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Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver I in Anchorage

Date & Time: Jul 26, 2022 at 0915 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N9776R
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Anchorage - King Salmon
MSN:
1126
YOM:
1957
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1709
Captain / Total hours on type:
142.00
Aircraft flight hours:
16072
Circumstances:
The pilot reported that, he was departing in the float-equipped airplane in strong gusty wind conditions. After accelerating on the water for about 3 seconds, the airplane suddenly became airborne and crabbed into the wind about 60° to 90° from the intended takeoff path and started to climb as it continued to track away from the intended flight path. As the climb continued, the airplane stalled and impacted the water in a nose low attitude which resulted in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s failure to maintain directional control during takeoff in gusting wind conditions which resulted in the wing exceeding its critical angle of attack, a loss of control and impact with the water.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Ketchikan: 6 killed

Date & Time: Aug 5, 2021 at 1050 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1249K
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Ketchikan - Ketchikan
MSN:
1594
YOM:
1965
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
15552
Captain / Total hours on type:
8000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
15028
Circumstances:
The accident flight was the pilot’s second passenger sightseeing flight of the day that overflew remote inland fjords, coastal waterways, and mountainous, tree-covered terrain in the Misty Fjords National Monument. Limited information was available about the airplane’s flight track due to radar limitations, and the flight tracking information from the airplane only provided data in 1-minute intervals. The data indicated that the airplane was on the return leg of the flight and in the final minutes of flight, the pilot was flying on the right side of a valley. The airplane impacted mountainous terrain at 1,750 ft mean sea level (msl), about 250 ft below the summit. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of pre accident failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Damage to the propeller indicated that it was rotating and under power at the time of the accident. The orientation and distribution of the wreckage indicated that the airplane impacted a tree in a left-wing-low attitude, likely as the pilot was attempting to maneuver away from terrain. Review of weather information for the day of the accident revealed a conditionally unstable environment below 6,000 ft msl, which led to rain organizing in bands of shower activity. Satellite imagery depicted that one of these bands was moving northeastward across the accident site at the accident time. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) weather cameras and local weather observations also indicated that lower visibility and mountain obscuration conditions were progressing northward across the accident area with time. Based on photographs recovered from passenger cell phones along with FAA weather camera imagery, the accident flight encountered mountain obscuration conditions, rain shower activity, and reduced visibilities and cloud ceilings, resulting in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) before the impact with terrain. The pilot reviewed weather conditions before the first flight of the day; however, there was no indication that he obtained updated weather conditions or additional weather information before departing on the accident flight. Based on interviews, the accident pilot landed following the first flight of the day in lowering visibility, ceiling, and precipitation, and departed on the accident flight in precipitation, based on passenger photos. Therefore, the pilot had knowledge of the weather conditions that he could have encountered along the route of flight before departure. The operator had adequate policies and procedures in place for pilots regarding inadvertent encounters with IMC; however, the pilot’s training records indicated that he was signed off for cue-based training that did not occur. Cue-based training is intended to help calibrate pilots’ weather assessment and foster an ability to accurately assess and respond appropriately to cues associated with deteriorating weather. Had the pilot completed the training, it might have helped improve his decision-making skills to either cancel the flight before departure or turn around earlier in the flight. The operator’s lack of safety management protocols resulted in the pilot not receiving the required cue-based training, allowed him to continue operating air tours with minimal remedial training following a previous accident, and allowed the accident airplane to operate without a valid FAA registration. The operator was signatory to a voluntary local air tour operator’s group letter of agreement that was developed to improve the overall safety of flight operations in the area of the Misty Fjords National Monument. Participation was voluntary and not regulated by the FAA, and the investigation noted multiple instances in which the LOA policies were ignored, including on the accident flight. For example, the accident flight did not follow the standard Misty Fjords route outlined in the LOA nor did it comply with the recommended altitudes for flights into and out of the Misty Fjords. FAA inspectors providing oversight for the area reported that, when they addressed operators about disregarding the LOA, the operators would respond that the LOA was voluntary and that they did not need to follow the guidance. The FAA’s reliance on voluntary compliance initiatives in the local air tour industry failed to produce compliance with safety initiatives or to reduce accidents in the Ketchikan region.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s decision to continue visual flight rules (VFR) flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident was the FAA’s reliance on voluntary compliance with the Ketchikan Operator’s Letter of Agreement.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Naivasha: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jul 12, 2021 at 1245 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-BCL
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nairobi - Lodwar
MSN:
1552
YOM:
1964
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
534
Captain / Total hours on type:
217.00
Aircraft flight hours:
9034
Circumstances:
On 12 July 2021 at about 1245 (1545) a Viking Air Ltd DHC-2 Beaver MK1A aircraft registration 5Y-BCL operated by the Desert Locust Control Organization of Eastern Africa (DLCO-EA) with three on board crashed at Kosovo area of Ndabibi in Naivasha, Nakuru County. The accident site is located near the edge of the hilly eastern side of Eburru forest manned by the Kenya Forest Service (KFS). The flight originated from Wilson airport, Nairobi County and was enroute to Lodwar airport, Turkana County. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and largely consumed by the ensuing fire. A passenger suffered fatal injuries while the pilot and the other passenger suffered serious injuries requiring more than 48 hours of hospitalization. At the time of the accident the area in the vicinity of the accident site had near overcast cloudy conditions.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver in Örebro: 9 killed

Date & Time: Jul 8, 2021 at 1921 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
SE-KKD
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Örebro - Örebro
MSN:
1629RB17
YOM:
1966
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Captain / Total flying hours:
1049
Captain / Total hours on type:
556.00
Aircraft flight hours:
14538
Aircraft flight cycles:
25605
Circumstances:
The intention of the flight was to drop eight parachutists from an altitude of 1,500 metres. It was the twelfth and planned to be the last flight of the day. The weather conditions were good. The parachutist bench to the right of the pilot had been replaced with a pilot's seat to distance the parachutists from the pilot as a Covid-19 precautionary measure. The pilot had no ability to perform a mass and balance calculation with the available information. After take-off, the aircraft climbed to an altitude of 400 to 500 feet above ground before changing course 180 degrees to the left. The aircraft turned around quickly in a descending turn with a high bank angle. During the final phase, the aircraft dived steeply and then slightly levelled off before impact. Upon impact, the landing gear was teared off, after which the aircraft skidded on its belly 48 metres straight ahead and caught fire. All nine persons on board sustained fatal injuries.
Probable cause:
Control of the aircraft was likely lost in connection with the wing flaps being retracted in a situation where the stick forces were high due to an abnormal elevator trim position, while the aircraft was unstable due to being tail-heavy and abnormally trimmed. The low altitude was not sufficient to regain control of the aircraft. The cause of the accident was that several safety slips occurred in the operation, which resulted in that the safety margin was too small for a safe flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver in Soldotna: 6 killed

Date & Time: Jul 31, 2020 at 0827 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N4982U
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
904
YOM:
1956
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
19530
Captain / Total hours on type:
13480.00
Aircraft flight hours:
23595
Circumstances:
On July 31, 2020, about 0827 Alaska daylight time, a de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, N4982U, and a Piper PA-12 airplane, N2587M, sustained substantial damage when they were involved in an accident near Soldotna, Alaska. The pilot of the PA-12 and the pilot and the five passengers on the DHC-2 were fatally injured. The DHC-2 was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on-demand charter flight. The PA-12 was operated as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The float-equipped DHC-2, operated by High Adventure Charter, departed Longmere Lake, near Soldotna, about 0824 bound for a remote lake on the west side of Cook Inlet. The purpose of the flight was to transport the passengers to a remote fishing location. The PA-12, operated by a private individual, departed Soldotna Airport, Soldotna, Alaska, (PASX) about 0824 bound for Fairbanks, Alaska. Flight track data revealed that the DHC-2 was traveling northwest about 78 knots (kts) groundspeed and gradually climbing through about 1,175 ft mean sea level (msl) when it crossed the Sterling Highway. The PA-12 was traveling northeast about 1,175 ft msl and about 71 kts north of, and parallel to, the Sterling Highway. The airplanes collided about 2.5 miles northeast of the Soldotna airport at an altitude of about 1,175 ft msl. A witness located near the accident site observed the DHC-2 traveling in a westerly direction and the PA-12 traveling in a northerly direction. He stated that the PA-12 impacted the DHC-2 on the left side of the fuselage toward the back of the airplane. After the collision, he observed what he believed to be the DHC-2's left wing separate, and the airplane entered an uncontrolled, descending counterclockwise spiral before it disappeared from view. He did not observe the PA-12 following the collision.
Probable cause:
The failure of both pilots to see and avoid the other airplane.
Contributing to the accident were:
1) the PA-12 pilot’s decision to fly with a known severe vision deficiency that had resulted in denial of his most recent application for medical certification and
2) the Federal Aviation Administration’s absence of a requirement for airborne traffic advisory systems with aural alerting among operators who carry passengers for hire.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver in Lake Coeur d'Alene: 6 killed

Date & Time: Jul 5, 2020 at 1422 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N2106K
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Coeur d'Alene - Coeur d'Alene
MSN:
1131
YOM:
1957
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
21173
Captain / Total hours on type:
217.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6171
Circumstances:
The float-equipped De Havilland DHC-2 was on a tour flight, and the Cessna 206 was on a personal flight. The airplanes collided in midair over a lake during day visual meteorological conditions. No radar or automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data were available for either airplane. Witnesses reported that the airplanes were flying directly toward each other before they collided about 700 to 800 ft above the water. Other witnesses reported that the Cessna was at a lower altitude and had initiated a climb before the collision. Review of 2 seconds of video captured as part of a witness’ “live” photo showed that both airplanes appeared to be in level flight before the collision. No evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunction was observed with either airplane. Recovered wreckage and impact signatures were consistent with the upper fuselage of the Cessna colliding with the floats and the lower fuselage of the De Havilland. The impact angle could not be determined due to the lack of available evidence, including unrecovered wreckage. The available evidence was consistent with both pilots’ failure to see and avoid the other airplane.
Probable cause:
The failure of the pilots of both airplanes to see and avoid the other airplane.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver in Sadiqabad: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 12, 2020
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
AP-AMB
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Rahim Yar Khan - Rahim Yar Khan
MSN:
1415
YOM:
1960
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Rahim Yar Khan-Sheikh Zayed Airport and was spraying pesticide in the area to tackle another wave of locust attacks, which began in December 2019, on the request of the district administration. In unknown circumstances, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed in a sandy area located in Sadiqabad, killing both crew members, a pilot and a flight engineer. They were completing a mission on behalf of the Department of Agriculture of Pakistan. Initial investigations suggest the plane crashed due to a technical fault.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver off Sechelt

Date & Time: Jul 30, 2019 at 1248 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GPZP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Vancouver - Pender Harbour
MSN:
722
YOM:
1954
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
En route from Vancouver to Pender Harbour, the pilot encountered engine problems and elected to ditch the aircraft about three miles off Sechelt. All three occupants were able to evacuate the cabin before the aircraft sank and was lost. All three occupants were rescued.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver off Seldovia: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jul 19, 2019 at 1010 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N68083
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seldovia – Anchorage
MSN:
1254
YOM:
1958
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
2689
Captain / Total hours on type:
150.00
Aircraft flight hours:
29448
Circumstances:
The pilot stated that, during takeoff in the float-equipped airplane, he saw the left float begin to move into his peripheral vision from the left cockpit window and the airplane began to yaw to the left. The left wing subsequently impacted the water and the airplane nosed over, separating the right wing from the fuselage. The passengers consistently reported choppy water conditions at the time of the accident; one passenger reported that white caps were visible on the ocean waves in the distance. The passengers said that, during the takeoff, the airplane impacted a swell or wave and nosed over abruptly, and the cabin rapidly filled with water. Examination of the float assembly revealed fractures in the left front flying wire attachment fitting and the right rear flying wire attachment strap and hole elongation in the left rear flying wire attachment fitting. Additionally, the bolts attaching the two left flying wire attachment fittings to the left float were bent, and the two flying wires that had been attached to the fractured attachment fitting and attachment strap were buckled. While some areas of corrosion were observed on the fractured left forward fitting, the total area of corrosion was a small percentage of the total cross-section, and the remainder of the fracture and associated deformation of the lug was consistent with ductile overstress fracture. Similar areas of corrosion were also observed on each of the intact flying wire attachment fittings. Post-accident testing completed by the float manufacturer revealed that buckling of flying wires similar to that observed on the accident airplane was only reproduced at strap and fitting failure loads above 9,000 pounds force; the design specification load was 3,453 pounds of force. This indicates that the small amount of corrosion present on the fractured flying wire attachment fitting did not reduce its loadcarrying capability below the design specification load of 3,453 pounds of force, and that both the flying wire attachment fitting and flying wire attachment strap fractured due to overload. Therefore, it is likely that the accident airplane floats were subject to forces that exceeded their design limitations, resulting in overload of the flying wires attached to the left float. It is also likely that, given the lack of damage on either float, the force was due to impact with an ocean wave or swell and not by striking an object.
Probable cause:
The airplane's floats impact with an ocean wave or swell, which exceeded the design load specifications of the flying wire assemblies and resulted in a partial separation of the float assemblies.
Final Report: