Partenavia P.68

The pilot stated that the flight was conducted at night and he used his GPS track to align with the runway. When the pilot activated the runway lights, the airplane was about 1/4 mile to the left of the runway and 1/2 mile from the approach end. The pilot made an aggressive right turn then hard left turn to make the runway for landing. While maneuvering on short final, at 50 feet above ground level (agl), the airplane's right wing impacted the tops of a number of trees that lined the southeast side of the runway. The airplane descended rapidly and landed hard, collapsing the landing gear and spinning the airplane around 180 degrees laterally, where it came to rest against some trees. The right wing's impact with trees and the hard landing resulted in substantial damage. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The twin engine aircraft departed South Africa on a flight to Tanzania with intermediate stops in Tete and Lilongwe, carrying one passenger and one pilot. The aircraft was en route to Dar es-Salaam to perform a Lidar (Laser Imaging Detection And Ranging) mission. En route, the pilot encountered engine problems and elected to make an emergency landing. Upon landing in an open field, the aircraft lost its tail and crashed landed about 45 km southwest of Lilongwe. Both occupants were rescued and the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft was engaged in a bird control mission over the center of Denmark and departed Billund Airport in the afternoon with one passenger and one pilot on board. While returning to Roskilde, on approach to runway 03, the pilot initiated a go-around procedure due to the presence of a slower aircraft on the runway. While climbing, the twin engine aircraft stalled and crashed near runway 03. Both occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Porlamar on a private flight to Charallave, carrying five passengers and one pilot, all from the same family. It is believed that the pilot changed his destination en route and elected to continue to the Cojedes Province. Due to fuel exhaustion, both engines lost power then failed, forcing the pilot to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft crashed in a wooded area located near Macapo. A young girl aged 10 was seriously injured while five other occupants were killed.

While performing a low-level law enforcement patrol flight, the pilot crossed a ridge and observed a parked vehicle. To investigate further, he lowered the flaps and descended to approximately 200 feet, into a canyon. The pilot made a second pass over the vehicle and initiated a right turn, during which the airplane encountered a tailwind that resulted in a rapid loss of airspeed and a descent. The pilot leveled the airplane and increased the power; however, the airplane was too slow and low to turn out of the canyon. As a result, the airplane stalled and impacted terrain. The pilot stated there were no preflight mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the airplane.

En route from Reggio de Calabre to Parma, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in hilly terrain near Canevare, about 50 km south of Modena. Both occupants were killed and the aircraft was destroyed.

The airplane, a Vulcan Air PA68 Observer 2, registration EC-IPG, had taken off from Sabadell airport to conduct a local flight. Onboard were the instructor and a pilot who was being tested for a CRI (SPA) (Class Rating Instructor). As they were flying over the town of Sant Pere de Vilamajor (Barcelona), the aircraft plunged to the ground, falling within the property limit of a private dwelling (a chalet). Several eyewitnesses reported that they stopped hearing the engine noise and that they then saw the airplane spinning in a nose down attitude. The front part of the airplane (cockpit) impacted the ground first. The crash resulted in a fire, the flames from which reached a part of the aircraft and an arbor next to the house, but not the house itself, though it was affected by the smoke. The two occupants perished immediately and were trapped inside the airplane. They were extracted by emergency personnel. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. The post-accident inspection did not reveal any signs of a fault or malfunction of any aircraft component. It has been determined that the accident resulted from a stall caused by flying the aircraft at a low speed. It has also been concluded that there were three contributing factors: the low altitude, the very likely possibility that the crew did not establish guidelines for action prior to the flight and the absence of an authority gradient between the crew members.

The pilot of the multiengine airplane was flying two passengers at night on an instrument-flight-rules flight plan. One of the passengers had been on an organ recipient waiting list and his wife was accompanying him. A viable matched organ was available at a distant hospital and the passenger had to arrive on short notice for surgery the following morning. All radio communications during the flight between the pilot and air traffic control (ATC), a flight service station (FSS), and a fixed-based operator (FBO) were routine. The pilot was aware of the weather at the destination airport, and had commented to ATC about 75 miles from the destination that the weather was "going up and down…like a real thin fog layer.” Additionally, better weather conditions prevailed at nearby suitable airports. The pilot mentioned one of those airports to ATC in the event he decided to divert. According to an employee at an FBO located at the destination airport, the pilot contacted him via radio and asked about the current weather conditions. The employee replied that the visibility was low due to fog and that he could not see the terminal lights from the FBO. The pilot then asked which of the two alternate airports was closer and the employee stated that he did not know. The employee then heard the pilot “click” the runway lights and contact the local FSS. about 5 miles from runway 29, just prior to the initial approach fix, the pilot radioed on the common traffic advisory frequency and reported a 5-mile final leg for runway 29. The FSS reported that the current weather was automated showing an indefinite ceiling of 100 feet vertical visibility and 1/4 mile visibility in fog. The pilota cknowledged the weather information. The weather was below the minimum published requirements for the instrument-landing-system (ILS) approach at the destination airport. Radar data showed that the flight intercepted and tracked the localizer, then intercepted the glideslope about 1 minute later. There were a few radar targets without altitude data due to intermittent Mode C transponder returns. The last recorded radar target with altitude indicated the airplane was at 600 feet, on glideslope and heading for the approach; however, the three subsequent and final targets did not show altitude information. The last recorded radar target was about 1.4 miles from the runway threshold. The airplane flew below glideslope and impacted 100-foot-tall trees about 4,150 feet from the runway 29 threshold. On-ground facility checks and a postaccident flight check of the ILS runway 29 approach conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration did not reveal malfunctions with the ILS. The cabin and cockpit area, including the NAV/COMM/APP, equipment were consumed by a postimpact fire which precluded viable component testing. Detailed examination of the wreckage that was not consumed by fire did not reveal preimpact mechanical malfunctions that may have contributed to the accident. Given that the pilot was aware of the weather conditions before and during the approach, it is possible that the pilot’s goal of expeditiously transporting a patient to a hospital for an organ transplant may have affected his decision to initiate and continue an instrument approach while the weather conditions were below the published minimum requirements for the approach.