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Crash of a Learjet 25B in Del Rio: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 19, 2003 at 1710 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N666TW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
El Paso – Del Rio
MSN:
25-116
YOM:
1973
Flight number:
AJI892
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
4689
Captain / Total hours on type:
1348.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2783
Copilot / Total hours on type:
263
Aircraft flight hours:
15363
Circumstances:
The cargo flight was cleared for a visual approach to the 5,000-foot long, by 150-foot wide asphalt runway. Based on estimated landing weight of the aircraft, the Vref was estimated at 116 KIAS. Air traffic Control (ATC) radar data revealed that the flight maintained a ground speed above 190 knots on final approach, to include the touchdown zone for runway 13. The first evidence of braking was noted at a point 1,247 feet from the departure end of the runway. Braking signatures on the asphalt as well as off the pavement were consistent with an operational anti-skid system. Witnesses at the airport also observed the airplane flying very fast and touching down long. Both crewmembers, the 4,689-hour captain and the 2,873-hour first officer, were familiar with the airport, and the flight was 20 minutes ahead of its scheduled arrival time. The airplane overran the departure end of runway 13, impacted the airport perimeter fence, proceeded across a roadway, took out another fence, and collided with two trees in a cemetery. The airplane was found to be within weight and balance limits for all phases of the flight. The installed cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was found not to be functional.
Probable cause:
The pilot's misjudged distance and speed during the approach to landing, and his failure to obtain the proper touchdown point resulting in an overrun. A contributing factor was the pilot's failure to abort the landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft T-1A Jayhawk in Biloxi

Date & Time: Aug 16, 2003 at 2221 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
91-0093
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Del Rio - Biloxi
MSN:
TT-34
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The Mishap Student pilot (MSP) was flying an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 21 at Keesler AFB. They were in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) at night and the runway was wet. After some deviations on the approach, they arrived over the threshold on a normal glide slope and faster (about 114 kts) than the computed approach speed of 108 kts. The aircraft touched down approximately 1500 feet down the runway. The Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) actuated the speed brakes/spoilers switch and the student began to immediately apply brake pressure. After 4-5 seconds, the instructor recognized that the aircraft was not decelerating and declared that she was taking control of the aircraft. The instructor immediately applied maximum braking with no perceived deceleration. She then grabbed the glare shield in an attempt to gain additional leverage on the brakes and again felt no perceived deceleration. At this point, the aircraft was rapidly running out of available runway. The instructor selected the emergency brakes just prior to arriving at the departure end threshold and the brakes locked resulting in a hydroplane skid. The aircraft departed the prepared surface and came to a halt 190 feet later. As a result of the runway departure, the right main and nose gear collapsed, and the forward fuselage and both wings were heavily damaged.
Probable cause:
Based on clear and convincing evidence, the Board President determined that this mishap was caused by a combination of several factors during the landing sequence. First, the Mishap Student Pilot (MSP) flew faster than the computed approach and landing speeds. Additionally she maintained higher than idle thrust for the first few seconds after touchdown. Because of these factors, the aircraft did not settle completely on the runway after touchdown-as the struts were not completely compressed. This put the aircraft systems in the "AIR" mode meaning that the speed brakes/spoilers could not deploy. Finally, the runway was wet; and the crew was inexperienced and thus did not recognize the anti-skid cycling at high speeds on the wet runway.

Crash of a Dassault Falcon 20C in Saint Louis

Date & Time: Apr 8, 2003 at 1850 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N179GA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Del Rio – Saint Louis
MSN:
100
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
GAE179
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3221
Captain / Total hours on type:
1270.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5758
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1532
Aircraft flight hours:
15899
Circumstances:
The twin engine turbofan powered airplane was ditched into a river after a complete loss of power from both engines. The airplane was on a second approach to land on runway 30R after having been instructed by air traffic control (ATC) to climb during the final approach segment of the first approach due to inadequate separation from another airplane. Subsequent to the first approach, the airplane was issued vectors for the second approach by ATC. Communications transcripts show that the flight crew asked ATC how far they would be vectored during the second approach, but the flight crew did not inform ATC of their low fuel state until the airplane was already on a "base turn...to join final." The airplane subsequently lost power from both engines. During interviews, both pilots stated that there were no problems with the airplane. The second-in-command (SIC) stated that the airplane "ran out of fuel" and that the fuel quantity indicators read 0 and 100 pounds when each respective engine stopped producing power. The SIC also stated that after being instructed to climb to 5,000 feet after their first approach, he questioned the pilot-in-command about landing at another airport located about 14 nautical miles west-southwest of the destination airport. The SIC said that the PIC elected to continue with the second approach to the original destination. Research indicated that the flight crew did not obtain a weather briefing prior to the accident flight. Additionally, the Terminal Aerodrome Forecast that was valid at the time the aircraft's flight plan was filed showed a forecast ceiling consisting of overcast clouds at 1,500 feet above ground level at the aircraft's arrival time at the destination. 14 CFR Part 91.169 requires that an alternate airport be listed in the flight plan when forecast ceilings are less than 2,000 feet. No alternate was listed in the flight plan for the accident flight. Additionally, 14 CFR Part 91.167 requires that aircraft operated in instrument meteorological conditions maintain fuel reserves that allow flight to the intended destination and then continued flight to the listed alternate, and an additional 45 minutes at normal cruise speed. In 1993, the FAA/industry advisory committee developed advisory material for fuel planning and management for 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 air carrier flight operations, but the material was never published.
Probable cause:
The pilot in command's improper in-flight decision not to divert to an alternate destination resulting in the exhaustion of the airplane's fuel supply, and his failure to relay his low fuel state to air traffic control in a timely manner.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Del Rio: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 26, 2001 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N80Q
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
San Antonio – Del Rio
MSN:
402B-1384
YOM:
1978
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1140
Captain / Total hours on type:
70.00
Aircraft flight hours:
19279
Circumstances:
Upon arrival at the destination airport, the commercial pilot of the Part 135 cargo flight reported to the tower that he was 7 miles to the east, intending to land on runway 13. Subsequently, the pilot reported that he would circle the airport a few times "because he was having trouble with his autopilot." After circling, the pilot positioned the airplane on final approach to runway 13. The pilot of another airplane in the traffic pattern observed the accident airplane on a "one to two mile final, in a normal flight attitude but possibly a little low." After looking at her instruments for several seconds, she made visual contact again and observed the airplane impact the ground with the "tail of the aircraft falling forward on top of a fence." She further stated that all of the radio transmissions from the accident airplane were "calm and completely un-alarmed prior to the accident." Another witness, who was located at a fixed base operator at the airport, observed the airplane turn onto final. He stated that the airplane "suddenly stalled and slammed into the ground from about two hundred feet." The 1,140 hour pilot had accumulated a total of 70 hours in the Cessna 402. The airplane was found to be within its prescribed weight and balance limitations at the time of the accident. Ground impressions and airframe deformations indicated that the impact angle was approximately 25 degrees nose down on a magnetic heading of 155 degrees with the landing gear extended and the flaps partially extended. A post-impact fire destroyed the airplane. Flight control continuity was established from the aft section of the cockpit to the rudder and elevator flight control surfaces. The elevator trim tab (located on the right elevator) was measured with a protractor and found to be in the 28 degrees tab-up position (aircraft nose down). According to the airplane manufacturer's specifications, the maximum tab-up travel limit (when connected) is 5 degrees. The trim tab would not move freely by hand forces and appeared to be jammed. The elevator skin was cut open (top side) to observe the trim tab connecting hardware. It was observed that the clevis end of the trim tab actuator rod was wedged against the front spar of the elevator's internal structure. Additionally, the bolt which connected the clevis end of the tab actuator rod to the actuator screw, was missing. After further inspection, neither the bolt nor the nut were found in the cavity of the elevator structure or the surrounding area. The clevis end of the actuator rod and the actuator screw were not damaged, and no impact damage was apparent on the trim tab. The operator's maintenance records showed that the right elevator had been replaced 10 flight hours prior to the accident.
Probable cause:
The loss of control due to a jammed trim tab, which resulted from the failure of maintenance personnel to properly secure the trim tab actuator rod when installing a replacement elevator.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft E18S in Del Rio

Date & Time: Apr 8, 1998 at 1905 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N2083C
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Del Rio - San Antonio
MSN:
BA-446
YOM:
1959
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6800
Captain / Total hours on type:
55.00
Circumstances:
The pilot lost control of the airplane following the loss of engine power from the right engine during takeoff. The pilot stated that the engine power loss was not sudden, but rather a slow continued reduction of power. The pilot further stated that the loss of power occurred after he placed the landing gear selector in the retract position. He added that his airspeed at the time of the power loss was between Vmc (86 mph) and Vy (120 mph). The airplane started to roll towards the right (dead) engine as the pilot reduced the power on the left engine. The outboard portion of the right wing impacted the ground short of a taxiway. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the right engine propeller was in the feather position and the left engine was torn from the airframe. The reason for the loss of engine power was not determined.
Probable cause:
A loss of engine power on the right engine for undetermined reasons, and the pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-3 Otter in Del Rio: 3 killed

Date & Time: May 10, 1978 at 1130 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N5370G
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Del Rio - Alamogordo
MSN:
343
YOM:
1960
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
1670
Captain / Total hours on type:
250.00
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Del Rio Airport, while climbing, the airplane went out of control and crashed. All three occupants were killed. They were completing a search and rescue mission to Alamogordo.
Probable cause:
Uncontrolled collision with ground during initial climb due to elevator failure. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Flight control surfaces: elevator assembly, attachments,
- Previous damage,
- Elevator push-pull tube broken,
- Aircraft parked in winds 30 gusting 58 knots,
- Controls not locked.
Final Report: