 feet for a runway with 0.125 inch of standing water. The chart also contained a note that the published limiting maximum tailwind component for the airplane is 10 knots but that landings on precipitation-covered runways with any tailwind component are not recommended. The note also indicates that if a tailwind landing cannot be avoided, the above landing distance data should be multiplied by a factor that increases the wet runway landing distance to 3,798 feet, and the landing distance for .125 inch of standing water to 6,356 feet. All distances in the performance chart are based on flying a normal approach at Vref, assume a touchdown point 840 feet from the runway threshold in no wind conditions, and include distance from the threshold to touchdown. The PIC's statement about the airplane being high at 300 feet above the runway reportedly prompted the copilot to mentally prepare for a go around, but neither pilot called for one. However, the PIC asked the copilot what he thought, and his reply was " it's up to you." The pilots touched down at an excessive airspeed (23 knots above Vref), more than 1,200 feet down a wet 4,305-foot-long runway, leaving about 3,100 feet for the airplane to stop. According to manufacturer calculations, about 2,710 feet of ground roll would be required after the airplane touched down, assuming a touchdown speed at Vref; a longer ground roll would be required at higher touchdown speeds. Although a 2 knot crosswind component existed at the time of the accident, the airplane's excessive airspeed at touchdown (23 knots above Vref) had a much larger effect on the outcome of the landing.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command's failure to maintain proper airspeed and his failure to initiate a go-around, which resulted in the airplane touching down too fast on a short, wet runway and a subsequent runway overrun. Contributing to the accident was the copilot's failure to adequately monitor the approach and call for a go around and the flight crew's lack of proper crew resource management.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Super Cargomaster in Manteo: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 25, 2002 at 0100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1122Y
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Elizabeth City - Manteo
MSN:
208B-0392
YOM:
1994
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
19091
Captain / Total hours on type:
500.00
Aircraft flight hours:
5229
Circumstances:
At 0029, the pilot contacted Norfolk Approach and stated he was ready for takeoff on runway 01 at Elizabeth City. The controller instructed the pilot to fly runway heading and climb to 3,000 feet. At 0032, the controller advised the pilot that the flight was radar contact and for the pilot to fly heading 160 degrees. At 0034, the Norfolk Approach controller instructed the pilot to contact the FAA Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center. At 0034, the pilot of N1122Y contacted the controller at Washington Center, stating he was coming up on 3,000 feet. The controller acknowledged, and the pilot requested the non-directional beacon (NDB) approach to runway 5 at Dare County Airport, Manteo. At 0036, the controller instructed the pilot to fly heading 145 degrees for Manteo and fly direct to the NDB when he receives the signal. The pilot acknowledged and the controller also asked the pilot if he had the current weather for Manteo. The pilot responded that he did have the current weather. At 0043, the controller cleared the pilot for the NDB runway 5 approach at Manteo and to maintain 2,000 feet until the flight crossed the beacon outbound. The pilot acknowledged. At 0046, the controller informed the pilot that radar contact with the flight was lost and for the pilot to report a cancellation or a downtime on his radio frequency. The pilot acknowledged. At 0057:21, the controller called the pilot and the pilot responded by reporting the flight was procedure turn inbound. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. When the pilot did not report that he was on the ground, and further radio contact could not be established, controllers initiated search and rescue efforts. The wreckage of the airplane was located in the waters of Croatan Sound, about 1.5 miles west of the Dare County Regional Airport about 1000. The pilot was not located in the airplane. The body of the pilot was located in the waters of Croatan Sound on February 11, 2003. Post crash examination of the airplane, flight controls, and engine showed no evidence of precrash failure or malfunction. The propeller separated from the airplane and was not located after the accident. Damage to the mounting bolts for the propeller was consistent with the propeller separating due to impact with the water. Postmortem examination of the pilot showed no findings which could be considered causal to the accident.
Probable cause:
The pilot's continued descent below the minimum descent altitude, for undetermined reasons, while performing a NDB approach, resulting in the airplane crashing into water 1.5 miles from the airport. A factor in the accident was a cloud ceiling below the minimum descent altitude and low visibility.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Edenton: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 2, 1997 at 1835 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N802TH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Manteo - Edenton
MSN:
208B-0179
YOM:
1989
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2980
Captain / Total hours on type:
850.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3520
Circumstances:
During his weather briefing, the pilot was told that his destination weather was not available, and was provided weather for an airport about 10 miles north. He was briefed that low visibility due to fog prevailed. The flight departed earlier then usual because the company business manager was concerned that the weather at the destination airport was deteriorating, and if the airplane was not there earlier they might not get into the airport. At the time of the accident there was a power failure, and lights around the destination airport went out. The airplane had struck power lines and a support tower located on the approach end of runway 1 and runway 5, about 1/2 mile southwest of the airport. The airport had one NDB approach which was not authorized at night. The nearest recorded weather, about 10 miles north of the crash site, at the time of the accident was; '...ceiling 100, [visibility] 1/2 mile, fog, [temperature] 46 degrees F, dew point, 42 degrees F, winds 220 degrees at 5 [knots], altimeter 29.90 inches Hg. Witnesses reported that there was heavy fog at the airport and the visibility was below 1/4 mile.
Probable cause:
The pilot's continued VFR flight into instrument meteorological conditions. Factors in this accident were: fog, the low ceiling, and the dark night.
Final Report: