De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver

The single engine airplane was chartered by a provider based in Crossroads Lake (near Churchill Falls reservoir) to fly four fisherman and two guides to Mistastin Lake, Labrador. The aircraft was supposed to leave Crossroads Lake at 0700LT but the departure was postponed to 1000LT due to low ceiling. Several attempts to contact the pilot failed during the day and the SAR center based in Trenton was alerted. SAR operations were initiated and four days later, the location of the accident was reached but only four bodies were found. The body of the pilot and two passengers were never recovered as well as the wreckage.

At approximately 1000LT on 12 July 2019, a private de Havilland DHC-2 Mk. 1 Beaver floatplane (registration C‑GRHF, serial number 1123) took off from the St-Mathias Water Aerodrome (CSV9), Quebec, with only the pilot on board, for a series of visual flight rules (VFR) flights. The aircraft landed at approximately 1130 on Désert Lake in La Minerve, Quebec, and came alongside a private dock where 3 individuals were waiting to board and fly to a fishing lodge. Once the baggage was stowed on the aircraft, the pilot provided a safety briefing to the passengers, who were all wearing a personal flotation device. The aircraft took off from Désert Lake at approximately 1215, bound for the Barrage Gouin Water Aerodrome (CTP3), Quebec, where the aircraft was scheduled to be refuelled. The aircraft landed at approximately 1430. Once the refuelling was complete, the aircraft took off once again around 1528, headed northwest to Weakwaten Lake, Quebec, where the fishing lodge was located. After approximately 48 minutes of flight, at around 1616, the aircraft collided with trees and struck the ground. There was no post-impact fire. The emergency locator transmitter was activated by the force of impact, and began transmitting a signal on frequency 121.5 MHz. This signal was detected by the flight crew of a commercial airliner at 1705 and reported to air traffic services. At 1850, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Trenton dispatched a CC130 Hercules aircraft to try to locate the distress signal. The occurrence aircraft was found in a densely wooded area at 2032. Two search and rescue technicians were parachuted to rescue the aircraft occupants. Three of the 4 occupants received fatal injuries. The survivor was evacuated and transported to the hospital in Chibougamau, Quebec.

On 11 July 2019, at approximately 0852 Eastern Daylight Time, the float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 Mk. I Beaver aircraft (registration C-FBBG, serial number 358), operated by Hawk Air, departed from the Hawk Junction Water Aerodrome, on Hawk Lake, Ontario. The aircraft, with the pilot and 1 passenger on board, was on a daytime visual flight rules charter flight. The aircraft was going to drop off supplies at an outpost camp on Oba Lake, Ontario, approximately 35 nautical miles north-northeast of the Hawk Junction Water Aerodrome. The aircraft departed heading northeast. Shortly after takeoff, during the initial climb out, just past the northeast end of Hawk Lake, the aircraft crashed in a steep nose-down attitude, severing a power line immediately before impact, and coming to rest next to a hydro substation. The pilot and the passenger received fatal injuries. The aircraft was destroyed as a result of the impact, but there was no post-impact fire.

The commercial pilot was conducting his first scheduled commuter flight from the company’s seaplane base to a nearby island seaplane base with one passenger and cargo onboard. According to company pilots, the destination harbor was prone to challenging downdrafts and changing wind conditions due to surrounding terrain. Multiple witnesses at the destination stated that the airplane made a westerly approach, and the wind was from the southeast with light chop on the water. Two witnesses reported the wings rocking left and right before touchdown. One witness stated that a wind gust pushed the tail up before the airplane landed. A different witness reported that the airplane was drifting right during the touchdown, and another witness saw the right (downwind) float submerge under water after touchdown, and the airplane nosed over as it pivoted around the right wingtip, which impacted the water. Flight track and performance data from the cockpit display units revealed that, as the airplane descended on the final approach, the wind changed from a right headwind of 6 knots to a left quartering tailwind of 8 knots before touchdown. The crosswind and tailwind components were within the airplane’s operational limitations. Examination of the airframe, engine, and associated systems revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation or egress. During the final approach and descent, the pilot had various wind information available to him; the sea surface wind waves and signatures, the nearest airport observation winds, the cockpit display calculated wind, and the visual relative ground speed. Had the pilot recognized that the winds had shifted to a quartering tailwind and the airplane’s ground speed was faster than normal, he could have aborted the landing and performed another approach into the wind. Although crosswind landings were practiced during flight training, tailwind landings were not because new pilots were not expected to perform them. Although the crosswind component was well within the airplane’s limits, it is possible that combined with the higher ground speed, the inexperienced pilot was unable to counteract the lateral drift during touchdown in a rapidly shifting wind. The pilot was hired the previous month with 5 hours of seaplane experience, and he completed company-required training and competency checks less than 2 weeks before the accident. According to the chief pilot (CP), company policy was to assign newly hired pilots to tour flights while they gained experience before assigning them to commuter flights later in the season. The previous year, the CP distributed a list of each pilot’s clearances for specific types of flights and destinations; however, an updated list had not been generated for the season at the time of the accident, and the flight coordinators, who were delegated operational control for assigning pilots to flights, and station manager were unaware of the pilot’s assignment limitations. Before the flight, the flight coordinator on duty completed a company flight risk assessment that included numerical values based on flight experience levels. The total risk value for the flight was in the caution area, which required management notification before releasing the flight, due to the pilot’s lack of experience in the accident airplane make and model and with the company, and his unfamiliarity with the geographical area; however, the flight coordinator did not notify management before release because the CP had approved a tour flight with the same risk value earlier in the day. Had the CP been notified, he may not have approved of the pilot's assignment to the accident flight. The pilot's minimal operational experience in seaplane operations likely affected his situational awareness in rapidly changing wind conditions and his ability to compensate adequately for a quartering tailwind at a higher-than-normal ground speed, which resulted in a loss of control during the water landing and a subsequent nose-over.

On May 13, 2019, about 1221 Alaska daylight time, a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, N952DB, and a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 (Otter) airplane, N959PA, collided in midair about 8 miles northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The DHC-2 pilot and four passengers sustained fatal injuries. The DHC-3 pilot sustained minor injuries, nine passengers sustained serious injuries, and one passenger sustained fatal injuries. The DHC-2 was destroyed, and the DHC-3 sustained substantial damage. The DHC-2 was registered to and operated by Mountain Air Service LLC, Ketchikan, Alaska, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight. The DHC-3 was registered to Pantechnicon Aviation LTD, Minden, Nevada, and operated by Venture Travel, LLC, dba Taquan Air, Ketchikan, Alaska, under the provisions of Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident. According to information provided by the operators, both airplanes had been conducting sightseeing flights to the Misty Fjords National Monument area. They were both converging on a scenic waterfall in the Mahoney Lakes area on Revillagigedo Island before returning to the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base (5KE), Ketchikan, Alaska, when the accident occurred. According to recorded avionics data recovered from the DHC-3, it departed from an inlet (Rudyerd Bay) in the Misty Fjords National Monument area about 1203 and followed the inlet westward toward Point Eva and Manzanita Island. At 1209, at an altitude between 1,900 and 2,200 ft, the DHC-3 crossed the Behm Canal then turned to the southwest about 1212 in the vicinity of Lake Grace. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) tracking data for both airplanes, which were provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), began at 1213:08 for the DHC-3, and at 1213:55 for the DHC-2. At 1217:15, the DHC-3 was about level at 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl) over Carroll Inlet on a track of 225°. The DHC-2 was 4.2 nautical miles (nm) south of the DHC-3, climbing through 2,800 ft, on a track of 255°. The DHC-3 pilot stated that, about this time, he checked his traffic display and “there were two groups of blue triangles, but not on my line. They were to the left of where I was going.” He stated that he did not observe the DHC-2 on his traffic display before the collision. The ADS-B data indicated that, about 1219, the DHC-3 started a descent from 4,000 ft, and the DHC-2 was climbing from 3,175 ft. During the next 1 minute 21 seconds, the DHC-3 continued to descend on a track between 224° and 237°, and the DHC-2 leveled out at 3,350 ft on a track of about 255°. Between 1220:21 and 1221:14, the DHC-3 made a shallow left turn to a track of 210°, then a shallow right turn back to a track of 226°. The airplanes collided at 1221:14 at an altitude of 3,350 ft, 7.4 nm northeast of 5KE. The ADS-B data for both airplanes end about the time of the collision. The DHC-2 was fractured into multiple pieces and impacted the water and terrain northeast of Mahoney Lake. Recorded avionics data for the DHC-3 indicate that at 1221:14, the DHC-3 experienced a brief upset in vertical load factor and soon after entered a right bank, reaching an attitude about 50° right wing down at 1221:19 and 27° nose down at 1221:22. The DHC-3 began descending and completed a 180° turn before impacting George Inlet at 1222:15 along a northeast track.

The pilot of the float-equipped airplane reported that, during the initial climb after a water takeoff, about 200 feet, he turned right, and the engine lost power. He immediately switched fuel tanks and attempted to restart the engine to no avail. The airplane descended and struck trees, and the right wing impacted terrain. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported to the Federal Aviation Administration inspector that, during the initial climb and after the engine lost power, he noticed that the center tank, which was selected for takeoff, was empty. He added that passengers stated that the engine did regain power after switching tanks, but the airplane had already struck trees. The pilot reported as a recommendation to more closely follow checklists.

The commercial pilot was conducting a 1-hour commercial air tour flight over Denali National Park and Preserve with four passengers on board. About 48 minutes after departure, the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center received an alert from the airplane's emergency locator transmitter. About 7 minutes later, company personnel received a call from the pilot, who reported that the airplane had run "into the side of a mountain." Although a search was initiated almost immediately, due to poor weather conditions in the area, the wreckage was not located until almost 36 hours later in a crevasse on a glacier about 10,920 ft mean sea level. Due to the unique challenges posed by the steepness of terrain, the crevasse, avalanche hazard, and the condition of the airplane, neither the occupants nor the wreckage were recovered from the accident site. A weather model sounding for the area of the accident site estimated broken cloud bases at 700 ft above ground level (agl) with overcast clouds at 1,000 ft agl and cloud tops to 21,000 ft agl and higher clouds above. The freezing level was at 9,866 ft and supported light-to-moderate rime type icing in clouds and precipitation. The on-scene assessment indicated that the right wing impacted snow while the airplane was flying in a wings-level attitude; the right wing had separated from the remainder of the wreckage. Based upon available weather data and forecast models and the impact evidence, it is likely that the pilot entered an area of reduced visibility and was unable to see the terrain before the airplane's right wing impacted the snow. The company's organizational structure was such that one group of management personnel oversaw operations in both Anchorage and Talkeetna. Interviews with company management revealed that they were not always aware of the exact routing a pilot would take for a tour; the route was pilot's discretion based upon the weather at the time of the flight to provide the best tour experience. Regarding risk mitigation, the company did not utilize a formal risk assessment process, but rather relied on conversations between pilots and flight followers. This could lead to an oversight of actual risk associated with a particular flight route and weather conditions. About 8 months after the accident, an assessment flight conducted by the National Park Service determined that during the winter, the hazardous hanging glacier at the accident site calved, releasing an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 tons of ice and debris. There was no evidence of the airplane wreckage near the crash site, in the steep fall line, or on the glacier surface over 3,600 ft below. Although the known circumstances of the accident are consistent with a controlled flight into terrain event, the factual information available was limited because the wreckage was not recovered and no autopsy or toxicology of the pilot could be performed; therefore, whether other circumstances may have contributed to the accident could not be determined.

The pilot was conducting an on-demand air taxi flight in a float-equipped airplane from a seaplane base on a public lake to a remote lakeside home, with a passenger and her young son. The passenger brought cargo to transport as well, including an unexpected 800 lbs of mortar bags. Witnesses who labored to push the airplane out after loading reported that the airplane appeared very aft heavy and the pilot said he would offload "cement blocks" if he could not take off. A review of witness videos revealed that the pilot attempted one takeoff using only 3/4 of the available waterway, then step taxied around the lake and performed a step-taxi takeoff, again not using the full length of the lake. The airplane eventually lifted off, and barely climbed over trees on the south end of the lake, before descending and impacting terrain. A home surveillance video that captured the airplane seconds before the crash revealed that 3 seconds before ground impact, the estimated altitude of the airplane was 115 ft above ground level (agl) and the groundspeed was about 64 miles per hour (mph), which was low and much slower than normal climb speed (80 mph). As the airplane banked to the left to turn on course, it rolled through 90° likely experiencing an aerodynamic stall. Analysis of the engine rpm sound revealed that the engine was operating near maximum continuous power up until impact, and a postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A calculation performed by investigators postaccident revealed the airplane's estimated gross weight at the time of the accident was 75 lbs over the approved maximum gross takeoff weight, and the airplane's estimated center of gravity was 1.76 inches aft of the rear limit. The pilot had been recently hired by the operator and he flew his first commercial flight in the same make and model, float-equipped airplane the week before the accident. He had accumulated 12.9 flight hours, and 13 sea landings/takeoffs in the accident model airplane since being hired as a part-time pilot. Although the airplane was able to takeoff, the aircraft's out-of-limit weight-and-balance condition increased its stall speed and degraded its climb performance, stability, and slow-flight characteristics. When the pilot turned the airplane left, the critical angle of attack was exceeded resulting in an aerodynamic stall at low altitude. If the pilot had performed a proper weight and balance calculation, he may have recognized the airplane was overweight and out of balance and should not have attempted the flight without making a load adjustment.