Crash of a Bombardier Global Express E-11A near Sharana AFB: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 27, 2020 at 1309 LT
Operator:
Registration:
11-9358
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kandahar - Kandahar
MSN:
9358
YOM:
2009
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
4736
Captain / Total hours on type:
1053.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1343
Copilot / Total hours on type:
27
Circumstances:
On 27 January 2020, at approximately 1309 hours local time (L), an E-11A, tail number (T/N) 11-9358, was destroyed after touching down in a field in Ghanzi Province, Afghanistan (AFG) following a catastrophic left engine failure. The mishap crew (MC) were deployed and assigned to the 430th Expeditionary Electronic Combat Squadron (EECS), Kandahar Airfield (KAF), AFG. The MC consisted of mishap pilot 1 (MP1) and mishap pilot 2 (MP2). The mission was both a Mission Qualification Training – 3 (MQT-3) sortie for MP2 and a combat sortie for the MC, flown in support of Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. MP1 and MP2 were fatally injured as a result of the accident, and the Mishap Aircraft (MA) was destroyed. At 1105L, the MA departed KAF. The mission proceeded uneventfully until the left engine catastrophically failed one hour and 45 minutes into the flight (1250:52L). Specifically, a fan blade broke free causing the left engine to shutdown. The MC improperly assessed that the operable right engine had failed and initiated shutdown of the right engine leading to a dual engine out emergency. Subsequently, the MC attempted to fly the MA back to KAF, approximately 230 nautical miles (NM) away. Unfortunately, the MC were unable to get either engine airstarted to provide any usable thrust. This resulted in the MA unable to glide the distance remaining to KAF. With few options remaining, the MC maneuvered the MA towards Forward Operating Base (FOB) Sharana, but did not have the altitude and airspeed to glide the remaining distance. The MC unsuccessfully attempted landing in a field approximately 21 NM short of FOB Sharana.
Probable cause:
The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was the MC’s error in analyzing which engine had catastrophically failed (left engine). This error resulted in the MC’s decision to shutdown the operable right engine creating a dual engine out emergency. The AIB President also found by a preponderance of the evidence that the MC’s failure to airstart the right engine and their decision to recover the MA to KAF substantially contributed to the mishap.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed C-130J-30 Super Hercules at Shank AFB

Date & Time: May 19, 2013 at 1420 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
04-3144
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kandahar – Shank AFB
MSN:
5560
YOM:
2004
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total hours on type:
904.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
252
Circumstances:
On 19 May 2013, at approximately 0950 Zulu (1420 local), a C-130J, tail number (T/N) 04-3144, assigned to the 41st Airlift Squadron, 19th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base (AFB), Arkansas, ran off the end of a runway at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shank, Northeast, Afghanistan, struck a ditch which collapsed the nose gear and eventually ripped the right main landing gear from the fuselage. The right outboard engine struck the ground, pressurized fuel and oil lines were broken, fluid was sprayed over the cracked engine casing, and the right wing caught fire. The mishap aircraft (MA) came to a full stop at approximately 544 feet (ft) off the end of the paved runway surface. The mishap crew (MC), Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) crew and two ambulatory patients safely evacuated the aircraft through the top flight-deck emergency escape hatch meeting 600 ft off the nose of the aircraft. There were no fatalities, significant injuries or damage to civilian property. The total estimated loss is $73,990,265. The MA was on an AE mission and included five active duty C-130J crewmembers from the 772nd Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (19th Airlift Wing deployed), Kandahar Air Base (AB), Afghanistan. Additionally, the MA had aboard six reserve AE crewmembers from the 651st Expeditionary Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (349th Air Mobility Wing and 433rd Airlift Wing deployed), Kandahar AB, Afghanistan. The mishap sortie happened on the third of five planned legs that day to an airfield that was at 6,809 ft Mean Sea Level (MSL) and experiencing winds varying from 200 to 250 degrees gusting from 6 to 28 knots. On the second attempted landing, the MA touched down approximately 1,500 ft down the runway but was 27 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) faster than computed touchdown landing speed leading to the aircraft going off the end of the runway at approximately 49 KIAS.
Probable cause:
On the second landing attempt at a high altitude airfield (6,809 ft MSL), poor CRM coupled with a late power reduction by MP1 caused the MA to touchdown 27 KIAS faster than computed touchdown landing speed leading to the aircraft going off the end of the runway at approximately 49 KIAS. Because of unique aircraft performance characteristics when operating into and out of high altitude airfields, there was no way that the MA could perform a 50% flap landing (in accordance with T.O. 1C-130(C)J-1-1 landing assumptions, nose wheel landing gear speed restrictions and power level transition speed restrictions) at FOB Shank and land 27 KIAS fast. The MA’s actual landing speed simply overtasked the aircrafts capability to stop within the runway available.
Several factors substantially contributed to this mishap, including:
- Channelized attention,
- Risk assessment during operation,
- Delayed necessary action,
- Response set,
- Procedural error.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft MC-12W 204 km NE of Kandahar: 4 killed

Date & Time: Apr 27, 2013 at 1243 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
09-0676
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Kandahar - Kandahar
MSN:
FL-676
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
Independence 08
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
1749
Captain / Total hours on type:
242.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2434
Copilot / Total hours on type:
38
Circumstances:
On 27 April 2013, at approximately 1243 local time (L) in Afghanistan, an MC-12W, tail number 09-0676 impacted terrain 110 nautical miles northeast of Kandahar Airfield (KAF) while on a combat intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission. The four crewmembers on board were the Mishap Mission Commander (MMC), Mishap Pilot (MP), Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO), and Mishap Tactical Systems Operator (MTSO). The four airmen were killed instantly on impact and the Mishap Aircraft (MA), valued at $19.8 million, was destroyed. The crew and MA were deployed to the 361st expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, 451st Air Expeditionary Wing, KAF, Afghanistan. The MA, callsign Independence 08, departed KAF at 1157L and entered orbit at 1229L. The MA encountered deteriorating weather in the orbit and was climbing from 20,000 to 23,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) at 1241L to fly above the weather when the mishap occurred. In addition, the crew had found an enemy combatant and was in the process of adjusting their orbit to enhance mission success.
Probable cause:
Accident Investigation Board was conducted by USAF Brigadier General Donald J. BACON. His conclusion were as follow:
I find by clear and convincing evidence the cause of the mishap was a stall due to insufficient airspeed, while in a climbing left turn, which developed into a left spin followed quickly by a high-speed spiral, from which the crew was unable to recover. Additionally, I find, by a preponderance of evidence, each of the following three factors substantially contributed to the mishap:
orbit weather that impeded visibility and masked the horizon;
pilot inexperience in the MC-12W;
known MC-12W program risks associated with sustaining required combat capability in theater.
Final Report:

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 in Kandahar

Date & Time: Jan 24, 2012 at 0828 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EC-JJS
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dubai - Kandahar
MSN:
49793/1656
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
SWT094
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
86
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4946
Captain / Total hours on type:
3228.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2881
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2222
Circumstances:
On Tuesday, 24 January 2012, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, registration EC-JJS and operated by Swiftair, took off from the Dubai Airport (United Arab Emirates) at 02:08 UTC on a scheduled flight to the Kandahar Airport (Afghanistan). Its callsign was SWT094 and there were 86 passengers (one of them a company mechanic), three flight attendants and two cockpit crew onboard. Swiftair, S.A. was operating this regularly scheduled passenger flight under an ACMI arrangement with the South African company Gryphon Airlines. The crew was picked up at its usual hotel in the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah (United Arab Emirates) at 21:00. The airplane was parked in the Ras al-Khaimah airport and had to be flown empty to the Dubai Airport. This flight departed at 00:20 UTC en route to Dubai. Once there, an agent for Gryphon Airlines gave the crew the documentation for the flight to Kandahar. They went through customs at the Dubai Airport, boarded the passengers and the cargo and refueled the airplane with enough fuel to make the return the flight, a typical practice so as to avoid refueling in Kandahar. The airplane took off from runway 30R at the Dubai Airport at 02:08 on standard instrument departure RIKET2D and climbed to flight level FL290. The first officer was the pilot flying. At 03:42, while over SERKA, they were transferred to Kabul control, which instructed them to descend to FL280. The crew reported its ISAF callsign (ISF39RT) to this ATS station, which allowed the aircraft to fly over Afghan airspace, and entered the new stipulated squawk code. Kabul Control instructed the crew to follow some radar vectors that took them to point SODAS, where they were transferred to Kandahar Control at 03:46. The crew reduced the airspeed to 250 kt above this point. Kandahar Control cleared them for an RNAV (GPS) approach to runway 05, providing a direct vector to point FALOD (the IAF), and to descend to 6,000 ft. The weather information provided on the ATIS “F” broadcast was runway in use 05, wind from 060º at 17 kt gusting to 24 kt, visibility 1,200 m, scattered clouds at 2,700 ft and broken clouds at 3,000 ft, temperature 1 ºC, dewpoint -7 ºC and QNH 30.06 in Hg (1,018 mbar). This information was practically the same as that radioed to the crew by the Kandahar control tower a few minutes before landing: wind from 060 at 15 kt gusting to 21 kt. They reached point FALOD (IAF) under cloud cover (and thus in IMC conditions). They did not exit the clouds until 1,500 ft before minimums which, for this approach, according to the associated chart, was an altitude of 3,700 ft, or 394 ft AGL. They established visual contact with the runway 500 ft above minimums and noted that they were a little right of the runway centerline. Since the captain had more operational experience at the destination airfield, he decided to take over the controls and fly the last phase of the approach maneuver. The PAPI was out of service, meaning that in final approach they only had visual references to the runway and over the ground. During short final they corrected the deviation from the runway centerline by adjusting their path from right to left. They landed at 03:58. During the flare, the crew noticed the airplane was shifting to the left, threatening to take them off the runway, as a result of which the captain applied a right roll angle. This caused the right wing tip to strike the ground before the wheels made contact with the ground. The captain regarded the maneuver as a hard landing, although the first officer thought they might have struck the runway. The autopilot was engaged until visual contact was established with the runway and the auto-throttle until the landing. On exiting the runway, the airport control tower personnel (who had witnessed the contact with the ground) ordered the crew to stop and informed them of the damage they had seen during the landing. They dispatched the emergency services (firefighters), which forced them to turn off their engines. Once it was confirmed that there was no fuel leak or damage to the wheels or brakes, they allowed the crew to restart the engines and proceed to the stand. The wing made contact with the ground some 20 m prior to the threshold, resulting in five threshold lights being destroyed by the aircraft and in damage to the aircraft’s right wing. According to the crew’s statement, the passengers were not really aware of the contact between the wing and the ground and they were subsequently disembarked normally.
Probable cause:
The accident was likely caused by the failure to observe the company's operating procedures and not executing a go-around when the approach was clearly not stabilized. Moreover, the operator lacked the authorization (and the crew the training) to carry out the RNAV (GPS) approach maneuver that was conducted at RWY 05 of the Kandahar Airport.
Contributing to the accident was:
The inoperable status of the PAPI at runway 05 of the Kandahar Airport, which was thus unable to aid the crew to establish the aircraft on the correct descent slope.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-32A in Kandahar

Date & Time: Oct 8, 2009
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
354
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
22 06
YOM:
1989
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Upon landing at Kandahar Airport, the left main gear collapsed and punctured the left wing. The aircraft came to rest and was damaged beyond repair. All occupants escaped uninjured.
Probable cause:
Failure of the left main gear upon landing for unknown reasons.

Crash of an Ilyushin II-76TD in Kandahar

Date & Time: Feb 14, 2008
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
UN-76020
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
00434 50493
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Upon landing at Kandahar Airport, the engine n°1 exploded and caught fire. The crew was able to stop the aircraft and to evacuate the cabin. The left wing and wing root suffered fire damage.

Crash of a BAe Nimrod MR.2 near Kandahar: 14 killed

Date & Time: Sep 2, 2006 at 1547 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XV230
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Muscat - Muscat
MSN:
8005
YOM:
1969
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
14
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed at 13:43 for a mission over Afghanistan, in support of coalition forces engaging the Taliban. At 15:30 the airplane rendezvoused with an RAF Lockheed TriStar tanker and received fuel in an air-to-air refuelling procedure that lasted 10 minutes. Air-to-air refuelling appeared to pass without incident and XV230's crew prepared to turn east, towards their operational area. Eleven minutes later a bomb bay fire warning, either coincident with, or followed immediately by, an elevator bay underfloor smoke warning, was reported. The crew also reported smoke entering the aircraft’s cabin, from both elevator and aileron bays. Within a minute the aircraft depressurised as the fire breached the aircraft’s pressure hull requiring the crew to don their oxygen masks. The captain began to turn the aircraft towards Kandahar, declared a MAYDAY and began a descent. Meanwhile a crew member reported a fire 'from the rear of the starboard engines'. Another crew member reported a fire within the aileron bay. Last radio contact was at 15:46 when the crew acknowledged the Kandahar weather for landing. About the same time, a Harrier GR7 pilot, who was several thousand feet above, reported an intense fire close to the starboard fuselage and stretching out between where the wing joins the aircraft fuselage to the starboard engine; there was a second fire that stretched behind the aircraft from a point on the side of the rear body of the aircraft. At 15:47 the Harrier pilot reported that he saw the Nimrod explode. It broke into 4 sections, at a height of between 750 feet and 1000 feet. All 14 crew members were killed.
Crew:
F/Sgt Gary Wayne Andrews,
F/Sgt Stephen Beattie,
F/Sgt Gerard Martin Bell,
F/Sgt Adrian Davies,
L/Cpl Oliver Simon Dicketts,
F/Lt Steven Johnson,
Sgt Benjamin James Knight,
F/Lt Leigh Anthony Mitchelmore,
F/Lt Gareth Rodney Nicholas,
Sgt John Joseph Langton,
Sgt Gary Paul Quilliam,
F/Lt Allan James Squires,
F/Lt Steven Swarbrick,
Mne Joseph David Windall.
Probable cause:
As the Board was unable to investigate XV230's wreckage at the crash site and it proved impossible to recover more than a few small components from the aircraft, the Board has been unable to determine positively the source or cause of the fire which led to the loss of XV230 and its crew. Nonetheless, through investigation of the limited data available, the Board was able to deduce the most probable location of the fire, a number of probable causes of that event and factors which possibly contributed to it:
a. The escape of fuel during AAR, occasioned by an overflow from No 1 tank, or a leak from the fuel system (fuel coupling or pipe), led to an accumulation of fuel within the No 7 tank dry bay. Although of a lower probability, the fuel leak could have been caused by a hot air leak damaging fuel system seals.
b. The ignition of that fuel following contact with an exposed element of the aircraft's crossfeed/ SCP pipe work.
Contributory factors:
a. The age of the Nimrod MR2's non-structural system components.
b. Nimrod MR2 maintenance policy in relation to fuel and hot air systems.
c. The lack of a fire detection and suppression system within the No 7 tank dry bay.
d. The fact that hazard analysis did not correctly categorize the potential threat to the aircraft caused by the collocation of fuel and hot air system components within the No 7 tank dry bay.
e. The formal incorporation of AAR capability within the Nimrod did not identify the full implications of successive changes to the fuel system and associated procedures.
Aggravating factor:
a. The loss of flying controls through fire damage to the hydraulic systems or cables and pulleys.

Crash of an Antonov AN-32B in Lashkar Gah: 5 killed

Date & Time: Apr 24, 2006 at 1145 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
ZS-PDV
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kandahar – Lashkar Gah
MSN:
30 03
YOM:
1992
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
12
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The aircraft was dispatched in Afghanistan on behalf of the US Department of State, carrying members of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Following an uneventful flight from Kandahar, the crew landed at Lashkar Gah Airport. After touchdown, a truck crossed the active runway so the pilot-in-command initiated a turn to avoid the collision. Doing so, the aircraft veered off runway and collided with nearby houses. Both pilots as well as three people on the ground were killed. All other occupants were injured, some seriously.

Crash of a Boeing 727-228A near Kabul: 45 killed

Date & Time: Mar 19, 1998 at 1300 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YA-FAZ
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Sharjah - Kandahar - Kabul
MSN:
22288
YOM:
1981
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
35
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
45
Circumstances:
The aircraft was completing a charter flight from Sharjah to Kabul with an intermediate stop in Kandahar, carrying 35 passengers and 10 crew members. While descending to Kabul-Khwaja Rawash Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and failed to realize his altitude was insufficient. The aircraft struck the slope of Mt Shakh-e Barantay (2,714 metres high) located about 15 km south of the airport. The wreckage was found less than 100 metres below the summit. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 45 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain.

Crash of an Antonov AN-32 near Khojak Pass: 51 killed

Date & Time: Jan 13, 1998 at 2230 LT
Type of aircraft:
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Kandahar - Herat
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
45
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
51
Circumstances:
While descending to Herat, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and decided to divert to Shindand. Weather was poor so the crew elected to return to Kandahar but was later informed that weather conditions deteriorated in Kandahar so a landing was not possible. The captain finally decided to divert to Quetta, Baluchestan. While descending to Quetta Airport, he informed ATC he was short of fuel when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located near the Khojak Pass. The wreckage was found about 75 km northwest of Quetta Airport. All 51 occupants were killed.