Albany

The airline transport pilot delayed his scheduled departure for the night cargo flight due to thunderstorms along the route. Before departing, the pilot explained to the flight follower assigned to the flight that if he could not get though the thunderstorms along the planned route, he would divert to the alternate airport. While en route, the pilot was advised by the air traffic controller in contact with the flight of a "ragged line of moderate, heavy, and extreme" precipitation along his planned route. The controller also stated that he did not see any breaks in the weather. The controller cleared the pilot to descend at his discretion from 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl) to 3,000 ft msl, and subsequently, the controller suggested a diversion to the northeast for about 70 nautical miles that would avoid the most severe weather. The pilot responded that he had enough fuel for such a diversion but concluded that he would "see what the radar is painting" after descending to 3,000 ft msl. About 1 minute 30 seconds later, as the airplane was descending through 7,000 ft msl, the controller stated, "I just lost you on radar, I don't show a transponder, it might have to do with the weather." About 40 seconds later, the pilot advised the controller that he intended to deviate to the right of course, and the controller told the pilot that he could turn left and right as needed. Shortly thereafter, the pilot stated that he was going to turn around and proceed to his alternate airport. The controller cleared the pilot direct to his alternate and instructed him to maintain 3,000 ft msl. The pilot acknowledged the instruction, and the controller then stated, "do you want to climb back up? I can offer you any altitude." The pilot responded that he would try to climb back to 3,000 ft msl. The controller then recommended a heading of 180° to "get you clear of the weather quicker," and the pilot responded, "alright 180." There were no further communications from the pilot. Shortly thereafter, radar data showed the airplane enter a right turn that continued through about 540°. During the turn its airspeed varied between 198 and 130 knots, while its estimated bank angles were between 40 and 50°. Examination of the wreckage indicated that airplane experienced an in-flight breakup at relatively low altitude, consistent with radar data that showed the airplane's last recorded altitudes to be around 3,500 ft msl. The symmetrical nature of the breakup, damage to the outboard wings, and damage to the upper fuselage were all signatures indicative that the left and right wings failed in positive overload almost simultaneously. All of the fracture surfaces examined had a dull, grainy appearance consistent with overstress separation. There was no evidence of pre-existing cracking noted at any of the separation points, nor was there evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. Review of base reflectivity weather radar data showed that, while the pilot was maneuvering to divert to the alternate airport, the airplane was operating in an area of light precipitation that rapidly intensified to heavy precipitation, as shown by radar scans completed shortly after the accident. During this time, the flight was likely operating in clouds along the leading edge of the convective line, where the pilot most likely would have encountered updrafts and severe or greater turbulence. The low visibility conditions that existed during the flight, which was conducted at night and in instrument meteorological conditions, coupled with the turbulence the flight likely encountered, were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. Additionally, the airplane's maneuvering during the final moments of the flight was consistent with a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. The pilot's continued flight into known convective weather conditions and his delayed decision to divert the flight directly contributed to the accident. Although the operator had a system safety-based program, the responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight was left solely to the pilot. Written company policy required completion of a flight risk assessment tool (FRAT) before each flight by the assigned flight follower; however, a FRAT was not completed for the accident flight. The flight followers responsible for completing the FRATs were not trained to complete them for night cargo flights, and the operator's management was not aware that the FRATs were not being completed for night cargo flights. Further, if a FRAT had been completed for the accident flight, the resultant score would have allowed the flight to commence into known hazardous weather conditions without any further review. If greater oversight had been provided by the operator, it is possible that the flight may have been cancelled or re-routed due to the severity of the convective weather conditions present along the planned route of flight.

During approach to runway 9, the tower controller instructed the pilot to perform an “S” turn 3 miles from the runway. The pilot initiated the “S” turn to the left, and after turning back to the right towards the runway to complete the other half of the turn, the controller advised the pilot that he did not need to finish the maneuver, and could turn onto final approach. The last recorded ground speed was 89 knots when the pilot banked the airplane sharply to the left at this time, witnesses stated that the airplane seemed to do a wing over onto its back and go straight down. Flight simulation tests revealed that while making a steep turn and not adding power, as the bank angle increased the airspeed would decrease and the airplane would enter an aerodynamic stall. Toxicology testing indicated that the pilot had been using tramadol, a prescription painkiller with potentially impairing effects. The pilot had not reported its use on his most recent application for airman medical certificate approximately 20 months prior to the accident. It is unclear what role, if any, the medication or the condition for which it might have been used played in the accident.

The accident flight was the first flight after maintenance personnel replaced the forward elevator trim cable. When the flightcrew received the airplane, the captain did not address the recent cable change noted on his maintenance release. The captain also did not perform a first flight of the day checklist, which included an elevator trim check. Shortly after takeoff, the flightcrew reported a runway trim, and manually selected nose-up trim. However, the elevator trim then traveled to the full nose-down position. The control column forces subsequently increased to 250 pounds, and the flightcrew was unable to maintain control of the airplane. During the replacement of the cable, the maintenance personnel skipped a step in the manufacturer's airliner maintenance manual (AMM). They did not use a lead wire to assist with cable orientation. In addition, the AMM incorrectly depicted the elevator trim drum, and the depiction of the orientation of the cable around the drum was ambiguous. The maintenance personnel stated that they had completed an operational check of the airplane after maintenance. The Safety Board performed a mis-rigging demonstration on an exemplar airplane, which reversed the elevator trim system. An operational check on that airplane revealed that when the electric trim motor was activated in one direction, the elevator trim tabs moved in the correct direction, but the trim wheel moved opposite of the corresponding correct direction. When the manual trim wheel was moved in one direction, the elevator trim tabs moved opposite of the corresponding correct direction.

The pilot said the preflight, engine start, run-up, taxi and takeoff were "normal". The pilot said that during the climb after takeoff, approximately 1,000 to 1,500 feet above the ground, the airplane's engine "spooled down, slowly and smoothly, like a loss of torque or the propeller going to feather." The pilot performed a forced landing to a field, where the airplane nosed over, and came to rest inverted. Examination of the engine and propeller revealed that the propeller-reversing lever was installed on the wrong side of the reversing lever guide pin, and that the reversing linkage carbon block was no longer installed, and had departed the airplane. Examination of the airplane's maintenance records revealed that the carbon block was replaced during a 100-hour maintenance inspection, 5 hours prior to the accident. Installation of the reversing lever on the incorrect side of the guide pin resulted in improper seating and premature wear of the carbon block. According to the engine manufacturer, any disconnection in operation of the propeller control linkage will cause the propeller governor beta control valve to extend, and drive the propeller into feather.

The DC-3 experienced an in-flight engine fire, and made a forced landing at nearby airport, following the separation of the right engine assembly from the airframe. According to the pilot, during cruise flight, at 5000 feet, he heard a loud "bang" and saw a reflection of fire on his left engine nacelle. Fire damage was found on the trailing edge of the right wing and on the landing gear assembly. The engine examination also showed that No. 12 cylinder had separated from the main case. Evidence of oil from the No. 12 cylinder was found across engine and exhaust systems. Further examination revealed Nos. 7, 8 and 9 cylinders also failed and separated, and the engine seized and separated from the airframe.

The pilot failed to deice the wings prior to the takeoff and overloaded the airplane by 360 lbs structurally and 1,100 lbs for flight in icing conditions. There was moderate snow falling at the time of takeoff. The takeoff roll was described as long and a witness saw the wings rocking from side to side after takeoff. The airplane struck trees one mile off the end of the runway, crashed and burned. Post accident investigation found snow contamination on the top of one wing that did not burn and the top of the horizontal stabilizers and elevators. No discrepancies were found with the engine or airframe. Both occupants were killed.

During takeoff, the aircraft rolled abruptly to the right after lift-off. Subsequently, the right wingtip struck the surface, then the aircraft cartwheeled and crashed. The fuselage was destroyed by a post-crash fire. An exam of the engines revealed that the right engine supercharger intermediate drive gear shaft had become worn and one of its gear teeth had failed from fatigue. There was evidence that an out-of-mesh condition occurred, which resulted in a partial loss of engine power during takeoff. Also, the aircraft was estimated to be 679 lbs over its max certified gross weight. Density alt was calculated to be about 2,000 feet. All six occupants were killed.

The airplane departed Albany on an air pollution monitoring program flight to Lancaster, carrying two passengers and one pilot. En route, while cruising in marginal weather conditions, the pilot encountered severe turbulences when control was lost. The airplane crashed in Rexville, killing all three occupants.

After takeoff from Albany Airport, while in initial climb, the left engine failed. The airplane lost height then struck the ground and crashed near the airport. The pilot, sole on board, was slightly injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

On final approach to Windsor Locks-Bradley Airport, the left engine lost power and the right engine failed. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the airplane struck trees and crashed in flames. Both occupants were slightly injured and the aircraft was destroyed.