Rockwell Sabreliner 75

The aircraft entered the Venezuelan airspace without flight plan and authorisation. While flying over the Paraguaña Peninsula at low altitude, the crew was forced to land when control was lost. The aircraft crashed in shallow water few meters offshore, lost its tail and both wings. Both pilots were killed.

The aircraft, a Rockwell Sabreliner 75A (NA-265-80 version) departed Celaya-Capitán Rogelio Castillo Airport shortly before 0700LT on a short flight to Santiago de Querétaro without any flight plan and with an unknown number of people on board. At 0731LT, the crew contacted the destination airport and elected to land about seven minutes later. After landing on runway 27, the crew was instructed to vacate via taxiway for the apron but the aircraft continued, veered off runway after a distance 800 metres, impacted a rocky wall, lost its nose gear and came to rest. When the rescuers arrived on the scene, there was nobody as the occupants left the airplane and disappeared. It appears the flight was illegal and it is believed that the aircraft was stolen at Celaya Airport.

The aircraft was returning to El Palomar AFB, near Buenos Aires, carrying three crew members and six passengers, among them General Luis Pozzi, Chief of the Argentinian Army. Upon landing, the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft slid on runway then veered to the right before coming to rest in a grassy area. All 9 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. General Pozzi was returning to El Palomar Air Base following a review of the troops in the Pampa Province.

The Rockwell International Sabreliner had just been released from the repair station following several months of maintenance, primarily for structural corrosion control and repair. According to the pilots, they began to taxi away from the repair station. Initially, the brakes and steering were satisfactory, but then failed. The airplane then contacted several other airplanes and a tug with an airplane in tow, before coming to a stop. The airplane incurred substantial damage as a result of the multiple collisions. Neither crewmember heard or saw any annunciations to alert them to a hydraulic system problem. Postaccident examination revealed that there was no pressure in the normal hydraulic system, as expected, and that the auxiliary system pressure was adequate to facilitate emergency braking. Additional examination and testing revealed that the aural warning for low hydraulic system pressure was inoperative, but all other hydraulic, steering, and braking systems functioned properly. Both the pilot and copilot were type-rated in the Sabreliner, and each had approximately 350 hours of flight time in type. Neither crewmember had any time in Sabreliners in the 90 days prior to the accident. Operation of the emergency braking system in the airplane required switching the system on, waiting for system pressure to decrease to 1,700 pounds per square inch (psi), pulling the "T" handle, and then pumping the brake pedals 3 to 5 times. In addition, the system will not function if both the pilot's and copilot's brake pedals are depressed simultaneously. The investigation did not uncover any evidence to suggest the crew turned on the auxiliary hydraulic system, or waited for the system pressure to decrease to 1,700 psi in their attempt to use the emergency braking system.

During the takeoff roll from San José-Juan Santamaria Airport runway 07, one of the tyre burst. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking manoeuvre. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage, hit obstacles and came to rest near the perimeter fence. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew departed Amman-Marka Airport on a positioning flight to Alexandria, Egypt. On final approach, the aircraft was too high on the glide but the captain decided to continue. During the last segment, after the speed brakes were deactivated, the aircraft floated and landed too far down the runway. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, it overran and came to rest. While all three crew members escaped uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane impacted heavily wooded terrain after experiencing a dual engine failure due to a reported lightning strike. The pilot received a weather brief that included information concerning a Convective Sigmet and a Severe Weather Watch. The weather briefer informed the pilot that a route to the southeast would keep the flight out of the heavy weather, and that, "... you'll get clobbered if you go due east." After departure, the pilot requested a turn to the northeast to stay clear of weather. While in the climb, the flight was advised of a Weather Watch that covered the area of their flight. The CVR revealed that Continuous Ignition was not selected prior to encountering turbulence. About 23 minutes after takeoff, the airplane was climbing at about 30,800 feet msl when the pilot reported a dual engine failure due to a lightning strike. The CVR indicated one engine quit and the second quit about two seconds later. The copilot established a 170 kts descent airspeed for "best glide." The airplane was vectored near a level 5 thunderstorm during the emergency descent. Two air starts were attempted when the airplane's altitude was outside of the air start envelope. Two more air starts were attempted within the air start envelope but were unsuccessful. The minimum airspeed for an air restart is 160 kts and the maximum speed for air start is 358 kts. The CVR indicated that the pilots did not call for the airplane's checklist, and no challenge and response checklists were used during the emergency descent. The CVR indicated the pilots did not discuss load shedding any of the electrical components on the airplane. The CVR indicated the hydraulic system cycled twice during the emergency descent and the landing gear was lowered using the hydraulic system during descent. During the descent the pilots reported they had lost use of their navigation equipment. The airplane impacted the terrain located about 166 nautical miles from the departure airport on a bearing of 083 degrees. No preexisting engines or airframe anomalies were found.

The pilot dropped off a passenger at Newton Airport before continuing the flight. The passenger, who was a contract pilot for the company, reported there had been no indications of any problem with the airplane. The pilot conducted a low pass followed by a steep climb to 10,000 feet when he departed Newton. Seven minutes later in the flight, the cockpit voice recorder revealed the pilot stating, 'You're going to pitch up now and take it all the way around here.' The pilot said, 'Pitch up, twenty degrees up.' After the pilot called for the nose to be pitched up, he did not make any statements for about 27 seconds. Then the pilot stated, 'Oh, Jim.' Eight seconds later the airplane impacted the ground. Radar data indicated that airplane's altitude about the time the nose was pitched up was 15,900 feet msl, and it impacted the ground about 37 seconds later. All flight control surfaces were found at the impact site. No maneuver in the pilot's manual or the FAA's Commercial test guide required the nose to be pitched up 20 degrees while maintaining 250 knots. The aircraft was certified as a Transport Category aircraft and was not certified for aerobatic flight.